PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANNY ROSE Y DAZA @ “JOHN REY ROSE” AND ARNESTO CORNILLO @ “PANOY” (AT LARGE), ACCUSED;

People versus Rose

The Case

This is an ordinary appeal to the Supreme Court by Danny Rose, who was convicted of robbery with homicide and, on appeal, additionally of carnapping with homicide, arising from a single violent incident that killed a seventeen-year-old tricycle driver. The case matters because it confronts two questions every criminal law practitioner must master: whether one Information may charge two special complex crimes, and whether convictions for both — springing from one act — violate the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. The Court's answer turns on the distinction between the identity of the act and the identity of the offenses.

Procedural History

Rose and his co-accused Arnesto Cornillo were charged with robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. Cornillo remained at large, and the case was archived as to him. Rose was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and went to trial. The trial court convicted him of robbery with homicide, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and awarded damages to the heirs of the victim.

Rose appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the conviction for robbery with homicide and, invoking its authority to review the entire records and rectify errors not specifically assigned, additionally found him guilty of carnapping with homicide. It sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for that offense as well and increased the damages. Rose then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the parties dispensed with supplemental briefs and adopted their respective appellate briefs.

Facts

On the afternoon of August 6, 2011, in Talisay City, Negros Occidental, Scott Teodoro was driving his tricycle when he saw Dexter Linogon operating his tricycle with Danny Rose seated behind him and Arnesto Cornillo in the sidecar. Teodoro knew both men as fellow tricycle drivers plying the same routes. As he passed Sitio Matab-ang, Teodoro heard cries for help. From about ten arm's length away, he saw Rose repeatedly stabbing Dexter with a knife while Cornillo struck Dexter's head several times with a large stone. Dexter struggled, then collapsed.

After Dexter fell, Rose and Cornillo took his wallet and money from his pockets, then fled using Dexter's tricycle, with Rose driving and Cornillo in the sidecar. The following morning, Dexter's father, Dominador, was informed that a body had been found in Barangay Matab-ang. He and his wife went to the funeral home and identified the remains as their son, who had sustained sixteen stab wounds. The police investigator conducted an ocular inspection, found the body with multiple stab wounds and head injuries consistent with blows from a stone, and noted signs of a struggle in the surrounding sugarcane fields. The tricycle was later recovered abandoned and stripped of its sidecar.

Rose was arrested in May 2012. In his defense, he denied the accusations and invoked alibi, claiming he had resided in Bago City since 2005 and had not returned to Talisay City. He denied knowing Dexter and Teodoro, though he admitted knowing Cornillo. The trial court convicted him, and the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications, adding a conviction for carnapping with homicide.

Issues

• Whether or not the Information was duplicitous in charging two offenses, and if so, whether a conviction for both may nonetheless be sustained.
• Whether or not the convictions for robbery with homicide and carnapping with homicide, arising from the same act, violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
• Whether or not the testimony of the eyewitness, Teodoro, should be relied upon despite alleged inconsistencies.
• Whether or not the conviction for robbery with homicide should be upheld on the merits.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 110, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 13. Duplicity of the offense. A complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.

This rule governs whether the Information validly charged two offenses, and whether Rose waived any objection to its duplicity.

Rule 120, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused-appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.

This provision authorizes conviction for multiple offenses even where only one Information was filed, if the accused failed to object before trial.

Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

This is the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy that Rose invoked against his dual convictions.

Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part:

Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

This defines and penalizes robbery with homicide, one of the two special complex crimes at issue.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Information was indeed duplicitous, as it charged two separate offenses — robbery with homicide and carnapping with homicide. The Court concurred with the appellate court's observation that the accused performed two unlawful acts resulting in two special complex crimes. Nevertheless, because Rose entered a plea of not guilty and did not move to quash the Information, he was deemed to have waived any objection to its duplicity. Under Rule 120, Section 3, a conviction for multiple offenses may validly stand even where only one Information was filed.

On the second issue, the Court held that no double jeopardy was violated. For double jeopardy to lie, three requisites must concur: first, a first jeopardy must have attached; second, the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and third, the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or for an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first. Here, there was no sequential prosecution. The charges were brought in one Information and resolved in a single proceeding, and Rose was arraigned for both offenses at the same time. More fundamentally, the two offenses are separate and distinct. The test is not the identity of the act, but the identity of the offenses, determined by examining the essential elements of each crime as defined by statute. Robbery with homicide does not require that the property taken be a motor vehicle, whereas carnapping with homicide is predicated specifically on the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. Each offense demands proof of an essential element not required of the other. The Court also noted that robbery with homicide is a felony classified as malum in se under the Revised Penal Code, while carnapping with homicide is penalized under a special law and is characterized as malum prohibitum, and a malum in se felony cannot absorb a malum prohibitum offense.

On the third issue, the Court held that the alleged inconsistencies in Teodoro's testimony did not diminish his credibility. Minor and inconsequential inconsistencies tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility of a witness, as they dispel any suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed. Teodoro testified nearly seven years after the crime, and any discrepancies were reasonably ascribed to the passage of time. His positive and categorical identification of Rose and Cornillo, whom he personally knew as fellow tricycle drivers, was unwavering. The defense presented no evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that all four elements of robbery with homicide were established: the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation; the property taken belongs to another; the taking is characterized by intent to gain; and on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery, homicide was committed. The killing was committed by reason of and on the occasion of the robbery, satisfying the fourth element.

Doctrine

A complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. If the accused fails to object to a duplicitous information before trial, the defect is deemed waived, and the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, imposing the penalty for each offense.

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not violated when distinct statutes define separate crimes, even if both offenses stem from a single act, provided that each crime involves an important element not essential to the other. The test is not the identity of the act, but the identity of the offenses, determined by examining the essential elements of each crime as defined by statute. Where homicide is not punished as an offense in itself but is absorbed as an element of distinct special complex crimes, a conviction for each complex crime arising from the same act does not offend the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

Disposition

The appeal was denied, and the Court affirmed the conviction of Danny Rose for both robbery with homicide and carnapping with homicide, with the corresponding penalties and awards of damages sustained.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the test for double jeopardy is not the identity of the act but the identity of the offenses, and a single act may give rise to convictions for two distinct special complex crimes where each requires proof of an element the other does not. Examiners like to use this case to test the duplicity rule under Rule 110, Section 13, the waiver of that defect under Rule 120, Section 3, and the distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum offenses.