G.R. No. 268891. October 22, 2024
GERARDO “JERRY” A. NOVERAS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NARCISO DELA CRUZ AMANSEC, RESPONDENTS.
GAERLAN, J.:
On October 6, 2021, petitioner Gerardo “Jerry” A. Noveras
(Noveras) filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of
Vice-Governor of the province of Aurora in the May 9, 2022 general
elections. At that time, Noveras was the incumbent governor of Aurora.
In the late afternoon of March 30, 2022, respondent Narciso Dela Cruz
Amansec (Amansec) and his wife went to the Aurora Training Center (ATC)
compound to visit a police officer friend who was stationed there. While
walking towards the compound, which hosted facilities of the provincial
government, Amansec saw a tarpaulin with a certain image and red
background. When Amansec moved closer to the premises, he saw the same
image and background being printed on tarpaulin sheets, which turned out
to be materials for Noveras’s vice-gubernatorial campaign. Amansec also
discovered that the tarpaulin printing machine was being run by Michael
Tecuico (Tecuico), a casual employee of the Aurora Local Government
Unit (LGU). Amansec approached Tecuico and asked him to explain why
Noveras’s campaign materials were being printed on LGU premises. Amansec
claimed that Tecuico got angry and defensive at the inquiry and
forcibly removed him from the premises. Amansec thus filed a police
report and applied for a search warrant of the ATC compound.[4]
On March 31, 2022, the executive judge of Branch 91, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora issued a search warrant for “illegally
printed election propaganda or campaign materials of Atty. Christian
Noveras and Atty. Gerardo Noveras, Gubernatorial and Vice-Gubernatorial
candidates for the Province of Aurora, respectively, which materials are
deemed properties “subject of the offense” or ‘fruits of the offense”;
and printing machines being used as a means of committing an offense
which are kept inside the said Printing Room, also referred to as the
“Extension Office of the Provincial Capitol” located at the Training
Center (ATC), Sitio Setan, Barangay Calabuanan, Baler, Aurora.”[5]
The search warrant was implemented on April 2, 2022. Recovered from the
ATC premises were the following items: one tarpaulin eco solvent
printer, one inkjet printer, a personal computer set and computer
peripherals, a semi-automatic eyelet machine, and 41 pieces of tarpaulin
campaign materials and/or tarpaulin design templates[6] bearing the names of Noveras and other candidates for various provincial and municipal elective offices in Aurora.[7] The implementation of the search warrant was witnessed by an elected barangay official and three media representatives.[8]
Amansec further alleged that one of the witnesses was able to take a
photograph of the tarpaulin campaign materials showing that they were
paid for by Christian Noveras, the incumbent vice-governor and Noveras’s
brother.
On April 20, 2022, Amansec filed a criminal complaint
against Noveras, Tecuico, and other persons for violation of Section
261(o) of the Omnibus Election Code and Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, in connection with the tarpaulin printing incident.[9]
On April 26, 2022, Amansec petitioned the COMELEC to disqualify Noveras
from standing as a candidate, claiming that the tarpaulin printing
incident was a violation of Section 261(o) ultimately attributable to
Noveras, whose campaign materials were found on the scene.[10]
Noveras argued that the petition should be dismissed outright for Amansec’s failure to appear in the preliminary conference.[11] Noveras denied the allegation that his campaign materials were being printed on LGU premises using LGU resources.[12]
Furthermore, violation of Section 261(o) is not among the grounds for
disqualification of a candidate under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC).[13]
Finally, Noveras argued that a final judgment of conviction is
necessary to disqualify a candidate whether under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the LGC.[14]
The May 9, 2022 national and local Elections were conducted as
scheduled, with Noveras remaining on the ballot. He garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of vice-governor.[15]
On March 8, 2023, the Aurora provincial prosecutor’s office
found probable cause to charge Noveras and five other individuals with
violation of Section 261(o) of the Omnibus Election Code; but on June
16, 2023, the Department of Justice (DOJ) modified the provincial
prosecutor’s ruling and dismissed the charge as against Noveras.[16]
On July 10, 2023, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant Amansec’s petition.
The First Division resolved the case on the merits despite
Amansec’s non-appearance in the preliminary conference, invoking the
public interest in the resolution of election cases and the liberal
interpretation of the COMELEC rules of procedure.[17] The First Division stressed Noveras’s failure “to
set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support
his denial of the factual allegations against him. He failed to
controvert the pieces of evidence clearly establishing that tarpaulins
for his campaign were being printed using provincial government
resources by a casual plantilla employee under his control and
supervision.“[18]
Noveras was disqualified on the basis of Section 261(d)(1) of the
Omnibus Election Code, as he influenced his subordinate, Tecuico, into
doing acts beneficial to his campaign. The witness statements and search
reports prove that Tecuico, a casual employee of the Aurora LGU, was
caught in the act of printing Noveras’s campaign materials using Aurora
LGU equipment, inside Aurora LGU premises. It was also proven that
Noveras appointed Tecuico to the LGU. As head of the Aurora LGU and the
signatory of Tecuico’s appointment, Noveras wielded not only moral and
legal ascendancy over Tecuico, but also command and control prerogatives
over the facilities and resources implicated in the tarpaulin printing
incident. Given the circumstances, the First Division concluded that
Tecuico would not have used Aurora LGU resources to print campaign
materials in the ATC compound if not for the moral and legal ascendancy
exercised over him by Noveras. Furthermore, any such use of provincial
government resources and facilities would not have been possible without
the knowledge or influence of Noveras, the incumbent provincial
governor.[19]
Noveras
may be disqualified on the basis of Section 261(d)(1) of the Omnibus
Election Code despite its apparent repeal by Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 7890. The effect of Republic Act No. 7890 on the treatment of acts
of coercion affecting the right of suffrage is ambiguous, as it
increased the penalty for such acts, but repealed the specific
provisions defining and regulating such acts in Section 261(d)(1) and
(2) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC First Division resolved
the ambiguity by resorting to the legislative history of the statute,
which shows that: 1) the scope of the original bill which became
Republic Act No. 7890 was limited to removing bloc voting by religious
groups from the enumeration of acts punished in Section 261(d); and 2)
there was no discussion or intention to remove the prohibition against
acts of coercion and undue influence affecting the right of suffrage by
public officers. The poll body in division thus concluded that Section 2
of Republic Act No. 7890 should be read not as a blanket repeal of
Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code, but as a mere amendment to
remove any reference to acts of coercion affecting the right of suffrage
committed by leaders or officials of religious organizations, which
means that Section 261(d) remains an available ground to disqualify
public officers like Noveras.[20]
In a separate opinion, Commissioner Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr.
(Commissioner Maceda) echoed the reasoning of the First Division and
further explained that Javier v. COMELEC,[21]
which construed Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7890 as an express and
blanket repeal of Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code, “did not in any way diminish [the COMELEC’s] power to act in the face of situations where the coercion of voters on matters of suffrage is clearly apparent.”[22]
Commissioner Maceda also opined that Noveras may be disqualified and
prosecuted under Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code, as the
tarpaulin printing incident amounts to a fraudulent scheme for the
purpose of inducing participation in a campaign.[23]
All the elements of said offense, as defined in Section 261(e), are
present. First, the unlawful and unauthorized use of government property
by public officers constitutes fraud; thus, Tecuico’s use of an Aurora
LGU-owned printing machine within Aurora LGU premises to print campaign
materials for the campaign of the incumbent governor is a fraudulent
scheme.[24] Second, the moral
and legal ascendancy Noveras had over Tecuico as local chief executive
and appointing authority is a strong indicator of inducement, as “[i]t
would be impossible for Tecuico to have performed such scale of illegal
activity on his own and without the knowledge and consent of his
superior officer. Further, it is without doubt that the commission of
the illegal acts would ultimately redound to the benefit and advantage
of [Noveras], not just indirectly but directly.”[25]
Third, the printing of tarpaulin campaign banners is an act of
participation in a campaign. The materials printed by Tecuico contain
exhortations for voters to cast their votes for Noveras and the other
candidates in his ticket.[26]
On September 6, 2023, the COMELEC En Banc
resolved to deny Noveras’s motion for reconsideration, sustaining the
First Division’s reasoning as to the effect of Republic Act No. 7890 on
Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code,[27] and adopting Commissioner Maceda’s findings on the applicability of Section 261(e).[28]
Noveras cannot be disqualified on the basis of Section 261(o) of the
Omnibus Election Code without a final judgment of conviction because it
is not one of the disqualificatory offenses mentioned in Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code.[29]
Nevertheless, the First Division did not err in disqualifying Noveras
on the ground of Section 261(d)(1) and Section 261(e), which are both
Section 68 disqualificatory offenses.
Noveras can be
disqualified for the tarpaulin printing incident even if he was not
personally involved therein, as Section 261(e) does not require that the
acts of coercion or influence be done directly:
The material factors in the unlawful use of government resources
are the following: (1) Mr. Tecuico – a provincial government casual
worker, and (2) the ATC Compound – a provincial government-owned
complex. These factors have a common denominator – [Noveras], as the
then incumbent governor and Chief Executive Officer of the Province of
Aurora, had direct authority over both the person of a provincial
government casual worker and the provincial property.This is not a mere coincidence but a strong indication that
[Noveras] had coerced and induced Mr. Tecuico in performing the acts
complained of. The clear language of Section 261(e) of the OEC states
that the prohibited act need not to be proved to be undertaken by
Respondent directly. Even the indirect act would render him liable.[C]oercion can be implied, as either legal or constructive,
where the relation of the parties is such that one is under subjection
to the other, and is thereby constrained to do what his free will would
refuse. Inducement is defined as an “act or process of enticing or
persuading another person to take a certain course of action.”As exhaustively explained by the Resolution of the Commission
(First Division), [Noveras], in view of the extensive powers granted to
him as the Governor of the Province of Aurora, exercised authority and
control over the hiring and termination of employees and appointees as
well as over government premises.[30]
Before Us, Noveras accuses the COMELEC of grave abuse of
discretion in: 1) construing Republic Act No. 7890 as a mere amendment
of Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code, contrary to the ruling
in Javier;[31] 2) disqualifying him on the basis of Section 261(d) despite its repeal by Republic Act No. 7890;[32]
and 3) disqualifying him on the basis of Section 261(e) despite the
absence of evidence showing that he actually coerced or influenced
Tecuico.[33] Noveras also
prayed for preliminary injunctive relief, arguing that the immediately
executory character of the assailed rulings deprives him of the right to
run for elective office, more so considering that he garnered the
highest number of votes for vice-governor of Aurora in the May 9, 2022
local elections.[34]
Commenting on the Petition on the COMELEC’s behalf, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the poll body’s ruling is
supported by a preponderance of evidence showing that Noveras
perpetrated a “fraudulent scheme by unlawfully using government
resources and premises… to compel and induce Mr. Tecuico, a provincial
casual worker, to print materials for his campaign[:] . . . a
prohibited act under Section 261(e) of the [Omnibus Election Code].”[35]
The DOJ’s dismissal of the Section 261(o) charge against Noveras is
immaterial because the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the electoral
aspect of the offense, which only requires a “clear preponderance of
evidence”.[36]
The State Tribune also asks Us to revisit the ruling in Javier,
arguing that the construction of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7890 as
an express and blanket repeal of Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election
Code is not only inconsistent with the legislative history of Republic
Act No. 7890, but also deprives the COMELEC of the power to act against
clear cases of coercion and undue influence affecting the right of
suffrage.[37]
Finally,
the OSG argues against the grant of preliminary injunctive relief, as
Noveras failed to show any clear legal right protectible by a
preliminary injunctive writ. His claimed rights to seek and hold public
office are not rights at all, but mere privileges that are subject to
legal regulation. Furthermore, Noveras can no longer invoke said rights
as basis for preliminary injunctive relief, as he remained on the ballot
and garnered the most votes for vice-governor of Aurora in the May 9,
2022 elections.[38]
On January 19, 2024, the Court received a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Comment and Notice of Death[39]
from a certain Naryne Amansec (Naryne), who represented herself to be
Amansec’s daughter. Naryne alleged that her father passed away on
October 3, 2022. She thus prayed to be: 1) allowed to substitute Amansec
as a party in the present action; and 2) given leave to file a comment
in substitution of Amansec. Noveras moved for the denial and expunction
of Naryne’s motion, on the ground that she is not a real
party-in-interest.[40]
The petition must be dismissed.
|
I. Amansec may be substituted in the disqualification proceeding
|
In Lanot v. COMELEC,[41]
Lanot and others filed a petition to disqualify Eusebio from standing
as a candidate in the May 10, 2004 election for mayor of Pasig City. The
COMELEC allowed the election and proclamation to proceed while the
disqualification case was pending. Lanot assailed the COMELEC’s action
before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the COMELEC referred the case
to its Law Department without issuing a definitive ruling on the
electoral aspect. While his case against Eusebio was pending before Us,
Lanot was assassinated. Raymundo filed a motion to substitute Lanot; and
the third placer in said election moved to intervene. We allowed both
Lanot’s substitution and the third-placer’s intervention:
The law and the COMELEC rules [of procedure] have clear
pronouncements that the electoral aspect of a disqualification case is
not rendered inutile by the death of petitioner, provided that there is a
proper substitution or intervention of parties while there is a pending
case. On Raymundo’s substitution, any citizen of voting age is
competent to continue the action in Lanot’s stead. On Benavides’
intervention, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, or the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 (“Electoral Reforms Law of 1987”), allows
intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if
no final judgment has been rendered. Although Eusebio was already
proclaimed as Pasig City Mayor, Benavides could still intervene, as
there was still no final judgment in the proceedings for
disqualification.The case for disqualification exists, and survives, the election
and proclamation of the winning candidate because an outright dismissal
will unduly reward the challenged candidate and may even encourage him
to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the
disqualification case until after he has been proclaimed. The exception
to the rule of retention of jurisdiction after proclamation applies when
the challenged candidate becomes a member of the House of
Representatives or of the Senate, where the appropriate electoral
tribunal would have jurisdiction. There is no law or jurisprudence which
says that intervention or substitution may only be done prior to the
proclamation of the winning candidate. A substitution is not barred by
prescription because the action was filed on time by the person who died
and who is being substituted. The same rationale applies to a
petition-in-intervention.[42]
The facts in Lanot are on all fours with the present case.
The election proceeded despite the pendency of Amansec’s
disqualification petition, with the party sought to be disqualified
remaining on the ballot and garnering the highest number of votes. The
final ruling on the electoral aspect came only after the election and
proclamation,[43] and Amansec
passed away before resolution of the case. Under Rule 25, Section 2 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, any voter or duly registered political
organization has standing to file a petition for disqualification. In Lanot,
since the Court allowed Raymundo to substitute for the assassinated
Lanot, so too should We allow Naryne, Amansec’s daughter and a
registered voter in Ipil, Dipaculao, Aurora,[44] to substitute for Amansec.
|
II. Revisit of Javier v. COMELEC not
necessary; Republic Act No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code |
The first rule of statutory construction is that one should not resort to statutory construction.[45] It is presumed that the legislature says what it means and means what it says when it passes laws.[46]
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous, there
is no occasion for interpretation. The literal meaning of the statute
must be followed without judicial addition or subtraction.[47] “[L]egislative
intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself
especially when the words and phrases therein are clear and unequivocal.
The statute in such a case must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
Its literal meaning should be followed; to depart from the meaning
expressed by the words is to alter the statute.”[48] “[L]egislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone.”[49]
With these rules in mind, We consider the text of Republic Act No. 7890:
AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 286, SECTION THREE, CHAPTER TWO, TITLE
NINE OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL
CODESECTION 1. Article 286, Section Three, Chapter Two, Title Nine
of Act No. 3815, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:“Art. 286. Grave Coercion. — The penalty of prision
correccional and a fine not exceeding Six thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, without any authority of law, shall, by
means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against
his will, whether it be right or wrong.“If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of
the right of suffrage, or for the purpose of compelling another to
perform any religious act, to prevent him from exercising such right or
from so doing such act, the penalty next higher in degree shall be
imposed.”SECTION 2. Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), Article XXII of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby repealed.
SECTION 3. All other election laws, decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed.SECTION 4. If, for any reason, any section or provision of this
Act, or any portion thereof, the application of such section, provision
or portion to any person, group or circumstance is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act or application of such
section, provision or portion thereof to other persons, groups or
circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.SECTION 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The statute is clear and categorical. Section 1 amends the
definition of grave coercion by adding “threats or intimidation” as
additional modes of committing said offense. It also increases the
penalty for grave coercion from arresto mayor and a PHP 500.00 fine to prision correccional and a PHP 6,000.00 fine.[50] Finally, Section 1 increases the penalty for coercions committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage.
In turn, Section 2 repeals Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code;
and Section 3 repeals all election laws and regulations inconsistent
with the statute. The sentence “Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), Article XXII of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby repealed”
can have no meaning other than the withdrawal of binding force and
legal effect from Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), Article XXII
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the removal of said provision from the
corpus of statutory law. This is exactly how We ruled in Javier, which also involved an elective official who was disqualified from standing as a candidate on the basis of Section 261(d):
A repeal may be express or implied. An express repeal is one
wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is
repealed. An implied repeal, on the other hand, transpires when a
substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws.In the present case, it is clear that R.A. No. 7890 expressly
repealed Section 261, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Omnibus Election
Code. The COMELEC Second Division’s October 3, 2014 resolution, however,
treated this repeal as merely an implied one. Commissioner Yusoph
reasoned out as follows:Moreover, the general repealing clause in Section 3 of RA 7890
cannot impliedly repeal Section 68 because the latter is not absolutely
and irreconcilably incompatible with Article 286, as amended by RA 7890.
Meaning, a case for disqualification due to coercion under Section 68
can very well stand apart from the criminal case for coercion under
Article 286, as amended. This is so because Section 68 involves an
administrative proceeding intended to disqualify a candidate whereas
Article 286, supra, involves a criminal proceeding intended to penalize
coercion. Both laws, therefore, can be given effect without nullifying
the other, hence the inapplicability of implied repeal.To firm up our stance against implied repeal of coercion as a
ground for disqualification, the following pronouncements of the Supreme
Court are guiding:“Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when
the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that
one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.”“Well-settled is the rule is statutory construction that implied
repeals are disfavored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the
latter statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant
with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand
together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference
of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. …”We point out that this resolution and the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Guia became the basis of the internal arrangement reached
upon by the Commission en banc whereby the commissioners agreed
to submit their respective opinions explaining their votes or their
concurrence with either Commissioner Yusoph or Guia.As earlier stated, the vote was 4-2-1 in favor of disqualification; in a per curiam order promulgated on January 12, 2015, the Commission en banc
disqualified Gov. Javier and annulled his proclamation as the governor
of Antique. Chairman Brillantes and Commissioner Arthur Lim wrote their
own opinions concurring with the position of Commissioner Yusoph, while
Commissioner Tagle submitted his vote concurring with the opinions of
Commissioner Yusoph and Chairman Brillantes.In his Separate Opinion, Chairman Brillantes agreed with
Commissioner Yusoph that the repeal of Section 261(d) by R.A. No. 7890
was merely implied, and made the following disquisition:. . . .
The Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has constantly
disfavored and struck down the use of repeal by implication. Pursuant to
jurisprudence, well entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is
disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws
should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be
effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be
irreconcilable with the latter act. Stated plainly, a petition for
disqualification on the ground of coercion shall be taken differently
and distinctly from coercion punishable under the [Revised Penal Code]
for the two can very well stand independently from each other.
Therefore, unless proven that the two are inconsistent and would render
futile the application and enforcement of the other, only then that a
repeal by implication will be preferred.A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and
becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective.
The discussion on implied repeals by the Yusoph resolution, (and the
concurring opinion of Chairman Brillantes, Jr.), including the
concomitant discussions on the absence of irreconcilable provisions
between the two laws, were thus misplaced. The harmonization of laws can
only be had when the repeal is implied, not when it is express, as in
this case.The COMELEC’s reasoning that coercion remains to be a ground for
disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code despite the
passage of R.A. No. 7890 is erroneous. To the point of our being
repetitive, R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261d(1) and (2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, rendering these provisions inoperative. The
effect of this repeal is to remove Section 261(d) from among those listed as ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.[51]
The COMELEC ruled that Javier misconstrued the relationship
between Republic Act No. 7890 and the Omnibus Election Code. According
to the national poll body, the increased penalty for acts of coercion
against the exercise of the right of suffrage is inconsistent with the
repeal of Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code:
A textual examination of the R.A. 7890 yields to ambiguity in
its interpretation. The first portion of the law actually increased the
penalty for acts of coercion that affect the exercise of the right to
suffrage and as well as forms of coercion for the purpose of compelling
another to perform any religious act, to prevent him from exercising
such right or from so doing such act. This is suggestive that the
legislative [sic] want[s] to punish and deter such forms of coercion.However, in the second portion, it repealed Section 261(d)(1)
and (d)(2). These sections enumerate in detail the different forms and
manner of coercion by certain factors affecting the right of suffrage of
the individuals coerced such as their decision to aid, campaign, and
vote for or against any candidate. Reading the provisions of R.A. 7890
and Section 261(d)(1) and (d)(2) together do not provide certainty as to
the real mandate of R.A. 7890.The apparent ambiguity in the provisions of R. A. 7890 in
relation to Section 261(d) of the OEC requires resort to the
ascertainment of legislative intent in order for the Commission to
properly enforce the same.[52]
However, as the COMELEC points out, the ambiguity resulting from
the correlation of Republic Act No. 7890 to Section 261(d) of the
Omnibus Election Code is more apparent than real, because Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7890 clearly, expressly, and categorically erased
Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code from the statute books.
Moreover, there is no inherent ambiguity or contradiction between
Republic Act No. 7890’s imposition of a higher penalty for coercions
against the right of suffrage and the deletion of the “detailed
enumeration” of specific forms of such coercions in Section 261(d).
Republic Act No. 7890 merely reconciles and simplifies the treatment of
coercion in the Omnibus Election Code and Revised Penal Code, as
explained below.
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code share a common subject:
coercion as a punishable act. Before the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 7890, grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised
Penal Code had the following elements: (1) that any person be prevented
by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to
do something against his will, be it right or wrong; (2) that the
prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material
force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control
the will of the offended party, and (3) that the person who restrained
the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other
words, that the restraint was not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of a lawful right.[53]
Courts and commentators have opined that grave coercion can be
committed by moral pressure or intimidation, as these may be considered
“displays of force.”[54]
In Macalintal v. COMELEC,[55] the Supreme Court En Banc
held that the right of suffrage is a fundamental political right which
stems from the right to liberty. The right of suffrage may therefore be
curtailed only by the State through law or regulation, in accord with
due process. Thus, as a general rule, any form of non-state interference
on the right of suffrage, whether through intimidation, coercion, or
influence, should be presumed to have been made without right or
authority.
The acts mentioned in Section 261(d)(1) of the
Omnibus Election Code, i.e., the direct or indirect coercion,
intimidation, or compulsion of a subordinate, employee, member, or
parishioner, to aid, campaign, or vote for or against any candidate or
any aspirant for the nomination or selection of candidates, are
clear-cut cases of compelling someone to do something against their will
by force or intimidation, without legal right or authority. The same is
true for the acts mentioned in Section 261(d)(2) of the Omnibus
Election Code, as threatened or actual reduction of salary, demotion,
transfer, suspension, separation, excommunication, ejectment, or
vexation falls under either intimidation or force and violence in the
form of moral or economic pressure. We therefore agree with the COMELEC
that Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code contains mere “detailed
enumerations” of acts of coercion particularly affecting the right of
suffrage which are already penalized by Article 286 of the Revised Penal
Code.
By expressly including threats and intimidation as modes
of committing grave coercion, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7890 merely
codified the above-discussed relation between the Omnibus Election Code
and the Revised Penal Code. Since coercions against the right of
suffrage are already penalized in Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code,
Section 261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code is superfluous.
Accordingly, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7890 expressly repealed said
superfluous provision. To reinforce such express repeal, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 7890 introduces an inconsistency clause directed at all
other election laws and regulations. This inconsistency clause erases
all other references to Section 261(d), not only in the Omnibus Election
Code, but in all other election statutes and regulations.
The
COMELEC makes much of the alleged original intent of the House Bill that
became Republic Act No. 7890. However, the intent to decriminalize the
enforcement of bloc-voting by officials of religious groups is easily
reconcilable with the total repeal of the provision that the legislature
actually enacted. The COMELEC itself admitted that “the House Bill as originally worded was approved on First and Second Reading and was
only amended [at the bicameral level] to include the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code and the blanket repeal of Section 261(d)(1) and
(d)(2) because the same was met with objections from various religious
denominations and sects.“[56]
This makes it clear that the Legislature ultimately settled on a
blanket repeal of Section 261(d) as the most satisfactory response to
the objections of “various religious denominations and sects.”[57]
At any rate, We again emphasize that resort to statutory construction
aids such as legislative history is proper only when the meaning of the
statute is not apparent from a plain reading:
[I]t is of course fundamental that the determination of the
legislative intent is the primary consideration. However, it is equally
fundamental that [ ] legislative intent must be determined from the
language of the statute itself. This principle must be adhered to even
though the court be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the
Legislature intended to enact something very different from that which
it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by
construction and hidden meanings at variance with the language used
cannot be sought out. To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and
is quite apt to lead to an amendment of a law by judicial construction.
To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the
statute, is to legislate not to interpret.[58]
In Regalado v. Yulo,[59] the Court further held, thus:
The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is
the intent expressed in the words of the statute. If legislative intent
is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by
interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found
in the phraseology of the law. In other words, the courts cannot assume
some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute to
accomplish this supposed intention.[60]
Here, the legislative history only confirms the plain meaning of
Republic Act No. 7890: the legislature intended to abrogate Section
261(d) of the Omnibus Election Code and all references thereto in other
statutes and regulations. The legislature and the apex court have
decided thusly, and the national poll body must yield.
|
III. Section 261(e) remains a valid
ground to disqualify candidates who resort to fraud, intimidation, undue influence or violence |
The COMELEC argues that Javier did not “diminish its power
to act in the face of situations where the coercion of voters on matters
of suffrage is clearly apparent.”[61]
We agree with this statement only insofar as Section 261(e) subsists as
a valid and lawful ground to disqualify a candidate who uses
intimidation, undue influence, or violence to vitiate the free and
informed exercise of the right of suffrage. As discussed above, the
abrogatory provisions of Republic Act No. 7890 apply only to Section
261(d), leaving the other disqualificatory offenses in Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code unaffected.
Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
(e) Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device
or other forms of coercion. — Any person who, directly or indirectly,
threatens, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any
violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage upon any
person or persons or that of the immediate members of his family, his
honor or property, or uses any fraudulent device or scheme to compel or
induce the registration or refraining from registration of any voter, or
the participation in a campaign or refraining or desistance from any
campaign, or the casting of any vote or omission to vote, or any promise
of such registration, campaign, vote, or omission therefrom.
The provision contemplates two general classes of acts: first,
threats, intimidations, and actual violence; and second, fraudulent
devices or schemes.
Under the first class fall the following
acts: a) threats, b) intimidations, and c) actual causing, infliction,
or production of violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss, or
disadvantage upon any person or any person’s immediate family, honor, or
property, with the intent of compelling or inducing any
of the following results: 1) registration or refraining from
registration of any voter; 2) participation in a campaign; 3) refraining
or desistance from any campaign; 4) casting of any vote; 5) omission to
vote; and 6) any promise to do the following acts. The second class
contemplates fraudulent devices or schemes intended to compel or induce
any of the abovementioned results. Both classes of acts may be committed
directly or indirectly.
|
IV. Finding of violation of Section 261(e), under both classes of acts defined therein, is supported by substantial evidence
|
Section 68 disqualification proceedings before the COMELEC are
administrative in nature. In such proceedings, the subject of the
inquiry is the electoral aspect of the election offense, i.e., whether
the respondent should be disqualified from being a candidate for having
committed any of the acts or offenses listed in Section 68; and the
COMELEC’s adjudication on said issue must be supported by a clear
preponderance of evidence.[62]
However, if the grounds for disqualification are also defined and
penalized as crimes, the COMELEC may also pursue the criminal aspect of
the offense by referring the same to its Law Department.[63]
Factual findings of the COMELEC are final and non-reviewable if supported by substantial evidence.[64] “[T]he
[Supreme] Court does not review in a certiorari petition the COMELEC’s
appreciation and evaluation of the evidence, except to determine if
these findings are supported by substantial evidence. If substantial
evidence exists, the COMELEC’s findings and conclusions, even if
erroneous, are accorded respect; COMELEC action under these
circumstances merely amount to an error of judgment. [W]hen factual
conclusions are not based on substantial evidence or when the
appreciation and conclusions of fact are attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the resulting errors mutate from error of judgment to error
of jurisdiction.”[65]
Noveras put up a defense of general denial before the COMELEC. He
simply disavowed any knowledge of the tarpaulin printing incident and
presented no evidence to refute the allegations in the petition. The
only defense he raised is the unsubstantiated allegation that Amansec’s
camp had seized control over the ATC compound prior to the
implementation of the search warrant.[66] Notably, Noveras only raised this matter in the criminal complaint against him for violation of Section 261(o).[67] Thus, the COMELEC First Division correctly reasons that:
These bare allegations are not enough to contravene the clear
and unequivocal statements of [Amansec] which include [affidavits of]
law enforcement agents regularly performing their duties by virtue of a
court-issued warrant of arrest. [Noveras’s] claim that the ATC Compound
was under the control of [Amansec] also runs counter ordinary logic and
human experience as [Noveras] is the Chief Executive of the Province of
Aurora and the compound is a property of the provincial government.[68]
|
IV.A. The tarpaulin printing incident is a fraudulent scheme to induce voters to cast their votes in favor of Noveras
|
The COMELEC found Noveras guilty of using fraudulent devices or
schemes to compel or induce Tecuico’s participation in his
vice-gubernatorial campaign, in violation of Section 261(e): a
disqualificatory offense under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
We sustain, to the extent that the tarpaulin printing incident is a
fraudulent scheme to produce campaign materials inducing the Aurora
electorate to vote for Noveras and his ticket.
As mentioned above, the election offense of use of fraudulent device has three elements:
As to the first element, the disqualification petition and its
attachments sufficiently establish that on March 30, 2022, Tecuico, a
casual employee of the Aurora LGU, was caught operating a printing
machine within Aurora LGU premises, for the purpose of printing out
campaign materials which were later identified to be for the campaign of
Noveras and his ticket. The parties do not dispute that the ATC
Compound is a provincial government facility, and the search team had to
liaise with an Aurora LGU employee to open the locked printing room.
The printing incident itself was personally witnessed by Amansec and
later recorded in the blotter of the Baler Municipal Police Station, as
follows:
[A]t around 3:30 PM of [March 30, 2022], when [Amansec was]
about [to] see and visit his friend (certain “Mariano”[,] a personnel
[sic] of HPG based at ATC Compound Sitio Setan, Brgy. Calabuanan, Baler,
Aurora) he accidentally saw/discovered the illegal printing of campaign
materials, like tarpaulins, for candidates Christian Noveras and
Gerardo Noveras, inside the ATC Compound by a certain Michael Tecuico.
Further, that when he confronted Michael Tecuico, the latter got mad,
choked him, and tried to push him outside. A commotion ensued between
them and as a result thereof, he sustained injury on his right elbow.
And accordingly, Mich[a]el Tecuico locked the accordion of the alleged
printing room, with all the pieces of evidence left inside.[69]
The documentation and reports from the ensuing search establish
that the printing machines and facilities used by Tecuico were found
within Aurora LGU premises. The Certification of Orderly Search and the
affidavits of the searching team show that the materials hurriedly left
behind by Tecuico in the ATC compound printing room were campaign
materials for Noveras and the other candidates on his ticket.[70]
The photographic documentation of the seized items show the computers,
printing equipment, printing supplies, and printed tarpaulins that were
recovered during the search.[71]
Amansec also submitted the plantilla, service records, accomplishment
reports, and daily time records proving Tecuico’s employment with the
Aurora LGU.[72]
The unlawful and unauthorized use of government resources by public officers constitutes fraud. We so ruled in Juan v. People,[73]
where three incumbent barangay officials were charged with violating
Section 261(o) of the Omnibus Election Code for using barangay-owned
radio equipment and vehicles in their election campaign. The trial court
ordered their preventive suspension on the basis of Republic Act No.
3019. Before Us, the accused officials argued that preventive suspension
under Republic Act No. 3019 does not apply when the public officer is
charged with an election offense. We rejected this contention and ruled
that preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 3019 applies to any
form of fraud involving government funds or property:
Interestingly, prior to its amendment by BP 195, [Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019] had applied to public officers who, under a valid
information, were charged with violations of RA 3019 or with offenses
covered by the Revised Penal Code provision on bribery. The amendatory
law expanded the scope of the provision; now, public officers may
likewise be suspended from office if, under a valid information, they
are charged with an offense falling under Title 7 of Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, or with any other form of fraud involving government
funds or property.True, the cases against petitioners involve violations of the
Election Code; however, the charges are not unidimensional. Every law
must be read together with the provisions of any other complementing
law, unless both are otherwise irreconcilable. It must be emphasized
that petitioners were incumbent public officers charged with the
unauthorized and unlawful use of government property in their custody,
in the pursuit of personal interests. The crime being imputed to them is
akin to that committed by public officers as laid down in the Revised
Penal Code. Certainly, petitioners’ acts constitute fraud against the
government: thus, the present case is covered by Section 13 of RA 3019.[74]
Similarly, the printing of campaign materials for the election
campaign of an incumbent public official by a government employee within
government premises is a fraudulent device or scheme involving the
diversion of government resources to unauthorized ends.
As to the
second and third elements, the photographic evidence indubitably
demonstrates that the campaign materials printed by Tecuico and
subsequently found in the ATC printing room were calculated to induce
the electorate of Aurora to cast their votes in favor of Noveras and his
ticket.[75]
Noveras
can be disqualified under Section 261(e) even if the unauthorized
printing of his campaign materials in Aurora LGU premises was done by
someone else, because Section 261(e) does not distinguish between direct
and indirect participation. What matters is that Noveras was the
ultimate beneficiary of the acts committed by Tecuico, and that he
exercised moral and legal ascendancy over the latter by virtue of his
position as governor of Aurora and as appointing authority, as
exhaustively explained in the assailed COMELEC resolutions.
|
IV.B. There was threat or intimidation
of punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage upon Tecuico which induced him to print Noveras’s campaign materials in LGU premises |
The election offense of threats, intimidation or coercion under Section 261(e) has the following elements:
1) the offender, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates,
or actually causes, inflicts, or produces violence, injury, punishment,
damage loss, or disadvantage;2) the threat, intimidation, or actual causing, infliction or
production of violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss, or
disadvantage is directed at a person or a person’s immediate family,
honor, or property; and3) the threat, intimidation, or actual causing, infliction or
production of violence is intended to compel or induce any of the
following results:a. registration or refraining from registration of any voter
b. participation in a campaign
c. refraining or desistance from any campaign
d. casting of any vote
e. omission to vote
f. any promise to do the following acts.
As to the first and second elements, the COMELEC En Banc
extensively discussed the prevailing power relation between Noveras and
Tecuico in their respective capacities as Aurora provincial governor and
Aurora LGU employee:
The material factors in the unlawful use of government resources
are the following: (1) Mr. Tecuico – a Provincial government casual
worker, and (2) the ATC Compound – a provincial government-owned
complex. These factors have a common denominator – Respondent, as the
then incumbent governor and Chief Executive Officer of the Province of
Aurora, had direct authority over both the person of a provincial
government casual worker and the propert[ies of the province].This is not a mere coincidence but a strong indication that
[Noveras] had coerced and induced Mr. Tecuico in performing the acts
complained of. The clear language of Section 261(e) of the OEC states
that the prohibited act need not to be proved to be undertaken by
Respondent directly. Even the indirect act would render him liable.As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, coercion can be implied,
as either legal or constructive, where the relation, of the parties is
such that one is under subjection to the other, and is thereby
constrained to do what his free will would refuse….…[Noveras], in view of the extensive powers granted to him as
the Governor of the Province of Aurora, exercised authority and control
over the hiring and termination of employees and appointees as well as
over government premises.We underscore that [Noveras’s] extensive power is evident in his
authority to terminate the services of casual workers like Mr. Tecuico
at will. Casual workers “may be laid-off any time before the expiration
of the employment period when their services are no longer needed or
funds are no longer available or the project has already been
completed/finished.”Again, coercion is evident where the relation of the parties is
such that one is under subjection to the other, and is thereby
constrained to do what his free will would refuse. This is clearly the
situation of Mr. Tecuico. He could not have performed the acts
complained of without any orders or authorization from [Noveras] who is
the Chief Executive Officer of the Province of Aurora. A provincial
casual worker would not be able to perform such a systematic and immense
task without any inducement from a superior officer.Further, it is without doubt that the commission of the illegal
acts would ultimately redound to the benefit and advantage of [Noveras],
not just indirectly but directly.[76]
The first class of acts defined in Section 261(e) includes threats or intimidations of punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage upon any person. As discussed above, Noveras’s position of power vis-Ă -vis
Tecuico inevitably carried with it an element of intimidation, insofar
as Tecuico would not have agreed to print Noveras’s campaign materials
in the ATC printing room if not for the moral and legal ascendancy
relations between them; or in the words of the COMELEC First Division, “Tecuico
would not have exposed himself to criminal liability for election
offenses and administrative sanctions for misuse of government resources
to no benefit to himself, without the persuasive influence of [Noveras].”[77]
As provincial governor, Noveras exercised disciplinary authority over
Tecuico. Stated differently, Noveras had the power and authority to
deprive Tecuico of any rights, privileges, or benefits he enjoys as an
employee of the Aurora LGU.[78] Case law puts it more bluntly: “moral ascendancy substitutes for force and intimidation.”[79]
The circumstances and effects of the power relations of moral and legal
ascendancy between employers and employees are not mere inferences or
conjectures, but are fundamental factual pillars of statutory and case
law.[80] In the words of the COMELEC First Division:
[T]he law recognizes that subtle forms of pressure or
manipulation can also constitute coercion or influence. In this case,
the governor’s authority, control over resources, and position of power
create a situation where the casual employee may feel compelled to
comply with requests or expectations, even without explicit threats or
intimidation.[81]
While it may be that the statutory and judicial precedents in this
area of law draw mostly from sexual harassment and rape cases, these
cases nevertheless share a common element with the first class of acts
defined in Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code: the resort to
threats, intimidation, or actual violence towards an illicit and immoral
end. It may even be argued that the degree of ascendancy is higher with
respect to elected government officials like Noveras, as they wield
more powers and enjoy more prerogatives than private employers or other
persons in authority.
The existence of intimidation upon
Tecuico’s person is further evinced by Amansec’s averments in his
disqualification petition and in his Complaint before the DOJ. In the
latter document, Amansec made the following narration, which is based on
his own personal knowledge and the cellphone video camera recording
made by his wife, Merlinda:
42. Na nais ko rin pong sabihin na ang aking asawa ay nakakuha
ng video ng insidente na naganap noong ika-30 [ng Marso] 2022 bilang
dagdag ebidensya laban sa mga inihahabla: “Kalakip bilang Annex P ang CD
kung saan nakalagay ang video na kinuha ni Gng., Amansec gamit ang
kanyang cellphone”43. Na mapapanood po sa naturang video na may tinawagang tao si
Michael Tecuico na tinawag niyang boss. Ito po ay mapapanood sa ika 4:30
hanggang 4:58 na minuto ng video;44. Na mapapansin po sa video na may tinetext o tinatawagan si
Michael gamit ang kanyang cellphone. Di kalaunan ay kausap na po niya
ang boss niya;45. Na ang iba sa mga sinabi ni Michel Tecuico ay ang mga
sumusunod;a. “Teka lang po Sir. Tatawagan ko boss ko.”; at
b. “Sir, may
problema… si Amansec…”46. Na malinaw po na hindi siya nag-iisa sa ilegal na gawain
sapagkat kinailangan pa niyang tawagan ang tinawag niyang boss upang
humingi ng tulong noong maaktohan ko ang kaniyang ilegal na ginagawa;[82]
Amansec’s account of the incident passed unrebutted by Noveras. It
shows that Tecuico got angry and defensive when Amansec caught him
using the tarpaulin printing machine and asked him what he was printing.
Tecuico tried to contact someone he called “boss” to notify him of a
“problem” with Amansec. Eventually, Tecuico tried to forcibly remove
Amansec from the premises, injuring the latter. Tecuico’s hostile and
seemingly confused response to Amansec’s presence in the ATC Compound
buttresses the COMELEC’s finding that he would not have agreed to print
Noveras’s campaign materials in the ATC compound if not for the
directive or inducement of a higher-up. The identity of this higher-up
is immaterial for purposes of Section 261(e), because, at the risk of
being repetitive, the threat or intimidation may be made indirectly. The
intimidation of punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage is inherent in
the LGU chief executive-employee relation between Noveras and Tecuico,
and became manifest in the latter’s behavior during the tarpaulin
printing incident. Moreover, the ultimate beneficiary of Tecuico’s acts
was Noveras, whose name and face appear on the tarpaulins found by the
search team.
As to the third element, it is indisputable that the printing
or publishing of campaign materials constitutes participation in an
election campaign.[83]
V. Conclusion
While the COMELEC is the constitutionally-designated frontline interpreter of election laws and jurisprudence,[84]
it must nevertheless yield to the clear and categorical directives of
the great branches of the government. When the Legislature and the
Judiciary speak, quasi-judicial agencies like the COMELEC should listen.
The COMELEC cannot insist on its own reading of the law when such is
clearly contrary to the intention of Congress and the interpretation of
the Supreme Court, especially when the law itself provides for
up-to-date and lawful means of addressing the numerous illegal and
unethical electoral practices that the state election agency has to
confront.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is DISMISSED. The September 6, 2023 Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPA Case No. 22-048 (DC) is AFFIRMED
insofar as it disqualified petitioner Gerardo “Jerry” A. Noveras from
standing as a candidate in the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections,
on the basis of Section 261(e) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended.
The December 11, 2023 Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Comment and Notice of Death filed by Naryne Aman sec is GRANTED. The June 13, 2024 Motion to Expunge from Records filed by Gerardo “Jerry” A. Noveras is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., M. Lopez, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., see dissent.
Hernando,* J., on official business.
Lazaro-Javier** and Rosario,** JJ., on official leave.
Inting,*** J., no part.
Zalameda,**** J., on leave but left his concurring vote.
Kho, Jr., J., join the dissent of Justice Caguioa.
Singh, J., dissent and join Justice Caguioa.
* On official business.
** On official leave.
*** No part.
**** On leave but left his concurring vote.
[1] Rollo, pp. 6–34.
[2] Id. at
252–280. Signed by Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Aimee P. Ferolino,
and Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr. (with separate opinion).
[3] Id. at
350–373. Signed by [Chairperson] George Erwin M. Garcia and
Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo (no part), Aimee P.
Ferolino, Rey E. Bulay (no part), Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr., and
Nelson J. Celis.
[4] Id. at 35–39, 72–73. Petition for Disqualification and Sinumpaang Salaysay of Merlinda M. Amansec.
[5] Id. at 77. Search Warrant issued by Executive Judge Enrico Voltaire S. Rivera.
[6] Id. at
88–100. Certificate of Orderly Search and Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay of PMSG Geoffrey M. Bolante and Pat Marvin E. Gonzales.
[7] Id. at 96–97.
[8] Id. at
101–104, Pinagsama-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Punong Barangay David
Orolfo, Jr., Media Representative Jason de Asis, Reynaldo Fernando, and
Rommel Espinosa.
[9] Id. at 128–149, Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Paghahabla.
[10] Id. at 35–48. Petition for Disqualification.
[11] Id. at 231–232. Noveras’s Memorandum before the COMELEC.
[12] Id. at 118–119. Noveras’s Answer before the COMELEC.
[13] Id. at 232–237. Noveras’s Memorandum before the COMELEC.
[14] Id. at 121. Noveras’s Answer before the COMELEC.
[15] Id. at 27. Petition for Certiorari.
[16] Id. at 321–327. June 16, 2023 Resolution in NPS Docket No. IV-01-INV-22D-129, signed by Secretary Jesus Crispin C. Remulla.
[17] Id. at 257. COMELEC First Division Resolution.
[18] Id. at 267.
[19] Id. at 260–267.
[20] Id. at 269–279.
[21] 777 Phil. 700 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[22] Rollo, p. 288, Separate Opinion of Commissioner Maceda.
[23] Id. at 290–297.
[24] Id. at 295–296.
[25] Id. at 293–295.
[26] Id. at 292.
[27] Id. at 361–365. COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
[28] Id. at 365–373.
[29] Id. at 360–361.
[30] Id. at 368–370. COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
[31] Id. at 13–22. Petition.
[32] Id.
[33] Id. at 22–25.
[34] Id. at 25–27.
[35] Id. at 513. Comment.
[36] Id. at 513–514.
[37] Id. at 514–518.
[38] Id. at 518–520.
[39] Id. at 541–546. Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Comment and Notice of Death.
[40] Id. at 629–635. Motion to Expunge from Records.
[41] 537 Phil. 332 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
[42] Id. at 352–353.
[43] Id. at 356–377, the Court set aside the COMELEC En Banc
order referring the case to the COMELEC Law Department upon a finding
that Eusebio did not commit any disqualificatory act under Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
[44] Rollo, pp. 541–546. Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Comment and Notice of Death.
[45] See Daoang v. Municipal Judge, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, 242 Phil. 774, 777 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division]; Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar, 124 Phil. 763, 779–780 (1966) [Per J. Castro, En Banc]; Government of the P.I. v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 42, 48–49 (1916) [Per J. Moreland, Second Division]; see Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Fortuna Paper Mill & Packaging Corp., 842 Phil. 819, 838 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, A., Jr., Second Division]. See also DANTE B. GATMAYTAN, LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 2.0 214-216 (2014).
[46] “Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there should be no departure. The rule is derived from the maxim index animo sermo est
— meaning, speech is the index of intention — which rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute.” Federation of Jeepney Operators and Drivers Association of the Philippines v. Government of Manila City, G.R. No. 209479, July 11, 2023 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc] at 28. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website. See also Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, 831 Phil. 135, 173–174 (2018) [Per J. Martires, En Banc]; Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 659 (1992) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
[47] See Soliman v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 202417 & 203245, July 25, 2023 [Per J. Marquez, En Banc] at 9. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website. See Nagaño v. Tanjangco, 903 Phil. 1, 16 (2021) [Per J. Hernando, Third Division]; Fagel Tabin Agricultural Corp. v. Judge Jacinto, 280 Phil. 205, 210 (1991) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division]; Insular Lumber Co. v. CTA, et al., 192 Phil. 221, 231 (1981) [Per J. De Castro, En Banc]; Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. CIR, 142 Phil. 502, 508 (1970) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
[48] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corp., 525 Phil. 644, 649 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna, Second Division].
[49] Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 40, 47 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
[50] In 2017, the
Legislature further increased the fine to PHP 100,000.00. Republic Act
No. 10951 (2017), An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property
and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based, and the Fines Imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, Otherwise
Known as “The Revised Penal Code”, As Amended, sec. 72.
[51] Javier v. Commission on Elections, 777 Phi1. 700, 725–727 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[52] Rollo, pp. 271–272. COMELEC First Division Resolution.
[53] Timoner v. People, 211 Phil. 166, 169 (1983) [Per J. Escolin, Second Division].
[54] See United States v. Cabanag, 8 Phil. 64, 65 (1907) [Per J. Tracey, En Banc]; United States v. Tupular, 7 Phil. 8, 9–11 (1906) [Per J. Torres, En Banc];
2 ANTONIO L. GREGORIO & LUIS R. FERIA, COMMENTS ON THE REVISED
PENAL CODE 362 (1959), citing 2 CUELLO CALON 752, February 27, 1940
Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, and People v. Fernandez, 43 O.G. 1717 (Court of Appeals); AMBROSIO PADILLA, CRIMINAL LAW: REVISED PENAL CODE ANNOTATED 286 (1951), citing People v. Irlanda,
40 O.G. (12 S, No. 18) 223 (Court of Appeals); MARIANO A. ALBERT, THE
REVISED PENAL CODE (ACT No. 3815) ANNOTATED 629–630 (1948); 3 RAMON C.
AQUINO & CAROLINA C. GRIÑO-AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE 67–68
(2007); 2 LUIS B. REYES & RHODA REGINA REYES, THE REVISED PENAL
CODE: CRIMINAL LAW 792, 796 (2021).
[55] Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 263590 & 263673, June 27, 2023 [Per J. Kho, Jr., En Banc] at 19–24. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[56] Rollo, p. 276 (footnote 72 of the COMELEC First Division Resolution.) Emphasis supplied.
[57] Id.
Parenthetically, these objections could have motivated the Legislature
to remove Section 261(d) from the list of “predicate offenses” under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
[58] Tañada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515, 518 (1935) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[59] Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 (1935) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[60] Id. at 179.
[61] Rollo, p. 363. COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
[62] Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 748 Phil. 205, 224–225 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]; Lanot v. Commission on Elections, 537 Phil. 332, 359–360 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Sunga v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 310, 324 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
[63] CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 2(6); OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, sec. 265; Albaña v. Commission on Elections, 478 Phil. 941, 950–952 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, En Banc].
[64] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 4; Cawasa v. Commission on Elections, 433 Phil. 312, 324 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Navarro v. Commission on Elections, 298-A Phil. 588, 593 (1993) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].
[65] J. Brion, concurring opinion in Dano v. Commission on Elections, 794 Phil. 573, 603 (2016) [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc]. See also Aratuc v. Comelec, 177 Phil. 205, 235–236 (1979) [Per J. Barredo, En Banc].
[66] Rollo, pp. 210–211. Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay of Gerardo Angala Noveras.
[67] Id. at 118–123, 229–236. Noveras’s Answer and Memorandum before the COMELEC.
[68] Id. at 268. COMELEC First Division Resolution.
[69] Rollo, p. 76. Extract of Police Blotter Entry No. 2022-03-110. Page No. 0025 paragraph A.
[70] Id. at 88–100. Certificate of Orderly Search and Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of PMSG Geoffrey M. Bolante and Pat. Marvin E. Gonzales; id. at 105–108. Photographs of seized tarpaulins bearing the names “Atty. Jerry A. Noveras” and “Christian M. Noveras.”
[71] Id. at 78–84.
[72] Id. at 56–71.
[73] 379 Phil. 125 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[74] Id. at 137.
[75] Rollo, p. 371. COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
[76] Rollo, pp. 368–370, COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
[77] Id. at 267. COMELEC First Division Resolution.
[78] Id. at 265–266.
[79] Dela Cruz v. People, 903 Phil. 801, 818 (2021) [Per J. Lopez, J., Third Division]; People v. Amoc, 810 Phil 253, 260 (2017) [Per J. Tijam, Third Division].
[80] See
Republic Act No. 7877 (1995), sec. 3; Republic Act No. 11313 (2019),
sec. 17; SC Administrative Matter No. 03-03-13-SC, December 14, 2004,
Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and
Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary, sec. 3; Cabatulan v. Buat, 491 Phil. 421, 426 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; People v. Ylanan, 436 Phil. 407, 416–418 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Villarama v. National Labor Relations Commission, 306 Phil. 310, 321 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division]; Castro v. Mayor, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268, November 25, 2014 (Unsigned Resolution, En Banc); People v. XXX, G.R. No. 258958, March 15, 2023 [Unsigned Resolution, First Division].
[81] Rollo, p. 266. COMELEC First Division Resolution.
[82] Id. at 141. Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Paghahabla by Narciso Dela Cruz Amansec.
[83] OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, sec. 79(b), in relation to par. (b)(4). See also
COMELEC Resolution No. 10730 (2021), sec. 1, item 4; COMELEC Resolution
No. 10049 (2016), sec. 1, item 4; COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 (2004),
sec. 1, item 1; COMELEC Resolution No. 3636 (2001), sec. 1.
[84] Villanueva v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260116, July 11, 2023 [Per J. Gaerlan, En Banc] at 15. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is the question of the validity of the Resolution[1] dated July 10, 2023 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division and Resolution[2] dated September 6, 2023 of the COMELEC En Banc,
which disqualified petitioner Gerardo “Jerry” A. Noveras (Noveras) from
running for the vice-gubernatorial position of the province of Aurora
in the 2022 National and Local Elections (NLE), under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) in relation to Sections 261(d)(1)[3] and (e)[4]
thereof. Noveras alleges that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when COMELEC found him
guilty of violating: [a] Section 261(d) of the OEC, despite its express
repeal; and [b] Section 261(e) for lack of legal basis, alleging that
COMELEC’s findings are based on suppositions and inferences.
The ponencia
agrees with Noveras to the extent that Section 261(d)—coercion of
subordinates—in relation to Section 68, may no longer be used as basis
for disqualifying candidates in view of its express repeal by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7890,[5] as extensively discussed in Gov. Javier v. COMELEC.[6] Notwithstanding, the ponencia upholds COMELEC En Banc‘s
finding that there is substantial evidence that Noveras violated
Section 261(e), i.e., using a fraudulent scheme to induce voters to cast
their votes in his favor,[7] and threatening or intimidating a government employee to participate in his election campaign.[8] Accordingly, the ponencia affirms the disqualification of Noveras.[9]
I dissent.
I submit that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disqualified Noveras based on grounds not alleged in the Petition for Disqualification
filed by respondent Narciso Dela Cruz Amansec (Amansec). As the
Petition for Disqualification is based solely on an alleged violation of
Section 261(o) of the OEC, COMELEC violated Noveras’s constitutional
right to due process when it ruled that Noveras may nonetheless be
disqualified under Sections 261(d) and (e). Contrary to the findings of
COMELEC, the material allegations in the Petition for Disqualification
do not charge Noveras with election offenses under these two provisions,
and neither are these offenses necessarily included in the sole offense
alleged to have been violated.
Even assuming that COMELEC may
disqualify a candidate based on grounds not alleged in the petition,
COMELEC still erred in disqualifying Noveras on the basis of Sections
261(d) and (e).
While I agree that Section 261(d) is repealed
under the clear and categorical language of R.A. No. 7890, and thus can
no longer be considered a ground for disqualification under Section 68, I
disagree that there is substantial evidence to prove that Noveras
violated Section 261(e) — to the contrary, there is no evidence as to any involvement of Noveras in the alleged offense.
Factual background of the case
Noveras, then incumbent governor of Aurora, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of vice-governor of the province of
Aurora in the 2022 NLE.[10] Amansec likewise filed his COC for the same position.[11]
Meanwhile, Christian Noveras (Christian), the son of Noveras and then
incumbent vice-governor of Aurora, filed his COC for the position of
governor.[12]
According to Amansec, on March 30, 2022, he went to the Aurora Training
Center (ATC), a government-owned property which houses different offices
and agencies of the Province of Aurora. At the ATC, Amansec allegedly
witnessed a certain Michael Tecuico (Tecuico), a casual government
employee of the province, printing the campaign materials of Noveras and
Christian, using the tarpaulin printer owned by the govemment.[13]
When Amansec confronted Tecuico about the campaign materials, Tecuico
allegedly called someone with his cellphone who Tecuico referred to as
“boss” and thereafter forcibly removed Amansec out of the building.[14]
On the same date, Amansec applied for the issuance of a warrant to
search the printing room at the ATC for possible violation of Section
261(o)[15] of the OEC.[16] The application was granted on April 1, 2022.[17]
On April 2, 2022, the police officers enforced the search warrant and
seized several campaign materials of Noveras and Christian, among other
items.[18] The seized campaign materials all contained the statement, “Paid by: Christian M. Noveras.”[19]
Proceedings before COMELEC
On April 26, 2022, Amansec filed before COMELEC the subject Petition for Disqualification[20]
against Noveras, in which Amansec alleged that, “[a]s the incumbent
Governor of the Province of Aurora, [Noveras] took undue advantage of
his position and abused the power and authority of his office by
utilizing and using the property, equipment, and facilities of the
Provincial Government of Aurora for his own personal interest and for
the benefit of his campaign as a vice-gubernatorial candidate of the
said province.”[21] Amansec emphasized that the ATC and the printer used to print the campaign materials are both owned by the government.[22]
Considering that the seized campaign materials have the same layout as
the materials used by Noveras and his running mates in their campaign,
it is allegedly impossible for Noveras to claim that he has no knowledge
where his campaign materials are being printed.[23]
Thus, Amansec claimed that Noveras should be disqualified from running
and continuing as a candidate for the vice-gubernatorial post for
committing an election offense under Section 261(o) of the OEC[24] which prohibits the use of government-owned or controlled facilities and equipment for an election campaign.
Notably, Amansec also filed a Petition for Disqualification against
Christian, ultimately alleging the same facts as alleged in the Petition
for Disqualification against Noveras.[25]
He also filed a criminal complaint against Noveras and Christian, among
others, for Malversation of Public Funds and against Noveras,
Christian, Tecuico, Joel D. Friginal (Friginal) and Ricardo Q. Bautista
(Bautista) for violation of Section 261(o) of the OEC.[26]
Friginal was the Supervising Administrative Officer of the Supply and
Property Management Division, while Bautista was the Provincial General
Services Officer.[27] Both were the immediate supervisors of Tecuico.[28]
In his Answer[29]
to the Petition for Disqualification, Noveras prayed for the dismissal
of the petition, arguing that a violation of Section 261(o) is not a
ground for disqualification under Section 68[30] of the OEC.[31] Meanwhile, a final judgment of guilt for an offense is required for disqualification under Section 12[32] of the OEC and under Section 40[33]
of the Local Government Code of 1991, and that, in that regard, the
criminal complaints against him are then still pending before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor.[34]
As the petition does not allege any grounds for disqualification other
than a violation of Section 261(o), Noveras asserted that the petition
has no basis in fact and in law.[35]
In the Resolution dated July 10, 2023, the COMELEC First Division
granted the Petition for Disqualification, but not for violation of
Section 261(o). Rather, Noveras was found to have violated Section 261(d)(1) of the OEC,[36]
i.e., coercing a subordinate to campaign for a candidate. Notably,
unlike Section 261(o), Section 261(d)(1) is an offense that Section 68
references as a ground for disqualification.
Noveras filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[37]
arguing that as R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261(d) of the
OEC, there is no legal basis for his disqualification on said ground.
Even assuming that one may be disqualified under Section 261(d), Noveras
alleged that the COMELEC First Division’s finding that he exercised
moral ascendancy over Tecuico and consequently coerced and/or influenced
the latter to perform acts to aid his candidacy are based on mere
suppositions and inferences.[38]
On August 14, 2023, Noveras filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration,[39] alleging that the Department of Justice, in a Resolution[40]
dated June 16, 2023, dismissed the criminal complaint against him for
violation of Section 261(o) for lack of probable cause since Amansec
“failed to establish how . . . [Noveras] and Christian . . . provided
moral assistance and asserted moral ascendancy over . . . [Tecuico] to
commit the crime charged”[41] or “instructed [the latter] to print [the] campaign materials.”[42]
Noveras likewise noted that the disqualification case against Christian
was dismissed by the COMELEC First Division for lack of merit because
Section 261(o) is not among the grounds for disqualification listed
under Section 68 of the OEC,[43] and that said case and the disqualification case filed against him (Noveras) are based on virtually the same facts.
In a Resolution dated September 6, 2023, the COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and disqualified Noveras for violation of Section 261(d)(1) and, additionally, Section 261(e) of the OEC, i.e., commission of a fraudulent scheme to compel Tecuico to participate in the campaign.
While the COMELEC En Banc agreed that Section 261(o) is not among the offenses warranting disqualification under Section 68,[44]
it nonetheless agreed with the COMELEC First Division that Noveras’
“extensive control over employees and appointees of the Provincial
Government establishes the use of coercion against a provincial casual
worker to commit partisan activities in violation of Section 261(d)(1)
of the OEC.”[45] Further, with respect to Section 261(e), the COMELEC En Banc ruled that:
[T]he material facts of the case and the supporting evidence
clearly establish that [Noveras’] use of a fraudulent scheme by
unlawfully using government resources and premises has enabled him to
compel and induce Mr. Tecuico, a provincial casual worker, to print
materials for his campaign. This is a prohibited act of Section 261 (e)
of the OEC. Thus, he can be disqualified pursuant to Section 68 of the
OEC.[46]
The COMELEC En Banc also referred the criminal aspect of the said election offenses to its Law Department for preliminary investigation.[47]
|
Noveras’ constitutional right to due
process was violated when COMELEC disqualified him based on grounds not alleged in the Petition for Disqualification. |
Administrative proceedings, such as disqualification proceedings
before COMELEC, are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles—including the right to due process.[48] A basic requirement of due process is that a person be duly informed of the charges against him or her,[49] and consequently be given an opportunity to present a defense on the accusations constituting such charges:
Administrative due process demands that the party being charged is
given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is complied with “if the
party who is properly notified of allegations against him or her is
given an opportunity to defend himself or herself against those
allegations, and such defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving
at its own independent conclusions.”. . . .
An important component of due process is the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against him or her.
A proper appraisal of the accusations would give the accused an
opportunity to adequately prepare for his or her defense. Otherwise, substantial justice would be undermined.[50] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
As such, the Court has held that, “even in an administrative
proceeding[, a person has] the right to be informed of the charges
against him, as well as the right not to be convicted of an offense for which he was not charged.”[51]
He likewise cannot be, even in administrative proceedings, “convicted
of a much serious offense, carrying a more severe penalty, without him
being properly informed thereof or being provided with the opportunity
to be heard thereon.”[52]
I am mindful that an administrative charge need not be drafted with the
same precision as is expected in a criminal prosecution.[53]
Indeed, due process requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand.[54] However,
such opportunity to explain is contingent on whether the person so
charged was sufficiently informed of the same—as one cannot truly defend
himself or herself—and therefore be heard—absent any knowledge of the
offense charged against that person. Hence, such failure to sufficiently
inform the respondent or accused of the charge amounts to a violation
of the basic right to due process, which should result in the dismissal
of the charges.[55]
Here, the violation of Noveras’s right to be duly informed of the
charges upon which his disqualification is based was committed not just
once, but twice—before the COMELEC First Division and then before the
COMELEC En Banc.
To recall, Amansec sought the
disqualification of Noveras based solely on the latter’s alleged
violation of Section 261(o) of the OEC. Consequently, in his Answer,
Noveras prepared a defense on the basis of Section 261(o), countering
that a violation of Section 261(o) does not automatically result in his
disqualification without a final conviction for the same, as it is not
included in the offenses listed in Section 68 of the OEC.
Indeed, as the COMELEC En Banc
later confirmed, Noveras’ motion for reconsideration was correct in
that it (the COMELEC First Division) cannot disqualify Noveras based on
Section 261(o) as it would be beyond its jurisdiction. The COMELEC First
Division should have ended its discussion there as the foregoing
pronouncement already warranted the dismissal of the disqualification
case against Noveras. Notably, in the disqualification case against
Christian, involving the same factual circumstances and grounds, the
COMELEC First Division correctly dismissed the petition precisely on
this basis—a violation of Section 261(o) does not warrant
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC.
However, in this
case, under the guise of substantial justice, the COMELEC First Division
went further and ruled that it is not bound by the allegations of the
petition[56] and disqualified Noveras based on Section 261(d)(1).
Unfortunately, when Noveras moved for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc,
the latter added yet another charge against Noveras for violation of
Section 261(e), stating that this new ground “can equally serve as basis
for [Noveras’] disqualification.”[57]
I simply cannot subscribe to the COMELEC En Banc‘s
opinion that the factual allegations in the Petition for
Disqualification for the violation of Section 261(o) likewise support
the disqualification under Sections 261(d)(1) and (e). These three
sections, while all election offenses, have different elements, and as
such, necessitate different factual allegations.
To determine if
Noveras was properly informed of the grounds on which he was
disqualified, so that he had a real opportunity to defend himself, the
allegations of facts in the Petition for Disqualification must be
examined. If said facts as alleged in the petition constitute the
offenses under Sections 261(d)(1) and 261(e), then there could not have
been any violation of Noveras’ due process rights. On the other hand, if
such alleged facts do not constitute such offenses, or if any essential
element of these offenses cannot be established by the alleged facts,
even on the assumption that they are true, then there was violation of
Noveras’ right to notice and hearing, i.e. right to due process.[58]
A closer reading of the assailed Resolutions of COMELEC shows that
there were, in fact, three distinct offenses that Noveras was found to
have allegedly committed:
261(d)(1), i.e., that he directly or indirectly coerced, intimidated,
compelled, or in any manner, influenced his subordinate—in this case,
Tecuico—to aid and campaign for him (Noveras);
manner—by directly or indirectly threatening, intimidating or actually
causing, inflicting, or producing any violence, injury, punishment,
damage, loss, or disadvantage upon Tecuico to compel or induce the
latter’s participation in the campaign for Noveras; and
manner—by directly or indirectly using any fraudulent device or scheme
to induce the voters to cast their votes for him (Noveras).
Dissecting these relevant provisions on the alleged offenses, the following relevant elements for each offense come to light:
1) the offender is a public officer; 2) he or she coerces or intimidates
or compels or in any manner influences, directly or indirectly his or
her subordinates; and 3) the purpose of these acts is for the
subordinates to aid or campaign for the public officer;
261(e): 1) the offender is any person; 2) he or she directly or
indirectly threatens or intimidates or actually causes injury,
punishment, loss, or disadvantage upon another person; and 3) the
offender’s purpose is to compel or induce the participation of the
victim in a campaign; and
Section 261(e): 1) the offender is any person; 2) he or she directly or
indirectly uses any fraudulent device or scheme; and 3) the purpose of
these acts is to compel another to cast a desired vote.
Again, as Noveras was found guilty of having committed all three
offenses by COMELEC, leading to his disqualification, all of the
elements—or all of the acts constituting such elements—of all these
three offenses must have been alleged as facts in the Petition for
Disqualification.
But a cursory reading of the Petition for Disqualification shows
that it only alleged the following facts: 1) that on March 30, 2022, as
Amansec was walking inside the ATC Compound, he noticed tarpaulins
bearing the images of Noveras and Christian being printed in the
tarpaulin printer;[59] 2) that the same tarpaulins are posted all over Aurora Province;[60] 3) that the person manning the printer was Tecuico, an Administrative Aide III under the Provincial General Services Office;[61] 4) that Tecuico was appointed by Noveras as shown by an official document later obtained by him from the capitol;[62] 5) that Tecuico submits his Accomplishment Report to Friginal and his Daily Time Record (DTR) to Bautista;[63] 6) that when Amansec reprimanded Tecuico, the latter got angry and forcibly dragged Amansec out of the building;[64] 7) that during Tecuico and Amansec’s conversation, before the latter was forced out of the building, Tecuico said “Teka lang po[,] Sir. Tatawagan ko boss ko,”[65] and actually called his “boss” on the phone. During such phone conversation, Tecuico blurted the words, “Sir, may problema . . . si Amansec;”[66]
8) that later, Amansec, reported the incident to the authorities, who,
in turn, was able to obtain a search warrant on the ATC Compound, and
that several campaign tarpaulins were recovered therefrom, all belonging
to Noveras and his running mates;[67]
and 9) that in one of the supporting affidavits for the petition for
disqualification, a Punong Barangay mentioned having seen a material
during the search which showed that Christian paid for the printing of
the tarpaulin.[68]
Given these allegations, it becomes readily apparent that absolutely none of the acts which would constitute the three offenses above were alleged in the Petition for Disqualification.
For the first offense—violation of Section (d)(1), there is
absolutely no allegation showing elements 2 and 3. For the second
offense—the first manner of violating Section (e), there is no
allegation which can constitute elements 2 and 3. For the third
offense—the second manner of violating Section (e), there is as well no
allegation showing elements 2 and 3. In other words, even on the
assumption that Amansec’s factual allegations were true and accurate,
none of the offenses that Noveras was found to have committed by COMELEC
could have been established.
To be sure, Noveras’s defenses were aimed at refuting the
factual allegations of Amansec and the latter’s conclusion that these
allegations were true and constituted the offense of violation of
Section 261(o). From the allegations of the Petition for
Disqualification, Noveras could not have known that he was to be
disqualified for violations of Sections 261(d)(1) and 261(e).
Thus, he could not have seasonably and reasonably put up defenses
against such a conclusion by COMELEC. If anything, he was only afforded
an opportunity to be heard on the Section 261(d)(1) charge in his motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
Yet, exacerbating the violation to Noveras’s right to due process, the COMELEC En Banc introduced another theory in resolving the motion for reconsideration—a violation of Section 261(e), without affording Noveras, again, an opportunity to refute the new charge.
From the facts of the case, it appears that COMELEC concocted the
subsequent charges for violations of Sections 261(d)(1) and (e) because
it knew that the charge in Amansec’s Petition for
Disqualification—violation of Section 261(o)—cannot support said
petition as the same is not a ground therefor. Thus, COMELEC imputed
other charges which it claimed were likewise supported by Amansec’s
allegations. Unfortunately for COMELEC, these charges, as mentioned,
cannot prosper even assuming that Amansec was speaking the truth in his
allegations.
To my mind, COMELEC’s repeated alterations of
the theories upon which Noveras should be disqualified blatantly
violated his right to due process—particularly, his right to be informed
of the accusations against him and his right to defend himself from
such accusations. In these lights, I respectfully submit that COMELEC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions.
At any rate, even assuming that the COMELEC En Banc
may validly disqualify Noveras based on Section 261(e), I find that the
evidence presented during the proceedings do not support a finding that
Noveras violated Section 261(e).
|
There is no substantial evidence to
prove that Noveras threatened or intimidated Tecuico with punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage, thereby inducing him to print the former’s campaign materials. |
The ponencia finds that the prevailing power relation between
Noveras and Tecuico “inevitably carried with it an element of
intimidation, insofar as Tecuico would not have agreed to print
[Noveras’] campaign materials in the ATC printing room if not for the
moral and legal ascendancy relations between them.”[69]
Considering that Noveras had the power and authority to deprive Tecuico
of any rights, privileges, or benefits he enjoys as an employee of the
Aurora Local Government Unit (LGU), his moral ascendancy substitutes for
force and intimidation.[70] Furthermore, the ponencia considers intimidation as “inherent in the LGU chief executive-employee relation between Noveras and Tecuico.”[71] In this connection, the ponencia
submits that the identity of the higher-up whom Tecuico called “boss”
is immaterial as the threat or intimidation may be made indirectly, and
the ultimate beneficiary of Tecuico’s acts was Noveras.[72]
Again, I disagree.
Just as there are no allegations
constituting the commission of the acts charged, as discussed above,
there is also no proof that Noveras committed any of the first class of
punishable acts under Section 261(e). The relevant portion of Section
261(e) of the OEC reads:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
. . . .
(e) Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion. — Any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces
any violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage upon any
person or persons or that of the immediate members of his family, his
honor or property, . . . to compel or induce the registration or
refraining from registration of any voter, or the participation in a
campaign or refraining or desistance from any campaign, or the casting
of any vote or omission to vote, or any promise of such registration,
campaign, vote, or omission therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, the acts punished under the first class of acts
in Section 261(e) are: (1) threatening; (2) intimidating; or (3)
actually causing, inflicting, or producing—violence, injury, punishment,
damage, loss or disadvantage, upon another person or the person’s
immediate family, honor or property.
To determine whether one
has indeed committed (1) and (2) of the above punishable acts, it is
necessary to define how threats and intimidations may be inflicted upon
persons.
Threats are “[w]ords or acts which are
calculated and intended to cause an ordinary person to fear an injury to
his person, business or property.”[73] On the other hand, there is intimidation when the words[74] or acts[75] of a person produce an intense fear in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of free will.[76]
What is apparent is that in both threats and intimidation, the person
must be proven to have uttered words or behaved or acted a certain way
in order to cause the fear in the mind of the victim.
Verily, a
finding of violation of any law or the commission of offenses, even
those which are administrative in nature, requires evidence that the
perpetrator is guilty of an act or omission, viz.:
This Court cannot be any clearer in laying down the rule on the quantum of evidence to support an administrative ruling: “In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.”[77] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
As applied in this case, it must thus be proven with substantial
evidence, that Noveras performed an overt act constituting any of the
punishable acts covered by the first manner of violating Section 261(e)
before he could be found liable for the same. By the very definition of threats and intimidation, it must be shown, with substantial evidence, that Noveras uttered words or behaved or acted a certain wav in order to cause fear in the mind of Tecuico.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence that Noveras—whether
directly or indirectly—threatened or intimidated punishment, damage,
loss or disadvantage upon Tecuico. To be sure, there were no allegations
at all that Noveras committed any overt act which can be taken to mean
that he induced, threatened, intimidated, or directly inflicted any harm
on Noveras. In fact, there is not a single allegation that Noveras ever
talked to Tecuico or that he even personally met or knew Tecuico, or
even any of the latter’s immediate supervisors who could have acted as
“middlemen” between Noveras and Tecuico. Indeed, there is not a single
allegation in the Petition for Disqualification of any overt act
that Noveras committed which could indicate any sort of connection or
understanding between him and Tecuico. Notably, Tecuico was not even
assigned to Noveras’s office; he was an Administrative Aide at the
Provincial General Services Office—one of the several departments under
the office of the Governor.[78]
The finding that Noveras is the “ultimate beneficiary” of Tecuico’s acts[79]
is not an element of the offense, and neither does it establish, to any
extent, an employment of threat or intimidation by Noveras.
Indeed, aside from his status as then incumbent governor of the Province
of Aurora and the appointing authority of employees in the provincial
government, there is no other evidence linking Noveras to Tecuico.
Most importantly, and as the ponencia itself acknowledges,
the identity of the “boss” who Tecuico called when Amansec confronted
him regarding the campaign materials was never established.[80]
The ponencia infers threat or intimidation from the supposed existence of moral ascendancy by virtue solely of the relationship between Noveras and Tecuico as superior and subordinate.[81]
However, the mere existence of a superior-subordinate relationship is
not an act punishable under Section 261(e)—this is not even act or an
element of the offense but is merely a legal fiction/relationship
between the parties. The mere existence of this relationship, in the
absence of evidence of an act or omission constitutive of the offense,
should not, in any way, warrant a finding of liability on the part of
the superior—whether criminal or administrative.
The superior-subordinate relationship or, as in this case, “LGU chief executive-employee relation“[82] between
the parties, cannot, on its own, be interpreted as outright evidence of
threat, intimidation, or actually causing, inflicting, or producing
violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss, or disadvantage.[83]
To stress, the offense in question—or any offense, really—requires the
doing of an act or an omission which violates a law. A relationship or a
status is evidently not an act or omission. It would have been
different if Noveras was alleged or shown to have communicated with
Tecuico before the latter was caught printing the campaign materials.
Such overt act of communicating, coupled with the relationship or
supposed moral ascendancy of Noveras over Tecuico, could have reasonably
supported the conclusion that Noveras must have had some sort of hand
in the offense that Tecuico was caught committing. As it stands,
however, no such communication or any form of interaction was alleged or
shown between Noveras and Tecuico.
Indeed, inferring threats or
intimidation simply from the position or status of a person, absent any
other act or omission showing the threat or intimidation, sets a
dangerous precedent. It will result in absurd and unjust scenarios
where a superior officer is conclusively found to have employed threats
or intimidation upon a subordinate or employee, by mere fact of being a
superior to the latter. Every superior officer will be deemed
to have threatened or intimidated a subordinate by mere existence of a
lopsided power relationship between them. Simply stated, it punishes the
superior simply because he is superior.
The ponencia and the COMELEC En Banc
impute upon Noveras knowledge and consent of the offensive acts of
Tecuico from, again, the mere fact that Noveras is the chief executive
who supposedly has primary accountability over the properties used as
such, and supervision over Tecuico.[84]
Such imputation is unfounded. To stress, Tecuico’s acts of printing the
campaign materials are not evidently part of his functions as
Administrative Aide of the province. In fact, the printing of the
campaign materials is illegal and therefore, far beyond the functions of
his post as Administrative Aide. There can be no presumption that these
acts were regular and within the functions imposed upon Tecuico by
Noveras as appointing officer. Stated differently, Noveras appointed
Tecuico only as Administrative Aide and with the functions expressly
stated in the latter’s appointment documents. It would thus be the
height of injustice to hold Noveras responsible for acts done outside of
such official functions without actual and concrete proof that the
latter actually consented to, or, at the very least, had knowledge of
such acts.
All told, I find that the conclusion that Noveras threatened or
intimidated Tecuico with punishment, damage, loss, or disadvantage,
which then induced him to print the former’s campaign materials is not
supported by substantial evidence to warrant the disqualification of
Noveras. A mere superior-subordinate relationship, without more, is not
substantial evidence of threats or intimidation.
|
There is no substantial evidence to
prove that Noveras used a fraudulent scheme to induce voters to cast their votes in his favor. |
As the ponencia discusses, the election offense of use of fraudulent scheme or device has the following elements:
The ponencia finds that the unlawful use of government resources by public officers constitutes fraud.[86]
As such, the printing of campaign materials for the election campaign
of an incumbent public official by a government employee within
government premises is a fraudulent device or scheme involving the
diversion of government resources to unauthorized ends.[87] The ponencia
likewise finds that the campaign materials were calculated to induce
the electorate of Aurora to cast their votes in favor of Noveras and his
ticket. Furthermore, since Noveras was the “ultimate beneficiary” of
the acts committed by Tecuico and he exercised moral and legal
ascendancy over the latter, he may be disqualified under Section 261(e)
even if the unauthorized printing was done by someone else. [88]
I agree that the unlawful and unauthorized use of government
resources by public officers constitutes fraud. However, the nature by
which the ponencia holds Noveras liable for the use of the
fraudulent device or scheme—by virtue of being the ultimate beneficiary
and by having moral and legal ascendancy—is akin to a principal by
inducement or a co-conspirator.
In order to be made liable as a principal by inducement, the person must have either directly forced or directly induced another to commit the crime.[89]
Directly forcing another to commit a crime may be accomplished by: (i)
using irresistible force, or (ii) causing uncontrollable fear; whereas,
directly inducing the commission of a crime may be: (i) by giving a
price, reward, or promise, or (ii) by using words of command.[90] On the other hand, in order to be made liable as a co-conspirator, the person must have performed an overt act
in pursuance of or in furtherance of the conspiracy, i.e., active
participation in the actual commission of the offense itself, or
extending moral assistance to his or her co-conspirators by being
present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting a
moral ascendance over the other co-conspirators by moving them to
execute or implement the criminal plan.[91]
Verily, liability as either a principal by inducement or a
co-conspirator necessitates an overt act. Corollary to the rule on
burden of proof in administrative cases, such overt act must be proven
with substantial evidence.
Thus, similar to the previous
discussion, I submit that, even if the use of fraudulent scheme or
device may be committed indirectly, there must still be at least some
iota of evidence linking the person to these acts to justify holding him
or her responsible or accountable for the same. It must be shown
through substantial evidence that he committed an overt act which shows
his or her involvement or participation, whether direct or indirect, in
the use of the fraudulent device or scheme. At the very least, there
must be substantial evidence to prove knowledge and approval of the
fraudulent scheme.
Here, as mentioned, there is absolutely no evidence
that (1) Noveras was involved in or even knew of the tarpaulin printing
incident, (2) Noveras directly or indirectly instructed Tecuico to
print his party’s campaign materials using government equipment, and (3)
Noveras directly or indirectly authorized the use of the government
tarpaulin printer to print the campaign materials. Knowledge or
permission cannot be inferred from Noveras’ position as governor,
especially as there is no showing that use of these government resources
would absolutely be impossible without Noveras’ authorization.
Further, the orchestration of a fraudulent scheme cannot likewise be
automatically imputed against Noveras on the basis of him being the
“ultimate beneficiary” of the campaign materials. As can be gleaned from
the records, the seized campaign materials endorsed the entire slate of
Partido ng Demokratiko Pilipino (PDP) Laban, including candidates for
city and municipal offices.[92] It was also indicated in the materials that Christian supposedly paid for the same.[93] To conclude that Noveras is the perpetrator of this scheme on account of his name and face appearing in the materials is non sequitur.
Lastly, I submit that the fraudulent scheme of using government resources for partisan activities was not “calculated to induce the electorate of Aurora to cast their votes in favor of Noveras and his ticket”[94]—at least, not in the sense intended by the law.
In determining the “inducement” contemplated by Section 261(e), the Court’s discussion in Aisporna v. CA[95] is instructive:
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute
must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible. The meaning of the law, it must be borne
in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section
or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a
general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. This means
that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment, not separately and independently. More importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where
a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made
clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or
with which it is associated.[96] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Here, the “inducement” or “compulsion” punished under Section 261(e)
must be read in conjunction with the other prohibited acts in the
provision, i.e., threatening, intimidating, or inflicting violence,
injury, punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage. From the title of the
sub-section alone, “threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device[,] or other forms of coercion,”
it is evident that the offense is intended to pertain to a certain
degree of devious acts or machinations. Accordingly, the fraudulent
scheme to induce or compel the casting of votes penalized under Section
261(e), involves a level of deceit akin to an infliction of violence
upon persons. Notably, Section 261(e) has indeed been used to prosecute
and disqualify candidates who commit vote-buying, terrorism, and similar
schemes to induce voters and/or to rig the elections in their favor.[97]
As such, campaign materials per se
cannot “induce” the electorate to cast their votes in favor of a
certain candidate under the contemplation of Section 261(e). By its very
nature, campaign materials endorse specific candidates and persuade
voters to cast their votes in favor of these candidates. As such, mere
printing of campaign materials using government resources can hardly be
considered as calculated to induce the electorate to vote in favor of a
certain candidate.
Accordingly, I submit that there is likewise
no substantial evidence to find Noveras guilty of committing the second
class of acts prohibited under Section 261(e). There is, thus, no basis
to disqualify Noveras on this ground.
|
There is no evidence—direct or circumstantial—proving the guilt of Noveras.
|
During the case deliberations wherein I raised the opinion which I
now write, it was suggested that: 1) I am espousing the view that only
direct evidence can be sufficient to hold Noveras accountable, and 2)
that such a view is mistaken because circumstantial evidence, as laid
down in the ponencia, suffices to support a finding of guilt.
For clarity, I do not think that direct evidence is necessary in
this case. I agree that circumstantial evidence—or evidence which
proves another fact than the act in issue but nevertheless proves the
same by inference or logic—can be enough, as long as the requisites
therefore as established in jurisprudence are satisfied.
Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites
concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one
another, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom
must be the guilt of the accused.[98]
While this provision appears to refer only to criminal cases, the Court has applied its principles to administrative cases. In Re: AC No. 04-AM-2002 (Josejina Fria v. Gemiliana de los Angeles),[99] the Court ruled:
For the third requisite to seal the circumstantial evidence against respondent, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
person being accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.Though administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal
rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative
actions is still subject to the limitations imposed by the fundamental
requirement of due process, especially if the charge, as in the case at
bar, if found to be true, also warrants her indictment criminally.[100] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To be clear and as shown by a plain reading of this opinion, what I
submit is not that direct evidence is indispensable, but that no
evidence—either direct or circumstantial—was proven or
alleged in this case which can support a fair and reasonable conclusion
of Noveras’s guilt. As mentioned, even assuming as true the allegations
of Amansec, there can be no reasonable inference that the elements of
the charges were proven.
The truth is that there is not even a
reasonable connection among these allegations and the elements of the
offenses. To stress an example I gave earlier, the ponencia
relies on the “circumstantial evidence” of employer-employee
relationship between Noveras and Tecuico to infer that the former
employed threats and intimidation on Tecuico for the latter to help in
the campaign by printing his (Noveras’) tarpaulins using the machines in
Tecuico’s office.
With due respect, I submit that the inference that the ponencia
makes (employment of threats, intimidation) from the fact established
(Noveras is Tecuico’s superior) nowhere near satisfies the requirements
of the law. It is not an inference that is “a fair and reasonable conclusion [that points to Noveras], to the exclusion of [all] others, as the guilty person.”[101] The fact that Noveras is Tecuico’s superior, alone, cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
lock in Noveras as the only possible “mastermind” in Tecuico’s acts or
even that Tecuico was instructed to commit the offense and did not act
by his own volition.
Conclusion
Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegations cannot stand without offending due process.[102]
The offense against such a fundamental right is all the more vile when,
as in this case, the allegations, even if assumed to be true, cannot
still support the decision because the conclusions drawn therefrom do
not follow.
It is true that in administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence is needed, or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Here, the factual allegations made, and the evidence presented, do not
at all make out the conclusions arrived at. In a nutshell, the
allegations and the facts established are merely that Noveras was the
Governor and the superior of Tecuico; therefore, the acts of Tecuico
must have been committed upon the threats, intimidation, and fraudulent
schemes of Noveras. Surely, such a grave inference that it can
disqualify a person from running for public service—and, inversely,
deprive the people of such person as a political option—should not be as
easily made. Otherwise, our leaders in public service will constantly
be at the risk of administrative sanctions of any kind by the
wrongdoings of any or some of their respective subordinates, even in the
absence of an iota of showing that the wrongdoing was sanctioned,
expressly or impliedly from his or her inaction despite knowledge
thereof, by the superior.
While COMELEC is rightfully earnest in
the implementation of our election laws—as, indeed, those who
transgress laws for political gain should not be allowed to continue to
operate with impunity—in doing so, however, neither COMELEC nor this
Court can dispense with the observance of the most fundamental
constitutional rights.
Given the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.
[1] Rollo, pp. 252–280.
Signed by Presiding Commissioner Socorro B. Inting, Commissioners Aimee
P. Ferolino and Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr. (with Separate
Opinion).
[2] Id. at 350–373.
Signed by Chairperson George Erwin M. Garcia and Commissioners Socorro
B. Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo (no part), Aimee P. Ferolino, Rey F. Bulay
(no part), Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr. and Nelson J. Celis.
[3] SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
. . . .
(d) Coercion of subordinates. — (1) Any public officer, or
any officer of any public or private corporation or association, or any
head, superior, or administrator of any religious organization, or any
employer or land-owner who coerces or intimidates or compels, or in any
manner influence, directly or indirectly, any of his subordinates or
members or parishioners or employees or house helpers, tenants,
overseers, farm helpers, tillers, or lease holders to aid, campaign or
vote for or against any candidate or any aspirant for the nomination or
selection of candidates.
[4] SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
. . . .
(e) Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion.
— Any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates or
actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment,
damage, loss or disadvantage upon any person or persons or that of the
immediate members of his family, his honor or property, or uses any
fraudulent device or scheme to compel or induce the registration or
refraining from registration of any voter, or the participation in a
campaign or refraining or desistance from any campaign, or the casting
of any vote or omission to vote, or any promise of such registration,
campaign, vote, or omission therefrom.
[5] Ponencia, pp. 9–16.
[6] 777 Phil. 700 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[7] Ponencia, pp. 17–21.
[8] Id. at 21–25.
[9] Id. at 25.
[10] Rollo, pp. 35–36. Amansec’s Petition for Disqualification dated April 26, 2022.
[11] Id. at 331, COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated August 31, 2022.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 37–38. Amansec’s Petition for Disqualification dated April 26, 2022.
[14] Id. at 39.
[15] SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
. . . .
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment
facilities owned or controlled by the government for an election
campaign. – Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever, directly
or indirectly, (1) public funds or money deposited with, or held in
trust by, public financing institutions or by government offices, banks,
or agencies; (2) any printing press, radio, or television station or
audio-visual equipment operated by the Government or by its divisions,
sub-divisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
or (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia
owned by the government or by its political subdivisions, agencies
including government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan
political activity.
[16] Rollo, p. 39, Amansec’s Petition for Disqualification dated April 26, 2022.
[17] Id. at 40.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 42, Amansec’s Petition for Disqualification dated April 26, 2022; id. at 105, Photographs of seized tarpaulins.
[20] Id. at 35–49.
[21] Id. at 37.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 44.
[24] Id. at 45.
[25] Id. at 330–332, COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated August 31, 2022.
[26] Id. at 122–123, Noveras’ Answer dated May 13, 2022; id. at 128, Amansec’s Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Paghahabla dated April 20, 2022; id. at 321, Department of Justice’s Resolution dated June 16, 2023.
[27] Id. at 323. Department of Justice’s Resolution dated June 16, 2023.
[28] Id.
[29] Id. at 118–127.
[30] SEC. 68. Disqualifications
— Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
[31] Rollo, pp. 119, 122.
[32] SEC. 12. Disqualifications
— Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and
to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall
be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
[33] SEC. 40. Disqualifications — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
[34] Rollo, pp. 122–123, Noveras’ Answer dated May 13, 2022.
[35] Id. at 122.
[36] Id. at 260–268.
[37] Id. at 298–312.
[38] Id. at 307.
[39] Id. at 316–320.
[40] Id. at 321–328.
[41] Id. at 317, Noveras’ “Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration dated 11 July 2023,” dated August 11, 2023.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Id. at 360–361. COMELEC En Banc‘s Resolution dated September 6, 2023.
[45] Id at 362. (Citation omitted)
[46] Id. at 372. COMELEC En Banc‘s Resolution dated September 6, 2023.
[47] Id.
[48] Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486, 491 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, En Banc].
[49] Id.
[50] Iglesias v. Ombudsman, 817 Phil. 338, 358–359 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[51] Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, 508 Phil. 569, 579 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
[52] Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno, 592 Phil. 636, 660 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
[53] Id. at 659.
[54] Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, 720 Phil. 120, 132 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
[55] Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, 295 Phil. 825 (1993) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
[56] Rollo, p. 259. COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated July 10, 2023.
[57] Id. at 360. COMELEC En Banc‘s Resolution dated September 6, 2023.
[58] See Exec. Sec. Ochoa v. Atty. Buco, 888 Phil. 117 (2020) [Per J. Inting, Second Division]; Iglesias v. Ombudsman, supra note 50; Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, supra note 51; Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 284 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
[59] Rollo, p. 37.
[60] Id. at 38.
[61] Id.
[62] Id.
[63] Id.
[64] Id.
[65] Id. at 39. (Emphasis in the original)
[66] Id. (Emphasis in the original)
[67] Id. at 39–41.
[68] Id. at 42.
[69] Ponencia, p. 23.
[70] Id.
[71] Id. at 25.
[72] Id.
[73] Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Assn. (PILA), 642 Phil. 275, 300 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division] (Citation omitted)
[74] See United States v. Zaballero, 13 Phil. 405 (1909) [Per J. Mapa, En Banc].
[75] Id.
[76] See People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 239138, February 17, 2021, 974 SCRA 390, 403–404 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]; Ablaza v. People, 840 Phil. 627, 647 (2018) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
[77] Office of the Ombudsman v. Dechavez, 721 Phil. 124, 130 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[78] Rollo, p. 38. Amansec’s Petition for Disqulification dated April 26, 2022.
[79] Ponencia, p. 25.
[80] Id. at 24–25.
[81] Id. at 25.
[82] Id. (Emphasis supplied)
[83] See Velasco v. Angeles, 557 Phil. 1 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
[84] See LOCAL GOV’T CODE of 1991, sec. 375, par. a, viz.:
SEC. 375. Primary and Secondary Accountability for Government Property.
– (a) Each head of department or office of a province, city,
municipality or barangay shall be primarily accountable for all
government property assigned or issued to his department or office.
[85] Ponencia, pp. 18–19.
[86] Id. at 20.
[87] Id. at 21.
[88] Id.
[89] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 17.
[90] People v. Manzanilla, 873 Phil. 529, 538–539 (2020) [Per J. Gaerlan, Third Division].
[91] People v. Raguro, 858 Phil. 613, 624 (2019) [Per C.J. Bersamin, First Division].
[92] Rollo, pp. 96–99. PMSG Geoffrey M. Bolante and Pat Marvin E. Gonzales’ Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated April 20, 2022.
[93] Id. at 105. Photographs of seized tarpaulins.
[94] Ponencia, p. 21. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
[95] 198 Phil. 838 (1982) [Per J. De Castro, First Division].
[96] Id. at 847.
[97] See Albaña v. Belo, 617 Phil. 340 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[98] People v. Cachuela, 710 Phil. 728, 742 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[99] 474 Phil. 462 (2004) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
[100] Id. at 473.
[101] Id. (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
[102] Nedira v. NJ World Corporation, G.R. No. 240005, December 6, 2022 [Per C.J. Gesmundo, En Banc] at 7. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.