NELLIE Y. CHAN TEE TEN, PETITIONER, VS. WILLY Q. TEE TEN AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Nellie Chan Tee Ten versus Willy Tee Ten

The Case

This is a petition by Nellie Chan Tee Ten against her husband Willy Tee Ten and the Republic of the Philippines, asking the Supreme Court to overturn the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Willy had sued to void the marriage on the ground of Nellie's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, and both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed with him. The case matters because it applies the settled teaching of Tan-Andal versus Andal on what psychological incapacity means, on the quantum of proof, and on whether a psychological examination of the allegedly incapacitated spouse is indispensable. It also reminds the bar that a Rule 45 petition is confined to errors of law, and that support and the settlement of co-owned property are matters for the trial court.

Procedural History

Willy filed his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the property regime before Branch 261 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, later amending it. In a decision dated November 3, 2016, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Nellie moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an order dated May 4, 2017. She then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in full in its decision dated May 4, 2021, and denied Nellie's motion for reconsideration in its resolution dated December 13, 2021. Nellie elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Supreme Court impleaded the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General as a respondent, and both Willy and the Solicitor General filed their comments.

Facts

Willy and Nellie were married on January 22, 1995, without any ante nuptial agreement, so their property relations were governed by the regime of absolute community of property. Willy alleged that even before the wedding, Nellie's psychological incapacity was already visible. Her childhood had been marked by overindulgence while her family was still wealthy, and she showed a domineering attitude coupled with lazy and poor study habits.

After the wedding, the incapacity allegedly became more apparent. Nellie was domineering and controlling, demanding that Willy always update her on his whereabouts. She was arrogant and haughty toward Willy's mother, and she irrationally insisted that Willy was having an incestuous relationship with his mother. She verbally abused Willy whenever he brought their children to visit his side of the family, physically abused him when he tried to take their daughter out to buy a bike, and tried to alienate their son from his paternal grandmother. Willy began sleeping in his office, and in October 2002 Nellie and the children moved to a condominium unit. Willy followed them in an effort to save the marriage, but to no avail. Willy further alleged that Nellie psychologically abused the children and that she entered his workplace without his consent and took documents and articles of value.

A clinical psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, prepared a psychological assessment report concluding that Nellie suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with paranoid features, and that her incapacity was grave, incurable, and had antecedents. Nellie did not undergo a personal examination by Dr. Dayan despite being invited. For her part, Nellie claimed that it was Willy who abused her and the children, and she attacked the reliability of the psychological report. Her own psychologist, Dr. Elias Adamos, opined that she was not incapacitated, but he admitted that she had withheld pertinent information that could have affected his findings.

Issues

• Whether or not the lower courts correctly declared the marriage void on the ground of Nellie's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Whether or not the psychological report of Dr. Dayan lost its probative value because Nellie was never personally examined by the psychologist.
• Whether or not the Court may review the factual questions raised by Nellie, namely Willy's alleged psychological incapacity and bad faith, the amount of support pendente lite, and the settlement of the parties' properties, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Applicable Provisions

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

This is the ground on which the marriage was declared void, and the Court measured Nellie's condition against its terms.

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

The husband and wife shall be obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

The Court called this the most basic of the essential marital obligations, and Nellie's pattern of failure to comply with it is what established her incapacity.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

This provision governs the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the common properties of spouses whose marriage is declared void under Article 36, and it is the rule the trial court must apply on remand.

Ruling

The Court denied the petition for lack of merit. On the first issue, it held that the totality of the evidence established Nellie's psychological incapacity. Following Tan-Andal versus Andal, the incapacity must be grave enough to cause an inability, not a mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty, to perform the essential marital obligations. It must have juridical antecedence, meaning it existed prior to or at the time of the marriage even if it manifested only later. And it must be legally incurable, meaning the spouse persistently fails to comply with the essential marital obligations with respect to a specific partner. The Court found that Nellie's narcissistic personality, rooted in her childhood and carried into her married life, was grave and legally incurable, and that her actions showed an undeniable pattern of failure to comply with her obligations to Willy.

On the second issue, the Court held that the psychological report did not lose its probative value. Psychological incapacity need not be proven through expert opinion, and the psychological evaluation of either spouse is not indispensable. It is enough that the totality of evidence establishes the incapacity. The Court noted that it was Nellie herself who refused to undergo evaluation, and that it is accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information. Dr. Adamos's admission that Nellie had withheld information compromised both his findings and her credibility.

On the third issue, the Court held that the questions raised were factual and could not be entertained in a Rule 45 proceeding, where its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. None of the recognized exceptions was present. Even assuming Nellie's allegations of abuse were true, they neither negated the evidence of her own incapacity nor proved that Willy was incapacitated. The Court nevertheless remanded the case to the trial court to determine the proper amount of support pendente lite, if still warranted, and to settle the parties' co-owned properties in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code, since the Court is not a trier of facts.

Doctrine

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code has three characteristics. It must be grave, causing an inability rather than a mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty in performing the essential marital obligations. It must have juridical antecedence, existing prior to or at the time of the marriage even if it manifests later. And it must be legally incurable, shown by a persistent failure to comply with the essential marital obligations toward a specific partner. The quantum of proof is clear and convincing evidence, more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Expert opinion is not required, and a psychological examination of the allegedly incapacitated spouse is not indispensable; the totality of the evidence suffices. Finally, factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, when consistent and supported by the evidence, are binding on the Supreme Court in a Rule 45 petition, and support and the settlement of co-owned property under Article 147 are properly addressed by the trial court.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied Nellie's petition, affirmed the Court of Appeals in full, and remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for further proceedings on the proper amount of support pendente lite and the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the co-owned properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Remember This

Memorize the three characteristics of psychological incapacity from Tan-Andal versus Andal: grave, with juridical antecedence, and legally incurable, all proved by clear and convincing evidence. Examiners use this case to test whether a psychological report based on collateral information, without a personal examination of the spouse, can still sustain a declaration of nullity, and to test the rule that factual matters and property settlement belong to the trial court, not to a Rule 45 petition.