PEDRO GRAVADOR, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. EUTIQUIO MEMIGO, THE DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF BAYAWAN-STA. CATALINA SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF NEGROS ORIE…

Gravador versus Mamigo

The Case

This is the case of Gravador versus Mamigo, decided by the Supreme Court in July 1967. Pedro Gravador, the principal of the Santa Catalina Elementary School in Negros Oriental, was separated from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five, the school authorities relying on pre-war records showing that he was born on November 26, 1897. He insisted that he was born on December 11, 1901, and brought a suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages against the teacher who replaced him and against the school officials. The case matters because it teaches how courts weigh conflicting records of a public officer's date of birth, how family tradition and declarations regarding pedigree are treated as evidence, and when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies must yield to the one-year period for a quo warranto action.

Procedural History

Gravador filed his suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. The respondents answered and entered into a stipulation of facts with him, and the case was submitted for decision. The trial court found that the petitioner was born on December 11, 1901, granted his petition, and ordered immediate execution, as a result of which he was reinstated. The respondents appealed directly to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, the petitioner asked for its dismissal on the ground that the issues had become moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the corresponding retirement benefits. The Court declined to dismiss, because the computation of retirement annuities depends on the number of years of service, and payment already made on the basis of December 11, 1901 would not exempt him from refunding should the Court rule that he was born on November 26, 1897. The Court therefore reviewed the decision on the merits.

Facts

On August 15, 1964, Pedro Gravador, then principal of the Santa Catalina Elementary School, was advised through the district supervisor of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five. The advice stated that according to his pre-war records, including his Employee's Record Card, he was born on November 26, 1897, making him sixty-six years, eight months and twenty-two days old, and that he would be separated effective immediately unless he could show valid proof, such as a baptismal or birth certificate, that he was below sixty-five. A few days later, Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the school.

On August 31, 1964, Gravador wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement and claiming that his date of birth was not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. He attached the affidavit of two neighbors of his late parents, who declared that they were present when he was born on December 11, 1901 and were invited to the baptismal party a few weeks later. On October 19, 1964, he wrote the Division Superintendent of Schools, reiterating his claim and enclosing supporting papers. On April 13, 1965, he filed his suit.

The controversy arose from conflicting records of the Division of Schools of Negros Oriental. The pre-war records, consisting of two Insular Teacher's Cards and one Employee's Record Card, showed his birth date as November 26, 1897, and these were the basis of the superintendent's finding. The post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an Employee's Record Card and an Employee's Record of Qualifications, stated that he was born on December 11, 1901, and these were the records he personally accomplished. The problem was aggravated by two uncontroverted facts: the records of the church where he was baptized were destroyed by fire, and the municipal civil register contained no record of his birth.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in relying on the post-war records, rather than the pre-war records, to establish the petitioner's date of birth as December 11, 1901.
• Whether or not the finding of the Superintendent of Schools as to the petitioner's date of birth is an administrative finding that binds the courts.
• Whether or not the petitioner's action was prematurely brought for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Applicable Provisions

Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on declarations regarding pedigree, provides:

The declaration of a deceased person made ante litem motam, or before the controversy arose, as to the pedigree of a person, is admissible in evidence.

The Court used this provision to admit the statement of the petitioner's deceased brother, made in a verified pleading in a cadastral case in 1924, that the petitioner was then twenty-three years old.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court correctly relied upon the post-war records, for three cogent reasons. First, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives, and such testimony is an assertion of family tradition; the petitioner consistently stated December 11, 1901 in his application for back pay in 1948, and again in 1956 and 1960 when he asked the Government Service Insurance System and the Civil Service Commission to correct his date of birth. Second, the declaration of his brother in a verified pleading in a cadastral case in 1924, that the petitioner was then twenty-three years old, was made before the controversy arose by a relative who was by then deceased, and is a declaration regarding pedigree. Third, the parties agreed that the petitioner's brother Constantino, who is admittedly older, was born on June 10, 1898, so the petitioner could not have been born earlier than Constantino, as the pre-war records would indicate.

On the second issue, the Court acknowledged that the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence, but held that whether there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue. The school official based his determination on pre-war records in the preparation of which the petitioner does not appear to have taken part, while the petitioner relied on post-war records which he personally accomplished.

On the third issue, the Court held that the argument that the action was prematurely brought is without merit. Suits for quo warranto to recover a public office must be brought within one year. Before filing suit, the petitioner waited eight months for the school officials to act on his protest, and on April 13, 1965, when the case was filed, he had only four months left within which to bring the case to court. The Court ruled that the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its observance would result in the nullification of the claim being asserted.

Doctrine

A person may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives, and such testimony is an assertion of family tradition. A declaration of a deceased relative as to a person's age, made before the controversy arose, is a declaration regarding pedigree and is admissible in evidence. The findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts only if supported by substantial evidence, and the court may examine whether such substantial evidence exists. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its observance would result in the nullification of the claim being asserted, as where the one-year period for a quo warranto action would lapse.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, with no pronouncement as to costs, and Pedro Gravador was upheld as entitled to the office on the basis of his birth date of December 11, 1901.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its observance would nullify the claim being asserted. Examiners like to use this case on questions of family tradition and declarations regarding pedigree as proof of age, and on the exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies in quo warranto actions.