THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE MARIANO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

People versus Mariano

The Case

This is the People of the Philippine Islands against Vicente Mariano, a criminal appeal in which the accused was convicted of abuse against chastity and later married the offended party. The legal question is whether that marriage extinguished his criminal liability. The case matters because it is the classic illustration of how the Supreme Court reads a statute that names only the graver crimes — rape, abduction, and seduction — and asks whether the lesser offense of abuse against chastity is swept in by the legislative purpose. It is a study in statutory construction, in the rule that the greater includes the lesser, and in the boundary between interpreting a law and legislating.

Procedural History

The accused was charged with abuse against chastity before the Court of First Instance of Manila. After trial, that court convicted him and sentenced him to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and the costs of the action. The accused appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, on August 3, 1927, he filed a motion praying for dismissal of the case on the ground that he had married the offended party, attaching the marriage certificate to the motion. The Attorney General opposed the motion, arguing that the marriage could not extinguish liability for abuse against chastity. The Supreme Court resolved the motion as part of the appeal.

Facts

Vicente Mariano was prosecuted for the crime of abuse against chastity. The Court of First Instance of Manila found him guilty and imposed a prison term, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.

While the appeal was pending, the accused married the offended party. He then filed a motion asking the Court to dismiss the case, relying on the marriage certificate he attached. The fact of the marriage and the identity of the parties were not disputed. The only question was legal: whether the marriage wiped out his criminal liability.

The Attorney General opposed the motion. He discussed the scope of Article 448 of the Penal Code and of Act Number 1773, which amended it, and concluded that marriage to the offended party does not extinguish liability for abuse against chastity. The Court therefore had to decide whether the statute's reference to rape reaches the lesser crime of abuse against chastity.

Issues

• Whether or not Section 2 of Act Number 1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among the cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the accused to the offended party.
• Whether or not the crime of rape, as named in that proviso, includes abuse against chastity, such that the accused's marriage extinguished his criminal liability.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Act Number 1773, the provision the Court construes, provides:

Condonation, pardon, or remission of penalty by the aggrieved person or the parents, grandparents, or guardian of such person shall in no way extinguish the liability of the guilty person or persons to criminal prosecution and punishment, nor shall such condonation, pardon, or remission operate to dismiss or suspend any prosecution once commenced in accordance with the provisions of the preceding section: Provided, however, That in cases of estupro, rapto, or violation the legal marriage of the accused of convicted person to the aggrieved person shall extinguish such criminal liability.

The entire case turns on whether the word "violation," meaning rape, in that proviso reaches abuse against chastity.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Section 2 of Act Number 1773 does include abuse against chastity. The Court acknowledged that rape and abuse against chastity are distinct crimes, both found in the same chapter of the Penal Code, with rape in Article 438 and abuse against chastity in Article 439. Rape requires the intention to lie, while abuse against chastity does not. Yet the Court stressed that this difference does not prevent the two crimes from being of the same nature. It noted that when a complaint alleges consummated, frustrated, or attempted rape, and the proof shows only lewd acts not amounting to attempted rape, the accused may be convicted of abuse against chastity, because that crime is included in rape.

On the second issue, the Court held that abuse against chastity is included in the rape named in the proviso, and so the marriage extinguished the accused's criminal liability. The Court reasoned from the Legislature's intent: the purpose of Act Number 1773 was that marriage of the accused or convict to the offended party should extinguish criminal liability in seduction, abduction, and rape, and in offenses included in those crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction, or rape. The Court put the point this way:

If the liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes.

The Court added that if abuse against chastity is not called rape, it is only for lack of the intention to lie, the two crimes being identical in every other respect though of different degrees of gravity. To hold abuse against chastity included, the Court said, is not to misinterpret the law or thwart its lofty and wholesome purposes. The Court also clarified that the commentaries on Article 448 of the Penal Code, which Act Number 1773 modified, could not serve as authority for interpreting Section 2 of the new Act.

Doctrine

First, where a statute extinguishes criminal liability by marriage in the graver crimes of seduction, abduction, and rape, the lesser offense of abuse against chastity is included, because the greater includes the lesser and the law's purpose is served by the stronger reason. Second, in construing a statute, the Court gives effect to the legislative intent, and a crime not named may still fall within the provision when it is of the same nature as, and included in, a crime that is named. Third, commentaries on a prior law that has been amended do not control the interpretation of the amending statute. These rules tie directly to the proviso in Section 2 of Act Number 1773, which names estupro, rapto, and violation, and to the Court's holding that abuse against chastity is embraced within violation.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the accused's motion, dismissed the case, and ordered the costs of the instance de oficio, with Justice Malcolm dissenting.

Remember This

Memorize the line that if liability is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, for a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Examiners use this case to test statutory construction and the greater includes the lesser rule, and to contrast the majority's purposive reading with Justice Malcolm's warning against judicial legislation.