XXX280727, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

XXX280727 versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a criminal case in which a woman stands accused of sexually abusing her eleven-year-old nephew. The petitioner, XXX280727, was the boy's paternal aunt, and the People of the Philippines prosecuted her for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The case matters because the Supreme Court not only settles the petitioner's guilt but also clarifies the boundary between statutory acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code and lascivious conduct punished as child sexual abuse under Republic Act Number 7610, and because it confronts the gendered language of the rape law, which historically excluded the possibility that a woman may be the perpetrator.

Procedural History

An information for acts of lasciviousness was filed against XXX280727 before the Regional Trial Court. On arraignment she pleaded not guilty, and after pretrial, trial on the merits followed. In a decision dated December 2, 2022, the Regional Trial Court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610 and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordered her to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of 50,000 pesos each, plus costs, with interest at six percent per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.

XXX280727 appealed. In its decision of August 30, 2024, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the conviction with modification as to the penalty, raising the maximum to sixteen years, five months and nine days of reclusion temporal. It found all the elements of acts of lasciviousness present and held that the petitioner used her influence and moral ascendancy over the eleven-year-old boy. Her motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals resolution of April 29, 2025. She then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court.

Facts

On September 7, 2018, then eleven-year-old AAA280727 visited the house of his paternal relatives. That night he slept in his father's room, but later transferred to the air-conditioned room of XXX280727, the half-sister of his father, who was then twenty-five years old. According to the boy, XXX280727 woke him in the middle of the night, ordered him to remove his clothes and lie on her bed, removed her own clothes, placed a condom on his penis, went on top of him, and inserted his penis into her vagina. The act lasted about ten minutes. When she was done, she told him to put his clothes back on and not to tell anyone, or else she would lie that he had raped her. He testified that he did not protest at first because he was curious, but afterward he felt ashamed and contemplated suicide.

The abuse came to light on February 16, 2019, when the boy's maternal uncle, BBB280727, was asked by the boy's mother, who was working in Saudi Arabia, to confront the boy about a group chat with his friends. When confronted, the boy told his uncle what had happened between him and XXX280727. On February 19, 2019, psychiatrist Dr. Bernadette Manalo-Arcena conducted a psychological debriefing and supportive psychotherapy. She noted symptoms of anxiety and depression, flashbacks, nightmares, and suicidal thoughts, and diagnosed the boy with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, advising anti-depressant medication and continued psychotherapy.

For her defense, XXX280727 denied the accusations and claimed that on the night of the incident she slept in a room with her other siblings while the boy slept in another room with his cousin, grandmother, and father. Her sister and mother corroborated her account. The boy's father, her brother, testified that the case was filed only to deprive him of custody of his son, since he and his wife were separated and fighting over custody.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the petitioner's conviction for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610.
• Whether or not the petitioner should be convicted of statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code rather than of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610, as worded before its amendment in 2022, provides:

SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.

This provision bears on the case because it expressly directs that when the victim is under twelve years of age, the perpetrator is prosecuted under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code for lascivious conduct, although the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is still imposed.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as worded during the commission of the crime on September 7, 2018, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

This provision bears on the case because its gendered language, requiring that the offender be a man and the offended party a woman, excludes the act committed by the petitioner from the definition of rape.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as revised by Republic Act Number 11648, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a person who shall have carnal knowledge of another person under any of the following circumstances: d) When the offended party is under sixteen (16) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present: Provided, That there shall be no criminal liability on the part of a person having carnal knowledge of another person under sixteen (16) years of age when the age difference between the parties is not more than three (3) years, and the sexual act in question is proven to be consensual, non-abusive, and non-exploitative: Provided, further, That if the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, this exception shall not apply.

This provision bears on the case because the Court notes that the revision theoretically allows rape to be committed by a person of either sex, even as jurisprudence still construes carnal knowledge as penetration of the female sexual organ by the male sexual organ.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly found the petitioner culpable. The reliability of a decision is not diminished by the fact that the judge who penned it was different from the judge who heard the witnesses, unless grave abuse of discretion is shown in the substitute judge's appreciation of facts. Here, the substitute judge had the transcript of stenographic notes containing all that was said during the hearings. On the credibility of the boy, the Court held that people vary in their reactions and in the way they cope with distressing situations, and that victims of rape or sexual abuse should not be burdened to resist or to have a standard reaction when intimidated and under emotional stress. The boy's clear and credible narration established the petitioner's culpability.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioner should be convicted of statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and not of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610. Following Gramatica versus People, acts of lasciviousness under Republic Act Number 7610 apply only when a minor gives a semblance of consent, albeit flawed, to sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult. It does not apply where a minor is entirely unaware, unconscious, or unable to give legal consent. The Court explained:

The Court finds that the term "sexual abuse," as defined under Republic Act No. 7610, encompasses situations wherein a minor indulges—or put differently, consents, albeit defectively—to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct as a result of coercion or undue influence exerted by an adult.

Since the age of sexual consent at the time of the incident in 2018 was twelve years old, the eleven-year-old boy was deemed unable to give consent. The proper denomination of the crime is therefore statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the maximum is taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, from fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months, while the minimum, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is taken from prision mayor, ranging from six years and one day to twelve years. The Court also noted that the petitioner was charged with statutory acts of lasciviousness because her acts did not fall within any definition of rape under Article 266-A as worded at the time, since the law then required a male offender and a female victim, leaving a void where a woman puts a man's penis into her vagina without consent.

Doctrine

First, acts of lasciviousness under Republic Act Number 7610 apply only when the minor gives a semblance of consent, albeit flawed, to the sexual act because of the coercion or influence of an adult; it does not apply where the minor is entirely unaware, unconscious, or unable to give legal consent. Second, where the victim is under twelve years of age, the perpetrator is prosecuted for lascivious conduct under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is still imposed, as Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610 expressly provides. Third, the reliability of a decision is not diminished by the fact that the judge who penned it was not the judge who heard the witnesses, absent grave abuse of discretion. Fourth, victims of sexual abuse are not burdened to resist or to show a standard reaction, since people vary in how they cope with distress. Fifth, the gendered language of the old rape law excluded from rape the act of a woman who, without consent, puts a man's penis into her vagina, a gap that Republic Act Number 11648 sought to address by using the word person instead of man and woman.

Disposition

The petition was denied as to guilt, but the petitioner was convicted of statutory acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code rather than lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610, and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine years, four months and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to sixteen years, five months and nine days of reclusion temporal as maximum, with civil indemnity raised to 150,000 pesos.

Remember This

Remember that Republic Act Number 7610 covers only the minor who consents, albeit defectively, while the minor who cannot consent at all falls under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, with the medium period of reclusion temporal still imposed when the victim is under twelve. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between statutory acts of lasciviousness and child sexual abuse, and to probe the gendered language of the rape law before Republic Act Number 11648.