PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX274442 [CA-G.R. CR-HC NO. 13704 (CRIMINAL CASE NOS. RTC 2011-0176, RTC 2011-0177, AND RTC 2011-0178)], ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
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People versus XXX274442
The Case
This is an ordinary appeal by the accused, XXX274442, from a decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed with modification his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Camarines Sur, for two counts of rape by sexual intercourse and one count of rape by sexual assault. The victim is a sixteen-year-old girl, referred to in the record as AAA274442. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to restate two rules every bar candidate must carry into the examination room: that a rape trial focuses on the actions of the offender and never on the sexual history or character of the victim, and that the so-called sweetheart defense does not, by itself, establish consent.
Procedural History
The Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Camarines Sur, after trial, rendered judgment on December 19, 2017, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and one count of rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of the same article. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua on each of the two counts of rape by sexual intercourse, and to an indeterminate penalty on the count of sexual assault, with awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, plus legal interest.
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 26, 2022, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the judgment with modification. It sustained the two convictions for rape by sexual intercourse. On the third charge, however, it held that the accused was liable not for rape by sexual assault but for lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, following the ruling in People versus Tulagan, and it adjusted the penalty and the damages accordingly.
The accused moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied. He then elevated the case to the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal. Before the Supreme Court, he filed a manifestation stating that he would not submit a supplemental brief, as his arguments were already exhaustively set out in his appellant's brief. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a manifestation adopting its appellee's brief.
Facts
In the early morning of November 19, 2010, at around three o'clock, the sixteen-year-old AAA274442 was alone and asleep in her room. She was awakened by someone knocking at her door. When she opened it, she saw a stranger holding a kitchen knife. He reeked of alcohol. He warned her not to fight back and threatened to kill her, showed the knife, and pushed her toward her bed. He then undressed her, kissed her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain, told him to stop, and tried to push him away, but he continued. He then forced his penis into her mouth, causing her to vomit, and afterwards raped her a second time.
The man asked when her father would return and what time she came home from school, and told her to meet him at the school pavilion at two o'clock in the afternoon. He said his name was Robert and that he would call her Honey. He left at around four thirty in the morning. That same day, AAA274442 kept her first urine, a tissue with her saliva, and her pajama, blanket, and shirt in separate containers. She told her father she had been raped, and her cousin accompanied her to the police station and then to the National Bureau of Investigation, where she gave a description used for a cartographic sketch. A medico-legal examination later showed clear evidence of previous injury to the hymen secondary to intravaginal penetration by a blunt object.
Pursuing her plan to entrap the rapist, AAA274442 went to the school pavilion at two o'clock, but he did not appear. She then received a Facebook message from a batchmate, Richard Regalado, signed Robert, calling her Honey and saying he was sorry he had not arrived on time. Regalado told her that the accused had asked to use his account. When the police showed her a photograph of the accused, she confidently identified him as the man who had raped her. For his part, the accused denied the charges. He claimed that he and AAA274442 were in a relationship, that she voluntarily let him into her house the night before, and that she consented to the oral sex. A common friend testified for the defense, but the trial court found her account implausible.
Issues
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving full credence to the testimony of AAA274442 despite the alleged inconsistencies and contradictions raised by the accused.
- Whether or not the victim's prior sexual experience or sexual history casts doubt on the possibility of rape or on her credibility.
- Whether or not the sweetheart defense interposed by the accused establishes consent and warrants acquittal.
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly held that the third charge is lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 rather than rape by sexual assault.
Applicable Provisions
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, provides:
Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1) Through force, threat, or intimidation; 2) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; 3) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and 4) When the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
This is the provision under which the accused was convicted of the two counts of rape by sexual intercourse.
Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the same Code provides:
By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
This is the provision under which the accused was originally charged and convicted by the trial court for the act of inserting his penis into the victim's mouth.
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, the provision applied by the Court of Appeals to the third charge, provides:
Those who commit the acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
This is the provision under which the Court of Appeals held the accused liable for lascivious conduct, following the Tulagan doctrine that sexual assault against a child aged twelve or older but below eighteen is designated as lascivious conduct under Republic Act No. 7610.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the alleged inconsistencies do not cast doubt on the victim's credibility. It recalled the guidelines in People versus Sanchez: the trial court's evaluation of a witness's testimony is given the highest respect because of its unique position to observe demeanor; absent any substantial reason to reverse those findings, the reviewing court is bound by them; and the rule applies with even greater force when the Court of Appeals has concurred. The Court stressed that it is not a trier of facts, and that the exception for glaring errors or misapprehension of facts does not apply here. It added that minor inconsistencies may be expected of young victims, whose youth and immaturity are generally treated as marks of truth and sincerity.
On the second issue, the Court rejected outright the argument that the victim's prior sexual experience makes rape improbable. It held that evidence of sexual history is irrelevant, because the elements of rape focus on the actions of the offender and not those of the complainant, and virginity is not an element of the crime. The Court quoted its own pronouncement in People versus ZZZ:
Rape is perhaps the only crime where the trial often focuses on the conduct of the victim instead of that of the accused. The need to prove lack of consent often becomes a question of the victim's behavior, her history, and her conduct before, during, and after the rape as implying that some women can be "bad enough" to be raped while others, because of their background, choices, and conduct, are simply lying when they claim that they were raped. It is time to strike down such uninformed and ignorant views.
The Court concluded that prior consent is never indicative of consent on the occasion of rape, and that proof of the victim's previous sexual behavior is irrelevant in determining whether rape was committed.
On the third issue, the Court held that the sweetheart defense does not establish consent. The accused failed to prove any consensual relationship, and the trial court found the defense witness's account contrary to human experience. The Court reminded that the victim's lack of resistance during the commission of the crime is not determinative of the consent necessary for acquittal.
On the fourth issue, the Court sustained the Court of Appeals' modification. Following People versus Tulagan, when sexual assault is committed against a child who is twelve years old or older but below eighteen, the crime is designated as lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, not rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Doctrine
First, in rape cases the court's attention must focus not on the character or behavior of the victim but on the actions of the offender. The victim's sexual history or lack of resistance is not determinative of the consent necessary for the offender's acquittal. Second, evidence of a complainant's sexual promiscuity finds no relevance in a rape prosecution, because the elements of rape under the Revised Penal Code focus on the offender's acts, and virginity is not an element of the crime. Prior consent is never indicative of consent on the occasion of rape. Third, the sweetheart defense does not, by itself, establish consent; it must be proven, and it must be consistent with human experience. Fourth, the credibility findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded the highest respect, subject only to the exception of glaring errors or misapprehension of facts. Fifth, under the Tulagan doctrine, sexual assault against a child aged twelve or older but below eighteen is prosecuted as lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Disposition
The appeal was denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed in full.
Remember This
Memorize this line: in rape, the law looks at the acts of the offender, never at the morals or sexual history of the victim. Examiners use this case to test the irrelevance of the victim's sexual past, the weakness of the sweetheart defense, and the Tulagan rule on lascivious conduct under Republic Act No. 7610.