IN THE MATTER OF THE URGENT PETITION FOR THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS IN THE MIDST OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC,

SEPARATE OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

Our country’s perennial jail congestion has made persons
deprived of liberty all the more vulnerable to the most virulent of
infectious diseases, including COVID-19. Thus, in view of the Petition’s
factual assertions and broad arguments, I concur with the unanimous
decision of this Court to refer this case to the trial courts to
determine, upon the parties’ proper motion or petition, whether there
are factual bases to support their temporary release.

Nonetheless, consistent with our constitutional duty to
recognize the intrinsic value of every human being, as well as our power
to provide guidance to the Bench and Bar, we should clarify the
following:

First, the traditional mode of securing the release of any
accused on trial or on appeal is through bail or recognizance. As Chief
Justice Diosdado Peralta (Chief Justice Peralta) said, trial courts
should conscientiously and consistently implement all of this Court’s
applicable guidelines on fixing the amount of bail to plea bargaining.^[1] I reiterate my opinion in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan^[2]
that a release on bail or recognizance should comply with the
Constitution, laws, and rules and regulations. Any release contrary to
these cannot be countenanced. Thus, in seeking release on bail or
recognizance, petitioners should go to the trial courts to determine the
facts that would entitle them to the relief.

Second, persons deprived of liberty should be able to file
an action for violations of their constitutional right against cruel,
inhuman, and degrading punishment, and their rights to life, health, and
security. As proposed by Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
(Justice Perlas-Bernabe), we should not diminish the possibility that
they may avail of these rights.^[3]
This Court is not powerless to ensure that these fundamental rights are
respected and implemented. It is why this Court exists. This aspect of
judicial review, to measure the constitutionality of a government act or
inaction vis-a-vis a legal right, is even more established than the
expanded jurisdiction now contained in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution.

Thus, I opine that Article III, Section 19 of the Bill of
Rights, which addresses the conditions of detention and service of
sentence, may be invoked by a detainee or a convict through either mode:
(1) a motion for release when the case is still on trial or on appeal;
or (2) a petition for habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy,
consistent with Gumabon v. Director of Prisons.^[4]

Nonetheless, mere invocation of the violation of
constitutional rights is not enough for the courts to afford relief. One
must allege and provide factual basis showing: (a) the existing
inhuman, degrading, or cruel conditions not organic or consistent with
the statutory punishment imposed; (b) the violation of a clear,
enforceable statutory or constitutional provision, including those which
may refer to judicially discernable international standards adopted in
this jurisdiction; (c) a clear demand on the relevant agencies of
government to address the grievance; and (d) the intentional or
persistent refusal or negligence on the part of the government
agency—whether the warden, director of prisons, local government unit,
or Congress—to address the proven situation and statutory or
constitutional provisions.

We should emphasize that all provisions in the Bill of
Rights are justiciable. However, in deference to the other
constitutional organs, a violation of the constitutional rights of
persons deprived of liberty anchored on existing jail or health
conditions should first be addressed by the executive and legislative
branches. Thus, before a court may give due course to such a cause of
action, there must be a showing that the movant or petitioner has made a
clear demand on the relevant agencies, and that there has been a denial
or unreasonable negligence on their part.

Finally, as a distinguishing initiative of the Peralta
Court, I suggest a measure that is grounded on social justice: a writ of
kalayaan. This will be similar to the writ of kalikasan
or the writ of continuing mandamus in environmental cases, but geared
toward addressing jail congestion. It shall be issued when all the
requirements to establish cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment are
present. It shall also provide an order of precedence to bring the
occupation of jails to a more humane level. Upon constant supervision by
an executive judge, the order of release will prioritize those whose
penalties are the lowest and whose crimes are brought about not by
extreme malice but by the indignities of poverty.

Jail congestion affects so many individuals, most of
them poor and invisible. The dawn of the COVID-19 pandemic has made this
a more urgent concern. It is time that we, as the Supreme Court,
address this through the clearest guidance to our lower courts.

Indeed, this case is unprecedented, for we are given the
opportunity to define the limitations of the expanded executive power
during a pandemic, as well as to address jail congestion—a longstanding
problem that has pervaded our justice system. The issues involved here
bear upon not only the role of the Judiciary, but also our collective
humanity, as we adapt to the unique circumstances brought upon by the
pandemic.

In this case, petitioners are detainees who pray for
their temporary release on recognizance or on bail, invoking
humanitarian considerations on account of their advanced age and
compromised health conditions, as well as the spread of COVID-19 in
congested jails. They ask that their release be allowed while the
country is in the state of public health emergency, national calamity,
lockdown, and community quarantine. They also pray for the creation of a
“prisoner release committee” that shall issue ground rules and
implement the release of all those similarly situated.^[5]

With many of them sick, elderly, and pregnant—those most
vulnerable to the disease—petitioners maintain that their continuing
detention threatens their life and health. This, they assert,
transgresses their right against cruel, degrading, and inhuman
punishment under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.^[6]

Petitioners likewise invoke their rights under
international law principles and conventions, including: (1) the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; (2) the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment; (3) the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules);^[7]
(4) the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and
Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules); and (5)
the United Nations Principles for Older Persons.^[8]

Petitioners also point out that the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights has recommended the decongestion of jails
by releasing the most vulnerable prisoners. They point out how the
governments of Ethiopia, Sudan, Germany, Canada, India, Iran,
Afghanistan, Turkey, Australia, and New Jersey in the United States have
begun releasing prisoners upon acknowledging the gravity of the
pandemic.^[9]

As such, petitioners pray that this Court apply equity
in their situation. They assert that their release will not prejudice
the State or the prosecution, and will lessen state costs and health
risks to jail personnel. They insist that they are not flight risks,
citing the quarantine and their advanced age, physical conditions, and
lack of resources to avoid trial.^[10] They further point out that they are not hardened criminals, as the charges against them are due to political beliefs.^[11] They likewise stress that they have not yet been convicted, and are thus presumed innocent.^[12]

Furthermore, petitioners cite the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 10575, which states that this Court may
order the release or transfer of any inmate, especially if not yet
convicted.^[13]

Petitioners maintain prisoners’ vulnerability to COVID-19.^[14] They point out that social distancing is impossible in jails, with some housing up to 534% capacity.^[15] They assert that the national government has not provided adequate health measures in detention facilities.^[16] While recognizing some measures set up in jails, they insist that these are not sufficient to prevent the disease’s spread.^[17] They also raise mental health issues, their contact with the outside world having been more limited.^[18]

Finally, petitioners assert that this Court has allowed bail on humanitarian grounds in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan^[19] and Dela Rama v. People,^[20] after accounting for the petitioners’ health conditions.^[21]

In an April 17, 2020 Resolution, this Court required
respondents to submit their comment and their verified reports on the
necessary interim preventive measures in response to the COVID-19
pandemic.

For their part, respondents pray that the Petition be
outright dismissed for petitioners’ failure to comply with the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. They maintain that petitioners should have gone
to the court where their criminal cases are pending.^[22]
Moreover, respondents argue that the Petition raises questions of facts
which only the lower courts may determine. Humanitarian grounds and the
COVID-19 pandemic are allegedly not compelling reasons to seek direct
recourse to this Court.^[23]

Respondents also claim that petitioners cannot be
temporarily released on recognizance or on bail. They say recognizance
cannot be granted as petitioners have all been charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua.^[24]
Specifically, petitioners are allegedly members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front
(CPP-NPA-NDF), which has been identified as a terrorist organization in
2017.^[25] As to bail,
respondents point out that it is a matter of discretion which requires
notice and hearing, in line with due process.^[26]

Respondents maintain that petitioners cannot rely on Enrile because it is a pro hac vice
ruling. It does not apply to petitioners who are all high-ranking
leaders of CPP-NPA-NDF, a terrorist organization. Moreover, since
petitioners had previously violated the terms of their provisional
release, respondents say they are flight risks and not entitled to
temporary release.^[27]

Respondents assert that petitioners invoke preferential
treatment. They claim that granting the Petition will violate the equal
protection clause, there being no substantial difference between
petitioners and the other prisoners who are also languishing in jail
despite the threat of COVID-19.^[28]
They characterize the Petition as a tool of deception used by the
CPP-NPA-NDF by taking advantage of the pandemic to justify the release
of its high-profile members.^[29]

Finally, respondents allege that the government has
taken several health and protection measures to ensure the safety of
persons deprived of liberty.^[30] They assert that the Philippines is not required to follow suit with foreign governments.^[31] The provisions on release of prisoners and prison congestion, they maintain, is not one of the grounds for release.^[32]

In reply, petitioners justify their direct recourse to
this Court because of the novel question of law brought about by the
COVID-19 pandemic. While they admit that their medical conditions are
questions of fact, they maintain that this Court may resolve the
legality of releasing the elderly, sickly, and those in critical
conditions based on humanitarian considerations.^[33]
They allege that this Court, exercising its equity jurisdiction, may
grant their provisional release because of the lack of speedy and
adequate remedies in the lower courts, as with the ravaging effects of
the COVID-19 pandemic in highly congested jail systems.^[34]

Petitioners argue that a substantial distinction exists
for this Court to allow them provisional liberty because of their status
as detainees yet to be convicted, their advanced ages, and existing
medical conditions. They plead that such classification of detainees be
applied to others similarly situated who must also be allowed temporary
release for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic.^[35]

Petitioners claim that respondents failed to curtail the
spread of COVID-19 in several of its institutions, as the issue of
physical distancing, a key measure to prevent a COVID-19 outbreak in
prisons, remains unaddressed. Petitioners pray for this Court to take
judicial notice of the overcrowding and subhuman conditions in
correctional facilities in the Philippines, and to rule that prison
systems are not equipped with medical and health care facilities to
address the COVID-19 pandemic.^[36]

I join this Court in referring this matter to the
appropriate trial courts, which will determine whether there are factual
bases to support petitioners’ temporary release. In the trial courts,
petitioners may pray for their provisional release by: (a) applying for
bail or recognizance; or (b) filing an action for a violation of their
constitutional rights.^[37]

I

The traditional mode of securing provisional release of an accused pending trial or appeal is through bail or recognizance.

Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, bail is the
security given by or on behalf of a person in custody so that they may
be provisionally released. It is meant to ensure their appearance before
any court.^[38]

Generally, all persons are entitled to the right to be released on bail.^[39] However, the grant of bail is subject to several conditions,^[40] requirements,^[41] procedures,^[42] and qualifications.^[43] Likewise, there are circumstances when release on bail shall not be granted.^[44]

In People v. Escobar,^[45] this Court explained that the right to bail is premised on the presumption of innocence:

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained but “whose guilt has not
yet been proven” in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is
cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:

The right to bail emanates from the [accused’s
constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a
person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption
of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon
filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any
court, as required under specified conditions. . . . (Citations omitted)

Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The
accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court. However, if the accused is
charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — “regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution'” — and when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.^[46] (Citations omitted)

There are instances when posting bail is no longer required,
but these must be provided in the law or in the Rules of Court. Rule
114, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides such instances:

When a person has been in custody for a period
equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for
the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice
to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the
maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.

A person in custody for a period equal to or more than
the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged,
without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (16a)

In 2014, this Court, through A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, issued
guidelines to enforce the accused’s rights to bail and speedy trial to
decongest holding jails and to humanize the conditions of detainees.^[47] Section 5 provides:

SECTION 5. Release After Service of Minimum Imposable Penalty.
— The accused who has been detained for a period at least equal to the
minimum of the penalty for the offense charged against him shall be
ordered released, motu proprio or on motion and after notice and
hearing, on his own recognizance without prejudice to the continuation
of the proceedings against him. [Sec. 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
and Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 10389]

Meanwhile, release on recognizance is generally allowed if it is provided by law or the Rules of Court.^[48] Rule 114, Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

SECTION 15. Recognizance. — Whenever allowed by law
or these Rules, the court may release a person in custody on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person.

In People v. Abner,^[49]
this Court defined recognizance as a record entered in court allowing
for the release of an accused subject to the condition that they will
appear for trial:

Section 1, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court, provides that
“bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who
is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.” Under this, there are two methods of taking bail: (1) by
bail bond and (2) by recognizance. A bail bond is an obligation given by
the accused with one or more sureties, with the condition to be void
upon the performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally be
required to perform. A recognizance is an obligation of record,
entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to lake it,
with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition
in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., Vol. II, page 592.) In U. S. vs. Sunico et al., 48 Phil., 826, 834, this court, citing Lamphire vs. State,
73 N. H., 462; 62 Atl., 786; 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas., 615, defined a
recognizance as “a contract between the sureties and the State for the
production of the principal at the required time.”^[50] (Emphasis supplied)

Under Republic Act No. 10389, or the Recognizance Act of 2012,
release on recognizance is allowed if any person in custody or detention
“is unable to post bail due to abject poverty.”^[51] It is a matter of right when the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, so long as the application is timely filed.^[52]

Republic Act No. 10389 further enumerates the procedure, requirements, and disqualifications for release on recognizance.^[53]

In Espiritu v. Jovellanos,^[54] this
Court enumerated the instances when release on recognizance is allowed
under Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Under Rule 114, §15 of the Rules of Court, the
release on recognizance of any person under detention may be ordered
only by a court and only in the following cases: (a) when the offense
charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal
offense, the imposable penalty for which does not exceed 6 months
imprisonment and/or P2,000 fine, under the circumstances provided in
R.A. No. 6036; (b) where a person has been in custody for a period equal
to or more than the minimum of the imposable principal penalty, without
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, in which case the court, in its discretion, may allow his
release on his own recognizance; (c) where the accused has applied for
probation, pending resolution of the case but no bail was filed or the
accused is incapable of filing one; and (d) in case of a youthful
offender held for physical and mental examination, trial, or appeal, if
he is unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances envisaged in
P.D. No. 603, as amended (Art. 191).^[55] (Citation omitted)

The other modes of release are reflected in the Bureau of Corrections Operating Manual, which provides the following:

SECTION 1. Basis for Release of an Inmate. — An inmate may be released from prison:

1. upon the expiration of his sentence;
2. by order of the Court or of competent authority; or
3. after being granted parole, pardon or amnesty.

SECTION 2. Who May Authorize Release. — The following are authorized to order or approve the release of inmates:

1. the Supreme Court or lower courts, in cases of acquittal or grant of bail;
2. the President of the Philippines, in cases of executive clemency or amnesty;
3. the Board of Pardons and Parole, in parole cases; and
4. the Director, upon the expiration of the sentence of the inmate.

Similarly, the Revised Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Comprehensive Operations Manual provides the modes and
guidelines for the release of inmates. Section 31 states in part:

SECTION 31. Modes and Guidelines for Release. — The following modes and guidelines shall be observed when inmates are to be released from detention:

1. An inmate may be released through:

1. Service of sentence;
2. Order of the Court;
3. Parole;
4. Pardon; and
5. Amnesty.

. . . .

3. No inmate shall be released on a mere verbal order or
an order relayed via telephone. The release of an inmate by reason of
acquittal, dismissal of case, payment of fines and/or indemnity, or
filing of bond, shall take effect only upon receipt of the release order
served by the court process server. The court order shall bear the full
name of the inmate, the crime he/she was charged with, the criminal
case number and such other details that will enable the officer in
charge to properly identify the inmate to be released;

4. Upon proper verification from the court of the
authenticity of the order, an inmate shall be released promptly and
without unreasonable delay.

Incidentally, alternative custodial arrangements are in
place for specific instances. Case in point, temporary leave from jail
for serious illness is allowed; however, this leave is not a release on bail, but a hospitalization leave that requires court approval:

SECTION 65. Leave from Jail. — Leave from jail shall be allowed in very meritorious cases, like the following:

1. Death or serious illness of spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, or children.

2. Inmates who are seriously ill or injured may, under
proper escort, be allowed hospitalization leave or medical attendance.
However, such leave shall require prior approval of the Courts having
jurisdiction over them;

Provided, however, that in life and death cases where
immediate medical attention is imperative, the warden, at his/her own
discretion, may allow an inmate to be hospitalized or moved out of jail
for medical treatment; Provided further, that when the emergency has
ceased as certified by the attending physician, the warden shall cause
the inmate’s immediate transfer back to the jail, except when there is a
court order directing him to continue the inmates confinement in a
hospital until his/her recovery or upon order of the Court for his/her
immediate return to the jail.^[56]

In Trillanes v. Pimentel,^[57]
this Court acknowledged that prisoners may be granted temporary leaves
from imprisonment upon a court order. However, a prisoner must first
establish an emergency or compelling reason.

Here, petitioners pray for their temporary release on
recognizance or on bail, invoking humanitarian considerations and this
Court’s exercise of its equity jurisdiction, on account of their
advanced age, compromised health conditions, the nature of COVID-19, and
our current jail conditions.

However, there are no legal provisions that provide for
the release of detainees based on humanitarian grounds. Neither does the
Constitution nor any statute allow for the automatic grant of bail or
release on recognizance for inmates who are of vulnerable health.

Petitioners know this. They themselves concede that humanitarian considerations are not grounds for bail.^[58] This is precisely why they invoke this Court’s discretion on the ground of compassion,^[59] filing their Petition as an exception to the rules on bail or recognizance.^[60] They pray that this Court exercise its equity jurisdiction on account of a gap in the law that it can legitimately remedy.^[61] Petitioners rely on Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,^[62] where the majority of this Court allowed the petitioner’s bail for humanitarian considerations.^[63]

In his opinion, Justice Delos Santos points out that
courts cannot grant reliefs, invent remedies, or recognize implied
rights without a law providing for it.^[64]
He holds that to allow petitioners’ release will intrude into the
powers of the legislature, and is contrary to the civil law tradition of
deciding cases based on express provisions of law.

He and Justice Jose Reyes, Jr. (Justice Reyes) both
opine that this Court cannot grant the release of petitioners on the
ground of equity, especially if it contravenes law. They add that the
case presents several questions of facts that must be lodged with the
trial courts. To allow the automatic release of detainees on a single
factor, without evaluating other factors, will create a substantive
right and predetermine an entitlement to a provisional liberty, which
courts have no power to do.^[65] Justice Reyes also notes that petitioners’ allegations are not sufficient to justify a direct recourse to this Court.^[66]

I agree with my colleagues that this Court cannot
exercise its equity jurisdiction to supplant the express provisions on
bail and recognizance.

A court’s exercise of equity jurisdiction often comes
into play when special circumstances reveal an inflexibility in its
statutory or legal jurisdiction, or an inadequacy in available laws,
such that it is unable to render substantive justice. In Reyes v. Lim:^[67]

Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice
in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the
special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its
statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which
substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.^[68] (Citations omitted)

Equity jurisdiction finds basis in Article 9 of the Civil Code,
which states that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.”^[69] Essentially, equity “fills the open spaces in the law.”^[70]

This Court’s equity jurisdiction has been exercised in cases
where the absence or insufficiency of an express provision or
procedural rule will result in unjust enrichment or prevent rightful
restitution.^[71] It has also
been applied where a strict application of procedural rules will
overrule “strong considerations of substantial justice[.]”^[72] In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court,^[73] this Court held:

Be that as it may, this Court has in a number
of cases, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard
technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on the
evidence.

Furthermore, it is well settled that litigations should,
as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicalities; that every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from
unacceptable plea of technicalities. This Court has ruled further that
being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review does not
merit automatic dismissal thereof. And even assuming that a petition for
review is filed a few days late, where strong considerations of
substantial justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax
the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main case,
such a petition usually embodies justifying circumstances which warrant
Our heeding the petitioner’s cry for justice, inspite of the earlier
negligence of counsel.^[74] (Citations omitted)

However, this Court has repeatedly clarified that equity only applies when there is an absence in the law. It cannot overrule, infringe, or disregard express provisions of law. In Heirs of Soriano v. Court of Appeals:^[75]

As often held by this Court, equity is available
only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. All abstract
arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, (judicial
rules of procedure) which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions.
Moreover, a court acting without jurisdiction cannot justify its
assumption thereof by invoking its equity jurisdiction.^[76] (Citations omitted)

In Samedra v. Court of Appeals:^[77]

This Court, while aware of its equity jurisdiction,
is first and foremost, a court of law. Hence, while equity might tilt
on the side of the petitioners, the same cannot be enforced so as to
overrule a positive provision of law in favor of private respondents.^[78]

In Antioquia Development Corporation v. Rabacal:^[79]

We stress that equity, which has been aptly
described as “justice outside legality,” is applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem. For all its conceded merit, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. . .^[80] (Citations omitted)

The law has positive provisions on bail and recognizance. This
Court cannot supplant such provisions on the sole basis of its equity
jurisdiction. These grounds, processes, and requirements are provided
under the Constitution, laws, and Rules of Court, and must still earn
respect.

This is precisely why I dissented in Enrile.

I (A)

Justice Delos Santos holds that Enrile does not
apply here because petitioners are charged with heinous crimes related
to national security and are also members of the CPP-NPA-NDF and its
affiliates.^[81] He notes of a
possibility of endangering the community: a person with deteriorating
health may still conspire to commit rebellion, and given modern
technology, strategize anti-government measures or give aid to active
comrades by providing intelligence reports.^[82]

To Justice Delos Santos, unlike in Enrile, petitioners here failed to show that they filed their respective bail applications,^[83]
leaving this Court with no way of knowing whether the evidence of guilt
is strong. He points out that petitioners likewise did not provide the
pertinent information such as the crimes against them, the status of
their cases, or medical records, among others.^[84] In any case, he maintains that the determination of such information should still be lodged with the trial courts.^[85]

Chief Justice Peralta states that petitioners cannot rely on Enrile because they have not filed their respective motions for bail in the lower courts.^[86]
Further, this Court cannot take judicial notice of their respective
health and medical conditions. Finally, he opines that the petitioner in
Enrile has proven that he was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.

I agree that Enrile does not apply in this case. However, my reasons differ from those of Chief Justice Peralta and Justice Delos Santos.

In Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,^[87] the petitioner, then Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile), was charged with plunder, punished by reclusion perpetua.
Later, when a warrant for his arrest was served, he proceeded to the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of the Philippine National
Police and filed a Motion to Fix Bail. He asserted that his voluntary
surrender and age were extenuating circumstances that would lower the
imposable penalty to reclusion temporal. He also argued that he was not a flight risk because of his age and physical condition.

While his Motion was pending, Enrile filed a Motion for
Detention at the Philippine National Police General Hospital or in
another medical facility, “arguing that ‘his advanced age and frail
medical condition’ merited hospital arrest.”^[88]
This was granted until further orders from the Sandiganbayan. Later,
the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail for being
premature, stating that he has not applied for bail and, thus, no bail
hearing had been had.

When the case was brought to this Court, the majority
allowed Enrile to post bail on account of his fragile health and
advanced age. I dissented, for several reasons.

First, the laws, rules, and doctrines on bail clearly require a hearing.^[89] Contrary to Chief Justice Peralta’s opinion, there was no bail hearing in Enrile.
As aptly pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, the absence of a bail
hearing was precisely why the Sandiganbayan rejected the Motion to Fix
Bail for being premature.^[90]

Furthermore, I opined that medical conditions requiring
special treatment should be pleaded and heard in the bail hearing,
because: (1) these are questions of fact which must be proven and
authenticated; and (2) the prosecution should have the right to due
process by being given an opportunity to rebut or verify the
allegations. In that case, Enrile’s medical condition, or any other
humanitarian reason, was not raised as a ground for bail in any of his
pleadings. Yet, the majority still granted his bail by taking judicial
notice of a doctor’s certification.

Second, I opined that bail for humanitarian
considerations is not found in the Constitution, or in any law or rule
of procedure. There is likewise no specific international law that
compels the release of an accused on account of his medical condition.

Thus, I discussed that the release of detainees on
humanitarian grounds needs clear legal basis and guidelines. Otherwise,
it will simply be based on the court’s discretion—”unpredictable,
partial, and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human
compassion on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote.”^[91]
Thus, bail cannot be granted solely by invoking a human right
principle. Constitutional rights apply to all, but it should not be
upheld by disregarding or suspending the rule of law.

Still, Justice Lazaro-Javier asserts that the standards applied in Enrile were clear-cut. She opines that Enrile
provided a two-step test to authorize the grant of discretionary bail:
“(1) the detainee will not be a flight risk or danger to the community;
(2) there are special, humanitarian, and compelling circumstances.”^[92]

I disagree. In fact, Enrile’s release raised several
questions that reveal the lack of clear guidelines: Is his release
because of his advanced age? Is it because he suffers from medical
conditions or because those conditions were aggravated by incarceration?
Is it due to a medical emergency? Can the release on bail be shortened
once the medical emergency has been addressed? What medical conditions
allow for the release on bail? Does it apply only to those on trial for
plunder, or to others with crimes punished by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment? Does it apply only to senators or those of similar
stature? Incidentally, these are the very questions that the Petition
now before this Court seeks to test.

Third, I noted that, when hospital treatment is
necessary, courts usually do not grant bail, but only modify the
conditions for one’s detention. The accused’s release should also not be
longer than the time needed to address the medical condition. Yet, the
majority in Enrile granted bail even if the Sandiganbayan did not
find Enrile suffering from a unique and debilitating disease. The
majority even permitted him to undergo hospital arrest.

Finally, I discussed that alternative custodial
arrangements should not favor only wealthy, powerful, and networked
detainees. The right to liberty applies to all individuals. Special
privileges should be granted only under clear, transparent, and reasoned
circumstances. The majority’s grant of bail was clearly a special
accommodation for Enrile. It lacked neutrality and impartiality as it
found a better argument for the petitioner, at the expense of the
prosecution.

I note Chief Justice Peralta’s opinion that the ruling in Enrile is not a pro hac vice ruling since pro hac vice rulings have been declared illegal in Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.^[93]
I also note Justice Lazaro-Javier’s opinion that Enrile forms part of
the law of the land as a legally binding decision, and her refusal to
treat it as pro hac vice ruling to avoid the notion that this Court lays down doctrines that solely serve the powerful and privileged.^[94]

I, however, join Justices Caguioa and Perlas-Bernabe in reaffirming that Enrile is a pro hac vice ruling, applicable only to the unique considerations accorded to Enrile.^[95] I agree that the ruling in Enrile does not support the Constitution, the rules, and jurisprudence. It is a stray decision^[96]
that cannot be a binding precedent, because there was no hearing to
determine whether the evidence of his guilt was not strong.

I maintain my opinion in Enrile here. Release on
bail for humanitarian considerations or medical conditions is not found
in the Constitution, in any local or international law, or in any rule
of procedure. While petitioners enjoy the constitutional rights to life
and health, these rights do not result in the automatic grant of bail
for those who are of advanced age and frail health.

Detainees cannot be allowed temporary release without
following the law. If petitioners or any other detainees seek to be
released on bail, a hearing is necessary to determine the amount of
bail. If they are charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing is necessary to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

Should a new ground for temporary release be allowed or
an alternative custodial arrangement be provided, the rule must be clear
as to who are qualified: What age? What medical conditions or health
concerns? What crimes? For how long? In any case, the right to equal
protection of the laws must always be kept in mind, so that no special
privilege or accommodation would be extended to anyone else, as what
happened in Enrile. Alternative custodial arrangements should be
granted only under clear, transparent, and reasoned circumstances. They
must always bow to the relevant laws and rules of procedure, subject to
continuous review by the trial court.

Thus, this Petition should be referred to the proper
trial courts to determine whether there is basis for their release on
bail or recognizance. Before petitioners may be released, they must
first establish before the trial courts the facts, circumstances, and
qualifications that will warrant their release on bail or recognizance.

I (B)

Justices Perlas-Bernabe and Delos Santos both hold that
there is wisdom in depriving the accused of liberty pending trial. Their
continued detention ensures the court’s jurisdiction over them, secures
their participation in the proceedings, and prevents them from
committing another crime.^[97]

However, Justice Delos Santos concludes that detaining
the criminally accused pending the determination of their guilt is part
of police power.^[98] I qualify his conclusion.

The State’s “capacity to prosecute and punish crimes” is part of its police power. In Tawahig v. Hon. Lapinid:^[99]

A crime is “an offense against society.” It “is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large[.]”

A criminal action, where “the State prosecutes a person
for an act or omission punishable by law,” is thus pursued “to maintain
social order.” It “punish[es] the offender in order to deter him [or
her] and others from committing the same or similar offense, . . .
isolate[s] him [or her] from society, reform[s] and rehabilitate[s] him
[or her].” One who commits a crime commits an offense against all the
citizens of the state penalizing a given act or omission: “a criminal
offense is an outrage to the very sovereignty of the State[.]”
Accordingly, a criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the “People”
as plaintiff. Likewise, a representative of the State, the public
prosecutor, “direct[s] and control[s] the prosecution of [an] offense.”
As such, a public prosecutor is:

[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he [or she]
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.

The capacity to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of the State’s police power.
It inheres in “the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common
will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the
interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the
liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his
rights.”^[100] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Police power cannot justify denying a person’s right to
provisional liberty. The Constitution provides that all persons, except
those punished with reclusion perpetua whose evidence of guilt is strong, have a right to provisional liberty.^[101] What justifies the accused’s deprivation of liberty is the determination that the evidence of guilt is strong:

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The
determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained
in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial
court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as
a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” Such
justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public
self defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners appellants like Jalosjos. As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,
it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and
pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while
pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited
than those of the public. The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense.
He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him
unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken
into account only to the extent that confinement restrains the power of
locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in
Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the
Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative
results. The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption
of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.^[102] (Emphasis supplied)

Justice Delos Santos even advances the following parameters
in determining whether the State’s police power should be exercised
during an emergency:

(1)	Such encroachment shall be incidental to public safety and shall not enter the bounds of arbitrariness;
(2)	Measures pursued or concerns protected by the State should be reasonably related or linked to the attainment of its legitimate objectives consistent with general welfare; and
(3)	The measure undertaken or concern addressed for the benefit of the majority pursuant to an exercise of police power must not be unnecessarily oppressive on the minority.[103]

Thus, Justice Delos Santos justifies petitioners’ continued
detention by invoking public safety. He claims that the serious nature
of the crimes charged against them, being related to their alleged
membership in the CPP-NPA-NDF, makes their continued confinement “a
legitimate and vital concern of national security.”^[104]

He is ready to make a pronouncement on petitioners’
participation as alleged key members of CPP-NPA-NDF and declare them as
terrorists,^[105] albeit
limited to determining “a reasonable link or relation between the
assailed government measures or concerns and the legitimate objectives
regarding general welfare in times of emergency.”^[106]
From this, he infers that petitioners’ continued detention is justified
because releasing them without bail hearings would endanger national
security.

I cannot find the reasonable link that Justice Delos
Santos claims to exist between the continued detention of petitioners as
alleged members of CPP-NPA-NDF and the State’s objective of suppressing
the pandemic. We cannot take judicial notice of the news reports of
alleged armed attacks against the military and police distributing
relief goods.^[107] Simply, these are not proper matters of judicial notice, whether mandatory or discretionary.

Rather, as Justice Reyes notes, this Court must refrain from making conclusions on the merits of petitioners’ pending cases,^[108] as it is premature to make pronouncements based on unverified information.^[109]
Both he and Justice Lazaro-Javier share the opinion that petitioners’
membership in the CPP-NP-NDF is an allegation that is still being
litigated.^[110]

I echo their sentiments. There being no bail hearings, the evidence of petitioners’ guilt has not yet been established.

To use the nature of the alleged crimes to justify
petitioners’ continued confinement denies them not only of due process,
but also of their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. As
Justice Perlas-Bernabe states, “an accused cannot just be left to perish
and die in the midst of a devastating global pandemic, without any
recourse whatsoever.”^[111] National security and public safety are no blanket excuses to violate the accused’s constitutional rights.

Thus, without the appropriate hearing in the trial
courts, this Court should not conclude if petitioners are entitled to
release on bail or recognizance based on the crimes charged against
them.

II

Persons deprived of liberty ought to be able to file a
case for violations of their right against cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment and other related constitutional rights.

In keeping with our constitutional duty to recognize the
intrinsic value of every human being, as well as our power to provide
guidance to Bench and Bar, I discuss the following causes of action
submitted by petitioners: (1) the right against cruel, degrading, and
inhuman punishment; (2) the right to life and health; and (3) the rights
of prisoners and detainees under international law principles and
conventions and our own local laws, rules, and procedures.

II (A)

The 1987 Constitution guards against the infliction of
any cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment. Its Article III, Section 19
states:

SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions
shall be dealt with by law.

In Alejano v. Cabuay,^[112]
this Court defined punishment as a chastisement that causes suffering
through harm or incapacitation that is more severe than the discomfort
of detention:

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action
causes the inmate to suffer some harm or “disability,” and (2) the
purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. Punishment also requires
that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be
independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.^[113] (Citations omitted)

Despite a few statutes and rules promoting the
rehabilitation of offenders, our criminal justice system is primarily
punitive, seeking to deter and penalize felonies and crimes through
imprisonment and fines. Thus, the Constitution does not prohibit
retributive justice in itself. What it prohibits is cruel, degrading, or
inhuman punishment.

The previous constitutions did not include punishment
that is “degrading or inhuman.” Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
respectively read:

SECTION 1 (19). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.^[114]

SECTION 21. Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.^[115]

With the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, the words “degrading or inhuman punishment” were added to the prohibition.

In David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,^[116]
this Court discussed that interpreting the text of the Constitution
involves reviewing how the text has evolved from its previous
iterations. The formulation of provisions usually involves a
reassessment of old ones in order to better address any shortcomings the
old rules failed to account for:

Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks
into how the text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions
are the result of the re-adoption — often with accompanying
re-calibration — of previously existing rules. Even when seemingly
novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of addressing the
inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules.

One may trace the historical development of text: by
comparing its current iteration with prior counterpart provisions,
keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along with accounting for more
conspicuous substantive changes such as the addition and deletion of
provisos or items in enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of
more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier
penalties. The tension between consistency and change galvanizes
meaning.^[117]

The adding of “inhuman” and “degrading” to the prohibited
punishment reveals that these words are meant to be treated separately
from cruel or unusual punishment, and meant to address different
circumstances.

In People v. Dionisio,^[118]
this Court explained that punishment is cruel and unusual when the
penalties imposed are inhuman, barbarous, and shocking to the
conscience:

Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves
cruel and unusual punishment, for the constitutional stricture has been
interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhuman and barbarous, or
shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not
in this category.

Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:

“It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out
of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is
severe does not make it cruel and unusual.’ Expressed in other terms, it
has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be
‘flagrantly and plainly oppressive,’ ‘wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’
(Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the
public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years’ confinement
for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant’s and similar
cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to
the extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to
note that the validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question
was contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief
for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the
oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as
possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction the duration of the
imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some members of the court
at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for executive
clemency for the appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment
within the prescribed range.”^[119] (Citations omitted)

In Maturan v. Commission on Elections,^[120]
this Court reiterated that it is the punishment’s character, not its
severity, that makes it cruel and inhuman. It would have to be an
infliction of “corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the
individual of [their] humanity”:

We have already settled that the constitutional
proscription under the Bill of Rights extends only to situations of
extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual
of his humanity. The proscription is aimed more at the form or
character of the punishment rather than at its severity, as the Court
has elucidated in Lim v. People, to wit:

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by
statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the
offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to
the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of
fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
degrading.

In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which
never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or
obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping
post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides
insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by
that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.^[121] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

The constitutional right thus necessarily ensures that all
persons are protected against all forms of torture. Republic Act No.
9745,^[122] otherwise known as
the Anti-Torture Act, outlines what constitutes torture and other types
of cruel and degrading treatment or punishment:

SECTION 3. Definitions. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) “Torture” refers to an act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person
information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority.
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.

(b) “Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment” refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority against a person
under his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing
suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter.^[123]

. . . .

SECTION 4. Acts of Torture. — For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or
punishment inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain,
exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body,
such as:

(1)	Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or other similar objects, and jumping on the stomach;
(2)	Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten;
(3)	Electric shock;
(4)	Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other chemical substances on mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the wound(s):
(5)	The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until the brink of suffocation;
(6)	Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;
(7)	Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals;
(8)	Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;
(9)	Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;
(10)	Pulling out of fingernails;
(11)	Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold;
(12)	The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of asphyxiation;
(13)	The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory, alertness or will of a person, such as:
		(i) The administration of drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental competency; or (ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and
(14)	Other analogous acts of physical torture; and

(b) “Mental/Psychological Torture” refers to acts
committed by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority
which are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine a
person’s dignity and morale, such as:

(1)	Blindfolding;
(2)	Threatening a person(s) or his/her relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or other wrongful acts;
(3)	Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;
(4)	Prolonged interrogation;
(5)	Preparing a prisoner for a “show trial”, public display or public humiliation of a detainee or prisoner;
(6)	Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to another, creating the belief that he/she shall be summarily executed;
(7)	Maltreating a member/s of a person’s family;
(8)	Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person’s family, relatives or any third party;
(9)	Denial of sleep/rest;
(10)	Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in public places, shaving the victim’s head or putting marks on his/her body against his/her will;
(11)	Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of his/her family; and
(12)	Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.

SECTION 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
— Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment refers to a
deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under
Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a
person in authority against another person in custody, which attains a
level of severity sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation or
debasement to the latter. The assessment of the level of severity shall
depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of
the treatment or punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in
some cases, the sex, religion, age and state of health of the victim.^[124]

Cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment involves causing
suffering, gross humiliation, or debasement to a person in custody.
Torture, on the other hand, generally involves intentionally causing
severe mental or physical agony for a specific purpose or for any reason
based on discrimination.

The right against torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading punishment is absolute. It is protected in all cases—even in
times of war or a public emergency:

SECTION 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, an Absolute Right.
— Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of
war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or any other
public emergency, or a document or any determination comprising an
“order of battle” shall not and can never be invoked as a justification
for torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment.

Accordingly, the law provides remedies for victims of torture or other cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment or punishment:

SECTION 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. — A victim of torture shall have the following rights in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture:

(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by
the CHR and by agencies of government concerned such as the Department
of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), the PNP, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the AFP. A prompt
investigation shall mean a maximum period of sixty (60) working days
from the time a complaint for torture is filed within which an
investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made
available. An appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the
same period prescribed herein;

(b) To have sufficient government protection against all
forms of harassment, threat and/or intimidation as a consequence of the
filing of said complaint or the presentation of evidence therefor. In
which case, the State through its appropriate agencies shall afford
security in order to ensure his/her safety and all other persons
involved in the investigation and prosecution such as, but not limited
to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and

(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner
by which he/she testifies and presents evidence in any for a in order to
avoid further trauma.

SECTION 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data Proceedings and Compliance with a Judicial Order. — A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas
data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of torture or
other cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or punishment shall be
disposed of expeditiously and any order of release by virtue thereof, or
other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed
or complied with immediately.

SECTION 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint — The
CHR and the PAO shall render legal assistance in the investigation and
monitoring and/or filing of the complaint for a person who suffers
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,
or for any interested party thereto.

The victim or interested party may also seek legal
assistance from the Barangay Human Rights Action Center (BHRAC) nearest
him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment organizations (NGOs).^[125]

From these provisions alone, it is clear that the State is
meant to protect its people’s right against cruel, degrading, and
inhuman punishment.

II (B)

Petitioners likewise invoke their rights to life and
health, which they claim are being threatened by the COVID-19 pandemic.
They allege that by being detained in inhumane prison conditions, their
lives are at risk of catching the disease.

All persons enjoy the right to life. This is enshrined under Article III, Section I of the 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,^[126]
this Court granted the first petition for a writ of amparo, recognizing
the right to life, liberty, and security of victims of enforced
disappearances. It clarified that the right to life is not only a
guarantee of the right to live, but to live securely, assured that the State will protect the security of one’s life and property:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive
— upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned — the
right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this
life, viz.: “The life to which each person has a right is not a life
lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated
by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance
that the government he established and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life
and property. . . pervades the whole history of man. It touches every
aspect of man’s existence.” In a broad sense, the right to security
of person “emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of
his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while
existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also
of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according
to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.”^[127] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In the same case, this Court expounded that the right to
security, as an adjunct of the right to life, is broken down to its
essential components: (1) freedom from fear; (2) guarantee of “bodily
and psychological integrity or security”; and (3) government protection
of rights:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear”.
In its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Some
scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational
principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom from fear”. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz.:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article
9 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz.:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

. . . .

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical
disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in
criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons
because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe
invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will
such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological
integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of
free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz.:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation,
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense).
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and
intimidation that vitiate the free will—although not involving invasion
of bodily integrity—nevertheless constitute a violation of the right
to security in the sense of “freedom from threat” as afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from
dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of
an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under
such investigation should all the more be protected from these
degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security
of person as a right against torture was made by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia. In this case,
the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state
authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his
right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights provides, viz.: “Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law
…” (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that
“(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.” Although the application failed on the facts
as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily
on the concept of security in holding, viz.:

. . . the applicant did not bring his allegations to the
attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could
reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his
security and to investigate the circumstances in question.

. . . .

. . . the authorities failed to ensure his security in
custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art. 3 to
conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women has also made a statement that the protection of the
bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security
and liberty, viz.:

. . . gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies
the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under
general international law or under specific human rights conventions is
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights
and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government.
In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full
respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization
of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz.:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a
serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by
the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private
interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family
or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth
by the government.^[128] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In his separate opinion in People v. Echegaray,^[129] Justice Artemio V. Panganiban discussed that the right to life includes the right to enjoy it with dignity and honor:

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the
first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that “(n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” This
primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in
dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is
in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions.
Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights, expressly prohibits any form
of torture which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes
the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the
mother and the unborn from the moment of conception and establishes the
people’s rights to health, a balanced ecology and education.

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than
property, for people more than the state, and for life more than mere
existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional
limits against the revival of death penalty as the final and
irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights
to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most
important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other
rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.^[130] (Emphasis supplied)

An essential component of the right to life, and equally fundamental, is the right to health. In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.:^[131]

A component to the right to life is the constitutional
right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.

Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States’ duty to provide for the health of the people, viz.:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all
the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an
effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate
health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country’s
health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency
for disabled persons for their rehabilitation, self-development, and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.^[132]

The right to life and the right to health are guaranteed in
our international laws. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides that everyone has a right to health, well-being, and
medical care:

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care
and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection. (Emphasis supplied)

The International Covenant on Economic and Social and
Cultural Rights also provides that everyone has the right to attain the
highest standard of physical and mental health. To this end, state
parties shall undertake all measures to prevent, treat, and control
epidemics. Article 12 states:

Article 12

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall
include those necessary for:

(a) The provision for the reduction of the
stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development
of the child;

(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;

(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;

(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all
medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
(Emphasis supplied)

II (C)

These rights—the right against torture, cruel, degrading, and
inhuman punishment; and the rights to life and health—are all anchored
on the State’s policy to value human dignity and to guarantee full
respect for human rights.^[133]

Reiterating the State’s policy, the Anti-Torture Act^[134] extends these rights to all persons, including those detained, jailed, imprisoned, or held under custody:

SECTION 2. Statement of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State:

(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights;

(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons,
including suspects, detainees and prisoners are respected at all times;
and that no person placed under investigation or held in custody of any
person in authority or, agent of a person in authority shall be
subjected to physical, psychological or mental harm, force, violence,
threat or intimidation or any act that impairs his/her free will or in
any manner demeans or degrades human dignity;

(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity, are prohibited; and

(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on
the absolute condemnation and prohibition of torture as provided for in
the 1987 Philippine Constitution; various international instruments to
which the Philippines is a State party such as, but not limited to, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant international
human rights instruments to which the Philippines is a signatory.^[135]

This State policy is likewise found in the laws and rules
governing the two (2) agencies tasked with the safekeeping and
reformation of inmates and detainees: (1) the Bureau of Corrections; and
(2) the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.

Created under Republic Act No. 10575, the Bureau of
Corrections is in charge of safekeeping and instituting reformation
programs to national inmates sentenced to more than three years.^[136]
It is a line bureau and a constituent unit of the Department of
Justice, which has supervisory powers over its regulatory and
quasi-judicial functions.^[137]

Section 2 of the law declares that every prisoner’s basic rights should be safeguarded and their general welfare promoted:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the
policy of the State to promote the general welfare and safeguard the
basic rights of every prisoner incarcerated in our national
penitentiary. It also recognizes the responsibility of the State to
strengthen government capability aimed towards the institutionalization
of highly efficient and competent correctional services.

Towards this end, the State shall provide for the
modernization, professionalization and restructuring of the Bureau of
Corrections (BuCor) by upgrading its facilities, increasing the number
of its personnel, upgrading the level of qualifications of their
personnel and standardizing their base pay, retirement and other
benefits, making it at par with that of the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP).

Under Section 3 of the law, the Bureau of Corrections is duty
bound to provide the inmates’ basic needs and to take measures for
their reformation and reintegration into society:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. —

(a) Safekeeping, which is the custodial component
of the BuCors present corrections system, shall refer to the act that
ensures the public (including families of inmates and their victims)
that national inmates are provided with their basic needs, completely
incapacitated from further committing criminal acts, and have been
totally cut off from their criminal networks (or contacts in the free
society) while serving sentence inside the premises of the national
penitentiary. This act also includes protection against illegal
organized armed groups which have the capacity of launching an attack on
any prison camp of the national penitentiary to rescue their convicted
comrade or to forcibly amass firearms issued to prison guards.

(b) Reformation, which is the rehabilitation
component of the BuCor’s present corrections system, shall refer to the
acts which ensure the public (including families of inmates and their
victims) that released national inmates are no longer harmful to the
community by becoming reformed individuals prepared to live a normal and
productive life upon reintegration to the mainstream society.

As provided in Section 4, the inmates’ basic needs include
“decent provision of quarters, food, water and clothing in compliance
with established United Nations standards.” The Bureau of Corrections
shall likewise institute several reformation programs, as follows:

SECTION 4. The Mandates of the Bureau of Corrections.
— The BuCor shall be in charge of safekeeping and instituting
reformation programs to national inmates sentenced to more than three
(3) years.

(a)	Safekeeping of National Inmates — The safekeeping of inmates shall include decent provision of quarters, food, water and clothing in compliance with established United Nations standards. The security of the inmates shall be undertaken by the Custodial Force consisting of Corrections Officers with a ranking system and salary grades similar to its counterpart in the BJMP.
(b)	Reformation of National Inmates — The reformation programs, which will be instituted by the BuCor for the inmates, shall be the following:
	(1)	Moral and Spiritual Program;
	(2)	Education and Training Program;
	(3)	Work and Livelihood Program;
	(4)	Sports and Recreation Program;
	(5)	Health and Welfare Program; and
	(6)	Behavior Modification Program, to include Therapeutic Community.

The rights and privileges of inmates and detainees^[138]
are further specified in the Bureau of Corrections Operating Manual.
Its Book I, Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4 includes provisions for
standards of prison accommodation:

SECTION 4. Prison Accommodation Standards. —

a. All accommodations for the use of inmates shall meet
requirements of sanitation and hygiene with emphasis on adequate
ventilation, living space and lighting.

b. Bathrooms and washing areas shall be provided in every prison facility.

c. All areas regularly used by inmates shall be properly maintained and kept clean at all times.

d. Beds and clothing shall be neatly made up in a uniform
manner at all times. Beds and buildings occupied by inmates shall be
thoroughly disinfected at least once a month.

e. Cleanliness shall be maintained at all times in all dormitories or cells specially toilet and baths.

f. As often as it is necessary, an inmate shall send his dirty clothes to the laundry.

g. Every Sunday and holiday, if weather permits, inmates
will expose their clothes, beds, bedding and so forth in the sunshine in
an area designated for the purpose. Cleanliness of the premises of the
dormitories and their surroundings shall be strictly enforced. Littering
is prohibited.

h. Inmates shall be served meals three (3) times a day.
Breakfast shall be served not more than fourteen (14) hours after the
previous day’s dinner.

Book I, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 3 further provides the inmates protection from institutional abuse:

SECTION 3. Protection of Inmate from Institutional Abuse. — An inmate shall be treated with respect and fairness by prisons employees.

He shall be protected against the following:

a. the imposition of any cruel, unusual or degrading act as a form of disciplinary punishment.

b. corporal punishment;

c. the use of physical force by correctional officers,
except in cases where the latter act in self-defense, to protect another
person from imminent physical attack, or to prevent a riot or escape;

d. deprivation of clothing, bed and bedding, light, ventilation, exercise, food or hygienic facilities; and

e. forced labor.

On the other hand, the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology was created under Republic Act No. 6975, a line bureau of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government.^[139]
Its primary function is to exercise control and supervision over all
district, city, and municipal jails that detain “any fugitive from
justice, or person detained awaiting investigation or trial and/or
transfer to the national penitentiary, and/or violent mentally ill
person . . . pending the transfer to a medical institution.”^[140]

The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology classifies
persons deprived of liberty as either a prisoner or a detainee. A
prisoner is a person convicted by a final judgment.^[141] Prisoners are further classified depending on their prison sentence:

CLASSIFICATION OF PRISONER	PRISON SENTENCE
Insular prisoner	three (3) years and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
Provincial prisoner	six (6) months and one (1) day to three (3) years;
City prisoner	one (1) day to three (3) years;
Municipal prisoner	(1) day to six (6) months.[142]

On the other hand, a detainee is a person undergoing investigation, trial, or awaiting final judgment from a court.^[143]

In any case, the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology is
tasked with supervising and controlling all district, city, and
municipal jails, guided by the principle of humane treatment in the
safekeeping and development of persons deprived of liberty. Thus, it
shall provide their basic needs, conduct rehabilitation activities, and
improve jail facilities and conditions. It shall ensure adequately
equipped sanitary facilities and quality services for their custody,
safekeeping, rehabilitation, and development.^[144]

All persons deprived of liberty under the custody of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology likewise have specific rights
and privileges. These include the rights to be treated as human beings;
to not be subjected to corporal punishment; to adequate food, space and
ventilation, rest and recreation; to avail themselves of medical,
dental, and other health services. They likewise have the privilege of
being visited and treated anytime by a doctor of their choice, or
treated in a government or private hospital if necessary and allowed by
the rules.^[145]

Moreover, under the same Manual, the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology shall aim to “improve the living conditions of
offenders, in accordance with the accepted standards set by the United
Nations.”^[146]

The Manual expressly references the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,^[147]
or the Nelson Mandela Rules, on the rule on segregation of prisoners
and the treatment of prisoners with special needs, which include senior
citizens, infirm inmates with contagious diseases, pregnant women, and
female inmates with infants. Rule IV, Section 34 provides the following
guidelines:

SECTION 34. Handling Inmates with Special Needs. — The
following guidelines shall be observed in handling inmates with special
needs:

. . . .

11. Senior Citizen Inmates

a. Senior citizen inmates should be segregated and close
supervised to protect them from maltreatment and other forms of abuse by
other inmates;

b. Individual case management strategies should be developed and adopted to respond to the special needs of elderly inmates;

c. Collaboration with other government agencies and
community- based senior citizen organizations should be done to ensure
that the services due the senior citizen inmates are provided; and d.
Senior citizen inmates should be made to do tasks deemed fit and
appropriate, their age, capability, and physical condition considered.

12. Infirm Inmates

a. Inmates with contagious diseases must be segregated to prevent the spread of said contagious diseases;

b. Infirm inmates should be referred to the jail physician or nurse for evaluation and management; and

c. Infirm inmates must be closely monitored and provide with appropriate medication and utmost care.

13. Pregnant Inmates/Female Inmates with Infants

a. Pregnant inmates must be referred to jail physician or nurse for pre-natal examination;

b. They should be given tasks that are deemed fit and proper, their physical limitations, considered;

c. During active labor, pregnant inmates should be transferred nearest government hospital;

d. Treatment of mother and her infant/s shall be in accordance with the BJMP Policy (Refer to DIWD Manual); and

e. Female inmates with infants shall be provided with ample privacy during breastfeeding activity.

III

The constitutional rights to life and health, the
prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,
and the State policy to guarantee full respect for human dignity are
affirmed in the international laws and standards that bind us. These
fundamental rights, anchored on the recognition of the inherent dignity
of every human being, have acquired the status of universal application
as jus cogens, or ‘compelling law.’^[148]

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”^[149] and declares that every human being is entitled to “the right to life, liberty, and security of persons.”^[150]

Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights^[151] expressly provides that persons deprived of liberty do not shed their “inherent dignity.” Article 10 states:

Article 10

1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

2.

(a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional
circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons and shall be subject
to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted
persons;

(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication.

3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and
social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from
adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal
status. (Emphasis supplied)

The inherent dignity of persons deprived of liberty as human
beings, as with their humane treatment, is a “fundamental and
universally applicable rule.”^[152] It applies without any distinction, and does not depend on the available material resources of a state party.

The Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners^[153]
provides that all prisoners retain all their rights under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international covenants where a
state is a member party:

5. Except for those limitations that are demonstrably
necessitated by the fact of incarceration, all prisoners shall retain
the human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and, where the State concerned is a party,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Optional Protocol thereto, as well as such other rights as are set out
in other United Nations covenants.

Furthermore, on December 9, 1975, the United Nations General
Assembly declared that no state may permit torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment.^[154]
Not even exceptional circumstances such as war, internal political
instability, and other public emergency can justify any of these
prohibited acts.^[155]

On December 9, 1988, the United Nations General Assembly
also adopted the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,^[156] which upholds the human rights of persons under any form of detention or imprisonment:

Principle 3

There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any
of the human rights of persons under any form of detention or
imprisonment recognized or existing in any State pursuant to law,
conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that this Body of
Principles does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a
lesser extent.

On May 13, 1977, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council adopted the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, which set the universally accepted minimum standards for
prisoner treatment and prison management.^[157]
These rules are “generally accepted as being good principle and
practice in the treatment of prisoners and the management of
institutions.”^[158]

Recently, on December 17, 2015, the United Nations
General Assembly revised the rules to reflect the changes in
international law and the advances in correctional science and good
management practices in correctional institutions. From then on, the
revised rules were called the Nelson Mandela Rules, which
contains provisions for minimum standards in prison accommodations,
personal hygiene, food and nutrition, access to health care services,
among others.^[159]

Incidentally, Justice Delos Santos states that Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides the
sources of international law, which are traditionally characterized as
either peremptory or non-peremptory in nature.^[160]
He discusses that in order to have domestic application, these norms
will have to either be incorporated or transformed into domestic law.
Citing the UN Charter, he proceeds to characterize the Nelson Mandela
Rules as merely recommendatory, with no binding effect.

I disagree.

The peremptoriness of a norm is not a mere categorization of international law.^[161] Jus cogens, or peremptory norms, are the “highest category of customary international law.”^[162] A prominent modern definition is that “(t)he rules of jus cogens
[are] those rules which derive from principles that the legal
conscience of [hu]mankind deem[s] absolutely essential to coexistence in
the international community.”^[163]

These definitions have been incorporated in Bayan Muna v. Romulo:^[164]

“The term ‘jus cogens‘ means the ‘compelling law.'” Corollary, “a jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other customary norms and principles.” As a result, jus cogens norms are deemed “peremptory and non-derogable.”When applied to international crimes, “jus cogens
crimes have been deemed so fundamental to the existence of a just
international legal order that states cannot derogate from them, even by
agreement.”

These jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of
universal jurisdiction, i.e., “any state may exercise jurisdiction over
an individual who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses,
even when no other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists.” “The
rationale behind this principle is that the crime committed is so
egregious that it is considered to be committed against all members of
the international community” and thus granting every State jurisdiction
over the crime.^[165] (Citations omitted)

Among the fundamental rights established as jus cogens are the right to life and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.^[166]
These non-derogable international customary norms have been reiterated
in several conventions that the Philippines signed and ratified, as
previously discussed.

In any case, the non-derogable international laws are
not the only rules governing the international community. For instance, a
treaty creating the World Trade Organization, or a Security Council
Resolution defining a terrorist organization, are non-peremptory in that
accession is optional; yet, they still have significant effects on the
international community. As elegantly captured in Justice Antonio
Carpio’s dissent in Bayan Muna:

Some customary international laws have been affirmed and
embodied in treaties and conventions. A treaty constitutes evidence of
customary law if it is declaratory of customary law, or if it is
intended to codify customary law. In such a case, even a State not party
to the treaty would be bound thereby. A treaty which is merely a formal
expression of customary international law is enforceable on all States
because of their membership in the family of nations. For instance, the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is binding even on non-party
States because the provisions of the Convention are mostly codified
rules of customary international law binding on all States even before
their codification into the Vienna Convention. Another example is the
Law of the Sea, which consists mostly of codified rules of customary
international law, which have been universally observed even before the
Law of the Sea was ratified by participating States.

Corollarily, treaties may become the basis of customary
international law. While States which are not parties to treaties or
international agreements are not bound thereby, such agreements, if
widely accepted for years by many States, may transform into customary
international laws, in which case, they bind even non-signatory States.^[167] (Citations omitted)

Therefore, the Nelson Mandela Rules and its precedent, the
United Nations Minimum Standard on the Treatment of Prisoners, cannot
simply be disregarded as non-binding norms. The principles and
fundamental rights on which these declarations are based—the right to
life, the prohibition of torture, and the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment—have attained a jus cogens status. These Rules have been adhered to and transformed into local legislation and incorporated in our penal institutions.

To view a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as not being jus cogens,
only being recommendatory, is limited. It fails to consider that a
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly may be any of the
following: (1) an articulation of a customary international norm; (2) a
reiteration of existing treaty obligations; (3) a reflection of emerging
international norms and standards, or commonly referred to as “soft
law”; or (4) a binding source of obligation that is judicially
enforceable once acceded to by a member state.

First, the Nelson Mandela Rules articulates
customary international norms on the treatment of prisoners. These are
based on one’s fundamental dignity, including those under confinement.
These are codified into several declarations and conventions that the
Philippines have ratified.

In Razon v. Tagitis,^[168]
this Court recognized “resolutions relating to legal questions in the
[United Nations] General Assembly” as material sources of international
customs:

The most widely accepted statement of sources of
international law today is Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall
apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law.” The material sources of custom include State practice, State
legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in
treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in
the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions
relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly. Sometimes
referred to as “evidence” of international law, these sources identify
the substance and content of the obligations of States and are
indicative of the “State practice” and “opinio juris” requirements of international law.^[169] (Citations omitted)

It is erroneous to dismiss the Nelson Mandela Rules just
because the United Nations General Assembly resolutions are only
recommendatory. The preambulatory clauses of Resolution No. 70/175,^[170]
which adopted the Nelson Mandela Rules, state that the precedent United
Nations Minimum Standard on the Treatment of Prisoners has already
attained the status of a “universally acknowledged minimum standards for
the detention of prisoners and that they have been of significant value
and influence.”^[171]

Second, a resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly may reiterate an existing treaty obligation, as in the
preambulatory clause of Resolution No. 70/175:

Taking into account the progressive development of
international law pertaining to the treatment of prisoners since 1955,
including in international instruments such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the
Optional Protocol thereto [.]

Notably, the Philippines acceded^[172] to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.^[173] This embraces the following obligations:

Article 2

1.	Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent ads of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
2.	No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3.	An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.
. . . .
Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture
. . . .
Article 16
1.	Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
2.	The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which relates to extradition or expulsion. (Emphasis supplied)

The Philippines also acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.^[174]
Among its objectives is to establish regular visits of detention places
and prisons from international and domestic bodies to prevent torture
and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.

Third, the Nelson Mandela Rules reflects emerging
international norms and standards, or commonly referred to as “soft
law.” It partakes of “new soft law standards” that function as a
“significant normative reference for national legislators, courts,
correctional administrators, and advocates on a range of prison
conditions issues.”^[175]

In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,^[176] this Court held that a “soft law,” while not necessarily binding, has great political influence:

“Soft law” does not fall into any of the categories of
international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946
Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is, however, an
expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that
influence state behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN
General Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various
cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative
Region v. Olalia, Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, Mijares v. Rañada and
Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of
Companies, Inc.

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a
specialized agency attached to the UN with the mandate to promote and
protect intellectual property worldwide, has resorted to soft law as a
rapid means of norm creation, in order “to reflect and respond to the
changing needs and demands of its constituents.”‘ Other international
organizations which have resorted to soft law include the International
Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization (in the
form of the Codex Alimentarius).

WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the
time of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu
outbreaks.

Although the IHR Resolution does not create new
international law binding on WHO member states, it provides an excellent
example of the power of “soft law” in international relations.
International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of
international law-“hard law”-from non-binding norms, principles, and
practices that influence state behavior-“soft law.” WHO has during its
existence generated many soft law norms, creating a “soft law regime” in
international governance for public health.

The “soft law” SARS and IHR Resolutions represent
significant steps in laying the political groundwork for improved
international cooperation on infectious diseases. These resolutions
clearly define WHO member states’ normative duty to cooperate fully with
other countries and with WHO in connection with infectious disease
surveillance and response to outbreaks.

This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the
wake of the SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful politically for two
reasons. First, the SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that
participating in, and enhancing, international cooperation on infectious
disease controls is in a country’s self interest . . . if this warning
is heeded, the “soft law” in the SARS and IHR Resolution could inform
the development of general and consistent state practice on infectious
disease surveillance and outbreak response, perhaps crystallizing
eventually into customary international law on infectious disease
prevention and control.^[177] (Citations omitted)

Finally, the Nelson Mandela Rules could not be
ignored, precisely because the Philippines adopted these standards
through its express adherence to the established standards of the United
Nations under Republic Act No. 10575, or the Bureau of Corrections Act
of 2013. Section 4 states:

SECTION 4. The Mandates of the Bureau of Corrections. —
The BuCor shall be in charge of safekeeping and instituting reformation
programs to national inmates sentenced to more than three (3) years.

(a) Safekeeping of National Inmates — The safekeeping of
inmates shall include decent provision of quarters, food, water and
clothing in compliance with established United Nations standards.
The security of the inmates shall be undertaken by the Custodial Force
consisting of Corrections Officers with a ranking system and salary
grades similar to its counterpart in the BJMP.

. . . .

SECTION 5. Operations of the Bureau of Corrections. — (a)
The BuCor shall operate with a directorial structure. It shall undertake
reception of inmates through its Directorate for Reception and
Diagnostics (DRD), formerly Reception and Diagnostic Center (RDC),
provide basic needs and security through its Security and Operations
Directorates, administer reformation programs through its Reformation
Directorates, and prepare inmates for reintegration to mainstream
society through its Directorate for External Relations (DER), formerly
External Relations Division (ERD).

. . . .

(c) Aside from those borne of the provisions under Rule 8, Part I, Rules of General Application of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
and that of the existing regulation of the BuCor on security
classification (i.e., maximum, medium and minimum security risk),
inmates shall also be internally classified by the DRD and segregated
according to crimes committed based on the related penal codes such as
Crimes Against Persons, Crimes Against Properties, Crimes Against
Chastity, so on and so forth, as well as by other related Special Laws,
Custom and Immigration Laws. (Emphasis supplied)

While the law was enacted in 2013, prior to the adoption of
the Nelson Mandela Rules in 2015, its express wording refers to
standards adopted by the United Nations.

Yet, Justice Delos Santos opines that with the sorry
state of our penal institutions, we can only dream of complying with the
Nelson Mandela Rules.^[178]
Thus, while he recognizes that the Philippines adhered to the United
Nations standards in safekeeping its prisoners under Section 4, he notes
that these standards cannot be judicially enforced.^[179]

As such, he declares^[180]
that this Court is not empowered to compel the Bureau of Corrections to
implement Section 4(a), which requires safekeeping of persons deprived
of liberty that complies “with established United Nations standards.” He
finds this provision not self-executing, as it confers no rights that
can be judicially enforced, being “so generic” and silent as to its
implementation. He states that the provision simply provides guidelines
for executive action as to how inmates will be accommodated.^[181]

Justice Delos Santos further discusses that the words
used in the Nelson Mandela Rules are so vague that the ministerial duty
sought to be enforced through an injunctive writ cannot be determined.^[182]
He asserts that a court cannot simply invent parameters for what
constitutes “reasonable” or “special” accommodations, or adjust any
implementing rule or regulation on equitable considerations.^[183]

I disagree. This Court has the power to compel the Bureau of Corrections to implement Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10575.

Judicial action on the enforcement of a law is based on a
cause of action, which is “the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another.”^[184] Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

What determines judicial power is the existence of one’s
right and its violation by another person or entity. This power is not
restricted by the vagueness of the words used in the law, or the absence
of parameters as to what constitutes a violation of the right.

Regardless, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10575 clearly
creates a right and indicates the standards by which that right is
fleshed out. Petitioners assert a violation of that right. There is,
thus, a cause of action that calls for the exercise of judicial power.

I oppose creating a distinction between self-executing
provisions and not self-executing provisions in statutes. I had
previously maintained that this should not be made in any of the
constitutional provisions, as it “creates false second-order
constitutional provisions”:

I do not agree, however, in making distinctions between self-executing and non-self-executing provisions.

A self-executing provision of the Constitution is one
“complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation.” It “supplies [a] sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected.” “[
I]f the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action,” the provision is self-executing.

On the other hand, if the provision “lays down a general
principle,” or an enabling legislation is needed to implement the
provision, it is not self-executing.

To my mind, the distinction creates false second-order
constitutional provisions. It gives the impression that only
self-executing provisions are imperative.

All constitutional provisions, even those providing
general standards, must be followed. Statements of general principles
and policies in the Constitution are frameworks within which branches of
the government are to operate. The key is to examine if the provision
contains a prestation and to which branch of the government it is
directed. If addressed either to the legislature or the executive, the
obligation is not for this Court to fulfill.

. . . .

There are no second-order provisions in the Constitution.
We create this category when we classify the provisions as
“self-executing” and “non-self executing.” Rather, the value of each
provision is implicit in their normative content.^[185] (Citations omitted)

The same can be said of all statutes. Mandatory provisions
should be deemed as imperative, and their authoritative or operative
effect should not be diminished on account of their “vagueness” or the
lack of parameters. It cannot be assumed that a statute is not meant to
be complied with. To do so is to nullify the mandatory language of the
provision and render legislative power useless.

Compliance with legal provisions cannot solely depend on
the presence of specific implementing rules and regulations. Justice
Delos Santos recognized this himself when he discussed that the
implementing rules and regulations—containing matters related to the
standards under the Nelson Mandela Rules—is subordinate legislation,
which is not a source of substantive rights and obligations.^[186]

As Justice Lazaro-Javier says, laws that use general
terms, like the Nelson Mandela Rules, do not make them any less
judicially enforceable.^[187]
Even if a certain law lacks a degree of specificity, the executive
branch must still comply with its mandate. Similarly, courts should not
shy away from interpreting what constitutes compliance with the law
using the rules on statutory construction. Courts are not meant to
create new parameters, but to interpret statutes. We can neither shirk
from this duty nor excuse the other government branches’ failure to
comply with their legal mandates.

I also agree with Justice Lazaro-Javier’s position that
budgetary restrictions, while it may be a factor in implementation, do
not determine the existence and enforceability of a right.^[188]
As she aptly points, this Court should not be restricted by the State’s
budget concerns in determining the existence and enforcement of a
right.^[189]

It is not the Nelson Mandela Rules as written that
should be in focus. What is relevant are the founding principles of
international law on which the Nelson Mandela Rules are based. The first
sentence of the Nelson Mandela Rules’ preambulatory clause states that
in its adoption, the United Nations General Assembly was guided by the
“fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
without distinction of any kind.”^[190]
These fundamental human rights include the right to life and the
prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment, both of which are anchored on one’s inherent dignity.^[191]

These principles are affirmed by the 1987 Constitution as a State policy.^[192]
Thus, persons deprived of liberty must be treated with humanity and
with respect for their inherent dignity. Furthermore, “provisions on the
right to life, prohibition from torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment, and slavery remain free from any derogation whatsoever,
having acquired a jus cogens character.”^[193]

More important, the Philippines’ compliance with the
United Nations standards should be assessed based on how the country
understood the implications of adherence to these standards. This is
done by examining the texts of applicable local legislations and
administrative issuances of penal institutions. These local and
international rules and standards operationalize the State’s duty on the
safekeeping of its prisoners and affirm how the inherent dignity of a
person is to be valued, even when deprived of liberty.

As discussed at length earlier, our local laws and the
international standards we have adhered to reveal that while our
prisoners and detainees’ right to liberty is restricted, their right to
be treated humanely, including their right to reasonably safe, sanitary,
and sufficient provisions and facilities, is not suspended and is not
merely recommendatory. Thus, no extraordinary circumstance, not even the
global COVID-19 pandemic, can justify actions violating these
fundamental rights.

IV

Considering the various sources of rights of persons
deprived of liberty, incarcerated individuals may file an appropriate
action based on a violation of these rights.

Violations of the constitutional right against cruel,
degrading, and inhuman punishment, the rights to life and health, the
rights of prisoners and detainees under international law principles and
conventions, and our own local laws, rules, and procedures are
justiciable matters.

I agree with Justice Perlas-Bernabe that we should not
diminish the possibility that persons deprived of liberty may avail of
their rights as listed in the Bill of Rights, including their right to
be protected against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.^[194]

Under Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
courts are given judicial power “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”^[195]

The Bill of Rights is an enumeration of rights that are legally demandable and enforceable.
Courts will hear and decide cases involving violations of these rights,
or any statute providing standards to comply with these rights. This
aspect of judicial review, to measure the constitutionality of a
government act or inaction vis-a-vis an enumeration of an individual or
group right, is even more established than the expanded jurisdiction now
contained in Article VIII, Section 1.

Thus, with respect to actual controversies involving
violations of fundamental constitutional rights, this Court is not
powerless to ensure its respect and implementation. It is precisely why
this Court exists.

I thus disagree with Justice Delos Santos’ statement
that “only Congress has the constitutional power to address subhuman
conditions that plague our penal institutions.”^[196]
He would have this Court “defer to the political branches as regards
the matter of selecting the most appropriate strategy to maintain public
order and preserve public safety.”^[197] Such position reduces the Judiciary’s role in relation to the Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights.

First, petitioners’ cause of action calls for this
Court’s interpretation of constitutional text. When this Court
interprets the Constitution and fleshes out its text, its decisions form
part of the law of the land. The Judiciary’s constitutional
interpretations are guided not only by the Constitution itself, but by
precedents that have construed the text and articulated its intent
through particular circumstances. In David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal:^[198]

Reading a certain text includes a consideration of
jurisprudence that has previously considered that exact same text, if
any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “[j]udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of [our] legal system.” Jurisprudence is not an independent
source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of
or written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally
passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the
contemporaneous intent that the text brings to effect. Nevertheless, one
must not fall into the temptation of considering prior interpretation
as immutable.^[199] (Citations omitted)

Since petitioners anchor their cause of action on their
constitutionally protected rights, courts have the power to settle the
controversy, and to articulate and apply what the Constitution,
statutes, and rules and regulations provide in relation to the right.

Furthermore, the vagueness of the Bill of Rights’
provisions does not detract from their enforceability. In fact, they
were written so to leave room for future instances that can shed further
light on how the provisions are to be interpreted. The Constitution is
not meant to pertain to a specific moment that would restrict its
application to a limited set of facts. Rather, it is meant to
encapsulate circumstances that may go beyond what was initially imagined
by its framers. Thus, when faced with a justiciable controversy, the
Judiciary has the power to define what constitutes a violation of these
provisions.

In J. M. Tuason & Company, Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration:^[200]

It could thus be said of our Constitution as of the United
States Constitution, to borrow from Chief Justice Marshall’s
pronouncement in M’Culloch v. Maryland that it is “intended to
endure for ages to come and consequently, to be adapted to the various
crisis of human affairs.” It cannot be looked upon as other than, in the
language of another American jurist, Chief Justice Stone, “a continuing
instrument of government.” Its framers were not visionaries, toying
with speculations or theories, but men of affairs, at home in
statecraft, laying down the foundations of a government which can make
effective and operative all the powers conferred or assumed, with the
corresponding restrictions to secure individual rights and,
anticipating, subject to the limitations of human foresight, the
problems that events to come in the distant days ahead will bring. Thus a
constitution, to quote from Justice Cardozo, “states or ought to state
not rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future.”

To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our
Constitution, any constitution, is not to be construed narrowly or
pedantically, for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase
Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in
their form, but are organic living institutions, the significance of
which is vital nor formal. There must be an awareness, as with Justice
Brandeis, not only of what has been, but of what may be. The words
employed by it are not to be construed to yield fixed and rigid answers
but as impressed with the necessary attributes of flexibility and
accommodation to enable them to meet adequately whatever problems the
future has in store. It is not, in brief a printed finality but a
dynamic process.^[201] (Citations omitted)

In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion:^[202]

The due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and
terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their
respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the
provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their
interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them
capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed
from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined
and expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted
in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law
the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in
order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead
prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause “gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of
the decisions of cases as they arise” (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78). Capsulized, it refers to “the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play” (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner’s Association vs. City
Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government
(Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).^[203]

Thus, in my separate opinion in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,^[204] emphasized that the right to life and liberty under the Bill of Rights evolves and expands to our current realities:

It is in this sense that the constitutional listing of the
objects of due process protection admits amorphous bounds. The
constitutional protection of life and liberty encompasses a penumbra of
cognate rights that is not fixed but evolves — expanding liberty —
alongside the contemporaneous reality in which the Constitution
operates. People v. Hernandez illustrated how the right to liberty is multi-faceted and is not limited to its initial formulation in the due process clause:

[T]he preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with
guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of
the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs
(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
(18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects
of freedom.

While the extent of the constitutional protection of life
and liberty is dynamic, evolving, and expanding with contemporaneous
realities, the mechanism for preserving life and liberty is immutable:
any intrusion into it must be with due process of law and must not run
afoul of the equal protection of the laws.^[205] (Citations omitted)

In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,^[206]
this Court discussed that judicial interpretation entails a holistic
approach—considering both the history and the contemporary, the
realities and the ideals, as effected by the Constitution and statutes:

Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what
they (respectively) construe to be plainly evident from Section
5.2(a)’s text: on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words “paid
for” evinces no distinction between direct purchasers and those who
purchase via subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that
Section 5.2(a)’s desistance from actually using the word “subscriber”
means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The variance in the
parties’ positions, considering that they are both banking on what they
claim to be the Fair Election Act’s plain meaning, is the best evidence
of an extant ambiguity.

Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to
pedantic rigor that foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate
insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and need not be
belabored. These dangers are by no means endemic to legal
interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced literal
interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of
grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text
can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that
unbridled textualism purports to bolster.

Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a
universal plain language is erroneous. In reality, universality and
uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes
that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is,
thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and the
interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned.
Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and
social ideals. The latter arc meant to be effected by the legal
apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order:
the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the
Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair
Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse provision
but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of
which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair
elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should
have a present authoritative effect, to achieve the ideals of those who
currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.^[207] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Bearing in mind its functions in constitutional
interpretation, it cannot be said that the Judiciary is powerless in any
capacity to address the subhuman conditions in our jails and prisons.

Still, Justice Delos Santos argues that only Congress
has the power to address the state of our penal institutions. He cites
the constitutional deliberations in discussing that it is the
legislature that determines what constitutes a violation of the right
against cruel and inhuman punishment.^[208]

In David,^[209]
this Court discussed that a resort to these deliberations should be the
last option, as doing so would be prone to “subjective interpretation”
and “the greatest errors”:

In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional
interpretation, inferring meaning from the supposed intent of the
framers or fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who
adopted the basic document is the weakest approach.

These methods leave the greatest room for subjective
interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors. The
alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily encompassed or
exhaustively articulated in the records of deliberations. Those that
have been otherwise silent and have not actively engaged in
interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a proposition
for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete agreement
with those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that the
beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely erroneous premises.
Fathoming original understanding can also misrepresent history as it
compels a comprehension of actions made within specific historical
episodes through detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modern
lenses.^[210]

Moreover, the original intent of the Constitution’s framers
is not always uniform with the original understanding of the people who
ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:^[211]

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult
the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort
thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer’s
understanding thereof.^[212] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, it cannot be assumed that violations of the
petitioners’ constitutional right against cruel, unusual, and degrading
punishment is solely left for Congress to address.

V

Considering that the violation of constitutional rights
is a justiciable matter, aggrieved persons deprived of liberty can file
an action in the proper trial court.^[213]

If yet to be convicted, such that the case is still on
trial or on appeal, detainees should be able to file a motion for
release invoking a violation of their constitutional right. If already
convicted with finality, a prisoner should be able to file for a writ of
habeas corpus. This is in line with Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,^[214]
where this Court allowed the release of prisoners after a finding that
their detention violated their constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws:

1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus
under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure
that illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is one of the
truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing.
The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining
whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical
freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby
cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be
extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any deviation from the
legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.

. . . .

2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its
origin in what has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a
habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if “the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,” the writ
does not lie. That principle dates back to 1902, when this Court
announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person
detained was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or magistrate. That is understandable, as during the time the
Philippines was under American rule, there was necessarily an adherence
to authoritative doctrines of constitutional law there followed.

One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte
Siebold, an 1880 decision: “The only ground on which this court, or any
court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on
habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of
another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person
or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.”

There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever
be kept in mind. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown
to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of
jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.

3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a
constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection. According
to their petition: “In the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted
by Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for which
Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under which they
were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were
convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime,
committed under the same law, how can we, in conscience, allow
petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?”

They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of
equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt
with. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the
uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: “Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For
the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous.
If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall
within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.”

The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive
ring. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such
is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our
controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed,
is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not
to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory.
Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only
distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before
the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for
the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as
noted in the petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava,
petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in jail
for perhaps the rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been
duly considered as having paid their penalty to society, and freed. Such
a deplorable result is to be avoided.^[215] (Citations omitted)

However, to be entitled to the reliefs mentioned, one must
first allege and prove the following: (a) the existing inhuman,
degrading, or cruel conditions not organic or consistent with the
statutory punishment imposed; (b) the violation of a clear, enforceable
constitutional provision or a local or international law; (c) a clear
demand on the relevant agencies of government; and (d) the intentional
or persistent refusal or negligence on the part of the government agency
or official to address the cruel conditions of the violation of the
statutory or constitutional provisions.

Justice Perlas-Bernabe finds that our laws addressing
jail congestion are lacking, and the rules on release on bail or
recognizance do not expressly consider the conditions of confinement.^[216] Thus, she and Justice Caguioa borrow the “deliberate indifference standard” used in the United States cases of Estelle v. Gamble^[217] and Helling v. McKinney.^[218]

While I agree that those cases may be relevant to this case, these are only persuasive to this Court.^[219] Rather, the guidelines in Alejano v. Cabuay,^[220]
the same case where this Court discussed punishment, may be used in
granting reliefs against violations of the right against cruel,
degrading, and inhuman punishment, right to life, and right to health of
persons deprived of liberty.

In the 2005 case of Alejano, junior military
officers staged a mutiny against the then President and took control of
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments. After a failed attempt, they
voluntarily surrendered and were taken in custody. Later, they filed a
petition for habeas corpus, alleging that their confinement
conditions violated their right against cruel and unusual punishment.
They specifically cry afoul on the bars that separated them from their
visitors and the iron grills and plywood in their individual cells.

This Court dismissed the petition, as the petitioners
failed to convince the court to infer punishment from the inherent
restrictions of confinement:

Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the
detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in
their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment.
This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out
that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably
interferes with a detainee’s desire to live comfortably. The fact
that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees’
desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into
punishment. It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless
that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts’ will also infer intent
to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the
alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to
that purpose. Jail officials are thus not required to use the
least restrictive security measure. They must only refrain from
implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it
serves.

We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

One further point requires discussion. The petitioners
assert, and respondents concede, that the “essential objective of
pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees’ presence at trial.”
While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision to
confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept respondents’
argument that the Government’s interest in ensuring a detainee’s
presence at trial is the only objective that may justify restraints and
conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. “If
the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of
detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at
trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally
justified form of detention.” The Government also has legitimate
interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the
individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may
require administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly
speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For
example, the Government must be able to take steps to maintain security
and order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit
drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the
institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not, without
more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are
discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have
experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here
attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental
interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial
detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring
the detainees’ presence at trial, the effective management of the
detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective
that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial
detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended
as punishment.

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action
causes the inmate to suffer some harm or “disability,” and (2) the
purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. Punishment also requires
that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be
independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.

Block v. Rutherford, which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish,
upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this practice was
reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of innocent
individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who
while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses
and may have prior criminal conviction. Contact visits make it possible
for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect
escapes. Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors
smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband. The restriction on
contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also
potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons. The
security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on
contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.

Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of
contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal of
internal security. This case reaffirmed the “handsoff” doctrine
enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint,
based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over
prison matters in deference to administrative expertise.

In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the
separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is
merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the
detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still
allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited
physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly
restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict noncontact visitation
regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the
detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive
response to valid security concerns.

The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of
security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to
fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing
on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills
ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The
diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in
the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the
detainees.

We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center are not inhuman,
degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and
Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary
cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well and given
regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively
clean and livable compared to the conditions now prevailing in the city
and provincial jails, which are congested with detainees. The Court of
Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that
the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from
the soldiers, a suspected New People’s Army (“NPA”) member and two
suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.^[221] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Alejano, this Court adopted the tests in the United States case of Bell v. Wolfish^[222]
in determining the “intent to punish” from the restrictions and
conditions of confinement: (1) if these are arbitrary, purposeless, and
do not satisfy a government interest; (2) assuming that there is an
alternative government interest (i.e. facilities’ operational concerns), if the conditions appear “excessive in relation to that purpose.”

Applying these tests, this Court held that the bar
installation was not unduly restrictive, and intended to secure the
detainees. Also, the illumination and ventilation were held to be
“inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on
the detainees.” Moreover, this Court held that their overall
conditions—their individual confinement, regular meals, clean and
livable cells—were not inhuman, degrading, and cruel, as compared to the
congested city and provincial jails. Thus, this Court did not infer an
intent to punish in their case.

I maintain that persons deprived of liberty have a cause
of action for violation of the right against cruel, degrading, and
inhuman punishment if their current state of detention is no longer
organic to the fact of their detention. As Justice Caguioa pointed out,^[223] Alejano
affirmed that the violations of the constitutional rights of persons
deprived of liberty are within the court’s power of review. In Alejano:

The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the
right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts
for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention
and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the
detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case
basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the
detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions.
However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if
what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement. (Citations
omitted)^[224]

Contrary to Alejano, however, I view that a petition for habeas corpus may also be a proper remedy to question conditions of confinement.

Thus, in allowing petitioners’ temporary release, the
ultimate issue to be resolved is whether or not the State has been
maintaining their jail or detention facilities in compliance with the
Constitution, local laws, and international standards on the rights of
persons deprived of liberty.

However, a mere allegation that constitutional rights
have been violated is insufficient. I agree with Justice Caguioa that
the causal link between notorious jail conditions and a person deprived
of liberty’s exclusion from the standard of care available to a free
person must be proven first. This is necessary to sustain a cause of
action anchored on the right against cruel and inhuman punishment and
relevant international laws.^[225]

Thus, to reiterate, petitioners must be able to satisfy
the following requisites: (a) the existing inhuman, degrading, or cruel
conditions not organic or consistent with the statutory punishment
imposed; (b) the violation of a clear, enforceable constitutional
provision or a local or international law; (c) a clear demand on the
relevant government agency; and (d) the government agency’s intentional
or persistent refusal or negligence to address the cruel conditions of
the violation of the statutory or constitutional provisions.

I emphasize the third and fourth requisites: before the
court can conclude a violation of constitutional rights, there must have
been a clear demand on the relevant government agency, and in turn, a
wanton denial or unreasonable negligence on the agency’s part. This is
in keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers. As Justice Caguioa
correctly puts it, addressing jail congestion is a “policy question and
formulation” under the jurisdiction of the executive and legislative
branches of government.^[226] Thus, the courts must first defer to the capabilities of the other constitutional organs.

VI

In this case, the claims of petitioners in relation to
these standards clearly require the presentation of evidence in the
trial court. Several factual determinations must be made before a ruling
can be had on whether there is a violation of their constitutional
rights.

It is correct that this Court may take judicial notice
of the nature of COVID-19 and the longstanding jail congestion which has
plagued the Philippine jails. This unresolved crisis is a significant
threat to the right to life, health, and security of persons in
congested penal facilities, whose conditions make social distancing
impossible.

While factual allegations must be proven by evidence,
courts may take judicial notice of particular circumstances. Rule 129,
Sections 1 to 3 of the Rules of Court state:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A
court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

SECTION 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

SECTION 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
— During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the
proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon
if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (Emphasis
supplied)

From these, this Court has summed up the requisites of judicial notice. In State Prosecutors v. Muro:^[227]

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced
by public records and facts of general notoriety.^[228] (Citations omitted)

Thus, this Court may take judicial notice of the state of
jail congestion in the Philippines, the nature of transmission of
COVID-19, and its deadly effects.

VI (A)

The available government data on prisons and jails
reveal the appalling state of congestion and overcapacity in the
Philippines.

The Bureau of Corrections’ statistics show that as of
January 2020, all prison facilities within its jurisdiction are
overcrowded:

Prison Facilities	PDL Population	Capacity	Occupancy Rate	Congestion Rate
New Bilibid Prison	29,173	6,435	453%	353%
CIW- Mandaluyong	3,422	1,008	340%	240%
Iwahig Prison & Penal Farm	2,783	675	412%	312%
Davao Prison & Penal Farm	6,607	1,354	488%	388%
CIW- Mindanao	579	102	567%	467%
San Ramon Prison & Penal Farm	2,329	733	318%	218%
Sablayan Prison & Penal Farm	2,646	994	266%	166%
Leyte Regional Prison	2,045	679	301%	201%[229]

The occupancy rate is obtained through dividing the number of
detainees by 4.7 square meters, which is the ideal habitable floor area
per inmate, according to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology’s
Revised Manual on Habitat, Water, Sanitation and Kitchen in Jails.^[230] If the quotient is above 100, it means the jail is congested.^[231]

Meanwhile, the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology has
neither published its data on jail congestion nor included it in the
Verified Report it submitted to this Court. Nonetheless, based on the
Commission on Audit’s annual review on the Bureau’s facilities, as of
December 31, 2018, the total occupancy rate is at 439.48%. It is broken
down as follows:^[232]

Office/RO	Jail Population	Total Ideal Capacity	Variance	Congestion Rate
NCR	36,035	5,237	30,799	588%
CAR	1,214	423	791	187%
R.O. I	4,364	1,085	3,279	302%
R.O. II	2,771	656	2,115	323%
R.O. III	10,035	1,548	8,487	548%
R.O. IV-A	21,128	2,925	18,203	622%
R.O. IVB	1,627	504	1,123	223%
R.O. V	2,882	785	2,097	267%
R.O. VI	9,056	4,231	4,825	114%
R.O. VII	19,751	2,665	17,086	641%
R.O. VIII	2,804	551	2,253	409%
R.O. IX	5,709	766	4,943	645%
R.O. X	4,633	950	3,683	387%
R.O. XI	6,253	1,069	5,184	485%
R.O. XII	5,064	910	4,154	457%
R.O. XIII	2,845	860	1,985	231%
ARMM	143	103	40	39%
Total	136,314	25,268	111,046	439.48%

The Commission on Audit found that the jail populations
increased because of the increase in drug-related cases, pendency of
cases, and non-release on bail due to poverty.^[233]
It noted that this congestion results in unhealthy living conditions of
inmates, which goes against the requirements of its governing Manual
and the United Nations standards.^[234]

Based on its findings, the Commission on Audit recommended
the following actions for the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology:

We recommended that Management:

(a) continue its efforts in making representations with
concerned government agencies in addressing the congestion problems in
all jail facilities;

(b) prioritize acquisition of lots and construction programs and projects aimed at improving the jail facilities;

(c) require the Regional Bids and Awards Committee to
ensure timely completion of all procurement activities pertaining to the
construction and/or improvement of all jail facilities in order to
decongest overcrowded jails; and

(d) enhance and intensify the GCTA process and give more
emphasis on the Recognizance Act for detainees early release without
necessarily completing their sentence which could significantly reduce
jail population and congestion.^[235]

According to the World Prison Brief, the Philippines’
occupancy level is at 463.6%, the second highest among all the prisons
in the world.^[236]

In 2012, the United Nations Committee Against Torture
alerted the Philippines to provide information on measures undertaken to
address overcrowding in penitentiary institutions.^[237]
In 2016, it raised its concern against the deplorable living conditions
in jails, detention centers, and police lock-up cells, which may
qualify as ill treatment or torture:

Conditions of detention

27. The Committee is concerned at the persistence of
appalling conditions of detention prevailing in the State party, both in
police lock-up cells and the jails and detention facilities run by the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, which do not meet minimum
international standards and may constitute ill-treatment or torture. It
is particularly concerned at the persistence of critical and chronic
overcrowding in all detention facilities, some of which may be operating
at 380 percent of capacity. Conditions in all places of deprivation of
liberty include dilapidated and small cells, in some of which detainees
are forced to sleep while sitting or standing, unsanitary conditions,
inadequate amounts of food, poor nutrition, insufficient natural and
artificial lighting and poor ventilation, which cause inter-prisoner
violence and the spread of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, the
incidence of which is extremely high. The Committee is particularly
alarmed at information that tuberculosis eradication programmes were not
a priority in the past because they were seen as irrelevant to the
maintenance of security. The Committee is concerned about sexual
violence against detained persons and about the treatment of detainees
belonging to minorities (arts. 2, 11 and 16).^[238] (Emphasis supplied)

VI (B)

COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by a new type
of coronavirus called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2). Generally, coronaviruses cause respiratory infections to
humans, which range from mild to severe. The Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, both viral outbreaks
that had swept the Philippines years ago, were both caused by
coronaviruses.

COVID-19 was first encountered in Wuhan, China last December 2019.^[239] On January 9, 2020, its first death was publicly recorded.^[240]

The common symptoms of this disease include fever, dry
cough, and tiredness. Some manifestations include aches and pains, nasal
congestion, sore throat, diarrhea, anosmia (loss of smell), and dysgeusia (loss of taste).^[241] These signs begin mildly and may gradually progress.^[242]

According to the World Health Organization, 80% of
infected persons recover from COVID-19 without needing hospital
treatment. However, one of every five people becomes seriously ill and
develops difficulty breathing. Any person can be seriously ill, but
those who are of advanced age, and those with underlying medical
problems such as high blood pressure, heart and lung problems, diabetes,
cancer, or immunosuppression have a higher chance of worsening
conditions.^[243]

COVID-19 is highly contagious.^[244]
Some get infected but do not develop any symptoms or feel unwell; some
only experience mild symptoms. However, even those with zero to very
mild symptoms can transmit the virus if they carry it.^[245]
In fact, COVID-19 has since spread worldwide, prompting the World
Health Organization to declare it a pandemic—the first one caused by a
coronavirus.^[246]

The World Health Organization had initially found that
the virus spreads when a COVID-19-positive person expels small droplets
from the nose or mouth through speaking, coughing, or sneezing. People
can catch COVID-19 “if they breathe in these droplets,” or if they
touched objects or surfaces on which the droplets are expelled and then
they touched their eyes, nose, or mouth. It later noted that “airborne
transmission of the virus can occur in health care settings where
specific medical procedures, called aerosol generating procedures,
generate very small droplets called aerosols.” It also reported that
some outbreaks in indoor crowded spaces suggested the possibility of
combined aerosol and droplet transmission, citing examples such as
during choir practice, in restaurants or in fitness classes.^[247]

Thus, the World Health Organization lists several
recommendations to prevent transmission. These include frequent hand
hygiene, physical distancing, respiratory etiquette, avoiding “crowded
places, close-contact settings and confined and enclosed spaces with
poor ventilation,” wearing fabric masks, and “good environmental
ventilation in all closed settings and appropriate environmental
cleaning and disinfection.”^[248]

As of now, there is no vaccine against the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and no proven cure for COVID-19.^[249]

All these factors have caused the entire world to undergo extraordinary changes to cope with the situation.

In the Philippines, where the first case of COVID-19 was reported on January 30, 2020,^[250]
the Department of Health has recommended measures to slow its spread,
including personal hygiene, social distancing, environmental
cleanliness, and food safety.^[251] It also advised against public events and gatherings.^[252]

The government has imposed travel bans,^[253] raised the COVID-19 Alert to Code Red sublevel 2—the highest level of national response management^[254]—announced a state of calamity throughout the country for six months,^[255]
and declared a national emergency. President Rodrigo Duterte was also
given emergency powers to address the state of public health emergency.^[256]

Several levels of community quarantine measures—general,
enhanced, to extreme enhanced along with their modified versions—were
imposed all over the country, depending on each locality’s situation.
Notably, work was suspended in the executive branch, and the other
branches were encouraged to follow suit. Private enterprises made
flexible work arrangements. Land, domestic air, and domestic sea travel
to and from Metro Manila were suspended.^[257]
Local governments started imposing curfews, implementing quarantine
passes, providing support to health workers, and distributing relief
goods.^[258]

Quarantine was extended several times,^[259]
and was subsequently modified based on the locality after consideration
of the developments of the COVID-19 epidemiological curve, health
capacity, and economic, security, and social factors.

Yet, based on publicly available Department of Health
data, the total number of cases continues to rise. In particular,
Moreover, several news reports announced positive cases of and deaths
related to COVID-19 in jails.^[260]

While the Bureau of Corrections and the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology submitted Verified Reports on the measures taken
to address the disease, they admit that social distancing is necessary
to disrupt the spread of the virus. They also concede that this is
unachievable in all of the penal facilities in the Philippines.^[261] Petitioners invoke the general absence of adequate medical and healthcare facilities to respond to basic needs of prisoners.^[262]

Clearly, the nature of COVID-19 and the jail congestion
in this country are matters that all courts may take judicial notice of.
The fact of overcrowding in jails and the transmissibility of COVID-19
no longer need further proof. However, even if this Court takes judicial
notice of these circumstances, there are several facts that must first
be determined in relation to the confinement of petitioners or any other
person deprived of liberty seeking release.

This includes, among others, the latest data on jail
congestion and measures taken to address the chronic problem of jail
overcapacity; the capabilities of the prison systems where petitioners
are detained to prevent the spread of COVID-19; the demands made by
petitioners to the detention facilities; any unjustified refusal or
negligence on the part of the detention facilities to act on their
concerns.

Courts cannot grant a blanket release without
determining these facts. Petitioners must establish the basis for their
temporary release. To be released based on a violation of their
constitutional rights, petitioners must still show the circumstances of
their own detention and prove they are deprived of the basic and minimum
standards of imprisonment. They should establish the individual
conditions of their confinement which are not organic or consistent with
the punishment imposed on them. They must invoke which constitutional
rights are violated. They must show they have made a clear demand on the
relevant government agencies, and that the latter intentionally or
persistently refused or negligently failed to act on their concerns.
They must ultimately show that the responsible government
instrumentality has been compliant or negligent with constitutional,
international, and local provisions and standards protecting their
rights.

Justice Lazaro-Javier opines that while this Court may take judicial notice of jail congestion,^[263]
the infringement of the minimum standards required under the law do not
constitute cruel and inhuman punishment. To her, while it affects the
severity of the punishment, it is merely incidental to the punishment.^[264]

She also agrees that jail congestion has a bigger impact on petitioners’ right to life during the pandemic.^[265]
However, she finds that it cannot be said that the increased risks
caused by COVID-19 on their right to life, security and health are the
fault of respondents, such that the violation can be attributed to them.
She holds that respondents committed no positive act to increase
petitioners’ risks or worsen the situation.^[266]
Neither are they guilty of inaction or idleness since they have taken
positive measures to minimize the spread of the virus and infection
among the prisoners. Even assuming their measures were not sufficient,
the inadequacy is attributable to other factors beyond the control and
authority of respondents, including the unpredictability of the
pandemic.^[267]

Similarly, without trial on the merits, Justice Delos
Santos is ready to conclude that petitioners’ continued detention is not
unnecessarily oppressive because they failed to show that the State has
been “indifferent to their clinical needs.”^[268]

These are already factual conclusions that may only be
determined in a proper hearing in the trial courts. I suggest that
before this Court make any finding, a full-blown hearing is necessary.
Without it, it cannot be established that jail congestion and the
general lack of adequate medical facilities preclude respondents from
preventing the spread of COVID-19 in its facilities. Without it, the
question of whether petitioners’ constitutional rights were violated
remains unanswered.

VII

Finally, I suggest a measure grounded on social justice: that this Court provide a remedy called the writ of kalayaan.

I recognize the many efforts and feats of this Court
under Chief Justice Peralta’s leadership to facilitate the release of
qualified persons deprived of liberty.^[269]

However, I urge this Court to move even further. In
recognition of the pervasiveness of congestion in our jails, this Court
should fashion a remedy called the writ of kalayaan similar to the writ of kalikasan or the writ of continuing mandamus in environmental cases.

This Court is not without precedent in formulating rules
to address pervasive and urgent violations of constitutional rights
with transcendental effects. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,^[270]
this Court issued, for the first time, a writ of continuing mandamus
ordering various administrative agencies to fulfill their respective
mandates to clean up and restore Manila Bay. Having appreciated the
extraordinary circumstances, the urgency of the situation, and the
extreme environmental degradation of Manila Bay, this Court upheld the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology through the writ.

This Court likewise recognized that it needed to
formulate special rules of procedure to enforce environmental laws and
finally address the continuing violations of these laws. On April 10,
2010, it promulgated the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases for
the enforcement or violations of environmental and other related rules.^[271] The Rules provide the procedure for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan,^[272]
an “extraordinary remedy that covers environmental damages the
magnitude of which transcends both political and territorial
boundaries.”^[273] The Rules also provide the issuance of a continuing mandamus,^[274] a “distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws.”^[275]

This time, a writ of kalayaan should be issued
when all the requirements to establish cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment are present. This is necessary considering that the continued
and malicious congestion of our jails does not affect only one
individual. Its issuance is grounded on this Court’s rule-making
authority and the extreme situation brought upon by the COVID-19
pandemic. As in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, this
Court is again being called to address a systemic problem that even the
most basic health protocols to prevent the spread of the virus cannot,
address. Jail congestion is as virulent as COVID-19 itself, especially
in the face of an unprecedented global pandemic.

The writ of kalayaan may require a more constant
supervision by an executive judge for the traditional or extraordinary
releases of convicts or detainees. It should provide an order of
precedence in order to bring the occupation of jails to a more humane
level. Those whose penalties are the lowest and whose crimes are brought
about, not by extreme malice, but by the indignities of poverty may be
prioritized.

Certainly, the writ of kalayaan will be the distinguishing initiative of the Peralta Court—a measure that is grounded on social justice.

Persons deprived of liberty do not shed their humanity
once they are taken into custody, yet the perennial congestion that
plague our jails do not reflect this. Instead, they reveal our failure
to respect the very fundamental rights that the State has guaranteed to
protect. This wrong, which we have allowed to persist, is all the more
pressing in the face of a highly contagious and deadly disease. Persons
deprived of liberty are in need of more remedies to ensure that their
detention do not prejudice their right to live.

Jail congestion harms so many individuals—most of them
poor, and therefore, invisible. The dawn of the COVID-19 pandemic has
only made this a more urgent concern. We cannot just watch and sit idly
by.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote that the Petition be referred
to the appropriate trial courts to determine, upon proper motion or
petition of the parties, whether there are factual bases supporting the
temporary release of petitioners on the following grounds:

First, they are entitled to release on bail or recognizance, if still applicable; or

Second, there is a violation of their constitutional
right against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment or other related
constitutional rights, such that they may file either: (1) a motion for
release if the case is still on trial or on appeal; or (2) petition a
writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy. The grant of
these remedies is subject to the establishment of the following
requisites: (a) existing inhuman, degrading, or cruel conditions not
organic or consistent with the statutory punishment imposed; (b) the
conditions violate clear, enforceable statutory or constitutional
provisions including judicially discernable international standards
adopted in this jurisdiction; (c) a clear demand on the relevant
government agency to address their grievance; and (d) the conditions are
the result of intentional or persistent refusal or negligence on the
part of the government agency, be it the warden, director of prisons,
local government unit, or Congress.

I also vote that this Court En Banc create a subcommittee under the Committee on Rules to immediately draft a proposal for a writ of kalayaan
to set the clearest guidance for the lower courts in adjudicating
proven violations of the right against cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment as a result of continuous congestion of detention centers or
jails.

^[2] 767 Phil. 147 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[3] J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, p. 10.

^[4] 147 Phil. 362 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, First Division]

^[5] Petition, p. 57.

^[6] Id. at 5-6 and 34.

^[7] Petitioners
assert these are recognized in the Philippines as they are referred in
Republic Act No. 10575 or the Bureau of Corrections Act and the Jail
Manual of Operations.

^[8] Petition, pp. 40-52.

^[9] Id. at 48-52.

^[10] Id. at 11 and 54.

^[11] Id. at 55.

^[12] Id. at 41.

^[13] Id. at 42. The Petition states “Republic Act No. 10375.”

^[14] Id. at 40.

^[15] Id. at 3, 27 and 30.

^[16] Id. at 27.

^[17] Id. at 56.

^[18] Id.

^[19] 767 Phil. 147 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[20] 77 Phil. 461 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].

^[21] Petition, pp. 53-54.

^[22] Comment, pp. 17-18.

^[23] Id. at 20-22.

^[24] Id. at 22-24.

^[25] Id. at 10.

^[26] Id. at 24-26.

^[27] Id. at 27-29.

^[28] Id. at 29-33.

^[29] Id. at 38.

^[30] Id. at 33-36.

^[31] Id. at 36-38.

^[32] Id. at 40.

^[33] Reply, pp. 4-5.

^[34] Id. at 5-11.

^[35] Id. at 12-16.

^[36] Id. at 50-56.

^[37] Should
they avail of the second remedy, a detainee whose conviction is not yet
final should file a motion for release, while a convicted prisoner may
file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.³⁷ The
movant or petitioner must show: (a) the existing inhuman, degrading, or
cruel conditions not organic or consistent with the statutory punishment
imposed; (b) the violation of a clear, enforceable constitutional
provision or a local or international law; (c) a clear demand made on
the relevant agencies of government; (d) the intentional or persistent
refusal or negligence on the part of the relevant agencies of government
to address the cruel conditions of the violation of the statutory or
constitutional provisions.

^[38] Rules of Court, Rule 114, sec. 1.

^[39] RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 4 provides:

SECTION 4. Bail, a Matter of Right; Exception. — All
persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law
or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

^[40] RULES or COURT, Rule 114, sec. 2 provides:

SECTION 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless
cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until
promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective
of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his
right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the
accused, the amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by
this section. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6)
months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be
attached to the bail. (2a)

^[41] RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 17 provides:

SECTION 17. Bail, Where Filed. — (a) Bail in the
amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or
in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional
trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If
the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than
where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional
trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge therein. (b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the
application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending,
whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal. (c) Any person
in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (17a)

^[42] RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, secs. 8 and 18 provide:

SECTION 8. Burden of Proof in Bail Application. —
At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
SECTION 18. Notice of Application to Prosecutor. — In the
application for bail under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give
reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to
submit his recommendation. (18a)

^[43] RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 5 provides

SECTION 5. Bail, When Discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed
to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal
under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion
of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case. (5a)

^[44] RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 7 provides

SECTION 7. Capital Offense or an Offense Punishable by Reclusion Perpetua or Life Imprisonment, not Bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)

^[45] 814 Phil. 840 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

^[46] Id. at 884.

^[47] A.M. No.
12-11-2-SC (2014), Third Whereas Clause. Guidelines for Decongesting
Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to
Speedy Trial.

^[48] Rules of Court, Rule 114, sec. 15 provides:

SECTION 15. Recognizance. — Whenever allowed by law
or these Rules, the court may release a person in custody on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person. (15a)

^[49] 87 Phil. 566 (1950) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].

^[50] Id. at 569-570.

^[51] Republic Act No. 10389 (2013), sec. 3.

^[52] Republic Act No. 10389 (2013), sec. 5 provides:

SECTION 5. Release on Recognizance as a Matter of Right Guaranteed by the Constitution.
— The release on recognizance of any person in custody or detention for
the commission of an offense is a matter of right when the offense is
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment: Provided, That the accused or any person on behalf of the accused files the application for such:
(a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court; and
(b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided, further,
That a person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum
of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on the person’s recognizance.

^[53] Republic Act No. 10389 (2013), secs. 6 and 7 provide:

SECTION 6. Requirements. — The competent court
where a criminal case has been filed against a person covered under this
Act shall, upon motion, order the release of the detained person on
recognizance to a qualified custodian: Provided, That all of the following requirements are complied with:
(a) A sworn declaration by the person in custody of his/her
indigency or incapacity either to post a cash bail or proffer any
personal or real properly acceptable as sufficient sureties for a bail
bond;
(b) A certification issued by the head of the social welfare and
development office of the municipality or city where the accused
actually resides, that the accused is indigent;
(c) The person in custody has been arraigned;
(d) The court has notified the city or municipal sanggunian
where the accused resides of the application for recognizance. The
sanggunian shall include in its agenda the notice from the court upon
receipt and act on the request for comments or opposition to the
application within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice. The action
of the sanggunian shall be in the form of a resolution, and shall be duly approved by the mayor, and subject to the following conditions:
. . . .
(e) The accused shall be properly documented, through such
processes as, but not limited to, photographic image reproduction of all
sides of the face and fingerprinting: Provided, That the costs
involved for the purpose of this subsection shall be shouldered by the
municipality or city that sought the release of the accused as provided
herein, chargeable to the mandatory five percent (5%) calamity fund in
its budget or to any other available fund in its treasury; and
(f) The court shall notify the public prosecutor of the date of
hearing therefor within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of the
application for release on recognizance in favor of the accused: Provided,
That such hearing shall be held not earlier than twenty-four (24) hours
nor later than forty-eight (48) ours from the receipt of notice by the
prosecutor: Provided, further, That during said hearing, the
prosecutor shall be ready to submit the recommendations regarding the
application made under this Act, wherein no motion for postponement
shall be entertained.
SECTION 7. Disqualifications for Release on Recognizance. —
Any of the following circumstances shall be a valid ground for the
court to disqualify an accused from availing of the benefits provided
herein:
(a) The accused had made untruthful statements in his/her sworn affidavit prescribed under Section 5(a):
(b) The accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual
delinquent, or has committed a crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(c) The accused had been found to have previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of
bail or release on recognizance without valid justification; SCEDAI
(d) The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole or under conditional pardon;
(e) The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the
facts surrounding his/her case indicate the probability of flight if
released on recognizance;
(f) There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the case; and
(g) The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or
higher penalty to the new crime he/she is being accused of.

^[54] 345 Phil. 823 (1997) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[55] Id. at 832-833.

^[56] Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule VIII, sec. 65.

^[57] 578 Phil. 1002 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

^[58] Petition, p. 8.

^[59] Id. at 6.

^[60] Id. at 7.

^[61] Id.

^[62] 767 Phil. 147 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[63] Petition, pp. 53-55.

^[64] J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, pp. 41-43.

^[65] Id. at 56, 59, and 66-67; J. Reyes, Separate Opinion, pp. 3-4.

^[66] J. Reyes, Separate Opinion, p. 3.

^[67] 456 Phil. 1 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]. See also Regulus Development, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 779 Phil. 75 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[68] Id. at 10.

^[69] Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

^[70] Id. at 10.

^[71] Id. See also Regulus Development, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 779 Phil. 75 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[72] Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 263 Phil. 846, 852 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].

^[73] 263 Phil. 846 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].

^[74] Id. at 851-852.

^[75] 275 Phil. 597 (1991) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].

^[76] Id. at 604.

^[77] 330 Phil. 1074 (1996) [Per J. Padilla, First Division].

^[78] Id. at 1081.

^[79] 694 Phil. 223 (2012) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].

^[80] Id. at 224-225.

^[81] J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, pp. 79-81.

^[82] Id. at 81.

^[83] Id. at 83.

^[84] Id.

^[85] Id. at 84.

^[86] C.J. Peralta, Separate Opinion, p. 5.

^[87] 767 Phil. 147 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[88] J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 767 Phil. 147, 183 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[89] If the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, the court having jurisdiction must determine if
the evidence of guilt is strong. Otherwise, the mandatory hearing is
only for determining the amount of bail.

^[90] Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, pp. 6-7.

^[91] Id. at 181.

^[92] J. Lazaro-Javier, Separate Opinion, p. 8.

^[93] 809 Phil. 453 (2017) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

^[94] J. Lazaro-Javier, Separate Opinion, p. 12.

^[95] J. Caguioa, Separate Opinion, p. 8; J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, p. 5.

^[96] Id. at 10.

^[97] J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, pp. 14-15; J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, p. 96.

^[98] J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, p. 96.

^[99] G.R. No.
221139, March 20, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65145> [Per
J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[100] Id.

^[101] CONST, art. 3, sec. 13 states:

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

^[102] Trillanes v. Pimentel, 578 Phil. 1014-1015 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc] citing People v. Hon. Maceda, 380 Phil. 1 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, Third Division].

^[103] J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, p. 97.

^[104] Id. at 98.

^[105] Id. at 98-99.

^[106] Id. at 99.

^[107] Id. at 58.

^[108] J. Reyes, Separate Opinion, p. 7.

^[109] Id. at 6.

^[110] Id. at 6; J. Lazaro-Javier, Separate Opinion, p. 32.

^[111] J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, p. 14.

^[112] 505 Phil. 298 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] citing Fisher v. Winter, 564 F Supp. 281 (1983).

^[113] Id. at 315.

^[114] 1935 CONST., art. I, sec. 1(19).

^[115] 1973 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1.

^[116] 795 Phil. 529 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[117] Id. at 572-573.

^[118] 131 Phil. 408 (1968) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].

^[119] Id. at 411.

^[120] 808 Phil. 86 (2017) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[121] Id. at 94.

^[122] Republic Act No. 9745 (2009), the Anti-Torture Act of 2009.

^[123] These
definitions of torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
or punishment under Republic Act No. 9745 were adopted from the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, which the Philippines ratified on June 18,
1986.

^[124] Republic Act No. 9745 (2009), secs. 3-5.

^[125] Republic Act No. 9745 (2009), secs. 9-1.

^[126] 589 Phil. 1 (2008) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

^[127] Id. at 50.

^[128] Id. at 50-55.

^[129] 335 Phil. 343 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[130] J. Panganiban, Separate Opinion in People v. Echegaray, 335 Phil. 343, 407 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[131] 732 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[132] Id. at 156.

^[133] CONST., art. II, sec. 11.

^[134] Republic Act No. 9745 (2009).

^[135] Republic Act No. 9745 (2009), sec. 2.

^[136] Republic Act No. 10575 (2013). Bureau of Corrections Act of 2013.

^[137] Republic Act No. 10575 (2013), sec. 8 provides:

SECTION 8. Supervision of the Bureau of Corrections.
— The Department of Justice (DOJ), having the BuCor as a line bureau
and a constituent unit, shall maintain a relationship of administrative
supervision with the latter as defined under Section 38 (2), Chapter 7,
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), except
that the DOJ shall retain authority over the power to review, reverse,
revise or modify the decisions of the BuCor in the exercise of its
regulatory or quasi-judicial functions.

^[138] Bureau of Corrections Operating Manual (2000), Book I, Part III, ch. I, secs 1-3 provide:

SECTION 1. Rights of an inmate. — An inmate shall have the following basic rights:

a. to receive compensation for labor he performs;
b. to be credited with time allowances for good conduct and loyalty;
c. to send and receive mail matter;
d. to practice his religion or observe his faith;
e. to receive authorized visitors;
f. to ventilate his grievances through proper channels; and
g.
to receive death benefits and pecuniary aid for injuries.

SECTION 2. Privileges of an Inmate. — The following privileges shall also be extended to an inmate:

a. Attend or participate in any entertainment or athletic activity within the prison reservation;
b. Read books and other reading materials in the library;
c. Smoke cigar and cigarettes, except in prohibited places;
d. Participate in civic, religious and other activities authorized by prison authorities; and
e. Receive gifts and prepared food from visitors subject to inspection.

SECTION 3. Rights of a Detainee. — A detainee may,
aside from the rights and privileges enjoyed by a finally convicted
inmate, wear civilian clothes and to grow his hair in his customary
style.

^[139] Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule I, sec. 1:

Section 1. MANDATE – The Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology was created on January 2, 1991 pursuant to Republic Act 6975,
replacing its forerunner, the Jail Management and Penology Service of
the defunct Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police. The BJMP
exercises administrative and operational jurisdiction over all
district, city and municipal jails. It is a line bureau of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).

^[140] Republic Act No. 6975 (1990), sec. 63 provides:

SECTION 63. Establishment of District, City or Municipal
Jail. — There shall be established and maintained in every district,
city and municipality a secured, clean adequately equipped and sanitary
jail for the custody and safekeeping of city and municipal prisoners,
any fugitive from justice, or person detained awaiting investigation or
trial and/or transfer to the national penitentiary, and/or violent
mentally ill person who endangers himself or the safety of others, duly
certified as such by the proper medical or health officer, pending the
transfer to a medical institution.
The municipal or city jail service shall preferably be headed by a
graduate of a four (4) year course in psychology, psychiatry,
sociology, nursing, social work or criminology who shall assist in the
immediate rehabilitation of individuals or detention of prisoners. Great
care must be exercised so that the human rights of this prisoners are
respected and protected, and their spiritual and physical well-being are
properly and promptly attended to.

^[141] Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule II, sec. 16.

^[142] Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule II, sec. 17.

^[143] Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule II, sec. 16.

^[144] Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule I, secs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 11 provide:

SECTION 2. Vision. — The BJMP envisions itself as a
dynamic institution highly regarded for its sustained humane
safekeeping and development of inmates.
SECTION 3. Mission. — The Bureau aims to enhance public
safety by providing humane safekeeping and development of inmates in all
district, city and municipal jails.
SECTION 4. Powers. — The BJMP exercises supervision and
control over all district, city and municipal jails. As such, it shall
ensure the establishment of secure, clean, adequately equipped sanitary
facilities; and ensure the provision of quality services for the
custody, safekeeping, rehabilitation and development of district, city
and municipal inmates, any fugitive from justice, or person detained
awaiting or undergoing investigation or trial and/or transfer to the
National Penitentiary, and/or violent mentally ill person who endangers
him/herself or the safety of others as certified by the proper medical
or health officer, pending transfer to a mental institution.
SECTION 5. Functions. — In line with its mission, the Bureau endeavors to perform the following functions:
a. to enhance and upgrade organizational capability on a regular
basis; thus, making all BJMP personnel updated on all advancements in
law enforcement eventually resulting in greater crime solution
efficiency and decreased inmate population;
b. to implement strong security measures for the control of inmates;
c. to provide for the basic needs of inmates;
d. to conduct activities for the rehabilitation and development of inmates; and
e. to improve jail facilities and conditions.
. . . .
SECTION 10. Objectives. — The broad objectives of the Bureau are the following:
a. To improve the living conditions of offenders in accordance with the accepted standards set by the United Nations;
b. To enhance the safekeeping, rehabilitation and development of
offenders in preparation for their eventual reintegration into the
mainstream of society upon their release; and
c. To professionalize jail services.
SECTION 11. Principles. — The following principles shall be observed in the implementation of the preceding sections:
a. Humane treatment of inmates;
b. Observance of professionalism in the performance of duties; and
c. Multi-sectoral approach in the safekeeping and development of
inmates can be strengthened through active partnership with other
members of the criminal justice system and global advocates of
corrections.

^[145] Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule VIII, secs. 63 and 64 provide:

Section 63. RIGHTS OF INMATES – Although the purpose for
committing a person to jail is to deprive him/her of liberty in order to
protect society against crime, such person is still entitled to certain
rights even while in detention. These rights are:
1. The right to be treated as a human being, and not to be subjected to corporal punishment;
2. The right to be informed of the regulations governing the detention center;
3. The right to adequate food, space and ventilation, rest and recreation;
4. The right to avail himself/herself of medical, dental and other health services;
5. The right to be visited anytime by his/her counsel, immediate
family members, medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by
him or by his immediate family or by his counsel;
6. The right to practice his/her religious beliefs and moral precepts;
7. The right to vote unless disqualified by law;
8. The right to separate detention facilities or cells particularly for women inmates; and
9. If a foreigner, the right to communicate with his/her embassy or consulate. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 64. Privileges Allowed the Inmates. — Detainees may enjoy the following privileges:
A. To wear their own clothes while in confinement;
B. To write letters, subject to reasonable censorship, provided
that expenses for such correspondence shall be borne by them;
C. To receive visitors during visiting hours. However, visiting
privileges may be denied in accordance with the rules and whenever
public safety so requires;
D. To receive books, letters, magazines, newspapers and other periodicals that the jail authorities may allow;
E. To be treated by their own doctor and dentist at their own
expense upon proper request from and approval by appropriate
authorities;
F. To be treated in a government or private hospital, provided it is deemed necessary and allowed by the rules;
G. To request free legal aid, if available;
H. To sport hair in their customary style, provided it is decent and allowed by the jail rules;
I. To receive fruits and prepared food, subject to inspection and approval by jail officials;
J. To read books and other reading materials available in the library, if any;
K. To maintain cleanliness in their cells and brigades or jail
premises and perform other work as may be necessary for hygienic and
sanitary purposes;
L. To be entitled to Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) as provided by law; and
M. To be utilized as jail aides as designated by the warden
himself, with the CONSENT OF THE INMATE/INMATES or upon the
recommendation of the personnel.

^[146] Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule I, sec. 10.

^[147] United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), A/RES/70/175 (2015).

^[148] J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Ocampo v. Abando, 726 Phil. 441, 486-487 (2014) [Per. Sereno, En Banc].

^[149] United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 III(A) (1948), art. 5.

^[150] United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 III(A) (1948), art. 3.

^[151] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, A/RES/21/2200 (1966).
The Philippines is a signatory of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The Philippines signed it on December 19,
1966 and ratified it on October 23, 1986. See UN Treaty Body Database,
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, available
at <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=137&Lang=E> (last visited on July 6, 2020).

^[152] General
Comment No. 21, Article 10 (Humane treatment of persons deprived of
their liberty), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (1992), par. 4.

^[153] A/RES/45/111 (1990).

^[154]
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
A/RES/30/3452 (1975).

^[155]
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
A/RES/30/3452 (1975), art. 3 provides:

Article 3. No State may permit or tolerate torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Exceptional
circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked
as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.

^[156] A/RES/43/173 (1988).

^[157] Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E/RES/2076(LXII) (1977), Preliminary Observations No. 1.

^[158] Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E/RES/2076(LXII) (1977), Preliminary Observations No. 1.

^[159] United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), A/RES/70/175 (2015).

^[160] J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, pp. 24-25.

^[161] Id. at 24.

^[162] Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 414 (1989).

^[163] Id. at 415 citing
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st and 2d Sess. Vienna Mar. 26
– May 24, 1968, U.N. Doe. A/CONF./39/11/Add. 2 (1971), and Statement of
Mr. Eduardo Suarez (Mexico) at 294 during the 52^nd meeting on May 4, 1968.

^[164] 656 Phil. 246 (2011) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc].

^[165] Id. at 303-304.

^[166] See Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411 (1980).

^[167] J. Carpio, Dissenting Opinion in Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246. 326-327 (2011) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc].

^[168] 621 Phil. 536 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

^[169] Id. at 600-601.

^[170] Adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 17, 2015.

^[171] United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), A/RES/70/175 (2015).

^[172] UN Treaty Body Database,
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, available
at <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=137&Lang=E>
(last visited on July 6, 2020).

^[173] A/RES/39/46(1984).

^[174] A/RES/57/199 (2002). Acceded on April 17, 2012.

^[175] Jennifer Peirce, Making the Mandela Rules: Evidence, Expertise, and Politics in the Development of Soft Law International Prison Standards, 43 QUEEN’S L.J. 263 (2018).

^[176] 561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].

^[177] Id. at 406-407.

^[178] J. Delos
Santos, Separate Opinion, p. 34 states: “However, for the Philippines
which has been reportedly afflicted with persisting issues of
overcrowding, the instance of ‘temporary overcrowding’ is colloquially
‘the stuff of dreams.'”

^[179] Id. at 29-30.

^[180] Id. at 27-28.

^[181] Id. at 30-31.

^[182] Id. at 31.

^[183] Id. at 31-32.

^[184] RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, sec. 2.

^[185] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 809 Phil. 453, 591-592 (2017) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

^[186] J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, p. 32.

^[187] J. Lazaro-Javier, Separate Opinion, p. 26.

^[188] Id. at 27.

^[189] Id. at 29-30.

^[190] United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), A/RES/70/175 (2015).

^[191] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, A/RES/21/2200 (1966), art. 10.

^[192] CONST, art. II, sec. 11.

^[193] J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Ocampo v. Abando, 726 Phil. 441, 488 (2014) [Per. Sereno, En Banc] citing INGRID
DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 162 (2nd ed., 2000) citing International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, A/RES/21/2200 (1966), art. 6, 7,
and 8.

^[194] J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, pp. 5 and 7.

^[195] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.

^[196] J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, p. 54.

^[197] Id. at 98.

^[198] 795 Phil. 529 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[199] Id. at 572.

^[200] G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].

^[201] Id. at 426-427.

^[202] 379 Phil. 165 (2000) [Per J. Melo, En Banc].

^[203] Id. at 202.

^[204] 815 Phil. 1067 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[205] Id. at 1144-1146.

^[206] 757 Phil. 483 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[207] Id. at 520-522.

^[208] J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, p. 53.

^[209] David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[210] Id. at 576.

^[211] 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per J. Fernan, En Banc].

^[212] Id. at 169-170.

^[213] 147 Phil. 362 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, First Division].

^[214] 147 Phil. 362 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, First Division].

^[215] Id. at 365-371.

^[216] J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, p. 14.

^[217] 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle,
a prisoner was injured while unloading a bale of cotton from a truck.
He filed a civil action for deprivation of rights against the Director
of the Department of Corrections, the warden of the prison, and its
medical doctors, alleging that the inadequate medical treatment
subjected him to cruel and inhuman punishment.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the government’s responsibility to
provide medical care for its prisoners. Failure to do so may constitute
a cause of action for cruel and inhuman punishment. First, however, the
prisoner must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,” which
constitutes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and in worst
cases, “physical torture or a lingering death.” Moreover, this
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs must be of
such nature that offends the contemporary standards of decency as
expressed in prison regulations. This means that not every accident or
medical malpractice is sufficient. There must be a deliberate disregard
of a prisoner’s serious medical condition, delay, or complete denial of
access to treatment, or intentional interference to a prescribed
treatment.

^[218] 509 U.S. 25 (1993). In Helling,
the deliberate indifference test was dissected into its subjective and
objective components. The prisoner filed a civil action for damages and
injunction against various prison officials. Roomed with another
prisoner who daily smoked five packs of cigarettes sold by the prison
store, he raised health damage that constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the conditions of confinement are
included in the scope of the right against cruel and unusual punishment.
The reason is that in depriving liberty, the State renders prisoners
unable to care for themselves. In a series of cases, the Court had
categorically held that the protection against cruel and unusual
punishment extends to “‘sufficiently imminent dangers” such that a
“remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.”
While the Court affirmed that a cause of action exists under cruel
and unusual punishment, the case was remanded to the trial courts to
prove the objective and subjective components of such right. The
objective factor consists of the prisoner’s exposure to a grave risk
that is not tolerated in the modern society. Moreover, the prisoner’s
exposure is of the nature that violates contemporary standards of
decency. On the other hand, the subjective factor pertains to prison
management showing deliberate indifference of the detention officers to
the risks and exposure of the prisoner.

^[219] Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 748 Phil. 205 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc] citing Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company, 449 Phil. 118 (2003) [J. Puno, Third Division] and Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531 (2004) [J. Puno, En Banc].

^[220] 505 Phil. 298 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] citing Fisher v. Winter, 564 F Supp. 281 (1983).

^[221] Id. at 313-317.

^[222] 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

^[223] J. Caguioa, Separate Opinion, p. 23.

^[224] Alejano v. Cabuay, 505 Phil. 298, 323 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

^[225] J. Caguioa, Separate Opinion, pp. 19-20.

^[226] Id. at 23.

^[227] 306 Phil. 519 (1994) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[228] Id. at 537-538.

^[229] Bureau of Corrections Statistic on Prison Congestion as of January 2020,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, available at <http://www.bucor.gov.ph/inmate-profile/Congestion-04062020.pdf>
(last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[230] BJMP Manual Habitat, Water, Sanitation and Kitchen in Jails (2012), p. 7.

^[231] Id. at 5.

^[232] Commission on Audit Annual Audit Report of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, available at <https://www.coa.gov.ph/index.php/national-government-agencies/2018/category/7502-department-or-the-interior-and-local-government> 55 (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[233] Id. at 55.

^[234] Id.

^[235] Id.

^[236] Highest to Lowest – Prison Population Total,
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, available at <https://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population
total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All> (last accessed on July 6,
2020). The World Prison Brief is a unique database that provides free
access to information about prison systems throughout the world,
compiled by the Institute for Crime and Justice Policy Research based in
the School of Law of Birkbeck, University of London.

^[237] List of
issues prepared by the Committee prior to the submission of the third
periodic report of the Philippines, CAT/C/PHL/Q/3 (2012).

^[238] United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Committee Against Torture, Concluding
observations on the third periodic report of the Philippines, Part C,
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accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[239] Timeline
of WMO’s response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, <https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline> (last
accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[240] Timeline: How the new corona virus spread,
Al Jazeera, April 23, 2020, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/timeline-china-coronavirus-spread-
200126061554884.html> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[241] Carol H. Yan MD, Farhoud Faraji MD PhD, Divya P. Prajapati BS, Christine E. Boone MD PhD, and Adam S DeConde MD (2020), Association of chemosensory dysfunction and Covid-19 in patients presenting with influenza-like symptoms,10
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^[242] World Health Organization, Q&A on coronaviruses
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accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[243] World Health Organization, Q&A on coronaviruses (COVID-19),
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accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[244] Steven Sanche, Yen Ting Lin, Chonggang Xu, Ethan Romero-Severson, Nick Hengartner, and Ruian Ke, High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2,
26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES JOURNAL (2020), available at <https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/7/20-0282_article> (last
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BLOOMBERG, available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-coronavirus-cases-world-map/> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[245] World Health Organization, Q&A on coronaviruses
(COVID-19). WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at <https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-coronaviruses> (last
accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[246] WHO,
Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19,
March 11, 2020, available at <https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—11-march-2020> (last accessed on July
6, 2020). See also Transcript of virtual press conference with
Gregory Hurtl, WHO Spokesperson for Epidemic and Pandemic Diseases, and
Dr Keiji Fukuda, Assistant Director-General ad Interim for Health
Security and Environment, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at
<https://www.who.int/mediacentre/influenzaAH1N1_presstranscript_20090526.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[247] Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: implications for infection prevention precautions: Scientific Brief
available at <https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/transmission-of-sars-cov-2-implications-for-infection-prevention-precautions> (last accessed
on July 26, 2020).

^[248] Id. See also
COMMUNICATING: PROTECT VULNERABLE & HIGH RISK GROUPS, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, available at <https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/covid-19/information/high-risk-groups> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[249] Ali Rismanbaf, Potential Treatments for COVID-19; a Narrative Literature Review,
8 ARCHIVES OF ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MEDICINE 1 (2020), available at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7085862/pdf/aaem-8-e29.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020). See also Feng He, Yu Deng, and Weina Li, Coronavirus disease 2019: What we know?,
92 JOURNAL OF MEDICAL VIROLOGY 719 (2020), available at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/jmv.25766> (last
accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[250] Kristine Sabillo, Philippines confirms first case of new coronavirus, ABS-CBN NEWS, January 30, 2020, available at (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
Claire Jiao and Derek Wallbank, Coronavirus Death in Philippines Is First Fatality Outside China,
BLOOMBERG, February 2, 2020, available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-02/first-person-outside-of-china-dies-from-virus-in-philippines> (last accessed on July 6, 2020). Coronavirus: First death outside China reported in Philippines, BBC, February 2, 2020, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51345855> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[251] Covid-19 Interim Guidelines,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, available at <https://www.doh.gov.ph/2019-nCov/interim-guidelines> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[252] COVID Advisory No. 7,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, February 7, 2020, available at <https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/health-update/COVID-19-Advisory-No7.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[253] Erwin Colcol, Duterte orders temporary travel ban on tourists from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau,
GMA NEWS ONLINE, February 2, 2020, available at <https://www.
gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/724475/duterte-orders-temporary-travel-ban-on-tourists-from-mainland-china-hong-kong-macau/story/> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[254] DOH Backs 11^th
IATF Resolutions; Reports 12 New Covid-19 Cases in PH, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, March 13, 2020, available at <https://www.doh.gov.ph/doh-press-release/doh-back-11th-iatf-resolutions-reports-12-new-covid-19-cases-in-ph> (last accessed on
July 6, 2020).

^[255] Proclamation No. 929 (2020).

^[256] See Republic Act No. 11469 (2020).
See IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR SECTION
4(AA) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11469, available at <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/03mar/20200401-IRR-RA-11469-RRD.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
Joint Memorandum Circular No. 01 (2020), Special Guidelines on the
Provision of Social Amelioration Measures by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Department of Labor and Employment, Department
of Trade and Industry, Department of Agriculture, Department of Finance,
Department of Budget and Management, and Department of the Interior and
Local Government to the Most Affected Residents of the Areas Under
Enhanced Community Quarantine, available at <https://www.COVID-19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DSDW-JOINT-MEMO-CIRC.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
Department of Budget and Management Local Budget Circular No. 124
(2020), Policy Guidelines on the Provision of Funds by Local Government
Units for Programs, Projects, and Activities to Address the Corona Virus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation, available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DBM-LOC-BUDGET-CIRC.pdf> (last
accessed on July 6, 2020).” Joint Memorandum Circular No. 01 (2020),
Emergency Procurement by the Government During a State of Public Health
Emergency Arising from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),
available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/COA-GPPB-JOIN-MEMO-CIRC.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[257]
Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious
Diseases Resolution No. 12, March 13, 2020, available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IATF-RESO-12.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020). See also Resolution No. 12
(2020) available at <https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/health-update/IATF-RESO-12.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[258]
Evolution of LGU involvement: DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-018, January
31, 2020, Guides to Action Against Coronavirus, available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/DILG-MEMO-CIR-2020-018.pdf> (last accessed
on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-061, March 21, 2020, Ensuring that the
Food Relief Operations to be Distributed to Muslim Communities are
Halal Compliant During the Period of Enhanced Community Quarantine,
available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DILG-MC-No-2020-061.pdf> (last
accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-062, March 21, 2020. Suppletory LGU
Guidelines on the Implementation of Enhanced Community Quarantine in
Luzon, and State of Public Health Emergency in other parts of the
Country due to the COVID-19 Threat, available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DILG-MC-No-2020-062.pdf> (last
accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-063, March 27, 2020, Interim
Guidelines on the Management of Human Remains for Patient Under
Investigation (PUI) and Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Cases, available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DILG-Memorandum-Circular-No.-2020-063.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-064, March 29, 2020,
Provincial/City/Municipal Special Care Facilities and Isolation Units
Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DILG-Memorandum-Circular-No.-2020-064.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-065, March 30, 2020, Guidelines for
Local Government Units in the Provision of Social Amelioration Measures
by the National Government to the Most Affected Residents of the Areas
Under Enhanced Community Quarantine, available at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DILG-Memorandum-Circular-No.-2020-065.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-066. March 31, 2020, Guidelines on
Providing Proper Welfare of Persons with Disabilities During the
Enhanced Community Quarantine Due to the Corona Virus 2019 (COVID-19)
Pandemic, <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DILG-Memorandum-Circular-No.-2020-066.pdf> (last accessed on July 6,
2020). DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-067, April 2, 2020, Additional
Guidelines on Quarantine and Isolation Measures Relative to the COVID-19
Situation, available at <https://www.COVID-19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DILG-Memorandum-Circular-No.-2020-067.pdf> last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-071, April 9, 2020, Mandatory Wearing
of Face Masks or Other Protective Equipment in Public Areas, available
at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/dilg-memocircular-202049_cfaebca293.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-072, April 11, 2020, Temporary
Shelter/Accommodation for the Safety and Protection Against
Discrimination of Health Workers in Provincial/City Hospitals and Other
Public Health Facilities Catering to COVID-19 Patients, available at
<https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/dilg-memocircular-2020412_d09896ea9c.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-073, April 13, 2020, Guidelines for
the Conduct of the Expanded Testing Procedures for COVID-19, available
at <https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/dilg-memocircular-2020414_6237b314e6.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular
2020-074, April 14, 2020, Realignment and Augmentation of SK Budgets to
Provide Funds for Programs, Projects, and Activities (PPAs) Related to
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), available at (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-075, April 23, 2020, Establishment of
DILG Overseas Filipino Workers’ (OFW) Desk and Designation of DILG-OFW
Desk Officer at the Region, Province, Highly Urbanized City (ITUC) and
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^[259]
Memorandum from the Executive Secretary, April 7, 2020, available at
<https://www.covid19.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20200407-Memorandum.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).

^[260] 9 inmates in Quezon City jail, 9 BJMP personnel contract COVID-19,
CNN PHILIPPINES, April 17, 2020, Available at <https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/17/coronavirus-positive-quezon-city-jail.html> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
517 prisoners contract COVID-19 in jails, May 25, 2020, available at
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^[261] Comment, pp. 31-32.

^[262] Reply, p. 7.

^[263] J. Lazaro-Javier, Separate Opinion, p. 13.

^[264] Id. at 14.

^[265] Id. at 14-15.

^[266] Id. at 15.

^[267] Id. at 16.

^[268] Id. at 100.

^[269] C.J. Peralta, Separate Opinion, pp. 3-4.

^[270] 595 Phil. 305 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc].

^[271] A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC(2010), sec. 2.

^[272] A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (2010), Rule 7, sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Nature of the Writ. — The writ is a remedy
available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency,
on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude
as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.

^[273] Abogado v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65756> [Per
J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[274] A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (2010), Rule 8, sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Petition for Continuing Mandamus. — When any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in
connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law
rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law,
rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the
law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.

^[275] Dolot v. Paje, 716 Phil. 458, 471 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].