MARTIN MENDOZA AND NATALIO ENRIQUEZ, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. MANUEL DE GUZMAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. MAX. B. SOLIS, INTERVENOR AND APPELLANT.

This case calls for the application of. articles 361, 453, and 454 of the
Civil Code to the proven facts.

On November 6, 1916, Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo Solis brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against Martin Mendoza for the
recovery of a certain piece of land. Judgment was rendered in that case
absolving Mendoza from the complaint, and this judgment was subsequently
affirmed by the Supreme Court.^[1] When the ease was remanded to the court of
origin, the trial judge issued an order requiring the provincial sheriff
immediately to dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction and to put Mendoza in
the possession of the land. By virtue 6f this order, Mendoza was in fact put in
possession of the property.

In the cadastral proceedings of the municipality of Sariaya, Tayabas, the
piece of land above-mentioned was identified as lot No. 687. In the decision
rendered in the cadastral ease, this lot was adjudicated in favor of Martin
Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in equal parts pro indiviso
subject to the right of retention on the part of Manuel de Guzman until he shall
have been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land. By virtue of
this judgment, De Guzman presented a motion requesting the issuance of a writ of
possession for lot No. 687 in his favor which was granted on June 25, 1924. From
the time Leandra Solis and Bernardo Solis, as well as Manuel de Guzman who was
working on the land, were ejected therefrom, Martin Mendoza possessed it until
June 25, 1924, when De Guzman obtained the writ of possession abovementioned.
Since then De Guzman has had dominion over the land.

Being unable to come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed
for the improvements made on the land, Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began
an action requesting the court to (a) fix the value of the
necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel de Guzman in introducing the
improvements; (b) require the defendant to render an
accounting of the fruits received by him and order that the value of the fruits
be applied to the payment of the necessary and useful expenses; and
(c) decree the restitution of the postettion to the
plaintiffs. To the complaint, the defendant filed an answer in the form of a
general denial with special defenses and appended a counterclaim and
cross-complaint, in which a total of P6,000 was asked. During the pendency at
the case, Bernardo Solis, or Max B. Solis, one of the persons who was ejected
from the land, asked leave to intervene, alleging, among: other things, that De
Guzman, in consideration of the sum of P5,000, had transferred all his rights
in the improvements and in the lot to him with the exception of two hundred
coconut trees. This petition was granted by the trial court.

When the case was called for trial, the parties entered into the following
stipulation:

“1. That the plaintiffs are the owners and proprietors of
the land described in the second paragraph of the complaint.

“2. That a decree of registration has been issued on said land in the terms
set forth in paragraph 3 of the complaint.

“3. That the defendant Manuel de Guzman is the one who has been in possession
and enjoyment of the land from June 25, 1924, up to the present time by virtue
of a writ of possession obtained by him from the Court of Land Registration.

“4. That the defendant has made improvements on said land by planting coconut
trees thereon.

“5. That the plaintiff Martin Mendoza is the one who has been in possession
and enjoyment of said property and its improvements since December 16, 1916, by
virtue of a writ of possession in civil case No. 356 until said possession was
transferred to the defendant Manuel de Guzman.

“6. That from March 20, 1920, the plaintiff Natalio Enriquez has been in
possession and enjoyment of a portion of the land, the subject matter of the
complaint herein, by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his favor by Attorney
Agustin Alvarez, who, in turn, acquired it from the other plaintiff Martin
Mendoza, until June 25, 1924.

“The parties desire to submit, as they do submit, under this stipulation of
facts the following questions:

“(a) The amount of the indemnity to be paid to the
defendant for the improvements made by him on said lot and the basis upon which
said amount shall be fixed.

“(b) Whether or not the defendant is obliged to render an
account of the fruits received by him from June 25, 1924, until the improvements
are delivered after same have been paid for.

“(c) Whether the value of said fruits and products
received by the defendant shall be applied to the indemnity to which he is
entitled, or whether said defendant is obliged to deliver to the plaintiffs the
remainder in case of excess.

“(d) Whether or not the defendant has the right to be
paid by the plaintiffs in whole or in part for the value of the fruits received
by Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez from the respective dates that they were
in possession and enjoyment of the land until June 25, 1924.

“The parties at the same time that they submit to the court for decision the
questions presented in the above stipulation reserve to themselves, whatever
said decision may be, the right to present later their evidence in support of
their respective views with respect to the amount of the indemnity.

“After the preliminary questions have been decided, the parties request that
commissioners be appointed to receive said evidence with respect to the amount
of the indemnity in accordance with the views of both
parties.”

The trial court resolved the questions
presented by holding (1) that in accordance with the provisions of articles 453
and 454 in relation with article 361 of the Civil Code, the value of the
“indemnizacion” to be paid to the defendant should be fixed according to the
necessary and useful expenses incurred by him in introducing “las plantaciones
en cuestion”; (2) that the plaintiffs as the owner of the property have the
right to make their own “las plantaciones hechas por el demandado” upon payment
in the form indicated in No. 1, the defendant having the right to retain the
land until the expenditures have been refunded; (3) that the defendant is
obliged to render a detailed and just account of the fruits and other profits
received by him from the property for their due application; and (4) that the
value of the fruits received by the defendant should first be applied to the
payment of the “indemnizacion,” and in case that it exceeds the value of the
“indemnizacion,” the excess shall be returned to the plaintiffs. With respect to
the last question as to whether or not the plaintiffs are obliged to return to
the defendant the value of the fruits received by them before the defendant took
possession of the land, the trial court abstained from making any pronouncement
for the reason that the circumstances under which the plaintiffs acquired
possession and the defendant again acquired it were not before him, the parties
needing to submit their evidence with respect to this point.

At the trial which followed and at the instance of the parties, two
commissioners were appointed with instructions to inspect the land and to count
the number of coconut trees planted thereon, determining the number of
fruit-bearing trees and those that are not fruit-bearing as well as the
condition of the same. After trial, Judge of First Instance Gloria rendered
judgment declaring (a) that the defendant Manuel de Guzman
and the intervenor Bernardo Solis have the right to collect from the plaintiffs
Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez the sum of P2,046 as compensation for the
necessary and useful expenditures in the proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de
Guzman and 80 per cent for Bernardo Solis; and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and
Bernardo Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P666.93 per
annum from June 25, 1924, one-fifth of this amount to be paid by Manuel de
Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis. As on the date when this
judgment was rendered, that is on September 23, 1927, the amount that the
plaintiffs were required to pay to the defendant and intervenor exceeded the
amount that the latter were to pay the former, the defendant and intervenor were
ordered to deliver the land and its improvements as soon as the plaintiffs have
paid the difference, without special pronouncement as to costs.

The appeal of the defendant and intervenor is based on fourteen assigned
errors relating to both questions of fact and of law. The question of fact
mainly concerns the amount to be paid as “indemnizacion” in the form of
necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. The question of law
mainly concerns the interpretation of articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil
Code. Counsel for the appellants has presented a learned brief divided into
three chapters. Counsel for the appellees has countered with an equally helpful
brief in which the fourteen assigned errors are reduced for purposes of argument
to four fundamental questions. It would not be profitable and it is not
necessary to follow opposing counsel into all of their refinements of fact and
law.

As to the facts, the findings of the trial judge should be given effect. An
examination of the evidence shows that these findings are fully substantiated.
Our only doubt has been as to the just value for each coconut tree now found on
the land. However, everything considered, we have at last determined that we
would not be justified in changing the value per tree of 92 as fixed in the
trial court. With respect to the fruits received by the defendant while the land
was in his possession, the finding in the trial court is correct.

With the facts as above indicated, little time need be taken to discuss the
points of law. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses
the word “indemnizacion.” However one may speculate as to the true meaning of
the term “indemnizacion” whether correctly translated as “compensation” or
“indemnity,” the amount of the “indemnizacion” is the amount of the expenditures
mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the present case
is the amount of the necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the
defendant. Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish
commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing (4 Manresa’s
Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 258); as those without which the thing would
deteriorate or be lost (Scaevola’s Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 408); as
those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expended (4
Manresa’s Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 261; 8 Scaevola’s Comentarios al
Codigo Civil, p. 416). Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for
cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. (4 Manresa’s Comentarios al Codigo Civil,
p. 257). Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced on
the land and are disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful expenses
incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not exactly a
possessor in good faith within the meaning of the law, seeks to be reimbursed
for the necessary and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should
account to the owners of the estate for any rents, fruits, or crops he has
gathered from it.

In brief, therefore, and with special reference to the decision appealed
from, the errors assigned on appeal, and the argument of counsel as addressed to
the decision in the lower court and the assignment of errors, we may say that
we are content to make the findings of fact and law of Judge Gloria in the lower
court the findings of fact and law in the appellate court.

Based on the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellants.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.

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[1] G. R. No. 14033, Espinosa and Solis vs. Mendoza, promulgated August 23,
1919, not reported.