THE UNIVERSAL PICTURE CORPORATION, VICENTE G. ALBERTO AND APOLONIA ZAPANTA, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. MIGUEL ROMUALDEZ AND VICTOR ALFONSO, AS MAYOR AND TREASURER, RESPECTI…

On February 11, 1927, the Municipal Board of the Cily of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 1569, which has been embodied in Chapter 84 of the Revised
Ordinances No. 1600 as sections 778, 779 and 780. The text of said ordinance is
as follows:

“[Ordinance No. 1569]

“AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION SEVEN HUNDRED TWO OF ORDINANCE
NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE, KNOWN AS ‘THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY
OF MANILA,’ AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCES NUMBERED FIVE HUNDRED FIVE, SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY-FIVE, AND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTYFOUR, BY INCREASING THE FEES OF
CINEMATOGRAPHS AND THEATERS AND IMPOSING SEPARATE FEES ON VAUDEVILLES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. 

“Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, that:

“SECTION 1. Section seven hundred two of Ordinance Numbered Two
hundred eighty-five, as amended by Ordinances Numbered Five hundred five, Seven
hundred twentyfive, and Eight hundred seventy-four, is hereby amended so as to
read as follows:

“‘SEC. 702. Permits, fees.—The city treasurer is empowered to
collect for the permit or permits granted in accordance with this Ordinance, the
following annual fees:

” ‘For first-class cinematographs
………………………..    P1,800.00

” ‘For second-class cinematographs
…………………..      P1,200.00

” ‘For third-class cinematographs
……………………..           P90.00

” ‘For each vaudeville company, with or without connection with
any cinematographs show shall pay a license in advance in the sum of P40.00

” ‘For each theatrical show or series of theatrical performances
known as operas, per show 20.00

” ‘For each theatrical show or series of theatrical performances
known as zarzuela or dramas in general, per show  10.00

” ‘For each theatrical show or series of theatrical performances
known as zarzuelas or native dramas, per show  2.00

“SEC. 2. Definition.—It shall be deemed first-class
cinematographs those projection halls open to the public and are used for the
exhibition or projection of films, which are situated in any of the following
streets of the City of Manila: Rosario, Escolta, Plaza Santa Cruz, Ronquillo,
Avenida Rizal between Carriedo and Azcarraga, Plaza Goiti, and Echague, and
which ordinarily exhibit films for the first time; second-class cinematographs
those which, not being situated in the streets aforementioned, exhibit films for
the first time or of first exhibition and those which, being situated in said
streets, exhibit regularly films for the second time after the exhibit for the
first time or first exhibition or which have the exclusive privilege for
exhibiting films of second hand; and third-class cinematographs those which are
not included among the first and secondclass cinematographs.

“SEC. 3. Maintenance of order.—It shall be the duty of the
police department, the city electrician, and the fire department of the City of
Manila to detail one employee at least from their respective offices to regulate
traffic, preserve the order in and about the premises of all cinematographs as
well as to make daily inspections of the wiring and apparatus used by every
cinematograph licensed under the provisions of this Ordinance, so as to give
ample protection to life and property of the public in case of fire or other
calamity.

“SEC. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect on its approval.

“Approved, February 11, 1927.”

On April 9, 1927, that is, fifty-eight days after the enactment
of said municipal ordinance, the plaintiffs filed a suit praying for a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin the defendants and each of them,
their agents, delegates and successors from enforcing said Ordinance No. 1569 of
the City of Manila during the pendency of the case, that after the hearing”,
each one of the defendants, their agents, delegates and successors be forever
enjoined from enforcing said Ordinance No. 1569, and that they be sentenced to
pay the costs.

The defendants, through the city fiscal, answered the
complaint, admitting the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof,
and denying each and every one of the allegations contained in the remaining
paragraphs of said complaint, and by way of special defense alleged that
Ordinance No. 1569 of the) City of Manila, approved on February 11, 1927, was
enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila in accordance with the powers conferred
upon it by the Manila Charter, for the purpose of giving each of the plaintiffs
and every owner of first-class cinematographs, the necessary, complete and
adequate fire and police protection, which redounds, not only to the benefit of
the plaintiffs herein, but also to the benefit of the patrons of the
cinematographs and of the public at large, and for this reason the ordinance is
reasonable and, therefore legal, valid and constitutional; that the amount of
Pl,800 per annum fixed by section 1 of said Ordinance No. 1569 as an annual
license fee for first-class cinematographs is in fact very much less than the
annual expenses incurred by the City of Manila to render police, fire and
administrative services to each such first-class cinematograph, in accordance
with section 3 of said Ordinance.

After the trial of the case the lower court declared said
Ordinance No. 1569 of the City of Manila, now sections 778, 779 and 780 of the
Revised Ordinances No. 1600 valid and legal, dismissed the petition with costs
against the petitioners, and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued
against the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed from the court’s judgment in due
time and form and in their brief assigned the following alleged errors:

“(1) The trial court erred in finding that Ordinance No. 1569
of the City of Manila imposes duties or rules of conduct to be observed by
cinematographs entailing expense to the city in procuring their observance;

“(2) The trial court erred in finding that Ordinance No. 1569
of the City of Manila does not discriminate between persons engaged in business
of the same class;

“(3) The trial court erred in finding that Ordinance No. 1569
of the City of Manila does not establish license charges that are excessive and
unreasonable;

“(4) The trial court erred in finding that the City of Manila
by enacting Ordinance No. 1569 was exercising its power to regulate and license
cinematographs and not attempting to exercise a power of taxation under the
guise of a power to regulate and license; and

“(5) The trial court erred in finding that Ordinance No. 1569
of the City of Manila is not null and void as an attempted exercise of a taxing
power with respect to cinematographs.”

The appellants argue in their first assignment of error that
Ordinance No. 1569 does not impose any additional duties or rules of conduct on
cinematographs to correspond to the increase in the license fee, and also that
the police have never been called upon to maintain order or to quell
disturbances in the cinematographs operated by the plaintiffs; and that as fires
have not occurred in cinematographs with any greater frequency than in any other
business houses, the police, fire and electrical supervision and inspection are
unreasonable and manifestly unnecessary. Supposing this to be true,
nevertheless, it does not show that the supervision exercised by the city
through the said departments thereof is unnecessary. The city fulfills the
duties imposed upon it by section 3 of said ordinance for the very purpose of
duly protecting the life and property of the public in case of fire or other
calamity.

In the case of Cuunjieng vs. Patstone (42 Phil., 818), this
court held that in the absence of a legal provision authorizing the imposition
of a license fee or revenue tax, the license fee for the regulation of
occupations or useful enterprises may be only an amount sufficient to cover the
expense of issuing the license and the necessary expense of police inspection
and supervision, taking into account not only the expense of direct regulation
but also the incidental consequences. The maintenance of order in and about the
cines and the inspection and supervision of the wires in their electrical
installations, as provided for in section 3 of the ordinance, will occasion
substantial expenses to the city, according to the testimony of Treasurer
Alfonso, which in our opinion shows that the fees fixed are charged only with a
view of covering that expense.

That the police and fire departments, and the city electrician,
as intimated in the appellants’ brief, have not especially assigned any of their
employees to the cinematographs within the city, as provided for in section 3 of
the ordinance, does not affect the question, since it is very clear that
non-compliance (if any), with the provisions of said ordinance by the employees
of the city does not make the ordinance void.

The appellants also allege that the City of Manila has no
authority to classify cinematographs and therefore the classification
established in section 1 of Ordinance No. 1569 is void; and, moreover, even if
the city were authorized to classify cinematographs, the classification
established in section 1 of said ordinance based, as it is, on a supposed
difference in the cost of issuing the licenses and enforcing compliance with
rules and regulations established by law when, as a matter of fact, there is no
such difference, is null and void as unreasonable, arbitrary, and constituting
in fact a discrimination between business enterprises of the same class. As to
the first proposition, suffice it to recall that the Manila Charter grants the
municipal board thereof (sec. 2444, paragraph [1], Administrative Code, as
amended) the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for the
following: “Hawkers * * * theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs,
public exhibitions, circusses,” and all other performances and places of
amusement. As to the allegation of unreasonableness and discrimination between
enterprises of the same class, it should be observed that the basis for the
classification of cinematographs established in the ordinance in question is
their location and the kind of films exhibited therein. In the case of
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. vs. Paris (138 Ky., 801), it was said: “Where the
classification of trades, occupations, and professions for the purpose of
imposing a different license fee upon each class is based upon a genuine
distinction, the courts shall not declare the classification void; the test
being not the wisdom, but the good faith, of the classification.”

The case of United States vs. Sumulong (30 Phil., 381),
involves the constitutionality of an ordinance passed by the municipal council
of Los Baños in accordance with the authority conferred upon it to impose a
license for fishing. The ordinance in question classified and graduated the
license fees for fishing as follows:

“For each fishery in public waters comprised within the
jurisdiction of the municipality of Los Baños, to wit:

“For each drag-net, quarterly in advance …………………………….. P20.00

“For each pante, quitang, and panilay, quarterly in
advance …………… 50

“For each fish corral, quarterly in advance ………………………………. 2.00”

The court said: “The whole purpose of the ordinance was to
classify and graduate the license fees for fishing privileges according to the
kind of apparatus used. No tax is imposed upon the several kinds of apparatus;
they are referred to in the ordinance merely as a means of classification.”
After citing numerous authorities holding that, for license purposes, “peddlers
may be classified as foot peddlers, peddlers with a one-horse cart or wagon, and
peddlers with a two-horse cart or wagon; vehicles, with reference to their
character and the use to which they are put, and the number of horses used
therewith; keepers of livery stables, according to the number of carriages kept
for hire; hotels, according to the number of rooms devoted to the accommodation
of the public,” the court held:

“Under a general power to impose and collect license fees and
occupation taxes, a municipality in this jurisdiction has the right to classify
and graduate such fees according to the estimated value of the privilege
conferred, provided such classification is reasonable and does not contravene
the provisions of its municipal charter.”

Counsel for appellants dwells on the difference between the
amount of license fees imposed upon the first-class cinematographs and those
upon the second and third-class cinematographs. But, as this court said in the
case of United States vs. Sumulong, supra, “It is nothing to one person,
belonging to a certain class, that someone else, belonging to another class,
pays more or less than he does, since all belonging to his class must pay the
same.” Furthermore, as the plaintiffs allege in the third paragraph of their
complaint, “your petitioners have, and each of them has, at all times complied
with all lawful rules and regulations and ordinances imposed, established, and
enacted by the City of Manila,” In fact, said plaintiffs in paragraph 8 of their
complaint allege having paid the license fee for the period ending November 30,
1927, which goes to show that the ordinances amended by Ordinance No. 1569 in
question were perfectly valid and constitutional. But simply because said
Ordinance No. 1569 increases the amount of license fee, the plaintiffs argue
that this ordinance is Invalid and unconstitutional. But in State vs. Thompson
(25 S. O., 148; 125 N. W., 567), it was held that: “An amendment of a license
act merely changing the amount of license to be paid by the different classes
does not affect the constitutionality of the law.”

The appellants allege furthermore that the license fee fixed by
the municipal ordinance in question is excessive and unreasonable, and that in
enacting said ordinance the City of Manila attempted to exercise a power of
taxation under the guise of a power to regulate and license. We cannot agree to
this proposition. In a city like Manila with more than three hundred thousand
inhabitants and where the population is extremely fond of such shows, we do not
think that P1,800 a year, which is the license fee for first-class
cinematographs, is proportionately excessive, and an abuse of the power to fix
the fees for licenses granted to cinematographic enterprises, and we do not feel
justified in holding that the municipal board has unduly exercised its functions
in this matter.

In the case of Higgins vs. Lacroix (119 Minn., 145; 41 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 737), it was held that a license fee of $200 per annum for a permanent
moving-picture show in a village of 1,000 inhabitants is not so excessive as to
clearly manifest either a purpose to tax or prohibit under the guise of a
license.

In the case of Tait vs. Campbell (18 How., 646), the court held
that a fee of $5 a day is chargeable as license for the exhibition of moving
pictures, and that such amount is not so excessive as to render the statute
invalid.

Justice Mitchell, in upholding a theatre license fee of $125
for six months in Duluth vs. Marsh (71 Minn., 248; 73 N. W., 962), uses this
language: “In respect to theatrical exhibitions and amusements of similar
character, a larger discretion on part of municipalities is recognized than in
the case of ordinary trades and occupations,’ both because they are liable to
degenerate into nuisances, and also because they require more police
surveillance and police service.” “Moving-picture shows are of comparatively
recent origin but of rapid growth, springing up everywhere in the large
cities, and invading even villages and towns of modest size. While, as generally
conducted, some educational value may be conceded to exist in these shows, it is
nevertheless true that the chief aim is to furnish the sort of entertainment
that will draw the most dimes. To furnish people with innocent and cheap
amusement is laudable, but experience teaches that, where amusements are
furnished for pecuniary profit, the tendency is to furnish that which will
attract the greatest number, rather than that which instructs or elevates. “To
say the least, opinions are quite at variance as to the merits of moving-picture
shows as an influence for good or evil in a community. .It must therefore be
classed among those pursuits which are liable to degenerate and menace the good
order and morals of the people, and may therefore not only be licensed and
regulated, but also prevented by a village council. (“Rev. Laws, 1905, par. 727,
subd. 12.) Common observation reveals the fact that crowds attend these picture
shows afternoons and evenings every day in the week. In or about the entrance of
the show place in the small village is undoubtedly the rendezvous of the young
and thoughtless, as well as the vicious. Police surveillance is likely to become
a necessity because of this. In the light of all the facts connected with
moving-picture shows the possibilities therein to degenerate and require
policing, we are of opinion that, under the principles announced in the
decisions above-cited, the license fee fixed by the village council of Deer
River is not so unreasonably high as to manifestly show an abuse of power or any
unlawful purpose or result.” (Higgins vs. Lacroix, supra.)

In virtue of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.