NATIVIDAD CENTENO ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. MARTINA CENTENO ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. NICOLAS CENTENO ET AL., INTERVENORS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal taken by the plaintiffs Natividad Centeno in
her own behalf and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased father,
Valentin Centeno, Jesus Centeno First, Rosalia and Rosario Centeno, and by the
intervenors Nicolas, Emilio, Isaac and Jesus Centeno Second, from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, of which the following is the
dispositive part:

“The agreement of partition in question is hereby upheld, with
the adjudications to the parties thereto, and therefore the partition prayed for
in this civil case by plaintiffs and intervenors respecting the realty described
in the sixth paragraph of the original complaint is denied. The other petition
that said partition be held void and of no effect in so far as it refers only to
the said portion adjudicated to defendants, is also denied.

“It is held that parcels Nos. 70, 86, and 95, described in the
aforementioned sixth paragraph of the original complaint, are held by defendants
pro indiviso; and the others, Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, and 69, with the metes
and bounds given in the said sixth paragraph, which are in possession of the
plaintiff Jesus Centeno First, as well as the others, Nos. 82, 85, and 99, which
are in thei possession of the defendant Telesforo Centeno.

“The defendants’ petition that the first 51 parcels of land
described in the said sixth paragraph of the original complaint, reproduced in
the last amendatory complaint, be partitioned in this case and parcel No. 116
described in the inventory Exhibit F of the plaintiffs, and 6 of the defendants,
as well as the said parcels Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, and 69, and the credits is
denied; all of which are considered and declared to be pro indiviso (Exhibit 7
of the defendants), without prejudice to said partition being made in such
manner as they may agree upon.

“It is ordered that the plaintiffs deliver to defendants the
two parcels of land described in the latters’ cross-complaint in their second
cause of action, and said two mares and harness cannot be ordered delivered,
because they are not formally detailed and difficulties would arise in the
execution of such an order.

“As Fabian Cabanilla and Simplicio Gaberto possessors of
parcels Nos. 76, 77, 59, and 100 claimed by plaintiffs and intervenors, were not
made defendants in this case, no pronouncement is here made against them nor as
to parcels Nos. 52, 66, 94, and 61, the possessors of which are unknown.

“Defendants are absolved from the claims with respect to
parcels Nos. 105, 106, 107, 11, 57, 75, 93, 102, 112, 115, 56, 58, 63, 64, 65,
67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97,
98, 101, 103, 108, 109, 110, 113, and 114 (43) described in the complaint.

“The pious legacy of parcel No. 104 made by the testatrix
Melchora Arroyo, is upheld.

“It is ordered that each of the parties, plaintiffs,
intervenors, and defendants, pay a third part of the costs of the trial.

“It is so ordered.”

Plaintiffs support their appeal by assigning nineteen alleged
errors, and the intervenors another nineteen, to the trial court in its
judgment, which we shall discuss hereinafter: In their second and last amended
complaint, the plaintiffs pray for judgment on the causes of action therein set
forth: (a) Ordering the partition between plaintiffs and intervenors in
accordance with the law and the wills of Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo of
all properties described in the sixth paragraph of the original complaint,
together with the property constituting the portion then adjudicated to the
defendants in the said partition; (b) holding the said partition to be void and
of no effect, only insofar as it refers to the portion adjudicated to the
defendants and ordering the latter to deliver the property in their possession
numbered from 52 to 115, with all its fruits, and to return what they have
unduly received in said erroneous partition; (c) ordering the defendants to pay
the costs of the action; and (d) granting plaintiffs such further remedy not
herein prayed for as may be just and equitable.

In their second amended complaint the intervenors pray for the
causes of action therein set forth that the voluntary partition of the property
left by the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo be declared null
and void, in so far as it respects the portion adjudicated to the defendants,
ordering the latter to return to said plaintiffs and intervenors what they have
unduly received in said partition.

In their amended answer, the defendants generally and
specifically deny each and every one of the allegations of the complaints of the
plaintiffs and the intervenors, with a special defense and cross-complaint and
pray the court: (a) To absolve the said defendants from the complaint entirely;
(b) to order the partition of the property under Nos. 1 to 51, 53, 54, 55, 60,
61, 62, 69, 116, 119 and 120, with their corresponding fruits or their
equivalent in money, and that their respective portions be adjudicated and
delivered to these defendants, and that the credits of the deceased so far
collected be equally distributed among the heirs; (c) that the plaintiff
Valentin Centeno be ordered to deliver to said defendants Martina Jose and
Telesforo Centeno, the property specified in paragraph 3 of the cross-complaint,
with all the fruits they produced or should have produced from 1911 up to
present date, or in default thereof, to pay the value of said fruits with the
proper legal interest; (d) that the plaintiff Valentin Centeno be ordered to pay
the costs of this action; and (e) grant said defendants all such further
remedies with respect to their rights as may be just and equitable.

The case having passed through all the proper proceeding and
after hearing the evidence presented by the parties in support of their
respective claims, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of
which is quoted above.

The preponderance of the evidence establishes the following
pertinent facts necessary to the solution of the questions of fact and of law
raised in the present appeal.

Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were husband and wife who
brought no property to the marriage but acquired much property during their
married life.

Isaac Centeno died on October 7, 1905, and was survived by his
wife Melchora Arroyo, and their three sons, Valentin, Faustino and Antonio
Centeno. Before his death, that is, on June 30, 1904, Isaac Centeno executed a
will, one of the clauses of which contained the following provision: “I hereby
named and institute as my sole and universal heirs my three sons Antonio,
Valentin and Faustino Centeno or their heirs, if any, to one-half of the
above-named property, provided, that the same be divided equally among my three
said sons” (Exhibit D of plaintiffs and Exhibit 4 of defendants.) The will
having been admitted to probate and his widow Melchora Arroyo, appointed
administratrix of the property left by him, said Melchora Arroyo, as such
administrator, filed with the court a detailed inventory of all the property
left by her deceased husband which had come into her possession. (Exhibit F of
plaintiffs and Exhibit 6 of defendants.)

On October 30, 1907, Antonio Centeno died leaving a widow,
Gabriela Fernandez, and a will executed on October 9,1907, clauses 3 and 8 of
which are as follows:

“Third. I declare that I was married once, being still married
to Dña. Gabriela Fernandez y Bribiesca, and during our union we had not a single
child; I also declare that although I said I have no child, the God of pity has
given me eight, who are my children by another woman, three of whom are called
natural, who are Martina, Jose (alias Pepe), and Telesforo Centeno, because they
were born even before I married my aforesaid wife, Ma. Gabriela; the five are
Sisenando, Antonina, Gregorio, Jose (alias Peping), and Gabriel Centeno, and are
called illegitimate, because they were born after my marriage; nevertheless I
acknowledge them all for I have had them since their birth supporting and
bringing all of them, up until now.

“Eighth. Of my portion from my deceased father Isaac Centeno
Purugganan, and of my future portion from my mother Dña. Melchora Arroyo, I
institute as my universal heirs my three children called natural, to have and to
hold in fee simple during their lives, under God’s blessing and my own.”
(Exhibit 9-b of defendants.)

This will was probated on petition of his mother Melchora
Arroyo de Centeno,.and his widow, Gabriela Fernandez de Centeno.

Melchora Arroyo de Centeno died on December 8, 1909, leaving
one son named Valentin Centeno, and a will executed on November 3, 1909, clause
3 of which provides:

“(c) The third part shall be divided equally, neither more nor
less, among my sons Antonio and Faustino Centeno, may they rest in peace, and
Valentin Centeno.” (Exhibit E of plaintiffs and Exhibit 5 of defendants.)

This will was probated upon petition of Valentin Centeno, one
of the executors named therein.

While testamentary proceedings for the settlement of the
estates of Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were being had, the heirs of both,
desiring a just and lawful partition in accordance with the wills of both,
submitted for its approval to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in
November, 1910 an agreement of partition executed in October, 1910 wherein
Valentin Centeno, Gabriela Fernandez de Centeno widow of Antonio Centeno, and
the latter’s acknowledged natural children, Martina and Emilio A. Centeno, and
Asuncion Arcebal, widow of Faustino Centeno, for herself and in behalf of her
minor son Jesus Centeno, jr., intervened as parties. (Exhibit 7 of defendants.)

On March 10, 1911, the court, acting on the motion presented by
said heirs, ordered the publication in newspaper of the largest circulation in
the locality once a week for three consecutive weeks, of a notice of the filing
in said court of the agreement of partition of the testate estate of the
deceased spouses, Isaac Genteno and Melchora Arroyo, so that each and every
person interested in said property and those who might have claims thereto may
present themselves before the court on the day appointed and show cause if any,
why said agreement of partition should not be approved or why said estates
should not be declared closed. (Exhibit 8-6 of defendants.) On March 8, 1911, in
pursuance of said order, the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
set the 8th of April 1911 for the hearing of the approval of the said agreement
of partition. On April 20, 1911, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
issued the following order:

On October 22, 1913 the said Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur issued also the following order:

“The present case being called for trial for the approval of
the account presented by the administratrix Gabriela F. de Centeno, the latter
appeared with, the heirs named Telesforo and Sisenando Centeno, and the legatee
Antonina Centeno, minor.

“Inasmuch as said administratrix declares that the aforesaid
heirs Telesf oro and Sisenando, as well as the other heirs not present, Martina
and Jose Centeno, have already received their corresponding share of the
inheritance; and as the said present heirs confirm this declaration of the
administratrix; and as the latter further declares that she holds the legacy
corresponding to said Antonina and her three brothers Gregorio, Jose (alias
Peping), and Gabriel, all sumamed Centeno, the court orders that Mr. Sisenando
Centeno be appointed guardian of the said minors with his consent, and with the
acquiescence of the said minor Antonio Centeno.

“It is likewise ordered that the said heirs file a statement
showing those who have already received their proper share of the inheritance.

“The administratrix is also ordered to present the inventory of
the property given as a legacy to said minors, which will be turned over to the
guardian appointed upon his giving bond, the amount of which is to be fixed
according to the aforementioned inventory. So ordered.”

In the partition agreement submitted by the heirs to the court
and approved by the latter, the property mentioned in plaintiffs’ account
Exhibit G, was adjudicated to Antonio Centeno, said exhibit being signed by all
the heirs who took part in said agreement of partition.

Besides the property left by the deceased spouses, Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, which was partitioned among the heirs, 115 parcels
of land described in the sixth paragraph of plaintiffs’ complaint remained
undistributed, of which fifty-one, marked Nos. 1 to 51, were in the possession
of the plaintiff Valentin Centeno and is now held by Ms sons, the herein
plaintiffs, who took his place after his death which occurred in the course of
the present proceeding in the lower court; two, designated Nos. 76 and 77 were
in the power and possession of Fabian Cabanilla who has had them in his
possession as owner for more than ten years previous to the filing of the
complaint having inherited them from his father, who, in turn, inherited them
from his father, having paid the land tax on the same; two others, designated
Nos. 59 and 100, are held by Simplicio Gaberto, who has been in possession
thereof from time immemorial without any interruption of any kind, having
inherited them from his father.

As to those marked Nos. 52, 66 and 94,
there is no evidence showing who holds and possesses them. Moreover, the two
alleged possessors named are not parties in the present suit.

The parcel of land marked No. 104, tax No. 10318, is the same
parcel bearing the same tax number included in the partition made in October,
1910 (Exhibit 7), destined to pious purposes by the deceased Melchora Arroyo,
according to her will (Exhibit E of the plaintiffs).

The four parcels of land marked Nos. 105, 106, 107 and 111, and
identified by sworn declarations of ownership Nos. 10328, 10329, 10330 and
10335, respectively, are the same parcels of land referred to in the said
partition made in the month of October, 1910 (Exhibit 7 of defendants),
designated as the legacy of Martina Centeno one of the defendants according to
the will of the deceased Isaac Centeno (Exhibit D of plaintiffs).

The parcels of land marked Nos. 57, 75, 93, 102, 112 and 115
and identified by sworn declarations of ownership Nos. 10374, 10474, 10533,
10549, 10388 and 10429, respectively, were adjudicated to the defendants in the
said partition made in October, 1910 (Exhibit G of defendants, who hold them).

The parcels of land marked Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62 and 69, and
identified by sworn declarations of ownership Nos. 10333, 10337, 10367, 10410,
10425 and 10459, respectively, and mentioned in defendants’ answer, are held by
Jesus Centeno First.

The declarations of ownership in the name of Melchora Arroyo de
Centeno of the parcels designated by Nos. 82, 85 and 99, in the complaint were
cancelled and substituted by those numbered 37522, 39333 and 21058, respectively
(Exhibit 1 of the defendants). It does not appear in whose possession said
parcels are, but it is to be presumed that they are held by Telesforo Centeno in
whose name the new declarations were made. Neither does it appear how the latter
acquired them. As they are not included in the partition they should be
considered as part of the undivided share of Melchora Arroyo de Centeno in the
estate.

The parcels of land designated by Nos. 56, 58, 101 and 103 in
the complaint have been in possession of the herein defendants Telesforo and
Martina Centeno since the death of the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo, which took place on October 7, 1905 and December 8, 1909,
respectively, who have been gathering their products and enjoying their fruits
exclusively. These four parcels of land are not included in the inventory of the
conjugal property left by said deceased spouses, which gives rise to the
presumption that said four parcels do not belong to their share in the estate;
otherwise, Melchora Arroyo, who must have known all the property of the conjugal
partnership, would have included them in said inventory which she submitted to
the court.

The parcels of land bearing Nos. 70, 86 and 95, are the same
ones designated by Nos. 145, 132 and 135 in said inventory, but which were not
included in the partition agreement. These three parcels of land are in
possession of the herein defendants, but it does not appear that said possession
meets all the requirements prescribed by law in order that it may ripen into
title.

The parcels of land Nos. 113 and 114, which are also enumerated
in the said inventory, have been in possession of the herein defendants since
the death of the spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, who have been
gathering their fruits and enjoying them exclusively. The parcels of land
designated in the complaint by Nos. 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79,
80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 108, 109 and 110 also are
not mentioned in the aforesaid inventory and are possessed by the defendants,
who have been enjoying their products exclusively.

As to the parcels of land Nos. 116, 119 and 120, which are the
subject matter of the defendants’ cross-complaint said three parcels belonged to
the spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo during their lifetime and are now
in the possession of the plaintiffs. Two of said parcels, those designated by
Nos. 116 and 120 are identified with Nos. 57 and 251 in the inventory of the
estate of Isaac Centeno. The parcel of land No. 120 is the same parcel No. 60
mentioned in the complaint. The parcel of land 119 is the same parcel No. 23 in
the same complaint. The parcel of land No. 116 must be added to the one hundred
and fifteen parcels claimed in the complaint as having belonged to the deceased
spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo and is pro indiviso.

There are two more parcels of land with sworn declarations of
ownership Nos. 10375 and 10386, which appear in the list of the properties
adjudicated to Antonio Centeno (Exhibit G of plaintiffs) and which are in the
possession of the plaintiffs.

The chattels and cattle adjudicated to Antonio Centeno in the
scheme of partition and which were in the possession of Valentin Centeno have
not yet been delivered to the defendants.

With respect to the uncollected credits which amount to P8,950
according to the partition agreement, Exhibit 7 of the defendants, and the
collection of which was intrusted to Valentin Centeno, the latter collected P300 owed by Pedro Biloria, leaving P8,650 uncollected, which is pro indiviso,
as well as the house and lot valued at P300 and adjudicated in part payment of
said credit.

To summarize, then, it appears that the only parcels of land
which may be the subject matter of the partition among the parties are the
following: Those designated in the original complaint by Nos. 1 to 51, and which
are in possession of the plaintiffs; those designated in said original complaint
by Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62 and 69 which are in possession of Jesus Centeno
First; those designated in said original complaint by Nos. 82, 85 and 99, which
are in the possession of Telesforo Centeno; those designated in said original
complaint by Nos. 70, 86 and 95, which are in the possession of the defendants;
and those designated in the cross-complaint by Nos. 116, 119 and 120, which are
in the possession of the plaintiffs, the two last of which are designated in
the complaint as Nos. 23 and 60, respectively.

The credits should also
be partitioned.

Before entering fully into a discussion of the questions of law
raised by the plaintiffs and the intervenors in their respective briefs, it is
well to decide the legal question of procedure raised by said parties as to
whether or not the trial court erred in not declaring the defendants in default
for not having answered the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint and in
permitting said defendants to present their answer on the day of the trial, upon
oral motion made in open court.

In maintaining the affirmative, the plaintiffs-appellants
invoke the provisions of articles 10 and 11 of the Rules of Courts of First
Instance, which require that all motions shall be in writing and shall be filed
with the proper court making it appear that the adverse party had notice thereof
three days before the time set for the hearing thereof, and providing that
unless it so appears, no action shall be taken on them.

The purpose of requiring such conditions is doubtless to give
sufficient time and opportunity to the adverse party to become informed of any
motion which may be presented in which he may be interested, and may interpose
his objection should he so desire. When a motion is made in open court and in
the presence of all the parties, it is not necessary to make it in writing nor
that the adverse party be notified thereof, since proceedings in Courts of First
Instance as courts of record, are reduced to writing by the official court
stenographer, and the adverse party has an opportunity to become informed of
said motion and of its nature and may object to it at once if he so desires, or
may ask the court for a period within which to file his opposition.

Since the defendants made the motion for the admission of their
answer to the second amended complaint in open court and in the presence of all
the parties, the trial court did not err in granting it and admitting said
answer and in not declaring them in default, in accordance with section 110 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.

Entering now upon the discussion of the questions on the merit,
we may say at the outset that with respect to the questions of fact raised by
the plaintiffs-appellants and intervenors-appellants in their respective briefs,
we have examined the evidence, both documentary and oral, adduced at the trial
by the respective parties in support of their respective contentions, and have
found the preponderance of the evidence fully justifies the findings of fact
made by the trial court in its judgment, and they are the same as set forth
above.

Touching the questions of law raised also by the
plaintiffs-appellants and intervenors-appellants in their respective briefs, they
may be reduced to the following:

1. Are the defendants entitled, as acknowledged natural
   children of Antonio Centeno, to inherit by will the hereditary portion which the
   latter might inherit from his legitimate father Isaac Centeno?

2. Are said defendants entitled; as such acknowledged natural
   children of Antonio Centeno, to the reservation of one-half of said hereditary
   portion which Melchora Arroyo inherited from her legitimate son Antonio Centeno,
   which hereditary portion the latter had inherited from his likewise legitimate
   father Isaac Centeno?

3. Are the defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural
   children of Antonio Centeno, to represent their natural father Antonio Centeno
   in the inheritance of their natural grandmother Melchora Arroyo, legitimate
   mother of Antonio Centeno?

4. Is the partition made among the plaintiffs, intervenors and
   defendants, and duly approved by the court, of the conjugal property left by the
   deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, valid?

5. Did the defendants acquire by prescription the ownership of
   the parcels of land adjudicated to them in the partition, and of the parcels of
   land included in the inventory of the properties left by Isaac Centeno and not
   adjudicated to them in the partition but which are in the possession of said
   defendants?

6. Are the defendants entitled, as acknowledged natural
   children of Antonio Centeno, to recover from the heirs of Valentin Centeno the
   personal and real property, cattle and credits which were adjudicated to them in
   said partition and which remained in the possession of said Valentin Centeno?

7. Are said defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural
   children of Antonio Centeno, to participate in the conjugal property left by
   Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo included in the inventory but not included in
   the partition?

8. May the partition of the conjugal property left by the
   spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyd and still remaining pro indiviso be
   ordered in these proceedings?

With regard to the first question, the defendants-appellees did
not inherit from their natural grandfather Isaac Centeno by intestate
succession, but from their natural father Antonio Centeno, who acknowledged them
in his will and named them heirs to the property he had inherited from his
deceased father Isaac Centeno, who had died before him. The fact that the
inheritance left by Isaac Centeno remained pro indiviso when Antonio Centeno
died, did not prevent him from acquiring during his lifetime, a right to inherit
from his deceased father, since article 657 plainly provides that the rights to
succession of any person are transmitted from the moment of his death.

As to the second question, the defendants, as acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to more than the half of the part
of the inheritance which could be freely disposed of by their natural father,
the latter not having left any legitimate descendants, but a legitimate
ascendant, who is his mother Melchora Arroyo, without prejudice to the legitime
of his widow Gabriela Fernandez, in accordance with article 841 in connection
with article 836 of the Civil Code, the other half of his estate going to his
mother Melchora Arroyo as her legitime, as provided in article 809 of the same
Code. Melchora Arroyo having died, said defendants, as acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to the reservation of the
hereditary portion which said Melchora Arroyo acquired gratuitously from her
legitimate son Antonio Centeno who, in turn, also acquired it gratuitously, from
his legitimate father Isaac Centeno, according to the doctrine laid down by this
court in the case of Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo ([1920], 41 Phil.,
915), as follows:

“RESERVABLE RIGHTS IN PROPERTY; INHERITANCE BY RELATIVES WITHIN THE THIRD DEGREE; ILLEGITIMATE RELATIVES.—Article 811 of the Civil Code which
provides that any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother
or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree, belonging
to the line from which such property came does not apply to illegitimate
relatives.” (See also the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain rendered on
June 10, 1918.)

Passing now to the third question, while it is true that in his
will Antonio Centeno named the herein defendants as his heirs, not only with
respect to the hereditary portion given him in the will of his father Isaac
Centeno, but also with respect to the hereditary portion of the property left by
his mother Melchora Arroyo, which he would inherit, nevertheless said
testamentary disposition with regard to the property of his mother is void and
of no effect, because, since his mother still lived, he had not acquired any
right to her inheritance and therefore could not dispose of said property, since
it is a rule of law that no one can dispose of anything that does not belong to
him. (Sy Joe Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil., 137.)

Although Melchora
Arroyo in her will named her son Antonio Centeno as one of her heirs, since he
died before her, the herein defendants, as acknowledged natural children of said
Antonio Centeno have no right to represent their deceased father, according to
the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of Spain, in the judgment rendered
on June 10, 1918, supra, which is as follows:

“Considering that the truth of this doctrine, and that the
judgment appealed from has not violated the laws cited in the fifth, sixth, and
seventh assignments of errors, is shown, besides the text of article 807 already
cited, by that of articles 836 and 944 of the same Code, in comparison with
articles 808, 843, and 941 thereof, because while the first of these, in dealing
with the legitime due to legitimate children includes the legitimate descendants
thereof, articles 843 and 941 in connection with natural children specifically
provide that the portion corresponding to them in the hereditary estate of the
parents who acknowledged them is transmitted upon the death of these children to
their legitimate or natural descendants. The latter’s right, however, to
represent their natural, father in the hereditary estate of their grandfather is
not admitted because the law does not call them to participate in the latter’s
estate, and for a like reason, in default of parents acknowledging the natural
child, the grandfather, according to article 945, cannot inherit from the
grandchild,—the doctrine laid down by this court in its decision of February 13,
1903, to the effect that a natural child whose deceased father was legitimate,
has no right to inherit from his grandfather, even if the latter should die
without any surviving legitimate descendant is a necessary consequence of the
aforecited legal provisions, because, as children inherit in their own right and
grandchildren by representation, it is clear that such representation of the
grandchildren only refess to and includes those who are in the same legal status
as the person represented, and never those who are in a different legal status.”
(M. Ruiz, Civil Code, vol. 7, p. 175.)

Touching the fourth question, “the heirs of the deceased Isaac
Centeno and his wife Melchora Arroyo de Centeno, also deceased, desiring to make
a just and lawful partition, and in accord with the wills of both,” submitted to
the consideration and approval of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur an
agreement of partition of the pro indiviso conjugal property left by the
deceased spouses as appearing in instrument Exhibit 7 of the defendants. Said
partition agreement having been submitted to the court, the latter ordered the
fixing of a day for the hearing of the accompanying motion, and the publication
of a notice for the appearance of all who might have an interest therein, and
the presentation of the claims and objections they might have. The day for the
hearing having arrived, and all the parties having been heard, who stated that
they bound themselves to answer for all the just claims against the two estates
of Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, the court approved the partition and
declared said two testamentary proceedings closed by its order dated April 20,
1911.

While it is true that the partition agreement was made by all
the heirs extrajudicially, in submitting it to the court for approval, and in
being approved by the latter after having announced the hearing through
publication in the newspapers, said extrajudicial agreement of partition became
judicial, and the order of the court approving it and declaring the respective
testamentary proceedings involving the estates of the deceased spouses closed,
became final and absolute, and binding upon all the parties who took part in
the said partition agreement, and acquiesced therein. More than six years having
elapsed from the date the order of the court approving the extrajudicial
agreement of partition became final until the filing of the first complaint
praying for the annulment of said partition, there is absolutely no legal reason
for setting aside said order which must therefore be considered irrevocable, and
the partition made in accordance with the agreement valid.

The fact that Jesus Centeno Second was a minor at the time said
agreement of partition was entered into, does not render it void with respect to
him, because he was represented by his mother Asuncion Arcebal, who was his
natural guardian by law, although without the right to the custody of his
property unless so authorized by the court (sec. 553, Act No. 190), and when the
court approved said agreement, said representation was impliedly approved and
the acts of the mother were validated.

Neither does the fact that the defendants were mere
acknowledged natural children, and therefore without the right of equal
participation with the legitimate children, render said partition void. Article
1081 of the Civil Code provides that a partition made with the inclusion of any
person who was believed, but was not, an heir shall be void. The herein
defendants-appellees were not strangers to the inheritance for they were named
as heirs by their natural father, whom they succeeded in his rights to the
hereditary portion which should have gone to him from the unsettled estate left
by his deceased father Isaac Centeno.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs and intervenors cannot allege
ignorance of the condition of the defendants-appellees as acknowledged natural
children, for this condition appeared from the will of Antonio Centeno, and in
making the partition in the form in which they made it, they desired to do so,
in a just, lawful manner, in accordance with the wills of the deceased spouses
Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, and they made it appear so in the preamble to
the scheme of partition, Exhibit 7 of the defendants.

It follows, then,
that the defendants-appellees not only were not strangers to the inheritance,
but that, with full knowledge of their status of acknowledged natural children,
the plaintiffs and intervenors adjudicated to them the property appearing in the
agreement of partition, deeming it just, legal, and in conformity with the wills
of their predecessors in interest, and said partition is therefore legal arid
valid.

As to the fifth question, having arrived at the conclusion that
the partition made among the plaintiffs, the intervenors, and the defendants is
valid and irrevocable, it is needless to discuss whether, in addition, said
defendants acquired rights of ownership to the goods adjudicated to them and
appearing in Exhibit G of the plaintiffs, by acquisitive prescription, and we
shall limit ourselves to considering1 the conjugal property left by the deceased
spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, included in inventory Exhibit F of
the plaintiffs, and 6 of the defendants, and not included in the scheme of
partition, Exhibit 7 of the defendants, but which is in the latters’ possession.

It cannot be doubted that if the defendants have been in
possession of said property adversely, continuously, publicly and as owners
thereof for a period of ten years, they have acquired the ownership thereof by
prescription. (Sec. 41, Act No. 190; Casanas vs. Rosello [1927], 50 Phil., 97.)

Taking up now the sixth question after the fourth has been
solved by holding that the partition among the plaintiffs, intervenors, and
defendants is legal and valid, and since the personal and real property, the
cattle, and credits claimed by the defendants in their cross-complaint are
included in said partition, they are entitled to claim them from the plaintiffs
who now have them in their possession

With respect to the seventh question, the defendants, as
natural children of Antonio Centeno, acknowledged by the latter as such and
named as his heirs in his will, are entitled to one-half of the hereditary
portion belonging to their natural father from the estate of the deceased Isaac
Centeno, which was included in the inventory of the property left by the latter
and which was not included in the agreement of partition, the other half of said
hereditary portion of Antonio Centeno belonging to his mother Melchora Arroyo
who survived him, with said natural children.

As to the eighth question, the plaintiffs and intervenors in
their respective complaints pray for the annulment and setting aside of the
agreement of partition entered into by and between them and the defendants in
October, 1910, in so far only as it refers to the portion adjudicated to the
latter; that it be ordered that said defendants return to said plaintiffs and
intervenors what they have received in excess; and that it be ordered likewise
that in accordance with the wills of Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, the
property mentioned in paragraph six of the original complaint be partitioned
between the plaintiffs and intervenors, together with the property constituting
the portion adjudicated to the defendants in the said partition.

The defendants in their cross-complaint pray that the property
designated by Nos. 1 to 51, 53, 54, 60, 62, 69,116, 117, 118, 119 and 120, and
their corresponding fruits or their equivalent in money, be partitioned, and
that plaintiff Valentin Centeno be ordered to deliver to said defendants the
property specified in paragraph three of the cross-complaint, with all the fruits
produced, or which it should have produced from the year 1911 up to the present
time, or in its default thereof to pay the value of said fruits, plus the proper
legal interest thereon, and the costs of the action.

As will be seen, the action instituted by the plaintiffs and
the intervenors, respectively, is for the recovery of property through the
annulment of the partition, and to have another partition made. The defendants’
cross-complaint is for the recovery and partition of undivided property. The
ownership of the property which is the subject matter of the action for recovery
having been settled, and its delivery to the proper party ordered, and the
property belonging in common and pro indiviso to the parties determined, there
is no bar in law, either positive or adjective, to the partition thereof.

In the case of Africa vs. Africa (42 Phil., 934), this court
enunciated the following doctrine:

“1. PARTITION; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY; ACTION FOR.—An action
cannot be considered as one for the partition of an inheritance, even though it
is so entitled and the prayer of the complaint is to this effect, if any party
to the suit denies the pro indiviso character of the estate whose partition is
sought, and claims exclusive title thereto, or to any part thereof. In such case
the action becomes one for the recovery of property in so far as the property
claimed exclusively by any of the parties is concerned.”

What this court meant in saying that an action cannot be
considered as one for the partition of an inheritance, even though it is so
entitled and the prayer of the complaint is to this effect, if any party to the
suit denies the pro indiviso character of the estate whose partition is sought,
is that when the existence of co-ownership is not recognized by all the parties,
but that some claim to be exclusive owners thereof, and it is found that there
is no property to partition, the action for partition loses its character as
such and becomes one for the recovery of property; but when the action is for
the recovery of property based upon the annulment of a partition and at the same
time for the partition of the property declared to be undivided common property,
it is not improper to order the partition of the estate which has been declared
to be undivided common property, since there is no incompatibility between the
action for the recovery of property and for partition of an inheritance, once
the court has declared that the property, the recovery of which is sought,
belongs to the parties in common and pro indiviso.

The conjugal property which has just been declared to be pro
indiviso, and which must be divided into two equal parts for the purpose of
ascertaining the participation of the defendants separating the one-half which
corresponds to Isaac Centeno from the other half that belongs to Melchora
Arroyo. The defendants, as we have said, are only entitled to the one-half of
the hereditary portion which belonged to their natural father Antonio Centeno of
the conjugal property left by Isaac Centeno, and not to the conjugal property
left by Melchora Arroyo. There being three children who survived Isaac Centeno,
namely, Valentin, Faustino, and Antonio Centeno, said one-half of the conjugal
property which still remains undivided, left by Isaac Centeno, must be divided
into three parts, one-third pertaining pro indiviso to the children of Valentin
Centeno, and Faustino Centeno, respectively. Of the one-third which belongs to
Antonio Centeno, one-half, that is, one-sixth of the whole, is what belongs to
the defendants, and the other half, or the other sixth part, to his legitimate
mother Melchora Arroyo, who inherited from her legitimate son Antonio Centeno,
because he died before her, saving always the rights of Gabriela Fernandez, as
surviving spouse of Antonio Centeno.

As to the one-half of the undivided conjugal property which
belongs to Melchora Arroyo, the only ones entitled to it are. the plaintiffs and
intervenors.

Summarizing all the above, we are of the opinion, and so hold:
(1) That the defendants, as acknowledged natural children and named heirs of
Antonio Centeno in his will, are entitled to inherit the one-half of the
hereditary portion which their deceased natural father had inherited from his
legitimate father by will; (2) that said defendants, though they are
acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to the
reservation of, the one-half which Melchora Arroyo received as her ligitime
from the hereditary portion which her son had received from his father, Isaac
Centeno also legitimate; (3) that the defendants, though they are acknowledged
natural children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to represent the latter in
the inheritance of his legitimate mother Melchora Arroyo; (4) that the fact that
defendants, as acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, took part,
together with Valentin Centeno, legitimate brother of said Antonio Centeno, and
with the children of Faustino Centeno, another legitimate brother of said
deceased Antonio Centeno, in the partition of the estates left by Isaac Centeno
and Melchora Arroyo, father and mother of Antonio, Valentin and Faustino
Centeno, does not make the partition void; (5) that the partition made between
the heirs, while extrajudicial at the beginning became judicial on being
approved by the court after complying with the proper requirements prescribed by
the law, and once all the periods have elapsed within which the law permits its
revocation for any reason, it became final and irrevocable; (6) that the fact
that Jesus Centeno Second, son of Faustino Centeno, was a minor at the time the
agreement of partition was entered into, does not make said agreement void,
since he was represented by his mother Asuncion Arcebal, and when said agreement
was approved by the court, said representation was impliedly approved, and all
her acts became validated ipso facto; (7) that in the absence of a preponderance
of evidence to the contrary, the defendants are exclusive owners of the parcels
of land designated by Nos. 113 and 114, which are included in the inventory of
the estate of Isaac Centeno, having acquired title thereto by prescription; (8)
that the defendants, as cross-complainants, are entitled to the ownership and
possession of the two parcels of land described in the third paragraph of the
second cause of action of the cross-complaint, as well as the two mares and the
harness which are in possession of the plaintiffs; (9) that the defendants are
entitled to one-sixth part of the undivided conjugal property left by Isaac
Centeno, which is yet to be partitioned; (10) that the action for the recovery
of the undivided property is not incompatible with the action for partition,
once the existence of the community of the property of the estate whose recovery
and partition are sought, has been declared.

For the foregoing, and with the sole modification of ordering
the partition of the conjugal property left by the deceased spouses Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo declared by the lower court to be pro indiviso, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.