SPOUSES ELVIN SENDING (DATU GIBO) AND JOCELYN SENDING (BAE ORANGE), PETITIONERS, VS. KRISTOPPER RAHDA CO UY, ATTY. JOCELYN PESQUERA, HENRY P. CAÑETE, JR., AND HON. AMELI AMOR R.…

Sending versus Co Uy

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus filed directly with the Supreme Court by Spouses Elvin Sending, known as Datu Gibo, and Jocelyn Sending, known as Bae Orange, against Kristoffer Rahda Co Uy, Atty. Jocelyn Pesquera, Henry Cañete Junior, and the presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela. The spouses seek to stop the execution of a final judgment in an unlawful detainer case and to compel the trial court to yield jurisdiction to indigenous customary law. The case matters because it tests the reach of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 against a final and executory judgment, and because it restates two bedrock rules every examinee must carry: the hierarchy of courts, and the narrow office of the writ of mandamus.

Procedural History

Co Uy filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela, which rendered judgment in his favor, ordering the spouses to vacate, and awarding moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation costs, and exemplary damages. Spouses Sending appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, sitting for Mandaue City, which affirmed the decision but deleted the awards of exemplary and moral damages for lack of basis. The spouses moved for reconsideration, and the Regional Trial Court denied the motion. They then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition and affirmed the Regional Trial Court, deleting in turn the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses. That decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

During execution, the trial court issued a resolution directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The spouses opposed it, raising for the first time their membership in an indigenous cultural community and invoking customary law. The trial court ruled that it could no longer act because of the finality of the judgment, and gave the spouses thirty days to vacate voluntarily. The spouses then filed this petition for mandamus directly with the Supreme Court, seeking a writ of preliminary injunction, an order compelling the judge to resolve their motion, an order on prosecutors, and the reversal of the trial court's 2016 decision.

Facts

Co Uy is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in the barangays of Yati and Jugan, in the municipalities of Liloan and Consolacion, Cebu. He acquired it by donation in December 2011, and it was registered in his name in February 2012. He alleged that Spouses Sending entered the property by mere tolerance, after seeking permission from his mother when they were ejected from an adjoining lot, and that they promised to vacate whenever the owner needed the land.

In September 2013, Co Uy notified the spouses to vacate to give way to construction. A demand letter followed in January 2014, giving them fifteen days to leave. They refused. In their answer, the spouses claimed that the property described in the complaint was not the one they occupied, that they had held their lot for more than fourteen years as owners, and that they never asked permission or paid rent.

The trial court found that the spouses' house stood on the portion of the subject property lying on the Consolacion side, and ruled for Co Uy. The judgment became final. Only at the execution stage did the spouses invoke their indigenous identity, asking that customary law and the tribal court, not the regular courts, resolve the dispute.

Issues

• Whether or not a writ of mandamus may issue to compel the trial court judge to resolve the motion to settle jurisdiction before notice for hearing.
• Whether or not the writ may issue to reverse and set aside the trial court's decision in the unlawful detainer case.

Applicable Provisions

Section 65 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides:

Section 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. — When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

This is the provision the spouses anchor their claim of tribal jurisdiction upon, and the Court reads it together with the next section.

Section 66 of the same law provides:

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

This provision confines the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples to disputes between members of the same indigenous cultural community or indigenous people.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court dismissed the petition for violating the hierarchy of courts. The Supreme Court shares original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, and direct recourse to the Supreme Court is frowned upon. The spouses alleged no exceptional or compelling circumstance to justify relaxation of the rule, and that failure alone warranted dismissal.

Even setting that aside, the petition failed on the merits. Mandamus lies only to compel a ministerial duty, one that is clear and definite and involves no exercise of judgment. The spouses showed no clear legal right. Section 65 must be read with Section 66, and under the Court's ruling in Unduran versus Aberasturi, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has jurisdiction only where the parties belong to the same indigenous community. Here, nothing showed that Co Uy belongs to the spouses' tribe. Subjecting a non-member to customary law would violate fair play and due process, so jurisdiction properly lay with the regular courts.

Nor was there a ministerial duty. Resolving motions, interpreting laws, and determining jurisdiction are discretionary. Mandamus may compel a judge to act on a pending motion, but it can never direct how the judge shall rule.

Doctrine

First, the hierarchy of courts requires litigants to seek relief first from the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals before coming to the Supreme Court, and failure to do so is a ground for dismissal absent strong and compelling reasons.

Second, customary law prevails under Section 65 only when the parties belong to the same indigenous cultural community. Where one party is a non-member, the regular courts retain jurisdiction, for no person may be bound by a customary law and a council of elders to which he does not belong.

Third, mandamus issues only to compel a ministerial duty, never to control discretion. It may order a judge to resolve a motion, but never to resolve it in a particular way.

Disposition

The petition for mandamus was dismissed, and the spouses did not obtain the writ.

Remember This

Memorize this line: customary law governs only among members of the same indigenous community, and mandamus compels action, never judgment. Examiners use this case to test the hierarchy of courts, the limits of the writ of mandamus, and the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples under the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act.