SOCORRO V. ALEJANO, EUGENIO P. ALEJANO, RODOLFO ALEJANO, EUGENIO V. ALEJANO, JR. AND CONCEPCION ALEJANO DE PERLAS, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND…

Petitioners seek the reconsideration of the resolution of this
Court of September 28, 1967, denying their petition for review on certiorari of
a decision of the Court of Appeals.  No
further legal arguments are adduced in support of their petition, their plea
for reconsideration being buttressed on the claim that such a denial “has
deprived them of their only chance to find redress from the errors of law
committed” not only by the trial court but by the Court of Appeals, which
errors of law, in their opinion, “are substantial and deserve the
consideration of [this Court] which is
the court of last resort.”^[1]
The claim is further made that the questions raised by them are
“substantial” in character, their right to property of which they were deprived without due process of law being invoked, an infringement thereof
being unavoidable “unless [this Court] comes to their aid.”^[2]
There is the further assertion that their petition finds support in “law
and jurisprudence which cannot just be brushed aside as in­consequential.”^[3]
They maintain that justice “cannot be served by simply denying their petition without so much as stating the
reason why the same was denied.”^[4]

There was no need to
state the reasons for denial as a careful
perusal of their petition as well as the
decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in the case indicate
quite unmistakably that the questions raised were factual in
character.  The first error of law assigned, while apparently couched in terms that would attach to it the character of
a legal question, namely, that
respondent Court of Appeals should not have sustained a declaration of default
made by the lower court in violation of their consti­tutional rights to due
process, cannot be viewed in isolation but must be correlated to the facts as
found.  What are those facts? According to the decision:

“In support of the alleged error, defendants-appellants
maintain that they did not receive the summons issued by the trial court, and
their filing a
motion to dismiss the
second cause of action constituted as a voluntary appearance only for the
second cause of action but not for the first cause of ac­tion.  Therefore, the order of default dated January 12, 1963, and the resulting judgment against them would
have no force and effect for being null and void, the trial court not
having acquired jurisdiction over their persons in accordance with Rule 16,
Sec. 1 (a), new Rules of Court.

“It is Our opinion that when the
lawyer of the defendants-appellants filed the motion to dismiss the second
cause of action, We can presume that they received the
summons.  Even if they failed to receive
the summons, if the party appeared generally in a case and not
by a special
appearance for the exclusive purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the
trial court, they submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the trial court,
and they cannot now claim before this Court for the
first time that they have never submitted to its jurisdiction, especially so, after the said Court dismissed the second cause of
action in the
complaint of plaintiff-appellee.  After all,
the trial
court permitted them to present evidence
during the trial, represented by Atty. Rexes V. Alejano,
thus giving the defendants-appellants their day in court.”^[5]

The second alleged error
assigned, namely, the insufficiency of
evidence presented by petitioner Eugenio V. Alejano, Jr. to show that the real estate mortgage to be
foreclosed was without valid consideration and in violation of the Usury Law,
is on its face a question inherently factual. 
It would appear therefore that a more careful scrutiny on the part of
petitioners as to the nature of the petition presented ought to have given rise
to a more realistic appraisal of the chances of its being given due course by
this Court.  Then perhaps no undue
disappointment would have been caused by their petition being denied.

Since no new matter
invested with legal significance is found in this motion for reconsideration,
the resolution of September 28, 1967
should stand.  It is not inappropriate to
remind petitioners that an attempt to dress essentially factual matters in the
habiliments of legal terminology is not likely to meet with success.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Dizon, Acting C.J., Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J., on
official leave.

^[1]
Pars. 1 and 2, Motion.

^[2]
Par. 3, Motion.

^[3]
Par. 5, Motion.

^[4]
Par. 11, Motion.

^[5]
Decision of Court of Appeals, Annex A, p. 4.