ROBERTO LICUP Y VILLALON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE HON. OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS FORMER ELEVENTH DIVISI…

Licup versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Roberto Licup y Villalon against the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and against the Court of Appeals. Licup had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act Number 9165, the Dangerous Drugs Act. He appealed, but the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal outright because his appellant's brief did not reach the court on time. The case matters because it is a modern restatement of when a procedural lapse in perfecting an appeal may be excused in the interest of substantial justice, especially where the consequence is the loss of liberty.

Procedural History

On November 11, 2019, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City convicted Licup of violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. On November 21, 2019, he filed his notice of appeal. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where the Eleventh Division issued a notice requiring him to file his appellant's brief within thirty days from receipt. He received that notice on January 7, 2022, giving him until February 18, 2022 to file. He filed his appellant's brief and sent copies to the Office of the Solicitor General through LBC courier on January 13, 2022. The Office of the Solicitor General moved to suspend the period to file its appellee's brief because Licup had not attached a copy of the trial court decision, and Licup filed a manifestation and compliance in March 2022.

On May 26, 2022, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution considering the appeal abandoned and dismissing it under Rule 124, Section 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, on the ground that no appellant's brief had been filed within the reglementary period. Licup moved for reconsideration with a motion to admit the attached appellant's brief. He explained that he had checked the LBC tracking portal only after receiving the dismissal and discovered that the mail had been disposed of because delivery had been attempted several times but the office was closed. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration, holding that LBC was not yet an accredited courier at the time of mailing, so the pleading was deemed filed only on actual receipt, and that appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege. Licup then filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.

Facts

Licup was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City on November 11, 2019 for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He appealed. In the Court of Appeals, he received the notice to file his appellant's brief on January 7, 2022, and had until February 18, 2022 to comply.

On January 13, 2022, Licup filed his appellant's brief and transmitted copies to the Office of the Solicitor General through LBC courier. The copy for the Office of the Solicitor General was duly received, and Licup continued to receive notices and resolutions from the Court of Appeals. Unknown to him, the copy intended for the court was never delivered. LBC had attempted delivery several times but the office was closed, and the mail was eventually disposed of. LBC did not call his counsel's law firm to report the failure.

Licup learned of the failed delivery only after he received the Court of Appeals resolution dismissing his appeal. He immediately filed a motion for reconsideration with a motion to admit the attached appellant's brief. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, and he elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Licup's motion for reconsideration with motion to admit the attached appellant's brief.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 124, Section 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

The failure of the appellant to file the required brief may be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.

This is the provision the Court of Appeals invoked in dismissing Licup's appeal, and the Supreme Court treats it as the starting point of the analysis.

Ruling

The Court granted the petition. It first confirmed that filing through a private courier not yet accredited is treated like filing by ordinary mail, so the date of actual receipt is deemed the date of filing even if the pleading was posted earlier. It also confirmed that failure to file the appellant's brief may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal under Rule 124, Section 8.

But the Court held that procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, and that the power to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the brief is discretionary, not mandatory. It relied on its 2008 decision in Government of the Kingdom of Belgium versus Court of Appeals, which synthesized the governing guidelines:

(1) The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when no appellant's brief is filed within the reglementary period prescribed by the rules; (2) The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and directory and not ministerial or mandatory; (3) The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the effect of causing the automatic dismissal of the appeal; (4) In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow the appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the court's leniency it is imperative that: (a) the circumstances obtaining warrant the court's liberality; (b) that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice; (c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay; (d) there is no contention that the appellees' cause was prejudiced; (e) at least there is no motion to dismiss filed; (5) In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and (6) Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate court's indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or (c) where the interests of justice so require.

Applying these guidelines, the Court found that the dismissal of the appeal would result in the permanent deprivation of Licup's liberty, which falls squarely under the second exception. It also found that the Office of the Solicitor General was not prejudiced by the delay, since it had received a copy of the appellant's brief and had even filed a motion to suspend the period to file its appellee's brief, showing it was apprised of Licup's arguments and given additional time to respond. The Court further noted that the brief was filed in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, when courts and post offices were forced to close for extended periods, adding to the extraordinary nature of the case.

The Court concluded that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in outrightly dismissing the appeal purely because of the procedural lapse. It reiterated that grave abuse of discretion arises when a court acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a legal obligation, and that it may also occur where there is a gross misapprehension of facts. The Court stressed that in the hierarchy of rights, a person's right to life and liberty enjoys primacy.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the failure of an appellant to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period does not automatically dismiss the appeal; the Court of Appeals has discretionary power to dismiss or to allow the appeal. Second, that discretion must be exercised with liberality where strong considerations of equity justify an exception in the interest of substantial justice, where no material injury has been suffered by the appellee, and where no motion to dismiss has been filed. Third, inadvertence of counsel is not ordinarily an adequate excuse, except where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process, where application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interests of justice so require. Fourth, filing through a private courier not yet accredited is treated like ordinary mail, so the date of actual receipt is the date of filing. Finally, grave abuse of discretion may arise not only from palpable errors of jurisdiction but also from a gross misapprehension of facts.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Appeals resolutions were nullified and set aside, and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, to be prioritized and expedited because Licup is a detainee.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the power to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief is discretionary, and it must yield to substantial justice where the result would be the outright deprivation of the client's liberty. Examiners use this case to test the exceptions to the rule on inadvertence of counsel and the standards for grave abuse of discretion in procedural dismissals.