🎧 Case Brief Lecture

NOLI DELA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. JORIVEL CARIÑO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, JOYMAE CARIÑO, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 270273, April 28, 2026 April 28, 2026

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Dela Cruz versus Cariño

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Noli Dela Cruz against Jorivel Cariño, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Joymae Cariño. Cariño sued Dela Cruz to have the steel gate he installed across a passageway declared a nuisance and abated, because that gate cut off her free access to the public road. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the distinction between a nuisance per se and a nuisance per accidens, on the factual character of that inquiry, and on the award of nominal damages for the vindication of a violated right.

Procedural History

Cariño filed a complaint for abatement of nuisance with damages before Branch 197 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City. The trial court ruled for Cariño. It declared the steel gate a nuisance per accidens, ordered Dela Cruz to remove it at his expense, ordered him to pay fifty thousand pesos in nominal damages, and ordered him to pay the costs of suit. Dela Cruz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court decision in its entirety. Dela Cruz moved for reconsideration, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Dela Cruz then came to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Facts

Jorivel Cariño owns a residential lot covered by a transfer certificate of title. The lot is bounded on all sides by lots belonging to different owners, so it has no adequate outlet to the public road except through a passageway. That passageway carries a right of way declared under the name of Noli Dela Cruz, and the easement is annotated at the back of the transfer certificates of title covering Dela Cruz's properties.

In February 2016, Cariño built a residential building on her lot. Dela Cruz then fenced his house and installed a steel gate, enclosing the passageway and preventing Cariño from traversing any part of it, thereby blocking her free access to the public road. On September 27, 2016, Cariño sent a demand letter asking Dela Cruz to remove the structure, but he refused.

Cariño then filed her complaint, praying that the steel gate be declared a private nuisance, that it be removed at Dela Cruz's expense, and that he be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. In his answer, Dela Cruz claimed he fenced his property because Cariño's use of the passageway violated his family's privacy. He also argued that the right of way is not a private nuisance because it is not the sole passageway to the public road, there being another accessible passageway at the back of Cariño's property. The evidence showed that the steel gate, though not locked, was tied with a wire, so Cariño still had to untie it to pass, and that the alternative route at the back required her to traverse several gates belonging to other neighbors.

Issues

  • Whether or not the steel gate constructed by Dela Cruz is a nuisance per accidens.
  • Whether or not the award of nominal damages in favor of Cariño is proper.

Applicable Provisions

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance:

A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.

The steel gate falls squarely under the fourth and fifth clauses, because it obstructs Cariño's free passage to the public road and impairs her use of her own property.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the petition. As a preliminary matter, the Court held that the question of whether the steel gate is a nuisance per accidens is a question of fact, and questions of fact lie outside a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is limited to questions of law. The Court acknowledged that the rule admits of exceptions, but the burden lies on the petitioner to allege and substantiate any exception, and Dela Cruz failed to do so. On that ground alone, the petition ought to be denied outright.

Even so, the Court resolved the merits and still denied the petition. It distinguished the two classes of nuisance. A nuisance per se is one recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and for that reason may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. A nuisance per accidens depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance.

Applying the distinction, the Court held that the steel gate is not a nuisance per se, because it is not recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances and does not pose an immediate general threat to the safety of all persons and property. It is a nuisance per accidens. Dela Cruz obstructed and interfered with Cariño's free passage to the public road and impaired her free use of her property, and since the passageway is a declared easement of right of way annotated on his titles, Cariño has the right to use it. That the gate was merely tied with a wire did not save it, because Cariño still had to untie the wire to pass, and the alternative route at the back required her to traverse several gates of other neighbors. It is only under these peculiar circumstances that the gate is declared a nuisance.

On the second issue, the Court sustained the award of nominal damages. Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. The amount is left to the sound discretion of the court. Dela Cruz willfully violated Cariño's right of access, and the award of fifty thousand pesos is reasonable. Following the Court's ruling in Lara's Gifts and Decors versus Midtown Industrial Sales, the Court imposed legal interest at six percent per annum on the total monetary award, reckoned from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid.

Doctrine

A nuisance per se is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances because it is a direct menace to public health or safety, and it may be abated summarily. A nuisance per accidens depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and because its existence is a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether it constitutes a nuisance. Whether a structure is a nuisance per accidens is a question of fact, and a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law. Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, anything that obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or that hinders or impairs the use of property, is a nuisance. Nominal damages are awarded not to indemnify for loss but to vindicate a right that has been violated or invaded.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were affirmed with modification, in that the total monetary award shall earn legal interest at six percent per annum from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid. Cariño won.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a nuisance per accidens depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing. Examiners like to use this case to test the nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens distinction, the rule that nuisance characterization is a question of fact, and the purpose of nominal damages as vindication of a violated right.