G.R. No. 27811. November 17, 1967
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY …
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question – May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority
of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources – yielded an affirmative answer from the lower court.[1]
Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals upon the provisions of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended.
The undisputed controlling facts are:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture
land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality
of Bansalan,
Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953,
Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a
portion (392.7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954,
the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was
officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared
agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955,
Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants[2]
applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955,
plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales
application covering the entire released area.
This was protested by Jose Paño and his
nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the
part thereof covered by their own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the
conflict, rendered a decision on July
31, 1956, giving due course to the application of plaintiff
corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño
and his companions. A move to reconsider
failed.
On July 5, 1957,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions – held that the appeal
was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo,
“[b]y authority of the President,” decided the controversy, modified
the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that “it would be for
the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend
on the land for their very existence, be allocated that portion on which they
have made improvements”; and (2) directed that the controverted
land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) “should be
subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants,
without prejudice to the corporation’s right to reimbursement for the cost of
surveying this portion.” It may be well to state, at this point, that the
decision just mentioned, signed by the Executive Secretary, was planted upon
the facts as found in said decision.
Plaintiff Corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of
First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force
and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and
effect.
And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the court a
quo dismissing plaintiff’s case.
1. Plaintiff’s mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
141. The precept there is that decisions
of the Director of Lands “as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when
approved” by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff’s trenchant claim is that this
statute is controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President.
Plaintiff’s position is incorrect. The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.[3]
So, too, is his control of all executive departments.[4]
Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss
them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls
and directs their acts. Implicit then is
his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. In this context,
it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a
decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of
Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office of the
President.[5]
This Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director as
approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President’s
on appeal.[6]
In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was
considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion
of all administrative remedies.[7]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the
President reposes upon the President’s power of control over the executive
departments.[8]
And control simply means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.”[9]
This unquestionably
negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department
secretary.
2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive
Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does
not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary. It
is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally
upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which
the President must exercise in person.[10] Not as
correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his
Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he
perform in person.[11]
Reason is not wanting for this view. The
President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive
and administrative functions. The Office
of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is
that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for
and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction
to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.[12]
3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive
Secretary is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than anyone
of them. From this, plaintiff carves the
argument that one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego
of the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another
department secretary. This argument
betrays lack of appreciation of the fact that where, as in this case, the
Executive Secretary acts “[b]y authority of the President”, his
decision is that of the
President’s. Such decision is to be
given full faith and credit by our courts.
The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say
that the Executive Secretary is not
authorized to do so. Therefore,
unless the action taken is “disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive”,[13]
that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully
assailed.[14]
No such disapproval or reprobation is even
intimated in the record of this case.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby
affirmed.
Costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs and
submits a separate concurring opinion.
[1]
Special Civil Case No. 2792, Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch II.
[2]
Julian Balala, Magdalena Balala,
Florencio Aguinaldo, Pedro Roguian, Carlos Francisco, Jose Pascua,
Agapito Viernes, Ricardo
Villanueva, Cezario Butava,
Vicente Riya, Pedro Ringor,
Jose Bartolome, Benjamine Simon, Carlos Villanueva, Esmio Simon, Gregorio Domingo, Fernando Roguian,
Severino Cape, and Sixto de
la Cruz.
[3]
Section 7, Article VII, Philippine Constitution.
[4]
Section 10 (1), Article VII, id.
[5]
Castillo, Law on Natural Resources, 1957 ed., p.118.
[6]
Castillo vs. Rodriguez, L-17189, June
22, 1965. See also: Extensive Enterprises vs. Sarbro & Co., Inc., L-22383 & L-22386, May 16,
1966.
[7]
Ham vs. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., L-13677, October 31, 1960; Calo vs. Fuertes, L-16537,
June 29, 1962.
[8]
Ham vs. Bachrach, supra;
Suarez vs. Reyes, L-19828, February 28, 1963; Extensive
Enterprises vs. Sarbro & Co., supra, citing
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the Constitution.
[9]
Mondano vs.
Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148; also quoted in Ham vs.
Bachrach, supra; Extensive
Enterprises vs. Sarbro & Co., supra.
[10]
Powers to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to proclaim
martial law [Sec. 10 (2), Art. VII, Phil. Constitution] and to grant
reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures [Sec. 10 (6), idem] mentioned
in Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil.
451, 462-463.
[11]
Executive Order 94, October 4, 1947,
provides in Sec. 27: that “[t]he
Executive Secretary x x x
shall exercise such powers, functions, and duties as may be assigned to him by the
President from time to time x x x.”
[12]
Extensive Enterprises vs. Sarbro
& Co., supra. See: Pajo vs.
Ago, L-15414, June 30, 1960,
and citations at footnote 8 herein. See
also: Martin, Revised
Administrative Code, 1962 ed., Vol. III, pp. 868-869.
[13]
Villena vs.
Secretary of Interior, supra, at p. 463. Cf. Ykalina vs. Oricio, 93 Phil. 1076, 1080.
[14]
Pozon vs. Executive Secretary (C.A.),
55 O.G. No. 18, pp. 3302, 3305.
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CONCURRING OPINION
FERNANDO, J.:
The learned opinion of Justice Sanchez possesses merit and
inspires assent. A further observation
may not be amiss concerning that portion thereof which speaks of “the
standard practice” allowing appeals from [decisions of Secretary of
Natural Resources affirming the action taken by the Director of Lands] to the
Office of the President. That for me is more than
a “standard practice.” It is sound law. The constitutional grant to the President of
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices yields
that implication.[1]
If
this were all, there would be no need for an additional expression of my
views. I feel constrained to do so
however in order to emphasize that the opinion of the Court appears to me to
reflect with greater fidelity the constitutional intent as embodied in the
above provision vesting the power of control in the Presidency.
The question asked in the opening paragraph of the opinion –
“May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President,
reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources [?]” – merits but one answer. It must be in the unqualified
affirmative. So the Court holds. That is as it should be. Any other view would be highly unorthodox.
Nonetheless, the thought seems to lurk in the opinion of a
respectable number of members of the bar that a provision as that found in the
Public Land Act to the effect that decisions of Director of Lands on questions
of facts shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources[2]
constitute a limitation of such power of control. This view might have gained plausibility in
the light of Ang-Angco v. Castillo,[3]
where the procedure set forth in the Civil Service Act in 1959 was held
binding in so far as the President is concerned in the case of disciplinary
action taken against non-presidential appointees.
The argument that what
the then Executive Secretary acting for the President did was justified
by the constitutional grant of control elicited no favorable response. The Court apparently was not receptive to a
more expansive view of such executive prerogative. This is not to say that what was there
decided was entirely lacking in
justification. It is merely to suggest that it may contain implications not in
conformity with the broad grant
of authority constitutionally conferred on the President.
It
is well-worth emphasizing that the President unlike any other official in the
Executive Department is vested with both “constitutional and legal authority”[4]
as Justice Laurel noted. Care is to be taken then lest by a too narrow interpretation what
could reasonably be included in such competence recognized by the Constitution
be unduly restricted. If my reading of
the opinion of Justice Sanchez is correct, then there is a more
hospitable scope accorded such power of control. For me this is more in keeping
with the fundamental law.
Moreover there would be a greater
awareness
on the part of all of the broad range of authority the President
possesses by virtue of such a provision.
Reference to the words of Justice Laurel,
who was himself one of the leading framers of the Constitution and thereafter,
as a member of this Court, one of its most authoritative expounders, in
the leading case of Villena v. Secretary
of Interior,[5]
is not inappropriate. Their reverberating clang, to paraphrase
Justice Cardozo, should drown all weaker sounds. Thus: “After serious reflection, we have
decided
to sustain the contention of the government in this case on
the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and
continued in force by paragraph 1, section
12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle
vs. United
States [1887],
122 U.S.,
543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141; see
also U.S.
vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet.,
291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs.
U.S.
[1890], 137 U.S. 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup.
Ct., Rep., 80; Wolsey vs.
Chapman [1880], 101 U.S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13
Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)”
The
opinion of Justice Laurel continues: “Fear
is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance
of the principle of qualified political agency in this and similar cases would
result in the assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines
for acts of any member of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or improper
may be these acts. The implications, it
is said, are serious. Fear, however, is
no valid argument against the system once adopted, established, and
operated. Familiarity with the essential
background of the type of government established under our Constitution, in the
light of certain well-known principles and practices that go with the system,
should offer the necessary explanation.
With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is
one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the
projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single,
not plural, Executive. The first section
of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department,
begins with the enunciation of the principle that ‘The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the Philippines.’
This means that the President of the Philippines
is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines,
and no
other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity,
and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, ‘should be of the President’s bosom
confidence’ (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of
Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), “are subject to
the direction of
the President.” without minimizing the importance of the heads of
the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President. Stated otherwise,
and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the
United States,
‘each head of a department is, and must be the President’s alter ego
in the matter of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority’ (Myers vs.
United States,
47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S.,
52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of course,
exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way
affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the
President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy
as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive,
in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority
in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his
acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the
President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire
Executive Department before his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in
the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular
government. These are the necessary
corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to
the system itself. We cannot modify the
system unless we modify the Constitution,
and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process of judicial
interpretation or construction.”
[1]
Article VII, Section 10(1) of the Constitution.
[2]
Sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 941 (1936).
[3]
L-17169, November 30, 1963.
[4]
Planas v. Gil (1939) 69 Phil. 52, at p. 76.
[5]
67 Phil. 451 (1939).
As far as presidential power of supervision over local governments is
concerned, its authority has been
impaired by Hebron v. Reyes,
104 Phil. 175 (1958).