TIBURCIO LUTERO ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. ROSARIO ESLER, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal taken from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiffs P20,000 as
professional fees, plus the costs.

The defendant is dissatisfied, and as grounds for the appeal
taken assigns several errors as committed by the trial court.

The plaintiffs rendered services as attorneys for the defendant
in a case wherein she claimed one-half of some property which she and the now
deceased Vicente Tad-y (with whom she had lived maritally for many years, and
whom she married a few moments before said Tad-y died) possessed, and which
amounted to some P240,000. The plaintiffs studied the case, conferred with the
client and her witnesses, undertaking the search of the latter in several
municipalities of Iloilo, consulted with the firm of Araneta & Zaragoza,
prepared and filed the complaint which they amended several times because the
demurrers filed had been sustained, appeared to support the complaint and the
amendments presented, appeared and acted as counsel in the several sessions had
on the case, prepared and submitted their memorandum to the court, and their
answer to the memorandum of the adverse party. And, an adverse judgment having
been rendered, they took exception and moved for a new trial, and duly filed the
proper bill of exceptions, which was approved.

The plaintiffs incurred expenses in maintaining that
litigation, among which those sufficiently established by the evidence are the
expenses of attorney Maza, the fees paid for the consultation with attorneys
Araneta & Zaragoza, fees paid for a similar reason to attorney Francisco,
and those paid for the translation of certain French jurisprudence, amounting in
all to P1,525. The other expenses alleged by the plaintiffs are not deemed
sufficiently proved.

However, that appeal did not reach its termination because the
client entered into negotiations with the adverse party whereby she was to
receive one-third instead of onehalf, of said property, which third part amounts
to approximately, P75,000. In view of this the appeal was withdrawn and the
relations of attorney and client, between plaintiffs and defendant terminated.

The defendant alleges that she delivered to attorney Lutero
(T.) the sum of P12,000 as fees, and loaned him P10,000 on a mortgage. The fees
referred to by the defendant are not those corresponding to the services
detailed above as rendered by the plaintiffs, but to those rendered by said
attorney Lutero (T.) in the guardianship of the minor Jose Tad-y, whose guardian
was the defendant, and they do not amount to the round sum of P12,000 but to the
P11,783.83 approved by the court as a just and reasonable quota litis
compensation to said attorney. The loan of P10,000 made in favor of the latter
and his wife is not, and cannot be considered attorney’s fees.

Therefore, our conclusion is that the plaintiffs have not yet
received the fees corresponding to the services which they rendered to the
defendant in the aforementioned claim instituted by her.

And, what is the amount of such fees? There was no written
contract between the parties. While the plaintiffs allege that the defendant at
the beginning agreed upon a quota litis of one-third if they won the case and
nothing if they lost it, the defendant asserts that the sum was left to her
discretion to fix if the case was won, and nothing would be paid if they lost
it. Although attorney Lutero’s (T.) statement in this particular seems to us the
more credible, we understand that that agreement cannot govern here, inasmuch as
the case was not won. But the preponderance of evidence shows that after the
adverse judgment had been rendered, and when the negotiations had been entered
into and the appeal withdrawn, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs would be
compensated for the services rendered following the rule of quantum meruit.

Under the circumstances of the case, this is the just and
equitable rule. It is the rule followed in the case of Montinola vs. Hofileña
(13 Phil., 339), similar to the instant case in that there, the case in which
the lawyer rendered services was amicably settled after the trial in the first
instance.

Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, we
consider the sum of five thousand pesos for fees, and reimbursement of the
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, as just and reasonable.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is modified and the defendant
is ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000, plus the costs of both
instances. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor Ostrand,
and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.