REYNALDO LABAYEN ET AL., PLAINTIFFS. REYNALDO LABAYEN, APPELLANT, VS. TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an action for damages in the amount of P28,620 for the
alleged breach of a contract to grind sugar cane in 1920-1921. After a
rehearing, the defendant was absolved from the complaint, and the plaintiff was
condemned, on the cross-complaint, to pay the defendant the sum of P12,114,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

An examination of the record on appeal discloses that the
exhibits are missing. Still this is not in this instance of great importance.
The facts as found by the trial judge are not seriously disputed. It is only the
deductions which should be drawn from the facts which worry the parties.

The plaintiff, along with another, possesses the hacienda known
as Dos Hermanos of Talisay, Occidental Negros. The defendant is a corporation
dedicated to the milling of sugar cane. On August 27, 1919, the plaintiff and
the defendant entered into a contract similar to contracts entered into by the
defendant and other planters. It is this contract which is the basis of
plaintiff’s cause of action. Among the clauses in the contract are the
following:

“COVENANTS OF ‘LA CENTRAL’

“Third: That it shall build and after building it shall do or
cause to be done all that is necessary for its preservation in good condition,
and shall, during the period of this agreement, without charge to the Producer
or Producers, operate a permanent railroad run by steam or motor, or both, for
the use of the plantation or plantations in the transportation of sugar cane,
sugar, fertilizer, and all such articles as the producer may need for his
estate, his use and that of his family and employees, and shall cause the main
line or a branch thereof, as the case may be, to reach the point of the
plantation to be hereafter described not farther than one mile from any of the
boundaries of said plantation, whenever the contour of the land, the curves, and
elevations permit the same; it shall provide said railroad with locomotives or
motors and wagons in a number sufficient to make efficient the transportation of
sugar cane, sugar, fertilizer, and the above mentioned articles, and shall
likewise build a branch of said railroad in such a way that from the main line,
mill, and warehouses, it shall reach the wharf above mentioned, and it shall
also cause the yard of the factory near the sugar mill to be available for use
with switches or otherwise. All the steam locomotives shall be provided with
safety spark devices. The railroad shall consist of a road or path conveniently
and duly designated so that, so far as possible, all the producers may derive
equal benefit from said railroad. The right-of-way for the main line of the
railroad shall be three and a half (3-1/2) meters wide measured from the center
of the: road to each side, and the branches, switches, or curves shall have more
if necessary.

“OBLIGATIONS OF THE PRODUCER

“Fifth: That he shall accept the provisions of clauses 7, 8,
and 19 of the covenants of ‘La Central’ and shall deliver the cane as therein
provided; hereby binding himself to plant each year according to the usage and
custom of a good agriculturist not less than one-half of his own lands devoted
to sugar cane subject to the approval of the Committee of Producers leaving the
remainder uncultivated.

“MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS

“10. In case of * * * inability to secure, under reasonable
conditions such rights-of-way as ‘La Central’ may require, * * * ‘La Central’
shall notify the Committee of Producers and without incurring any lability for
the non-fulfillment of the terms of this contract, its effects shall be
suspended in part or in whole during such period of incapacity. * * *.” (Italics
inserted.)

With particular reference to the third paragraph of the clauses
obligating the central, it is admitted that the central has not continued its
railroad through to the Hacienda Dos Hermanos. The railroad comes to the
Hacienda Esmeralda No, 2 and there stops. For the railroad to extend to the
Hacienda Dos Hermanos, a distance of four kilometers would require a gradual
elevation of 4.84 per cent to 7 per cent, would make necessary the providing of
twenty-six curves, and would cost about P80,000. The witness H. W. Corp, a civil
engineer employed in the construction work of the Manila Railroad Company, the
Pampanga Sugar Milling Co., and the Binalbagan Central, testified that it was
possible to construct a railroad to the Hacienda Dos Hermanos but that to do so
would be very dangerous.

Recalling that the contract provided for the
construction of a railroad “whenever the contour of the land, the curves, and
elevations permit the same,” and that such construction is possible but very
dangerous, the question then arises if the defendant can excuse itself on this
ground, or if the plaintiff can recover froin the defendant for damages for
breach of contract, through inability to mill cane.

It is elemental that the law requires parties to do what they
have agreed to do. If a party charges himself with an obligation possible to be
performed, he must abide by it unless performance is rendered impossible by the
act of God, the law, or the other party. A showing of mere inconvenience,
unexpected impediments, or increased expenses is not enough. Equity cannot
relieve from bad bargains simply because they are such. So one must answer in
damages where the impossibility is only so in fact. (Thornborow vs. Whitacre, 2
Ld. Raym. [1164], 92 E. R., 270; Reid vs. Alaska Packing Co. [1903], 43 Or.,
429; Columbus Ry. & Power Co. vs. Columbus [1919], 249 U. S., 399.)

The foregoing are familiar principles to be found in the
American and English law of contracts. The civil law on the subject of
obligations is not essentially different. Article 1272 of the Civil Code
provides: “Impossible things or services cannot be the subject-matter of
contracts.” And article 1184 of the same Code provides: “The debtor shall also
be relieved from obligations which consist in the performance of an act if
fulfillment of the undertaking becomes legally or physically impossible.”

May one obligate himself to do something which, when
accomplished, will prove to be dangerous to life and property? We doubt it. Take
the contract in question as an example. It was a general contract of the form
used by the central and various proprietors of sugar-cane fields. It was
intended to be limited in particular application to haciendas where not impeded
by physical impossibility. The contract was qualified by an implied condition
which, if given practical effect, results in absolving the central from its
promise. Not to sanction an exception to the general rule would run counter to
public policy and the law by forcing the performance of a contract undesirable
and harmful. (8 Manresa’s Codigo Civil Español, p. 355.)

There is another aspect to the case which has to do with the
tenth paragraph of the mutual obligations of the contract and which concerned
the securing of the right-of-way for the proposed railroad. To get from the
Hacienda Esmeralda No. 2 to the Hacienda Dos Hermanos, the railroad would have
to pass through the haciendas of Esteban de la Rama. But he would not grant
permission to use his land for this purpose in 1920, and only consented to do so
in 1924. Here then was a clear case of such a condition of affairs as was
contemplated by the contract.

The foregoing points being admitted, it logically follows that
the defendant can recover on its cross-complaint. The defense to the
cross-complaint is identical with the theory of the complaint. For the same
reasons that the plaintiff cannot recover must he make good for his debt to the
defendant.

Accepting, therefore, the facts as found by the trial judge,
and noting no reversible error on any legal question, the judgment appealed from
must be as it is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.