HELEN DAHLKE, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND ALBERT H. DAHLKE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CARMEN VINA, DEFENDANT. GIBBS & MCDONOUGH, APPELLEES.

May 27, 1927, the legal firm of Gibbs & McDonough filed the
following attorney’s lien:

“Come now the undersigned and to this Honorable Court
respectfully manifest:

“That they are the attorneys of record for the plaintiff and
appellee, Helen Dahlke; that this Honorable Court has rendered judgment therein
in favor of plaintiff and appellee, Helen Dahlke, and against Carmen Vina,
defendant and appellant.

“That the undersigned attorneys have and claim a lien upon said
judgment for services performed by them for said Helen Dahlke in the present
case and in various other matters prior to this date in the sum of two thousand
pesos (P2,000).

“Wherefore, the undersigned pray that the said lien be
noted of record for all legal effects.”

June 3, 1927, this court, through its Vacation Justice, made
the following order:

“Considering the pleading of the attorneys for the plaintiff
and appellee in the above entitled case, stating that said attorneys have and
claim a lien upon the judgment therein rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
appellee and against the defendant and appellant in the sum of P2,000, it is
ordered that the same be noted of record and certified copy thereof and of this
order be furnished the lower court when the record is
remanded.”

The case was then sent back to the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila, in which the attorneys filed the following petition:

“Come now the undersigned attorneys and to this Honorable Court
respectfully pray that an order issue directing the clerk of court to issue a
writ of execution in the name of the undersigned attorneys instead of the
plaintiff so that the amount of the judgment may be paid to the undersigned
attorneys direct.”

Upon which the court made the following order:

“This matter is now before the court upon a petition presented
by attorneys Gibbs & McDonough requesting for the reasons therein set forth
that a writ of execution be issued directing that the amount due under the
judgment herein be paid to them. It appearing that said petition is just and
reasonable:

“It is, therefore, ordered that a writ of execution
issue in the name of Gibbs & McDonough instead of the plaintiff, and that in
said writ the amount due under the judgment herein should be made payable to
said Gibbs & McDonough. So ordered.”

After which and on the same day, the appellant here filed a
motion stating in substance that the issuance of the execution in favor of the
attorneys would cause great harm to the plaintiff upon the ground: “(a)
That the plaintiff does not owe the said attdrneys any amount as great as that
nor has she been informed that she owes them anything,” and “(b) that
the plaintiff is not insolvent,” and that no formal demand has ever been made,
and prays that the order issuing the execution be revoked.

After a hearing and without the taking of any testimony as to
the value of the services by either party, the lower court denied plaintiff’s
motion, from which she appeals and contends that the lower court erred in its
order of June 10, 1927, directing that a writ of execution should be issued in
the name of the attorneys and not in the name of the plaintiff, and in deciding
that P2,000 should be paid to the attorneys for professional services without
any evidence or proof of the claim, and in admitting the petition of the
attorneys without giving the plaintiff a chance or opportunity to present her
objection.

JOHNS, J.:

The question involved is the legal construction to be placed on
section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is as follows:

“Lawyers’ Liens.—A lawyer shall have a lien upon all
the funds and papers and documents of his client which may lawfully have come
into his possession, and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements due to him from his client have been paid, and may apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof He shall also have a lien to the same extent
upon all judgments and decrees for the payment of money, and executions issued
in pursuance of such judgments and decrees which he has secured in a litigation
of his client, from and after, but not before, the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of
the court rendering such judgment or decree, or issuing such execution, and
shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to the adverse party,
and shall have the same right and power over such judgments, decrees, and
executions to enforce his lien as his client had or may have, to the extent that
may be necessary for the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.”

In the instant case, the lien in question was filed on a
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for and on account of legal services
which the attorneys rendered to plaintiff, and in all things and respects
complies with the terms and conditions of section 37 as to the preparation and
the filing of the lien.

It will be noted that the lien is not founded upon any express
written contract, and that the amount of the claim is in the nature of a
quantum meruit or the reasonable value of legal services performed, and
that there has never been any agreement between the parties or any legal
adjudication of the amount due or owing the attorneys. The section above quoted
expressly provides that the attorney shall have the same right and power over
such judgments, decrees, and executions to enforce his lien as his client had or
may have, to the extent that may be necessary for the payment of his just fees
and disbursements. In the instant case, the amount of the just fees has never
been legally determined, and in the very nature of things, it could not be
ascertained without an agreement between the parties or some evidence as to the
reasonable value of the legal services. In other words, upon the record before
us, the attorneys are legally entitled to a lien for the amount of their just
fees, but there has never been any legal adjudication of that amount.

The method of procedure in a case like this is well stated in
Corpus Juris, vol. 6, p. 794, in which it is said:

“Until a judgment is fully executed, the court retains
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties for the purpose of hearing
any motion affecting such judgment, and if the attorney desires to have his lien
established and declared against such judgment he may apply to the court for
that purpose. Thus in some jurisdictions the attorney’s lien upon a judgment may
be established and enforced upon an application to the court in the case wherein
the judgment was rendered, and, although it is sometimes held that this lien may
be enforced in an independent action by the attorney, yet ordinarily a motion in
the cause is the proper remedy. The attorney need not become a party to the
cause in order to enforce his lien upon the judgment, but in a proper case he
may be permitted to intervene. In such a proceeding it would be proper practice
for the attorney, on being admitted as a party, to file a petition in his own
name against both plaintiff and defendant, setting forth the particulars of his
claim and lien, so that if disputed by them answers could be filed, and the
issues made up, as in other cases. * * * While it is not necessary to the
existence of the lien that the amount due the attorney should be liquidated, yet
the exact amount of the claim should be determined before the lien can be
enforced. Ordinarily the amount of the attorney’s fee and the question as to how
much has been paid by the client thereon cannot be determined summarily on
motion and affidavits, but should be ascertained on a reference. But while the
court may refer the matter to a referee to take evidence, or even ah account,
and to report the same with his opinion to assist the court in deciding the
questions arising, it cannot delegate the entire matter to the referee for final
determination. And where a reference is authorized to determine the amount due
under an agreement, the referee cannot ignore the agreement and ascertain the
amount due on a quantum meruit. Where the facts are not disputed,
however, the court may find the value of the attorney’s services from the facts
before it.”

We are clearly of the opinion that the attorneys are legally
entitled to a lien for the amount of their just fees, and that the filing of the
notice of the lien in question in the manner in which it was done is a
compliance with the statute and fully protects the legal rights of the attorneys
as to the lien. But upon the facts disclosed in the record, we are clearly of
the opinion that the appellant had a legal right to be heard as to the amount of
the lien and as to the amount only. In the absence of a specific written
contract, the filing of the lien for the reasonable value of legal services does
not within itself legally ascertain and determine the amount of the lien, in
particular, where, as in this case, the amount is contested.

Upon the facts in this case, it devolved upon the attorneys
claiming to both allege and prove that the amount is unpaid, reasonable and
just, and upon that question the client has a legal right to be heard.
Otherwise, he would be bound by the amount specified in the lien even though it
was not just or it may have been paid.

Nothing said in this opinion should be construed as to saying
what is the just amount of the attorney’s lien. Upon that question we do not
have or express an opinion.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case
remanded, with leave to each party to produce evidence as to the value of the
services performed and the amount for which the attorneys should have a lien,
and when that is judicially determined by the court, that execution may then
issue as prayed for in the motion of June 10, 1927, without costs to either
party. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.