G.R. No. 28208. September 03, 1928
GREGORIO FIGUERAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SIMEON SERRANO, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LEANDRO SERRANO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
for medical services amounting to P52,229, with P7,310 interest, plus P5,000
damages, and the costs of the action.
Besides filing a general denial and a special defense, the
defendant sets up two counterclaims: One for P10,000 damages on account of the
plaintiff’s having prevented the partition of the estate of the deceased Leandro
Serrano among his heirs, by means of a groundless, unreasonable claim of fees;
and another for P200,000 damages also, on the ground that Primitiva Serrano lost
her eyesight completely, due to lack of diligence and precaution on the
plaintiff’s part in not having given her proper treatment, in consequence of
which the patient suffered hardships and moral depression.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur which
tried the case, reads as follows:
“In consideration of the foregoing, the court orders the
defendant administrator Simeon Serrano to pay plaintiff out of the funds of the
estate of the deceased Leandro Serrano the sum of nineteen thousand one hundred
and fortyfour pesos (P19,144) with legal interest from the date of the filing of
the complaint, and the costs of the action.“The plaintiff is absolved from defendant’s counterclaim. So
ordered.”
The plaintiff acquiesced in this decision, but not so the
defendant, who appeals assigning the following errors as committed by the trial
court:
“1. In not dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
there being no evidence that the appellee’s appeal from the decision of the
committee of claims of the testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Leandro Serrano, was taken within the legal period.“2. In admitting as evidence for the appellee, Exhibits C, H,
I, J, E, and N, and in not finding that these exhibits are false and
apocryphal.“3. In holding that the appellee and the deceased Leandro
Serrano agreed that said appellee would be entitled to charge P4 for each of the
27 kilometers between Vigan and Cabugao, for the services he would render
Primitiva Serrano.“4. In admitting as evidence Exhibits Q and R, A, B, E, F, G,
L, M, O, P, S, T, U, W, W-1, W-2, X, Y, Z, Z-1, Z-2, CC, DD, and BE, presented
by the appellee.“5. In finding that the appellee made 134 medical visits to
Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao, and 195 in Vigan, and that during these 195 visits
the appellee gave Primitiva Serrano 161 electrical treatments, 120 intramuscular
injections, 132 eye treatments and 192 treatments of both eyes.“6. In not finding that the appellee made no more than 26
medical visits in Cabugao and 90 visits in Vigan, and that on commencing the
treatment of Primtiva Serrano, said appellee agreed to charge P20 for each visit
in Cabugao and P2 for each visit in Vigan when the patient was brought to the
latter municipality.“7. In holding that, besides the medical services rendered to
Primitiva Serrano by the appellee, he treated Leandro Serrano also, having made
126 visits in Cabugao.“8. In holding that the reasonable price of the electrical
treatments, injections and eye treatments is P15 for each treatment, P5 for each
injection, and 92 for each eye treatment.“9. In ordering appellant to pay the appellee P19,144 with
interest and the costs of the action when it should have held that the
appellee’s fees are already fully paid.“10. In not upholding appellant’s counterclaim and in not
ordering the appellee to pay the sum claimed therein.”
According to the complaint, the services for which compensation
is here claimed consist in medical attendance during the years 1919, 1920, and
1921, on Primitiva Serrano as well as on her father Leandro Serrano, for which
purpose the plaintiff, who at that time lived in Vigan, had to make many trips
to the town of Cabugao, 27 kilometers distant from where said patients lived.
Leandro Serrano is now dead, and the complaint here is directed against his
estate, represented by the defendant administrator. It is also alleged therein
that Leandro Serrano promised to pay for plaintiff’s trips to the town of
Cabugao at the rate of P4 per kilometer.
The principal evidence adduced to prove this promise is the
letter Exhibit C which is alleged to be addressed to the plaintiff and signed by
Leandro Serrano. The defendant assails the authenticity of this letter and the
signature at the bottom thereof. Indeed, we notice as to the context that the
typewritten characters therein are very similar to those of Exhibit 2 (p. 184 of
the record) which is a letter written by the plaintiff’s brother. The difference
we observe in the typewriting of these documents consists in that in Exhibit C
the type is more worn, thus suggesting the fact that it was written later. The
prior date appearing in it does not preclude this conclusion, for any date, past
or future, may at a given time be written on any document.
A careful examination of Exhibit C reveals some details which
bear out the presumption that it was written on the same typewriter as document
Exhibit 2.
And the changes and erasures which have not been satisfactorily
explained, likewise argue against the admissibility of this exhibit.
The remarkable resemblance almost identical, in point of size
and contour, between the signature in Exhibit G and the one in Exhibit J, as may
be clearly seen by placing one upon the other, casts serious doubts on, its
genuineness. It seems hardly probable that Leandro Serrano should have been able
to write two signatures so exactly alike, not only in the curvature at the base
of the letters, and in the form of the small as well as the capital letters, but
also in the distance between them, the space they occupy, and the slant of the
strokes of the whole signature as well as of each letter thereof, and even in
the length, contour, and other details of the paraph.
As thele details strongly indicate that Exhibit C is not
genuine, we cannot consider it as reliable proof in this case. The burden of
proof was on plaintiff to show, at least by a preponderance of evidence, that
this document was admissible evidence of record, and, in this case, the
preponderance militates against the document.
It cannot be held proven, therefore, that Leandro Serrano
promised to pay the plaintiff P4 for every kilometer of his trips to Cabugao on
his medical visits.
The preponderance of admissible evidence of record is to the
effect that the cost of each of such visits to Cabugao is about P25. Considering
plaintiff’s social standing, he was entitled to use an automobile as the most
adequate mode of transportation.
Exhibits Q and R are objected to by the defendant as not duly
identified and as incompetent evidence. It is true that the witnesses Parto and
Florendo testified that they recognize the writing in said notebooks as
plaintiff’s, but there is no proof that the notes in these exhibits were written
with the knowledge and consent, or even in the presence, of Leandro Serrano.
Neither does it appear that such notes were made at the time of the visits and
professional services referred to therein, or that they were written about that
time. And the appearance of the writing in these books (Exhibits Q and R) does
not show that such notes were made therein oh different occasions and at
different periods of time, considering the noticeable uniformity of the
handwriting and of the color of the ink used (in Exhibit Q), in almost all the
entries, notwithstanding the fact that these entries cover a period of over one
year.
It is absolutely necessary for the admission of such entries to
prove that they were made at or about the time of the transaction to which they
relate. Once this is proven they may be admitted to corroborate the testimony of
the person who made them.
“Written memoranda made at or about the time of the transaction
to which they relate are sometimes admitted in evidence to corroborate the
testimony of the person by whom they were made.” (22 C. J.,
896.)
But the fact is that Exhibits Q and R not only do not meet the
requirement as to being contemporaneous, but it appears that the plaintiff who
made the memoranda noted therein did not even testify concerning them.
These exhibits cannot, therefore, be taken into consideration
to determine the number of visits made by the plaintiff nor that of the times he
rendered professional services.
The appellee alleges that said entries are corroborated by the
witnesses Florendo, Formoso, Figueras and Arcebal, the first three of whom,
chauffeurs who successively took the plaintiff to Cabugao, among themselves
fixed the total number of trips to Cabugao at about one hundred, and Arcebfid
testified that at the time in question, he saw the plaintiff stop in front of
the municipal building of Cabugao two or three times a week, going in the
direction of Leandro Serrano’s house. The number of times testified to by these
witnesses, is, as it could not otherwise be as inferred from their own
testimony, mere conjecture, without sufficient assurance of approximation, much
less exactness. What these witnesses definitely established and wherein they
corroborate the notebooks Exhibits Q and R, is that the plaintiff made trips to
Cabugao, a fact admitted by the defendant. But as to the number of said trips,
which is the point in question, the testimony of these witnesses, with all its
uncertainty on this point, cannot be considered as either direct or
corroborative evidence.
We therefore find that the plaintiff’s evidence does not supply
data legally competent to ascertain the number of times he was in Cabugao to
render professional services to Primitiva Serrano.
According to the defendant’s evidence consisting of Exhibits 6,
7, 9 and 10, identified by Pedro Suero and Simeon Serrano, the plaintiff made
twenty-six medical visits to Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao, and ninety in Vigari.
Not only are these Exhibits 6, 7, 9 and 10, identified, but it appears from the
testimony of Pedro Suero, that he, as former clerk to Leandro Serrano, was
enjoined to note down in Exhibits 6 and 7, which are Bristol Almanacs for the
years 1919 and 1920, the name of Gregorio Figueras, whenever said physician paid
a professional visit to Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao. And it appears from the
testimony of Simeon Serrano that he used to record plaintiff’s medical visits to
witness’ sister, Primitiva Serrano, in Vigan, in the almanacs Exhibits 9 and 10
with the initial 6 and the letters “a. m.” or “p.m.” according as they were
made in the morning or afternoon.
Unlike the entries in Exhibits Q and R, those of Exhibits 6, 7,
9 and 10, are competent evidence, because, in addition to being sufficiently
identified by the persons who made them at the time of the visits, their
appearance, details, and the fact that they were made at the time of the visits
so recorded, render them competent corroborative evidence under the rule above
quoted from Corpus Juris (22 C. J., 896) and in accordance with the provision of
section 279 of our present Code of Civil Procedure.
Consequently we conclude that the number of visits proven in
these proceedings is 26 in Cabugao and 90 in Vigan, and that the evidence shows
that the plaintiff is entitled to receive P25 for each visit to Primitiva
Serrano in Cabugao and P2 for each visit to her in Vigan, or a sum total of
P830, as professional fees. It has not been sufficiently proven that these
amounts do not include the fees for the treatment given on such visits, nor that
the reasonable price of electrical treatments, injections and eye treatments
(which in themselves are not sufficiently established) is P15 for each
electrical treatment, P5 for each injection, and P2 for each eye treatment.
It does not appear sufficiently established that the plaintiff
rendered medical service to Leandro Serrano.
With regard to the appellant’s allegation of lack of
jurisdiction, the lower court could take judicial notice of the administration
proceedings in which the estate was represented by the defendant and when that
court proceeded to hear this case on appeal from the committee on claims, it
must be presumed that in doing so, taking judicial notice of the legality of the
appeal, it acted in the performance of its duty, and within the scope of its
jurisdiction. (Sec. 334, Nos. 14 and 15, Code of Civil Procedure.) And this
presumption not having been rebutted by evidence to the contrary, it
sufficiently proves the allegation in the first paragraph of the complaint
relative to. the perfection of the present appeal from the committee on
claims.
We agree with the court a quo that the defendant’s
counterclaims have not been sufficiently proven.
Having rendered our decision on the determining points of the
case, we deem it unnecessary for the purposes of this decision to take up the
other assignments of error in detail.
It appearing that the plaintiff admitted, and that the trial
judge so held without any objection from said plaintiff, that the latter has
already been paid the sum of P1,025 on account of the fees here in question, and
as the sum of P830 as above stated to which he is thus entitled is less than
that, said fees have already been amply satisfied.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and
defendant is absolved from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue in this case is the reasonable value of the
professional services performed by Dr. Gregorio Figueras for Leandro Serrano.
The issue is not as to whether Dr. Gregorio Figueras is criminally guilty of
fabricating the much discussed Exhibit C. With or without Exhibit C, there is
sufficient evidence, including the physician’s book of account, which
establishes satisfactorily the approximate number of visits made by Doctor
Figueras to Mr. Serrano and the proper amount for each visit. (30 Cyc., 1603.)
The total demanded by Doctor Figueras of the estate of Mr. Serrano coming to
over P60,000 is grossly exaggerated. Even the sum of P19,144 granted by the
trial judge is too high. Yet there is no need to be so carried away by an
enthusiastic desire to condemn unethical and unprofessional practices in making
evidence to establish claims when no such evidence is necessary, as to throw out
the action entirely and concede nothing to Doctor Figueras. Figuring on a basis
of approximately two hundred visits to Cabugao, the home of the deceased, at P20
a visit and nearly the same number of consultations at the office of the
physician at P2 a consultation, and adding a reasonable sum for special services
and treatments, and taking into consideration the professional standing of
Doctor Figueras, it is my opinion that the physician should be allowed P5,000
for his services. That is my vote and to that extent I dissent.