G.R. No. 28770. January 21, 1928
DOROTEA DAIS ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Dais et al., against the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Seventeenth Judicial
District, Jose Altavas and Jose Morente, in which it is prayed that an order be
issued to the respondent judge requiring him to certify and transmit to this
court an exact and complete transcription of the record, decision and
proceedings in cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714),
entitled the Director of Lands vs. Justo Abiertas et al., concerning the portion
referring to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136, for review by this Supreme Court; and
that after hearing both parties, judgment be rendered declaring the judicial
orders of the Court of First Instance of Capiz dated July 25, 1927, August 8,
1927, and September 22, 1927, as well as the judgment rendered by the same court
on September 29, 1927, and all other proceedings had in connection therewith,
void and of no effect.
The facts appearing from the pleadings and documentary evidence
attached thereto, presented in this case, are hereinafter set forth in the order
of their occurrence.
In the course of the intestate proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased Serapion Dais, civil case No. 988 of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, Manuel Arnaldo was appointed administrator of the
estate. For the payment of some of the debts of the deceased, said administrator
was authorized to sell certain parcels of land of said estate; whereupon he sold
lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 in the form prescribed by the law, to Antonio Habana,
which sale was approved by the court on February 15, 1926. The herein
petitioners or some of them objected to such approval and filed a motion for
reconsideration on March 6, 1926, which was denied on March 10,1926. They
appealed accordingly on April 6, 1927, and the same was denied on August 1,
1927, on the ground that it was not presented within the time prescribed by
section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because more than twenty days had
elapsed since the orders appealed from had been entered. It appears from the
order denying said appeal that the appellants contend that the time within which
said appeal should be taken must be counted from the date of the notification of
said orders and not from the date on which they were entered.
On May 20, 1926, Manuel Arnaldo filed an answer in the
cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714), in the name of
Serapion Dais’s heirs, claiming title to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 of said
proceeding. Jose Morente also filed an answer claiming title to lots Nos. 1132
and 1136. Jose Altavas also filed an answer claiming title to lot No. 626.
Before the hearing of the case, and in pursuant of a motion of
the claimants Jose Altavas and Jose Morente, respectively, with the consent of
Manuel Arnaldo, as judicial administrator of Serapion Dais’s intestate estate,
the respondent court ordered the answers presented by said administrator in the
name of Serapion Dais’s heirs with respect to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136
stricken out.
Dissatisfied with this order striking out their answer, the
heirs of Serapion Dais presented a motion for reconsideration, objecting to the
motions to strike out their answer and praying that the order of July 25, 1927,
granting said motions, be annulled. The motion for reconsideration being denied,
the movants, heirs to Serapion Dais, took formal exception to said order, and
gave notice of their intention to appeal to this court, and, to perfect their
appeal, filed the proper bill of exceptions, which was disapproved by the court
on the motion of claimants Jose Altavas and Jose Morente.
After the aforementioned answers presented by the judicial
administrator Manuel Arnaldo on behalf of the heirs of Serapion Dais anent lots
Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136, had been stricken from the record of the cadastral
proceeding, the court proceeded to the hearing of the answers of Jose Altavas
and Jose Morente in regard to the said lots, after which the respondent court
rendered a judgment on September 29, 1927, adjudicating lot No. 626 to the
spouses lose Altavas and Socorro Laserna, and lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to Jose
Morente and Patria Altavas.
There are two principal questions to be determined in the
present instance, to wit:
- Have the petitioners the right to intervene in a cadastral proceeding for
the purpose of objecting to the striking jut of an answer filed by the judicial
administrator of the intestacy of the petitioners’ predecessor in interest,
claiming several parcels of land as the property of said estate, when the
aforementioned administrator consents to its being stricken out? - And in case they have, has the respondent judge exceeded his powers in
ordering that the answer be stricken from the record, over the objection of the
said petitioners? In relation to the first question, article 657 of the Civil
Code provides:
“ART. 657. The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death.”
And article 661 of the same Code says:
“ART. 661. Heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of
the decedent by the mere fact of his death.”
Interpreting the above quoted legal provisions, this court lias
held in various decisions that the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs immediately
succeed to the dominion, ownership and possession of the property of their
predecessor. (Quison vs. Salud, 12 Phil., 109; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Beltran vs. Doriano, 32 Phil.,
66; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Velazco vs. Vizmanos, 45 Phil., 675; Fule
vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317.) The fact that the law provides for the appointment of
a legal administrator for the liquidation of the deceased’s property, and the
partition of his hereditas jacens among his heirs, does not deprive the
heirs of the right to intervene in the administration of said property for the
protection of their interests. On the contrary section 714 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in connection with section 722 of the same Code, requires that the
written consent and approval of the heirs be obtained for the sale of the
deceased’s property in order to pay his debts and the costs of administration.
This provision shows that, notwithstanding the appointment of a judicial
administrator, the heirs have a right to intervene when they believe the
administrator’s acts are prejudicial to their interest. And it cannot be said
that the administrator answers with his bond for any damage he may cause to the
interests of the estate, since such bond might not be sufficient to cover said
damages.
For the reasons above stated, we are of opinion that the heirs
have a right to intervene in a cause involving certain property of the
decedent’s hereditas jacens whenever they believe the legal
administrator’s acts ace prejudicial to their interests.
The second question to determine is whether or not the
respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that the answers filed by
the legal administrator in the name of the heirs be stricken out, said
administrator having consented against the opposition of said heirs.
In determining the first question, we have seen that the heirs
have a right to intervene when they believe that the acts of the judicial
administrator of the property of the hereditas jacens of their
predecessor in interest are prejudicial to their interests. The petitioners have
made use of this right in the present proceedings, opposing the dismissal and
taking exception to the order granting the motion filed to that end.
The answers in cadastral proceedings partake of the character
of an action to recover title, as real rights are claimed therein. According to
section 10 of Act No. 2347, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are of
a suppletory nature in land registration cases. Since Act No. 496, known as Land
Registration Act, contains no special rule as to the procedure to be followed in
impugning the sufficiency of the answers in cadastral proceedings nor in
determining whether or not they must be dismissed, the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure are applicable. According to the said Code, complaints can only
be dismissed by a failure to prosecute, by default, by abandonment, or by
defects provided by the law as grounds for a demurrer (Secs. 101 and 127, Act
No. 190). When two persons claim the ownership of one and the same cadastral
lot, both of them are claimants and opponents at the same time, and their
respective answers cannot be dismissed by the court without the presence of any
of said circumstances; and a motion for dismissal that is not based on any of
said grounds does not confer jurisdiction on the court to dismiss the complaint,
and if it does so, it exceeds its powers.
In this case, the motion presented by Jose Altavas, claimant of
lot No. 626, praying for the dismissal of the answer filed by the judicial
administrator, Manuel Arnaldo, on behalf of the heirs of the deceased Serapion
Dais, with reference to the same lot, is based on the allegation that said lot
never pertained to the mass of property of said decedent, and that it had never
been in the possession of said administrator. The motion presented by Jose
Morente for the dismissal of the answers presented by the judicial administrator
of the intestate estate of Serapion Dais on behalf of the latter’s heirs, with
reference to lots Nos. 1132 and 1136, is based on the claim that said lots were
sold by the said administrator with the approval and authority of the court.
Neither of these grounds is found among those mentioned by the present law of
civil procedure as causes for dismissal. It is true that the judicial
administrator agreed to the dismissal asked for, but the heirs, in whose name he
had presented said answers, objected to it, and presented a motion for
reconsideration in time, Which was denied by the respondent court. In view of
such opposition of the heirs, who are interested parties in the case, the court
should not have ordered the dismissal of the said answers, but should have
proceeded to the trial on the merits of the lots in question with the
intervention of said heirs.
In ordering the dismissal of the answers presented by the
judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Serapion Dais, in the name of
the latter’s heirs, notwithstanding their opposition and for a cause not
provided by law as a ground for dismissal, the respondent court did really
exceed its jurisdiction; because it is not enough that a court have jurisdiction
over the subject matter in litigation and the parties, but it is necessary that
it have authority in and over each and every one of the essential particulars of
the case.
In the case of Larrobis vs. Wislizenus and Smith, Bell &
Co. (42 Phil., 401), this court laid down the doctrine that the erroneous
exercise of interlocutory powers is irregular and justifies the institution of
certiorari proceedings.
And on page 104 of volume 11 of Corpus Juris, the following
rule may be found:
“* * * But it has been held that ‘any departure from the
recognized and established requirements of law, however close the apparent
adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect to deprive
one of a constitutional right is as much an excess of jurisdiction as where
there is an inceptive lack of power.’ “
In dismissing the answer presented by the judicial
administrator, Manuel Arnaldo in the name of the heirs of the deceased Serapion
Dais, over their objection, and in finally deciding the case on the merits
awarding the controverted lots to their adversaries, without hearing said heirs,
the court not only exceeded its jurisdiction, but also deprived them of their
constitutional right to be heard before being deprived of their property rights,
and its proceedings were in this sense, void and of no effect.
The appeals taken by the petitioners from the orders which are
the subject of this proceeding were denied by the respondent judge; hence, said
petitioners have no other adequate and speedy remedy in law to protect their
rights other than a writ of certiorari.
It is, therefore, proper to grant, as we do hereby grant, the
remedy sought, and the decree of the Court of First Instance of Capiz of July
25, 1927, ordering the dismissal of the answers concerning lots Nos. 626, 1132
and 1136 filed on behalf of the petitioners in cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G.
L. R. O. Record No. 714) is set aside, as well as the orders dated August 8,
1927, and September 22, 1927, denying the motion for reconsideration and the
appeal respectively, and the judgment of the same court dated September 29,
1927, awarding lot No. 626 to the spouses Jose Altavas and Socorro Laserna and
the lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to the spouses Jose Morente and Patria Altavas, with
all the orders rendered in connection with said decision, without costs. So
ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.