TOMAS MONTEVERDE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. SEBASTIAN T. GENEROSO, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF DAVAO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is a case the determination of which could easily be made difficult by
the injection of numerous controversial questions of fact and law, but which as
we view it can readily be decided on a basic legal point arising from the
undisputed facts and on a concession without decision of all disputed facts in
favor of the Government. On this basis, the ultimate and decisive question is
this: Is a provincial governor, a district engineer, or a district health
officer authorized to destroy private property consisting of dams and fishponds
summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that
such private property constitutes a nuisance? 

The undisputed facts are these: Tomas Monteverde is the owner of a parcel of
land situated in the barrio of Santa Ana, municipality of Davao, Province of
Davao. He possesses a Torrens title to the land obtained in 1921. The parcel of
land is bounded on the northwest by the Agdao River. The Tambongon Creek is a
branch of the Agdao River and runs through Monteverde’s land. For fishpond
purposes, Monteverde constructed two dams across the Agdao River and five dams
across the Tambongon Creek. The two dams in the Agdao River were destroyed by
order of the district engineer of Davao. The provincial governor of Davao also
threatened to destroy the other dams in the Tambongon Creek. The motive behind
the destruction of the dams of the Agdao River and the proposed destruction of
the dams in the Tambongon Creek was to safeguard the public health. To prevent
the contemplated action with reference to the Tambongon Creek, Monteverde sought
in the Court of First Instance of Davao to obtain an order of injunction in
restraint of the provincial governor, the district engineer, and the district
health officer, but in this attempt Monteverde was unsuccessful in the lower
court.

To the undisputed facts, there may be added for the purposes of the decision
without necessarily having to resolve them the following: The fishponds were
constructed in 1921 and 1922 and did not exist as the result of a concession in
Spanish times. The Tambongon Creek running through Monteverde’s property is
navigable and as such is of public ownership. (See in this connection the cases
of Samson vs. Dionisio and Fabian [1908], 11 Phil, 538, and Bautista vs. Alarcon
[1912], 23 Phil., 631.)

The reason for the contemplated action by the provincial governor and the
legal authority on which he relied are 126 disclosed by the communication from
the provincial governor to the plaintiff reading as follows:

“Mr. TOMAS MONTEVERDE

“Sta. Ana, Davao

“SIR: There have been referred to this office several complaints against you
for having closed some of the branches of the Agdao River for fishpond purposes
without ‘previous authorization from competent authorities, thus obstructing the
flow of water and causing the development of stagnant water which serves as
suitable breeding places for mosquitos.

“For the good of public sanitation, and by virtue of the authority conferred
me by section 24 of the Water Law, you are hereby ordered, upon receipt hereof,
to open all the ditches by destroying the dams so constructed therein as
obstruction of the water flow, the construction of same not being in accordance
with the law. 

“Prompt compliance to this order is enjoined, otherwise, the district
engineer will be ordered to effect the work at your costs.

“Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) “S. T. Generoso
“Provincial Governor”

Again emphasizing that the facts for the purposes of the appeal may be
conceded to be as contended by the Government, we then must determine if any
existing law authorizes the provincial governor and the other provincial
officials to remove without a hearing or legal process any private construction
on a navigable stream.

The law is found in many places. There have been cited sections 938, 941,
978, 980, 995, 2592, 2594, 2604, and 2625 of the Administrative Code; section 89
of the Land Registration Act; articles 389, 844, 407, 412, and 490 of the Civil
Code; and article 24 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. With reference to
this varied assortment of law, the flat statement is advanced without fear of
contradiction that with the possible exception of article 24 of the law of
Waters no law expressly empowers the provincial governor to order the removal of
obstructions and the destruction of nuisances in a navigable stream. On the
contrary, the law specifically grants to the municipal council the power by
ordinance or resolution “to declare, prevent, and abate nuisances.” (Sec. 2625
[aa], Administrative Code; Bernardino and Zaplan vs. Governor and Provincial
Board of Cavite [1910], 17 Phil., 176.) As to article 24 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, it provides:

“Any person may, upon his own private property, construct artificial ponds of
sea water, having communication with the sea, for use as bathing places or
vivaries, or for any other commercial or recreative purpose, notice thereof
being given to the governor of the province. During two months, the governor
shall have power to order the suspension of the work if, after consultation with
the naval officer in command and the provincial engineer, it appear. that the
work might be substantially prejudicial to the public interests. In such an
event the interested party may appeal to the Government.” But as to the
applicability of this article, it necessarily would have to conform to the
principles of the existing public law.

Nuisances are of two classes: Nuisances per se and per accidens. As to the
first, since they affect the immediate safety of persons and property, they may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. But if the nuisance be
of the second class, even the municipal authorities, under their power to
declare and abate nuisances, would not have the right to compel the abatement of
a particular thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person
alleged to be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing
before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing or act does in law
constitute a nuisance. Such in effect was the holding in Iloilo Ice and Cold
Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo ([1913], 24 Phil., 471). Applied
here, it is self-evident that a dam or a fishery constructed in a navigable
stream is not a nuisance per se. Of course, a dam or a fishpond may be found to
be a nuisance where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property
by causing water to become stagnant. The public health may be conserved but
conserved only in a legal manner. Due process of law must be observed before the
citizens’ property or personal rights or liberty can be interfered with.
Conceding without deciding that article 24 of the Law of Waters is in force, we
reiterate that it can only be made use of by conforming to the provisions of the
organic law.

The case of Lawton vs. Steele, originally decided in the Court of Appeals of
New York and then taken to the United States Supreme Court, is the leading case
on the subject. This was an action brought to recover the value of sixteen nets
belonging to the plaintiffs which Were destroyed by defendant. He, as a state
fish and game protector, justified himself by citing the section of the law
authorizing the seizure and removal of nets. The court recognized the
legislative power to regulate fishing in public waters, and the right of summary
abatement of nuisances without judicial process or proceeding for the protection
of the health; but said the court: “In the process of abating a nuisance there
are limitations both in respect of the agencies which may be employed, and as to
what may be done in execution of the remedy.” In the United States Supreme
Court, it was in part said:

“It is not easy to draw the line between cases where the property illegally
used may be destroyed summarily and where judicial proceedings are necessary for
its condemnation. If the property were of great value, as, for instance, if it
were a vessel employed for smuggling or other illegal purposes, it would be
putting a dangerous power in the hands of a custom officer to permit him to sell
or destroy it as a public nuisance, and the owner would have good reason to
complain of such act, as depriving him of his property without due process of
law. But where the property is of trifling value, and its destruction is
necessary to effect the object of a certain statute, we think it is within the
power of the legislature to order its summary abatement. For instance, if the
legislature should prohibit the killing of fish by explosive shells, and should
order the cartridges so used to be destroyed, it would seem like belittling the
dignity of the judiciary to require such destruction to be preceded by a solemn
condemnation in a court of justice. The same remark might be made of the cards,
chips, and dice of a gambling room.

“Upon the whole we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding this act to be
constitutional, and the judgment of the Supreme Court is, therefore, affirmed.”
(119 N. Y., 226; 152 U. S., 133.)

In contrast with Lawton vs. Steele, supra, (1) there is no law authorizing
the summary abatement of nuisances by the provincial governor; and (2) the dams
and fishponds are not of trifling value. The question at issue is answered in
the negative.

In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be as it is
hereby reversed, and instead the injunction prayed for shall issue prohibiting
the defendants from destroying the dams and fishponds in question. It is so
ordered without express finding as to costs in either instance.

Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romiualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.