BARA LIDASAN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections1 is
this:  Is Republic Act 4790, which is
entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao del Sur“,
but which includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato
– to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that
“No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”? Comelec’s
answer is in the affirm Live.  Offshoot
is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On June 18, 1966,
the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill known as Republic Act.  4790, now in dispute.  The body of the statute reproduced in haec verba, reads:

“SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur,
are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and
independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality
of Dianaton, Province of Lanao
del Sur.  The
seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new
municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general
elections for local officials.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.”

It came to light later that barrios Togaig
and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko Colodan, and Kabamakawa, are parts and parcel of another municipality,
the municipality of Parang, also in the Province
of Cotobato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec
adopted its resolution of August 15,
1967, the pertinent portions of which are:

“For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of
voters and for other election purposes, the Commission, RESOLVED that pursuant
to R.A. 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lano del Sur shall comprise the
barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magoletung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.”

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios – in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato – are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur.
This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces,

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President., through
the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec
that the operation of the statute be suspended until “clarified by
correcting legislation.”

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own
interpretation, declared that the statute “should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and
prohibition by Bars Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer
of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He
prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec’s resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral
purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement
afore-stated, that “[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”^[2]

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional
provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.  First. 
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of hetero­geneous
subjects:  Second.  The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned
of the import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive.  The subject of the statute must be
“expressed in the title” of the bill. 
This constitutional require­ment “breathes the spirit of
command.”^[3]
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not ‘exact
of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of
the bill.  In fact, in the case of House
Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives,^[4]
where the bill, being of local application, originated.^[5]

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.  It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.  And this, to lead them to inquire into the
body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon,
and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.^[6]

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute
conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be
taken as guidelines:

“The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it
is misleading; and, while technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject
need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain
that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really
embraced in the act or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act, is
bad,

x                                   x                                  x

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance
rather than its form should be considered
and the purpose of the constitutional
requirement, of giving notice to all
persons interested should be, kept in mind
by the court.^[7]

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the
disputed statute.  The title – “An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the
Province of Lanao del Sur“^[8] –
projects the impression that solely the province
of Lanao del Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton.  Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province
of Cotabato
are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town.  The phrase
“in the Province of Lanao del Sur,”
read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,
deceptive.  For, the known fact is that
the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute:  (1) it creates the mucipality
of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in
the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato,
a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not
so difficult to perceive.  Such title did
not inform the members of Congress as to the fall impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur;
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill.  These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
4790.

Respondent’s stance is that the change in boundaries of the two
provinces resulting in “the substantial diminution of the territorial
limits” of Cotabato province is “merely the
incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary” of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore,
reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are
taken away “need not be expressed in the title of the law.” This
posture – we must say but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in
writing down the title of the bill. 
Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another
of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and
the corresponding increase of those of the other.  This is as important as the creation of a
municipality.  And yet, the title did not
reflect this fact.

Respondent asks us to read Felwa
vs. Salas L-26511, October
29, 1966, as controlling here. 
The Felwa case is not in focus.  For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act
4695) reads:  “An Act Creating the
Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao,
and KalingaApayao.” That title was assailed as
unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section 8
thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created,
were not set forth in the title of the bill. 
We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit “for, surely,
an.  Act creating said provinces must be
expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof” –
which is “manifestly germane to the subject” of the legislation, as
set forth in its title.  The statute now
before us stands altogether on a different footing.  The lumping together of barrios in adjacent
but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical
consequence of the creation of the new municipality
of Dianaton.  A change of boundaries of the two provinces
may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.

As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is
drawn to Hume vs. Village
of Fruitport, 219 NW
648, 649.  There, the statute in
controversy bears the title “An Act to Incorporate the Village
of Fruitport, in the County
of Muskegon.”  The statute, however, in its Section 1
reads:  “The people of the state of Michigan
enact, that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon
and Ottawa, Michigan,
to wit:  x x x be, and the same is hereby constituted a village
corporate, by the name of the Village
of Fruitport.”  This statute was challenged as void by
plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa,
county, in an action to restrain the Village from exercising jurisdiction and
control, including taxing of his lands. 
Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan
State Constitution, which reads: 
“No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be
expressed in its title.” The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and
defendant appealed.  The Supreme Court of
Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. 
The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:

“It may be that the words, ‘An act to incorporate the village
of Fruitport,’ would have been a sufficient title, and that the words, ‘in the
county of Muskegon,’ were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that
the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.

x x x Under the
guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject
a part of the title of an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Wooly, 56 N.J. Eq.
649, 39 A. 539.

A purpose of the provision of the
Constitution is to challenge the attention
of those affected by the act to its
provisions.  Savings Bank vs.
State of Michigan, 228 Mich.
316, 200 NW 262.

The title here is restrictive.  It restricts the operation
of the act to Muskegon
country.  The act goes
beyond the res­triction ill was said in
Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra:  ‘The title is erroneous
in the worst degree, for it is
misleading.”^[9]

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political
subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were
likewise declared unconstitutional.^[10]

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be
salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Bala-bagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere
nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the
municipalities of Buldon and Parang
in the other province of Cotabato.  The reasoning advocated is that the limited
title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province
of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of
long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional
and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional
portion upheld.  Black, however gives the
exception to this; rule, thus:

“x x x But
when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all
could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions
which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.”^[11]

In substantially similar language, the same exception is
recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:

“The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as
repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.  But in order to do this, the valid portion
must be so far independent of the invalid portion that
it is fair to presume that the
Legislature would have enacted it by itself
if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other.  x x x Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and
valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent.  x x x.  The language used
in the invalid part of the statute ran have no legal force or efficacy for any
purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will independently of the void
part, since the court has no power
to legislate, x x x.”^[12]

Could we indulge in the assumption, that Congress still intended,
by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns
of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town
“of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios
in the towns of Buldon and Parang,
Cotabato, were to be excluded therefrom?
The answer must be in the negative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions.  Firstly.  They serve as an instrumentality of the State
in carrying out the functions of government. 
Secondly.  They act as an
agency of the community in the administration of local affairs.  It is in the latter character that they are a
separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdi­vision of the
State.^[13]

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consider­ation
of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an
independent municipality.  Amongst these
are population, territory, and income. 
It was apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of
House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton.  Speaking of the original twenty–one
barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House
Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:

“The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate
population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an
independent municipality.

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants
concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal
autonomy.”

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress,
unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine barrios – was
in the mind of the proponent thereof. 
That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality
of Buldon
in Cotabato. 
And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus:  Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain
an independent municipality, still apply to a motely
group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one?  Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of
the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a
municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent
municipal corporation?  Could they stand
on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community?  How about the peace and order, sanitation,
and other corporate obligations?  This
Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions.  And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or
to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an
undeclared will.  With the known premise
that Dianaton was created upon the basic
considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and
sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only 9 – of the original 21 – barrios, with,
a seat of government still left to be conjectured.  For, this unduly stretches judicial
interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point.  To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which
circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises.  Paying due respect to the traditional separation
of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended
twenty-one barrios.  Really, if these
nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress,
not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.

Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable and it is accordingly null
and void in its totality.^[14]

3. There remains for consideration the issue re raised by
respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely
affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790.  Stated differently, respondent’s pose is that
petitioner is not the real party in interest.

Here, the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that
it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be
expressed in its title.  Capacity to sue,
therefore, hinges on whether petitioner’s substantial rights or interests are
impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is
residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community
affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is
not dismembering his place of residence “in accordance with the
Constitution” is recognized in this jurisdiction.^[15]

Petitioner is a qualified voter. 
He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own
barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected.  He may not want, as is the case here, to vote
in a town different from his actual residence. 
He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are formed into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the
place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights
and benefits he acquired therein.  He may
not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire
to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the
officials in the town before dismemberment. 
Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in
its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,^[16]
it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the
part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null
and void and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for
electoral purposes.

No costs allowed.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

1
Hereinafter referred to as Commelec.

^[2]
Article VI, See. 21 (1), Philippine Constitution.

^[3] Stiglitz vs.  Schiardien, 40 SW 2d 315, 317, 320.

^[4]
Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 40, p. 8; Vol. I, No. 50, pp. 40-41

^[5]
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution, provides:

“SEC. 18.  All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.”

^[6]
Vidal de Roces vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 108, 111-112; Ichong vs.  Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155, 1188-1190.

^[7]  82 C.J.S., pp. 385, 370; emphasis supplied.

^[8]  Emphasis ours.

^[9]
Emphasis supplied.

^[10] Examples:  Wilcox vs. Paddock, 31 NW 609, where
the statute entitled “An act making an appropriation of state swamp lands
to aid the county of Gratiot in improving the channel of Maple river x x x” but the body of the act
affected another county other than Gratiot.

State vs. Burr, 238 P 585, the statute entitled “An act to
amend Secs. 4318 and 4327 of the Codes of Montana
relating to changing the boundaries of Fergus and Judith Basin counties” was rendered
void because the body of the act included the boundaries of Petroleum county.

Atchison vs. Kearney County, 48 P 583, where the title
of the act purported to attach Kearney county to Finney county but
the body of the act attached it to Hamilton county.

State vs. Nelson, 98 So. 715, the title of the act purporting to
alter or rearrange the boundaries of Decatur city and the body of the
act which actually diminished the boundary lines of the city were considered by
the court as dealing with incongruous matters. 
The reading of the former would give no clear suggestion that the latter
would follow and be made the subject of the act.  Jackson, Clerk vs.  Sherrod, 92 So. 481; City of Ensley vs. Simpson, 52 So.
81, cited.

Fairview vs, City of Detroit, 113 NW 368,
where the title gave notice that the entire village of Fairview is annexed to
Detroit when the body affected only a portion.

^[11]
Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2d. ed., p. 116.

^[12] Barrameda vs. Moir, 25
Phil. 44, 47-48, quoted in Government vs. Springer, 50
Phil. 259, 292; emphasis supplied.

^[13]
I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., pp.
456-464.

^[14] In the case of Fuqua vs.
City of Mobile, 121 So. 696, it was asserted that the portion of
the statute excluding a territory from Mobile which was not expressed in
the title “An act to alter and rearrange the boundary lines of the city of
Mobile in the state of Alabama” should be the only
portion invalidated. The court, using the test whether or not after the
objectionable feature is stricken off there would still remain an act complete
in itself, sensible, capable of being executed, ruled that there can be no
segregation of that portion dealing with the excluded territory from that
dealing with additional territory because these two matters are all embraced
and intermingled in one section dealing with the corporate limits of the city.

In the case of Engle vs. Bonnie, 204
SW 2d 963, the statute involved was entitled “An Act relating to
cities”.  Section 4 there of
“requires the creation of a municipality on petition of a majority of
voters or 500 voters.”  But some of
the provisions were germane to the title of the law.  This statute was declared void in toto. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky ruled as follows:

“The judgment declared only Section 4
[relative to the creation of a municipality on petition of the voters] to be
void and the remainder valid.  While some
of the provisions of the act are germane to the title, since they deal with the
classification of cities to be created, they seem merely to harmonize other
sections of the statute which they amend with a new creation of cities other
than sixth class towns.  To remove only
Section 4 would be like taking the motor of an automobile which leaves the
machine of no use.  We are quite sure
that these provisions would not have been enacted without Section 4; hence,
they too must fall.”

^[15]  Macias vs. The Commission on
Elections, 58 Off. Gaz. (51) 8388.

^[16]
Brooks vs. Hydorn, 42 NW 1122, 1123-1124; Fairview
vs. City of Detroit, 113 NW
368, 370.

150
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