PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX258643, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus XXX258643

The Case

This is an ordinary appeal brought by an accused who was convicted of rape and sexual abuse. The People of the Philippines prosecute the accused, a member of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit assigned at a Philippine Army camp, for sexually assaulting a fourteen-year-old girl on four separate occasions in December 2016. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to settle a long-running quarrel in the jurisprudence: how much resistance must a rape victim show, and when must she show it. The Court holds that refusing to heed a victim's expression of resistance is itself force, whether that resistance comes before or during the sexual act.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court of Ligao City tried the accused on three counts of rape and one count of sexual abuse. In its Joint Judgment, the trial court convicted him of one count of rape under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code and three counts of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610. It sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for the rape, and to an indeterminate penalty for each count of sexual abuse, with fines and damages.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the monetary awards in the three sexual abuse cases, lowering the civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in each case. The accused then brought this ordinary appeal to the Supreme Court, which is the posture in which the case now reaches us.

Facts

The victim, a girl who was almost fourteen years old, was staying at the Paulba Patrol Base in Ligao City, Albay, where her father was also assigned. The accused, twenty-four years old, was a member of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit at the same base. On the evening of December 16, 2016, the accused, who was drunk, approached the victim and asked to speak with her alone. She refused, but another member urged her to talk to him inside a hut. Once inside, he asked her to be his girlfriend; she refused. He then grabbed her hand, kissed her, pushed her onto a bamboo bed, pulled down her shorts and underwear, and had sexual intercourse with her despite her pushing him away and telling him her father was calling her.

On December 21, 2016, the accused approached her again, apologized, and asked her to go to an abandoned house. She went, believing his sincerity. There he dragged her to the corner of the porch, made her bend over, and had intercourse with her. She tried to stand up, but he held her back and continued until he ejaculated inside her. On December 26, 2016, he saw her at a post, dragged her into a hut, removed her clothing, and had intercourse with her while she pleaded with him to stop and tried to stand up, but he pushed her back down. On December 28, 2016, he dragged her into another hut, laid her on a bed, placed her legs on his shoulders, and was about to insert his penis when they heard her father's motorcycle; he stopped.

The victim kept silent out of fear that a gunfight might erupt between the accused and her father. On December 31, 2016, her father received an anonymous text saying someone at the base was harassing his daughter. On January 6, 2017, he confronted the victim, who cried and admitted the harassment. The next day he asked his wife, working abroad, to come home, and upon her arrival they went to the Department of Social Welfare and Development, which referred them to the police. The victim underwent psychotherapeutic sessions and was diagnosed with trauma-related symptoms with significant depressive indicators due to sexual abuse.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court correctly convicted the accused of rape in the first case based on the victim's testimony, despite his claim that her behavior was inconsistent with that of a rape victim.
• Whether or not the accused's sweetheart theory, that he and the victim were lovers, defeats the charge of rape.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the conviction for sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610 in the second and third cases, given the trial court's finding that those incidents were not attended by force, restraint, or intimidation.

Applicable Provisions

Article 266-D of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree, or where the offended party is so situated as to render him or her incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A.

This provision bears on the case because it shows that the law itself does not require tenacious resistance, and it contemplates situations where the victim cannot exert any physical overt act of resistance yet still did not consent.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the prosecution established all the elements of rape by carnal knowledge beyond reasonable doubt through the positive and categorical testimony of the victim. Her account showed that she pushed the accused away but could not because he was too strong, and that he continued despite her telling him her father was calling. The Court rejected the argument that her conduct was unnatural, stressing that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped, and that even lack of resistance does not automatically imply consent.

On the second issue, the Court held that the sweetheart theory is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge and places on the accused the burden of proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence, and further requires proof that the victim consented to sexual relations. Apart from his self-serving statements, the accused failed to prove any romantic relationship. The Court reiterated that a love affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will. The victim's denial of the relationship, coupled with the accused's failure to prove it, left her testimony intact.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction for sexual abuse under Section 5(b) in the second and third cases. The trial court's own factual findings showed that the victim told the accused to stop but he refused to listen, and that she tried to stand up but was unable to because he was holding or pushing down on her back. These acts of asking or pleading that he stop, and of trying to stand up, are expressions of resistance. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

Thus, when a person resists another's sexual advances, it would not be presumptuous to say that that person does not consent to any sexual activity with the other. That resistance may establish lack of consent. Sexual congress with a person who expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes force either physically or psychologically through threat or intimidation. It is rape.

The Court explained that the mere act of refusing to heed the victim's expression of resistance already constitutes force. It traced the old rule requiring tenacious resistance, noted that later cases abandoned it, and stressed that whether the resistance is made prior to, at the beginning of, or in the middle of the sexual act, it is resistance just the same. It is the job of the Court to say what the law is, not how and when victims should resist sexual acts.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, refusing to heed the victim's expression of resistance constitutes force regardless of whether the resistance was made prior to or during the sexual act. Second, resistance need not be tenacious; a mere physical overt act manifesting resistance in any degree, or words expressing resistance, may be accepted as evidence of lack of consent, as Article 266-D of the Revised Penal Code provides. Third, lack of resistance does not negate rape, because there are circumstances that may render a person unable to express resistance. Fourth, the sweetheart theory is an admission of carnal knowledge that shifts to the accused the burden of proving the relationship by substantial evidence and of proving consent; a love affair does not justify rape.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction for rape in the first case, but reversed the conviction for sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act Number 7610 in the second and third cases and instead found the accused guilty of rape in those cases.

Remember This

Memorize this line: refusing to heed the victim's expression of resistance is itself force, and resistance is resistance whether made before or during the sexual act. Examiners use this case to test the required degree and timing of resistance in rape, and to test the burden of proof under the sweetheart theory.