G.R. No. 275788, July 07, 2026
MCGILL ESQUILLO OMANDAM, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
CAGUIOA, J.:
Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
On October 14, 2019, Omandam and his co-accused Samson Natuil Tapere (Tapere) were charged with violating COMELEC Resolution No. 10461, in relation to Section 261(dd)(l) of the Omnibus Election Code, the accusatory portion of the Information reading, as follows:
That on or about May 12, 2019, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Omandam and Tapere], did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously drink or take intoxicating liquor [on] the street the day before election period from January 13, 2019 to June 12, 2019.
Contrary to and in Violation of Sec. 261 of COMELEC RESOLUTION [No.] 10461 (COMELEC LIQUOR BAN).[7]
Upon arraignment, Omandam and Tapere pleaded “not guilty.”[8] During pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts, among others: (1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused; (2) the accused are the same persons who were arraigned; and (3) the arrested accused were not caught in the act of drinking liquor.[9]
Trial on the merits ensued.[10]
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution presented as its witnesses, PCpl. Danrie Dumaog Oberez (PCpl. Oberez) and Barangay Peacemaking Action Team (BPAT) member, Ronnie C. Yongco (Yongco).[11]
On May 12, 2019, the day before the May 13, 2019 general elections, at around 11:45 in the evening, Yongco and other members of the BPAT of Brgy. Maria Cristina, Iligan City were on duty at their outpost at the barangay hall. One barangay kagawad approached the BPAT to report two intoxicated men who were causing a disturbance by hurling stones at neighboring residences.[12]
The BPAT members proceeded to the location and saw Omandam and Tapere who appeared to be under the influence of alcohol based on their appearance and demeanor. They likewise saw two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum. The BPAT members were familiar with both men since they were neighbors and were notorious troublemakers in their community. Thus, the BPAT members proceeded to the police station to request for assistance.[13]
After receiving the report, PCpl. Oberez, together with other police officers and the BPAT members proceeded to the area onboard a police patrol car. While still inside the vehicle, PCpl. Oberez saw Omandam and Tapere along the highway. He also saw two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum within the vicinity.[14]
When Omandam and Tapere saw the arrival of the police officers, they immediately scampered. Tapere, who was quick to run, fled to an unknown direction and successfully evaded the police. On the other hand, Omandam was too intoxicated to run and was caught by the police.[15]
PCpl. Oberez and Yongco personally observed the appearance and demeanor of Omandam. According to them, his breath smelled of alcohol, his speech was slurred, and his movements were groggy. Convinced that Omandam had been drinking alcohol during the election period, PCpl. Oberez arrested him. Omandam resisted and shouted, “Ay kog dakpa Sir! Gago ka nga pulis! Dako pag ranggo ako ang papa sa imoha!” (Do not arrest me, Sir! You are a stupid policeman! My father has a higher rank than you!).[16]
PCpl. Oberez seized the two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum. In the police station, PCpl. Oberez interviewed Omandam and the latter revealed that Tapere was his drinking buddy who fled upon the arrival of the police. Meanwhile the two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum were preserved and kept at the police station.[17]
On the basis of the foregoing interview, as well as the information allegedly relayed by the BPAT members regarding Tapere’s supposed presence at the scene prior to the arrival of the police, the prosecution subsequently caused the issuance of a subpoena against Tapere and eventually included him, together with Omandam, in the charge for violation of the COMELEC liquor ban.[18]
Version of the defense
The defense presented its lone witness, Tapere, to counter the charge. He vehemently denied the prosecution’s allegations and claimed that he was with his wife and children at around 8:00 p.m. on May 12, 2019. He prepared dinner and then slept. He woke up at around 6:00 a.m. the following day and heard about the arrest of his friend, Omandam.[19]
Four days later, he received a subpoena and it was then that he learned he was implicated in the incident. Later, Omandam told him that he was merely walking along the road when the patrol car passed by and arrested him.[20]
The defense did not present Omandam.[21]
Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated January 27, 2023, the RTC found Omandam and Tapere guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the COMELEC liquor ban. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds [Omandam] and [Tapere] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of an election offense of Violation of Section 261(dd)(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and imposes upon each of them a straight penalty of one year imprisonment.[22]
The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s witnesses who were public officers. Thus, according to the trial court, they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties, in the absence of any showing of ill-motive.[23]
Ruling of the CA
On January 22, 2024, the CA partly granted the appeal. Tapere was acquitted of the charge, but Omandam’s conviction was affirmed. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered. The Appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Judgment dated January 27, 2023 of the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 04, Iligan City, in Criminal Case No. 19-23270 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that [Tapere] is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. On the other hand, the conviction of [Omandam] is affirmed.[24]
The CA ruled that no concrete evidence exists to prove Tapere’s drunkenness as he was able to escape. According to the CA, PCpl. Oberez and Yongco could not observe the appearance and demeanor of Tapere.[25]
On the other hand, the CA emphasized that while no direct evidence was proffered by the prosecution to prove that Omandam consumed alcohol on May 12, 2019, circumstantial evidence may be appreciated to support his conviction. The CA concluded that the only plausible explanation why Omandam was not in full control of his bodily movements, coupled with a strong smell of alcohol in his breath and slurred speech, was because he drank alcohol that night.[26]
The CA also appreciated the admission of the two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum since the strict application of the chain of custody rule in dangerous drugs has not been extended to other seized articles.[27]
In a Resolution dated July 10, 2024, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Omandam.[28]
Hence, this Petition.
The Present Petition
Omandam posits that the Petition, while based mainly on questions of fact, is within the exception considering that the CA’s findings were grounded on speculation or conjecture and based on a misapprehension of facts.[29] According to Omandam, the prosecution’s witnesses admitted that they never saw him actually drink alcoholic beverage that night.[30] Moreover, he argues that the prosecution failed to provide any proof, other than circumstantial evidence. Based on PCpl. Oberez’s testimony, he never subjected Omandam to a breath analyzer test or chemical test to check the presence of alcohol in his system.[31]
The Court, in a Resolution dated February 10, 2025, ordered: (1) Omandam to inform the Court whether he is out on bail or in confinement; and (2) the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a Comment.[32] The Public Attorney’s Office filed a Manifestation and Compliance dated May 28, 2025, informing the Court that Omandam is out on bail pursuant to the February 1, 2023 order of the RTC.[33] On the other hand, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting an additional 60 days to file its Comment, or on July 1, 2025.[34]
On July 1, 2025, the OSG filed its Comment arguing that the issues raised by Omandam in his Petition were beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition as it raised pure questions of fact.[35] In any case, it argues that direct evidence is not required as the CA correctly ruled that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was enough to establish Omandam’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[36]
Issue
Whether or not Omandam is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 261(dd)(l) of the Omnibus Election Code, or the COMELEC liquor ban.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds the Petition impressed with merit.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that while a petition for review on certiorari is, as a rule, limited to the resolution of pure questions of law as factual findings of the lower courts are generally binding upon the Court, this admits of well-defined exceptions provided by jurisprudence, among them: when the findings of the lower courts are grounded on speculation, surmise, or conjecture, and when the appellate court overlooked or failed to consider material and undisputed facts which, if properly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion.[37]
The Court finds that the present case falls squarely within these exceptions. The findings of fact relied upon to convict Omandam rest largely on conjectural inferences, and the CA did fail to give due consideration to relevant and undisputed facts that materially affect the outcome of the case.[38] Accordingly, a re-examination of the facts is both justified and necessary.
Section 261(dd)(l) of the Omnibus Election Code penalizes, among others, the act of taking intoxicating liquor during the periods fixed by law, specifically on the day before the election and on election day. The provision reads:
(1) Any person who sells, furnishes, offers, buys, serves or takes intoxicating liquor on the days fixed by law for the registration of voters in the polling place, or on the day before the election or on election day: Provided, That hotels and other establishments duly certified by the Ministry of Tourism as tourist oriented and habitually in the business of catering to foreign tourists may be exempted for justifiable reasons upon prior authority of the Commission: Provided, further, That foreign tourists taking intoxicating liquor in said authorized hotels or establishments are exempted from the provisions of this subparagraph.[39]
This statutory prohibition was further reinforced and implemented by Sections 1 and 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10461, which categorically provide:
Prohibited Acts. – It shall be unlawful for any person, including owners and managers of hotels, resorts, restaurants, and other establishments of the same nature to sell, furnish, offer, buy, serve, or take intoxicating liquor anywhere in the Philippines.
Period of Prohibition. – The liquor ban shall be in force and effect on the day before the elections (May 12, 2019) and on election day (May 13, 2019).[40]
Taken together, the foregoing provisions make it clear that the act punished is the actual taking of intoxicating liquor within the prohibited period. In the present case, however, the prosecution itself concedes that the BPAT members and the arresting police officers did not witness Omandam in the act of consuming alcohol.[41] To be sure, it was even stipulated during the pre-trial conference that the accused were not caught in the act of drinking liquor.[42]
In lieu of direct evidence, the prosecution anchors its case on circumstantial evidence, which it claims suffices to sustain a conviction.[43]
While it is settled that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction in criminal cases,[44] such evidence is adequate only when the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[45]
The Court rules that the third element was not met.
Examining the underlying rationale for admitting circumstantial evidence as a basis for conviction, the Court relies on People v. Lignes[46] (Lignes) where the Court explained:
Admittedly, there was no direct evidence to establish appellant’s commission of the crime charged. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, and that direct evidence is not always necessary. This Court has recognized the reality that in certain cases, due to the inherent attempt to conceal a crime, it is not always possible to obtain direct evidence.[47] (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied)
Corollarily, conviction based on circumstantial evidence demands that the circumstances be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and that they establish moral certainty of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[48]
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the sole reliance on circumstantial evidence was unwarranted; taken as a whole, the circumstances are not incompatible with innocence.
Unlike in most cases where resort to circumstantial evidence is justified by the covert or clandestine nature of the crime, the alleged violation here—the taking of intoxicating liquor during the COMELEC liquor ban—together with its factual milieu, is neither complex nor shown to have been attended by any element of concealment.
The elements of the offense are elementary and uncomplicated: (1) that the accused consumed intoxicating liquor, and (2) that such consumption occurred within the prohibited period.[49]
More tellingly, the attendant circumstances negate any semblance of concealment. By the prosecution’s own account, Omandam was allegedly drinking along a public roadside and was apprehended by PCpl. Oberez and Yongco on that very same evening and location.[50] Under these conditions, there existed no practical impediment to the procurement of direct and objective evidence of the supposed violation, rendering the absence of such evidence all the more conspicuous and significant.
Indeed, the Court has consistently held that the probative value of circumstantial evidence is not inferior to that of direct evidence, for the Rules of Court draws no distinction between the two.[51] However, this doctrinal parity does not dispense with, much less dilute, the stringent safeguards governing the appreciation of circumstantial evidence.
As early as People v. Ludday[52] (Ludday), the Court ruled that circumstantial evidence must be received with utmost caution and should be carefully weighed against all proven facts. The Court therein laid down the enduring standard:
“No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he [or she] is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” (12 Cyc., 488.)
“A conviction may rest upon circumstantial testimony alone, but the facts and circumstances must be such as are absolutely incompatible upon any reasonable hypothesis with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused.” (State vs. Hunter, 50 Kan., 302.)
The four fundamental rules given by Wharton for testing circumstantial evidence are the following: “First, it should be acted upon with caution; second, all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, as that is to be compared with all the facts proved; third, the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; fourth, the facts must establish such a ce1iainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense.” (Wharton’s Crim. Evidence, vol. II, p. 1643.)[53]
Notwithstanding the simplicity of the alleged offense and the availability of means to ascertain alcohol consumption with precision, the police failed to utilize any objective or scientific method to confirm Omandam’s alleged taking of intoxicating liquor. As admitted by PCpl. Oberez during trial:
THE COURT
Q: Aside from your testimony also what is your proof that when that accused Omandam was arrested he was drunk or he was under the influence of liquor?
A: I can smell him, Your Honor.
Q: Yes, that is based on your testimony, but did you bring him to crime laboratory to test him on the presence of alcohol?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: And of course you have no [breath] analysis apparatus?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: And you did not take picture of him (sic) while he was appearing to be groggy?
A: No, Your Honor, because he was aggressive at that time, Your Honor.
Q: Even your cellphone, you did not use your cellphone?
A: No, Your Honor.[54]
The foregoing admissions are telling.
In 2019, or the time of the incident in question, objective and standardized methods for determining alcohol consumption were already in place by virtue of Republic Act No. 10586 or the “Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013.”[55] Through this, law enforcement authorities had already been equipped, trained, and mandated to utilize scientific means of determining liquor consumption.[56] While the said statute was enacted in the context of drunk-driving, the procedural safeguards it embodies are no less relevant here where the issue likewise turns on the reliable determination of the “taking” of alcoholic beverages.[57] These measures reflect the State’s underlying recognition that subjective impressions are inherently insufficient where criminal liability is in question.
Yet, as the records unmistakably show, PCpl. Oberez did not conduct any field sobriety test, administer any breath analyzer examination, or secure any confirmatory chemical test. Equally telling is the absence of even the most rudimentary forms of documentation—no photographs, no video recording—of Omandam’s purported condition at the time of arrest.[58]
Nor did the investigative lapses end there.
Despite allegedly recovering two empty bottles of Tanduay Rhum from the scene, preserving the same in police custody,[59] and ultimately presenting them as evidence,[60] the authorities nonetheless failed to subject the same to forensic examination. No effort was made to lift latent fingerprints therefrom and compare the same with the fingerprints of Omandam or Tapere, notwithstanding that such procedure could have provided independent corroboration as to whether either of them had in fact handled the subject bottles.
To be sure, the value of forensic evidence in criminal prosecutions has long been recognized as a critical counterbalance to the inherent limitations of testimonial evidence. As the Court observed in People v. Sartagoda,[61] testimonial evidence, unlike object or forensic evidence such as fingerprint and DNA analysis, is susceptible to human error, whether intentional or unintentional.[62] The Court likewise acknowledged the evidentiary significance of fingerprint examination, emphasizing that a positive finding of matching fingerprints carries substantial probative value because it provides an objective means of linking persons to objects or crime scenes when conditions permit.[63]
In this case, the bottles allegedly recovered from the scene formed part of the very circumstantial evidence relied upon to establish Omandam’s supposed commission of the offense. Despite their potential forensic value, no attempt was made to objectively verify whether they had in fact been handled by either accused.
Strikingly, in lieu of these readily available and more reliable means of verification, the prosecution rests its case solely on the bare assertion that Omandam appeared groggy, spoke in a slurred manner, and emitted the odor of alcohol, coupled with other equivocal and uncorroborated circumstances.[64]
These omissions cannot be dismissed as mere procedural lapses. They reflect a marked departure from established standards designed to ensure accuracy and fairness in criminal investigation, particularly in the ascertainment of intoxication. The failure to employ available objective methods—without any explanation—seriously undermines the credibility of the prosecution’s evidence and creates a material evidentiary gap, especially in this case where the fact of alcohol consumption constitutes the very gravamen of the offense.
More importantly, the cumulative effect of these omissions casts serious doubt on the reliability and sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. Guided by the rationale in Lignes and the cautionary doctrine in Ludday, the Court cannot ignore the fact that no circumstance of concealment attended the alleged act, and that the offense itself was simple and readily susceptible of direct or objective proof. Yet, the prosecution asks the Court to rely almost entirely on subjective observations inherently prone to error and varying interpretation.
Clearly, such reliance is inconsistent with the very justification for allowing circumstantial evidence to serve as sole basis for conviction.[65] This rule finds justification in necessity—that is, where direct evidence is not reasonably available—not on convenience or inadequacy of law enforcement. The recognized parity between direct and circumstantial evidence does not authorize the abandonment of objective proof where the same is plainly obtainable. Otherwise, the unexplained absence of such evidence raises troubling questions as to why it was never secured in the first place.
Indeed, where available means of verification is inexplicably disregarded and the prosecution relies instead on tenuous inferences, the Court cannot altogether discount the possibility that the narrative presented may have been reconstructed, embellished, or fabricated after the fact. To regard such proof as sufficient would dilute the exacting standards governing circumstantial evidence and transform a rule born of necessity into a refuge for investigative shortcomings.
All told, a careful and holistic consideration of the circumstantial evidence on record, taking into account not only the inferences presented[66] but also the glaring omissions and admissions of PCpl. Oberez, leads the Court to the inescapable conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of Omandam beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence fails to constitute that coherent chain of circumstances required to engender moral certainty, and instead discloses a fragile web of assumptions unsupported by objective verification.
The Constitution demands more before liberty may be curtailed and criminal liability imposed. To affirm a conviction on such frail grounds would not only erode the presumption of innocence but would likewise sanction a standard of proof far beneath that required in criminal prosecutions—a result which the Court cannot and will not countenance.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 22, 2024 and the Resolution dated July 10, 2024 of the Court of Appeals – Cagayan de Oro City, Twenty-Third Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 02389-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mcgill Esquillo Omandam is ACQUITTED of violation of Section 261(dd)(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 10461, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Any amount paid by way of cash bond is ordered RETURNED.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Inting, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Singh,* J., on official leave.
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 14-26.
[2] Id. at 32-45. Penned by Associate Justice Ana Marie T. Mas and concurred in by Associate Justices Lily V. Biton and Lorna Francisca Catris-Chua Cheng.
[3] Id. at 47-49. Penned and concurred in by the same Associate Justices.
[4] Id. at 78-81, RTC Decision. Penned by Presiding Judge Ali Ombra R. Bacaraman.
[5] Rules and Regulations on The Liquor Ban in Connection with The May 13, 2019 National and Local Elections (2018).
[6] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[7] Id. at 33.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 34.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 34-35.
[15] Id. at 35.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 36.
[19] Id. at 35-36.
[20] Id. at 36.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 80, RTC Decision.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. at 44, CA Decision.
[25] Id. at 40-41.
[26] Id. at 39-40.
[27] Id. at 43-44.
[28] Id. at 47-49, CA Resolution.
[29] Id. at 19-20, Petition.
[30] Id. at 21-22.
[31] Id. at 23.
[32] Id. at 103-104, Resolution dated February 10, 2025.
[33] Id. at I 12-113, Compliance dated May 28, 2025.
[34] Id. at 105-106, Motion for Extension.
[35] Id. at 124-126, Comment.
[36] Id. at 127-130.
[37] See Pagsibigan v. People, 606 Phil. 233 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
[38] Id.
[39] Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, sec. 261(dd)(l).
[40] COMELEC Resolution No. 10461, secs. 1 and 2.
[41] Rollo, p. 129, Comment.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Dimaapi v. People, 954 Phil. 699 (2024) [Per J. Kho, Jr., Second Division].
[45] Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 133, sec. 4.
[46] 874 Phil. 530, June 17, 2020 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[47] Id. at 539-540.
[48] See People v. Adona, 959 Phil. 72 (2024) [Per J. Dimaampao, Third Division].
[49] Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, sec. 26l(dd)(l).
[50] Rollo, p. 129, Comment.
[51] See Bacera v. People, 812 Phil. 25 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[52] 61 Phil. 216 (1935) [Per J. Vickers, En Banc].
[53] Id.
[54] Rollo, p. 23, Petition.
[55] Republic Act No. 10586, secs. 3-6.
[56] Republic Act No. 10586, secs. 9-11.
[57] Id.
[58] Rollo, p. 23, Petition.
[59] Id. at 35, CA Decision.
[60] Id. at 44.
[61] 293 Phil. 259 (1993) [Per J. Campos, Jr., Second Division].
[62] See id.
[63] Id.
[64] Rollo, pp. 129-130, Comment.
[65] See People v. Lignes, supra note 46.
[66] See Bacerra v. People, supra note 51.