ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, AURORA MEJIA VILLASOR, ROY P. VILLASOR, PETITIONERS, VS. THE CITY JUDGE, CESAR L. PARAS, TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN, AND TERRA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

In the month of February 1964,
petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as administrator of the
intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Laza tin (Special Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila), together with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez
and Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said
spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the development and subdivision of three parcels
of land belonging to said intestate estate. Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to the
Terra Development Corporation. Months later, petitioners and other coheirs filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City (Civil Case No. Q-8344) for the rescission of said
contract for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms.
Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development
Corporation, in turn, filed with the Fiscal’s Office
of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners
for an alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172 in relation to those
of Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a
preliminary examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal of Angeles
filed with the Court of said City an information charging petitioners with the
crime of falsification of a private document upon the allegation that they made
it appear In the contract mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was the “guardian” of the minor George L. Mejia and
that Angelina M. Lopez was similarly the “guardian” of the minor Alexander L.
Mejia, when in truth and In fact they knew that they were not the guardians of
said minors on the date of the execution of the document (Criminal Case No.
C-2268).

Upon petition of the parties thus
charged, the City Fiscal of Angeles reinvestigated the case on March 7, 1965 to
give them an opportunity to present exculpatory evidence, and after the
conclusion of the reinvestigation the parties charged moved for the dismissal of
the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction
over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged false
statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said
city. As the resolution of this motion to dismiss was delayed
and In the meantime the City Court had set Criminal Case No. C-2268 for
arraignment, the defendants secured from said court several postponements of the
arraignment.

Finally, in view of the City
Fiscal’s continued failure to act on the motion to
dismiss the case, petitioners filed on November 26,
1965 with
the City Court a motion to quash upon the ground that said court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complainants in the case – with the
conformity of the City Fiscal – filed an opposition thereto, and on
February 3,
1966 the
respondent judge denied said motion to quash and reset the arraignment of all
the defendants on March 5 of the same year. In view
thereof, petitioners filed the present action for certiorari and
prohibition.

Upon the foregoing facts the only
question to be resolved is whether or not the
City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and
decide Criminal Case No. C-2268 for alleged falsification of a
private document by the parties named in the
information.

It is clear that petitioners are
not charged with having used a falsified document, in violation of the last
paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge against them is
that of having falsified a private document by knowingly and willfully stating
therein that Aurora M. Villasor and Angelina M. Lopez
were the “guardians” of their minor brothers George and Alexander, respectively,
when in fact they knew that, at the time they made such written statement, it
was Carolina M. de Castro who was the judicial guardian of said minors.

It is settled law in criminal
actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not only
determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction
(U.
S. vs. Pagdayuman 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of
Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original
jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction.

In the present case, it is the
claim of petitioners -a claim supported by the record – that Angelina M. Lopez
and Aurora M. Villasor signed the private document
wherein they are alleged to have made a false statement of fact, the first
within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati, and the
second within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon
City, both within the province of Rizal.

We now come to consider the
question of when and where is the offense of falsification of a private document
deemed consummated or committed. Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and
definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that the
crime of falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Article
304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)
is consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent to
prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was
intended.

Again in
U.S. vs. Barreto, 36 Phil. p. 207, We said:

“xxx xxx xxx The contention of counsel
would seem to be that the information was defective, in that it fails to set
forth expressly the place where improper and illegal use was made of the
falsified document, an allegation which counsel for appellant insists was
absolutely essential for the proper determination of the court clothed with
jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But under the definition of the crime of
falsification of a private document as set forth in article 304 of the Penal
Code, the offense is consummated at the time when and at the place where the
document is falsified to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a
third person, and this whether the falsified document is or is not put to the
improper or illegal use for which it was intended. It is evident, therefore,
that the place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is
actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the document
thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of
falsification of a private document; xxx xxx.”

Applying the above ruling to the
facts before Us, it would appear that if the private document subject of the
information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the act of
falsification – the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause
damage – was committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private document was
thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended, or was
signed by the other contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Angeles is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of
falsification of the private document, nor could it in any way change the fact
that the act of falsification charged was committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the City Court of Angeles has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond question.

Respondents, however, contend
that the motion to quash filed by the defendants necessarily assumes the truth
of the allegation of the information to the effect that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City and that they may
not be allowed to disprove this at this early stage of the proceedings. This is
not exactly the law on the matter at present. It was the law applicable to a
demurrer – now obsolete – to an information. The motion
to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is manifestly
broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects apparent
upon the face of the complaint or Information but extends to issues arising out
of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that, among the grounds for a
motion to quash, Section 2 of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or
acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused
etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the determination of which
a preliminary trial is required.

In the present case, the portion
of the record of the reinvestigation which was submitted to the respondent judge
for consideration in connection with the resolution of the motion to quash filed
by the defendants shows beyond question that the
offense charged was committed far beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
Angeles City.

On the propriety of the writs
prayed for, it may be said that, as a general rule, a court of equity will not
issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order of a lower court denying a motion
to quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to prevent said court from proceeding
with the case after such denial, it being the rule that upon such denial the
defendant should enter his plea of not guilty and go to trial and, if convicted,
raise on appeal the same legal questions covered by his motion to quash. In this
as well as in other jurisdictions, however, this is no longer the hard and fast
rule.

The writs of certiorari and
prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis,
intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration
of justice. Thus, in Yu Kong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, We took cognizance of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition although the accused in the case could have appealed In due time
from the order complained of, our action in the premises being based on the
public welfare and the advancement of public policy. In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43 Phil.
304, We also admitted a petition to restrain the
prosecution of certain chiropractors although, if convicted, they could have
appealed. We gave due course to their petition for the orderly administration of
justice and to avoid possible oppression by the strong arm of the law. And in
Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63
Phil. 627, the petition for certiorari challenging the trial court’s action
admitting an amended information was sustained despite the availability of
appeal at the proper time.

More recently, We said the following in Yap vs. the Hon. D. Lutero etc. G. R. No. L-12669, April
30, 1959:

“Manifestly, the denial, by
respondent herein, of the motion to quash the information in case No. 16443, may
not be characterized as ‘arbitrary’ or ‘despotic’, or to be regarded as
amounting to ‘lack of jurisdiction’. The proper procedure, in the event of
denial of a motion to quash, is for the accused, upon arraignment, to plead not
guilty and reiterate his defense of former jeopardy, and, in case of conviction,
to appeal therefrom, upon the ground that he had been
twice put in jeopardy of punishment, either for the same offense, or for the
same act, as the case may be. However, were we to require adherence to this
pretense, the case at bar would have to be dismissed and petitioner required to
go through the inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of
submitting himself to trial on the merits in case No. 16443, apart from the
expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that his trial and conviction
therein would violate one of his constitutional rights, and that, on appeal to
this Court, we would, therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of
the lower court. This would, obviously, be most unfair and unjust. Under the
circumstances obtaining in the present case, the flaw in the procedure followed
by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in the interest of a more enlightened
and substantial justice.”

Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction
of the City Court of Angeles over the criminal offense charged being patent, it
would be highly unfair to compel the parties charged to undergo trial in said
court and suffer all the embarrassment and mental anguish that go with
it.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that the offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case
No.O-2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction
of said court and that, therefore, said court is hereby restrained and
prohibited from further proceedings therein. Costs against the
private respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J. B. L., Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, Sanchez
and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.