BIENVENIDO DELA CERNA (KALI APITONG), VIRGINIA DELA CERNA (BAE SENIGWELAS), ROLANDO DELA CERNA (DATU DAKIT), MARIBETH DELA CERNA (BAE APPLE), “ISAY” DELA CERNA (BAE SUNFLOWER), …

Dela Cerna versus Flexcon Manufacturing

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction filed directly before the Supreme Court by the Dela Cernas, who claim membership in the KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Sugbo-anon tribe, against Flexcon Manufacturing Corporation and its officers. The Dela Cernas sought to compel the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Carcar, Cebu to defer proceedings in Flexcon's action for injunction and to resolve their motion to dismiss, on the theory that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, not the regular court, has jurisdiction over the dispute. The case matters because it draws the outer boundary of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples' quasi-judicial power under the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, and because it reminds every litigant that the extraordinary writ of mandamus cannot be used to control a judge's discretion or to leapfrog the hierarchy of courts.

Procedural History

Flexcon filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Carcar, Cebu, Branch 77, against the Dela Cernas. The Dela Cernas answered and moved to dismiss, insisting that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, through the Dadantulan Highest Tribal Court, had jurisdiction. The trial court granted Flexcon a temporary restraining order, later issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of a bond, and ruled that the Dela Cernas had failed to prove the juridical personality of their tribe as a recognized indigenous political structure or registered indigenous peoples' organization, and that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples' jurisdiction covers only disputes where both parties belong to the same indigenous cultural community. Instead of appealing, the Dela Cernas went straight to the Supreme Court by petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65, asking that the trial judge be ordered to defer proceedings and resolve their motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court resolved the petition on the merits.

Facts

Flexcon, a domestic corporation in San Fernando, Cebu, entered into a five-year usufruct contract over a six hundred meter property, which it planned to use as its office, plant, stockyard, and staff house. Sometime in 2024, the Dela Cernas installed barbed wire barricades around the compound, blocking Flexcon's employees and delivery vehicles from entering and exiting.

On July 24, 2024, Flexcon's president discovered that the electric meter inside the plant was missing. When he went outside to look for it, Rolando Dela Cerna threw a coconut husk at him, nearly hitting his head, and shouted that he would axe the president's head if he went outside.

Two weeks later, Flexcon filed a petition for injunction praying that the Dela Cernas be directed to remove the barricades, stop blocking ingress and egress, take down the tarpaulins, and remove the closed-circuit television cameras pointed inside its premises. The Dela Cernas answered, claiming membership in the KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Sugbo-anon tribe, invoking their customary laws, and praying that the case be transferred to the Dadantulan Highest Tribal Court. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, then a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond, and refused to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the trial judge to defer proceedings and resolve the motion to dismiss.
• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in refusing to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction in favor of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.

This is the very text the Court used to test whether the judge unlawfully neglected a ministerial duty, and it failed because the act complained of was discretionary.

Section 66 of Republic Act No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, provides:

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

This is the jurisdictional grant the Dela Cernas invoked, and the Court read its qualifying clauses to confine the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples to disputes between members of the same indigenous cultural community.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that mandamus does not lie. The writ issues only where a tribunal or officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty. The judge's act of issuing the temporary restraining order was not ministerial but discretionary, an exercise of judicial power, and mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion. The Court also found no clear legal right on the part of the Dela Cernas, who cited only historical treaties to support a claim that their ancestral domain covered thousands of islands and effectively the entirety of the Philippines, while Flexcon's predecessors presented a deed of absolute sale and a certificate of retention. Their direct recourse to the Supreme Court likewise violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, since the power to issue the extraordinary writs is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts, and the concurrence of jurisdiction does not give parties full freedom of choice of forum.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Regional Trial Court did not err. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples' jurisdiction under Section 66 is limited to claims and disputes arising between parties belonging to the same indigenous cultural community. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.

The Court explained that the proviso speaks of the parties in the plural, requiring both sides to have exhausted remedies under their customary laws and to have obtained the certification of the Council of Elders, a condition that can only be met where both parties belong to the same tribe. To impose one tribe's customary laws on a non-member would violate fair play and due process. The Court then summarized the requirements: the claim or dispute must involve the rights of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples; both parties must belong to the same indigenous cultural community or indigenous people; they must have exhausted all remedies under their customary laws; and compliance must be evidenced by a certification of the Council of Elders that the dispute remains unresolved. Since Flexcon is not a member of the tribe, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has no jurisdiction, and the regular court properly retained the case.

Doctrine

First, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples only when both parties belong to the same indigenous cultural community or indigenous people, and only after both have exhausted remedies under their customary laws, evidenced by the certification of the Council of Elders as a condition precedent. Where one party is not a member of the group, the regular courts take cognizance of the case.

Second, mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer, and it requires a clear legal right on the part of the petitioner. Third, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts must be respected even though the power to issue the extraordinary writs is concurrent among the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over Flexcon's action for injunction was sustained.

Remember This

The single line to memorize is that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has no jurisdiction where the parties do not belong to the same indigenous cultural community, because customary law cannot be imposed on a non-member. Examiners like to use this case on the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples under Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, and on the limits of mandamus against discretionary judicial acts.