JENNIEFER L. JUMAO-AS, PETITIONER, VS. ZENAIDA CRISOSTOMO, MARICHU CRISOSTOMO[,] JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, AND ANY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF AND INTEREST, RESP…

Jumao-as versus Crisostomo

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Jenniefer L. Jumao-as against Zenaida Crisostomo, Marichu Crisostomo, and their unnamed co-respondents, arising from her complaint for injunction and enforcement of an easement of right of way over a lot registered in the respondents' names. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the whole architecture of the easement of right of way: the distinction between a voluntary and a compulsory easement, the rule that a discontinuous easement can be created only by title and never by prescription, the four requisites of a legal easement, and the caution courts must observe before recognizing a burden on another person's land.

Procedural History

Jenniefer filed her complaint for injunction and enforcement of easement of right of way before Branch 292 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City. The trial court denied her prayer for a temporary restraining order, and later denied the respondents' motion to dismiss. After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, and it likewise denied her motion for reconsideration while dismissing the respondents' counterclaim. Jenniefer appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court in a decision dated August 16, 2024, and later denied her motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated March 17, 2025. She then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Facts

Jenniefer owns five parcels of land in Barangay Niugan, Malabon City, which she acquired from Norman Fulgencio, who in turn obtained them from Bernabe Gozon, the late brother of Zenaida. A subdivision plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Godofredo Villasenor from a survey conducted on August 15, 1982 shows that Jenniefer's lots, the respondents' lots, and the lot of Floredeliz Borja adjoin one another. Jenniefer's properties sit at the corner of Calle M. Aquino and a road lot known as Lot 2-1-7, with an area of 402 square meters, registered in the names of Zenaida and Bernabe, among others, under a transfer certificate of title. Jenniefer built townhouses on one of her properties along that road lot.

On May 1, 2019, the respondents blocked her access to Lot 2-1-7 by erecting steel poles, claiming the lot is private property. Jenniefer insisted that the lot had been used as an access road to the subdivision lots even before she acquired her properties, and that an easement was inscribed on the title. She brought the matter to the barangay for conciliation, but no settlement was reached, so she sued for a restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, and damages.

The respondents answered that no easement was annotated on their title, and that Jenniefer still had access to Calle M. Aquino, a public road, and merely chose to pass through their property. The trial court found that Jenniefer failed to prove any accession to her use of the road lot, that the lot was part of the city road network, or that it had been donated to her or to the local government, and so it upheld the erection of the steel poles. The Court of Appeals agreed, adding that she proved neither a legal nor a voluntary easement, and that no easement by prescription could arise because a right of way is discontinuous.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that no legal easement of right of way exists over Lot 2-1-7.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that no voluntary easement of right of way exists over Lot 2-1-7.

Applicable Provisions

Article 613 of the Civil Code defines the easement and its two estates:

Article 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.

This fixes the burden on the servient estate and the benefit to the dominant estate, which is the frame for Jenniefer's claim over the respondents' road lot.

Article 649 of the Civil Code governs the compulsory easement and its indemnity:

Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance. This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.

This supplies the requisites of enclosure, indemnity, and non-isolation by the owner's own acts, each of which Jenniefer failed to meet.

Article 650 of the Civil Code fixes the location of the passage:

Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

This is the fourth requisite, and it fails here because Jenniefer already has direct access to a public highway.

Ruling

The Court denied the petition. As a preliminary matter, it held that the question raised is one of fact, since it would require a re-weighing of the evidence already passed upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and factual questions are beyond the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. None of the recognized exceptions was present.

On the legal easement, the Court held that Jenniefer failed to establish all four requisites. Her properties are bounded on one side by Calle M. Aquino, a public highway, so they are not surrounded and without adequate outlet. She never manifested any willingness to pay indemnity, either in her complaint or at trial. Her property is not isolated at all, much less by her own acts. And with clear access to a public road, the road lot is not the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The Court stressed that a right of way is compelled only upon a showing of absolute necessity, and that the claimant must prove the accessibility circumstances of all surrounding immovables to rule out other adequate outlets.

On the voluntary easement, the Court held that an easement of right of way is discontinuous, because its exercise depends on the intermittent acts of persons passing through, and under the Civil Code discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by prescription and may be constituted only by title. Jenniefer showed no agreement, and her bare allegation, unsupported by evidence and resting only on the respondents' failure to present rebuttal evidence, is not proof. Neither the title nor the subdivision plan carries any annotation of an easement; the title merely describes the lot as a road and cites the Villasenor survey. A designation as a road does not by itself grant a right of way to adjoining estates, and the lot remains private property, never having been donated or expropriated. The Court closed with a rule of caution:

Thus, courts should, at the very least, exercise caution and refuse to recognize an easement when proof of its existence is tenuous or doubtful.

Doctrine

An easement of right of way is a discontinuous easement, and under the Civil Code it cannot be acquired by prescription; it may be constituted only by title, whether by agreement or by a case for the conferment of a legal easement. The burden of proof rests on the owner of the dominant estate who seeks the easement, because an easement limits the servient owner's rights of ownership. A compulsory easement under Article 649 requires all four requisites: the immovable is surrounded by other immovables and without adequate outlet to a public highway; proper indemnity is paid; the isolation is not due to the owner's own acts; and the passage is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate under Article 650. The claimant must prove the accessibility circumstances of all surrounding immovables, since courts compel a right of way only upon absolute necessity. A lot merely designated as a road in a subdivision plan, and not donated or expropriated, remains private property and does not automatically create a voluntary easement in favor of adjoining estates.

Disposition

The petition was denied, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were affirmed, and Jenniefer's complaint for injunction and enforcement of easement of right of way remained dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a right of way is discontinuous, cannot be acquired by prescription, and may be constituted only by title, with the burden of proof on the owner of the dominant estate. Examiners use this case to test the four requisites of a compulsory easement under Articles 649 and 650, and to test whether a lot labeled a road on a subdivision plan automatically creates a voluntary easement.