MACARIO AROCHA, ETC., PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. MARTINIANO VIVO, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS. MARTINIANO VIVO, ETC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, ET AL, RESPONDE…

These are two cases instituted by the Solicitor General for the
Commissioner, of Immigration:  G. R. No.
L-24844, is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Manila in Civil Case No. 61824 for a writ of Habeas Corpus,
declaring as null and void the warrant issued by appellant Immigration
Commissioner, for the exclusion from this country of Pedro Gatchalian,
and ordering the immediate release of the latter from the custody of
immigration authorities; while G. R. No. L-24853 is a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, in which petitioner Commissioner of Immigration assails as in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, the issuance by the
same court of first instance of the aforementioned order .to release Pedro Gatchalian from detention and of the permanent injunction
against his arrest, exclusion or deportation.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On June 25, 1961, Pedro Gatchalian, a
minor, arrived at the Manila International Airport aboard a Cathay-Pacific
Airways plane, together with four other persons supposedly his father (Jose Gatchalian), an aunt and two brothers, and sought entry as
a Filipino citizen.  Not satisfied with
his papers, the immigration officer referred the case of Pedro Gatchalian to the Special Board of Inquiry.  This body, after due
hearing, rendered decision on July 6, 19 61 (in I. C. Nos. 61-2108-C to 61-2114-C)
admitting Pedro Gatchalian and seven others, as
Filipino citizens.  Submitted to
the individual members of the Board of Commissioners, the decision was marked
‘noted’ by Commissioners Talabis and De la Rosa on July
14 and 26, 1961, respectively, while Commissioner Galang
voted to “exclude” the persons subject of the decision, on Aug­ust
21, 1961.

On August 16, 1961,
Pedro Gatchalian was issued Identification
Certificate No. 16132 by the immigration authorities, attesting to his
admission as citizen of the Philippines as per decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry dated July 6, 1961.

On January 24, 1962,
the Secretary of Justice, as department head, issued Memorandum Order No. 9,
directing the Immigration Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed
on the ground that the entrant was a citizen of the Philippines
(Records, p. 37).

In July, 1962, the Board of Commissioners, allegedly after review
of the entire proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the
decision of the latter body and ordered the exclusion of Pedro Gatchalian, for being improperly documented (Exh. 5).  Subject of
the decision was accordingly notified of the Commissioners’ ruling through his
counsel (Exh. 6). 
But, although the warrant for his exclusion was issued in July, 1962,
Pedro Gatchalian was taken into custody by the
immigration authorities only on June 6, 19 65 (Exh
7).

On July 21, 1965, Macario Arocha, on behalf of Pedro Gatchalian,
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for a writ of, habeas corpus
(Civ. Case No. 61824), claiming that the detention of
Gatchalian, a Filipino, by the Immigration.  Commissioner, is violative of said petitioner’s constitutional rights.  Respondents immigration officials countered
that the exclusion order was issued Pursuant to the decision of the Board of
Commissioners dated July 6, 1962, finding Pedro Gatchalian
to have failed in proving the allega­tion that he is a Filipino citizen.

During the trial, the issues in controversy centered on the
actual date of rendition of the Commissioners’ decision, revers­ing that of the
Special Board of Inquiry; and the validity of that Commissioners’ decision,
admittedly issued motu proprio
and without affording petitioner opportunity to be heard.  It was therein petitioner’s contention that
the decision was originally dated July 20, 1962, which date was erased and
superimposed with another figure to read July 6, 1962.  On the other hand, respondents alleged that
the erasures were made to correct clerical mistakes.

In its decision of July 31, 1965, the court sustained
petitioner’s theory that the decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners
was antedated and issued beyond the prescribed one-year period.  Holding that the decision of the Special
Board of Inquiry, admitting the Philippine citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian had already become final, the Court ordered his
immediate release from detention and enjoined respondents, permanently, from
arresting, deporting and otherwise depriving him of his liberty.  On the strength of a writ of habeas corpus,
issued by the Court, Pedro Gatchalian was released
from custody of the immigration authorities at 9 o’clock in, the evening of
August 3, 19 65.

Notified of the abovementioned decision of the lower Court,
respondents filed notice to appeal therefrom, on
August 3, 1965, and this appeal was docketed in this Court as G. R. No. L-24844.  In addition,
the Commissioner of Immigration also came to this Court on August 9, 1965, for
writs of certiorari and prohibition (G. R. No. L-24853, by
charging the Court below with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
immediate release of Gatchalian notwithstanding the
perfection of an appeal from the decision of said court, contrary to the
provisions of Section 20, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The cause of petitioner and appellant Commissioner of Immigration
in this Court hinges on the issue of the correct date of promulgation of the
decision of the Board of Commissioners reversing that of the Special Board of
Inquiry.  For if, indeed, the re­versal
was made on July 20, 1962, as asserted by appellee
and respondent Gatchalian, instead of July 6, 1962,
as maintained by herein appellant and petitioner, then the admission on July 6,
1961 by the Special Board of Inquiry of the fact of Gatchalian’s
Philippine citizenship would have become final and, therefore, his detention by
the immigration authorities would be unlawful.

The parties are agreed that pursuant to Section 27(b) of
Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by Republic Act 503, the decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry shall become final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of
Commissioners, or in the absence of en appeal, unless reversed by the Board of
Commissioners after a re­view by it, motu proprio, of the entire proceedings within one
year from the promulgation of the said decision.

In the instant cases, the decision of the Board
of Commissioners (Exh. 5), the notification to appellee’s counsel that such decision was rendered (Exh. 6), and the warrant of exclusion (Exh.
7), bear the date July 6, 1962, or within one year from the reviewed
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. 
It is contended, however, that in all of these documents, the date of
promulgation of the decision appeared to have been originally written as July
20, 1962, but the number “20” was erased and superimposed by
“6”.

Appellant Commissioner of Immigration insists that these erasures
and substitutions were corrections made only to rectify clerical mistakes.  Besides, according to appellant, there is
proof that the decision was actually rendered on July 6, 1962, pointing to a
certification of the Secretary to the Board of Commissioners that the said body
voted to exclude the applicants in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-2113-0, 2114-C and
2110-C, Gloria Gatchalian et al., on July 6, 1962 (Exh. 5-A); and to the minutes of the meeting of that Board
indicating that the matter of admission of Gloria Gatchalian
et al. was taken up on July 6, 1962 (Annex F, to L-24853).

As previously stated, the Court of First Instance agreed with the
appellee that the erasures indicated that the
original date was July “20”, but that the figures had been erased and
retyped as “6”; and concluded that the Commissioners’ decision and
the warrant of exclusion had been antedated, in order to bring the decision
within the one-year term fixed by Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act 613, as
amended, wherein the proceedings before the Board of Special Inquiry may be
reviewed and revoked, either upon ap­peal or motu
proprio by the Board of Immigration
Commissioners.  The Court below held,
therefore, that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, declaring Pedro Gatchalian to be a Filipino citi­zen had become final and
definitive.

We do not believe that the mere fact of a retyping of dates an
the face of the documents, without further evidence of record, suffices to
convict the three members of the Board of Immigration Commissioners of
maliciously antedating their decision, considering the presumption of
regularity in official actuations, and the serious implications of the charge,
which amounts to no less than falsification of official documents.  Such an offense cannot be lightly inferred;
but must be clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In the first place, the accusation is negatived
by the official minutes of the Board’s proceedings (Exhibit 5-A in case G. R. No. L-24844 and Annex F,
in case G. R. No. L-24853), which clearly show that
the resolution to exclude was adopted on July 6, 1962.  No alteration in dates appear; in these
Exhibits.  And it goes without saying
that the operative date of the Commissioners’ action is that when the
resolution of exclusive was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of
the date when the decision in extenso
was prepared, written and signed.  In
fact, the alterations observed by the Court below are susceptible of the
explana­tion that the date July 20 was originally placed by the stenographer or
typist because it was then that the reasoned and extended decision was
typewritten in final form, but that it was corrected to July 6, the date it was
voted, because the decision in extenso
must relate back to the day the resolution to exclude was actually
adopted.  Necessarily, the extended
opinion had to be posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and
resolved to reverse he findings of the Board of Special.  Inquiry, The Secretary’s certificate (Annex
F, L-24853) shows that the Board of Immigration Commissioners acted upon not
less than eight immigration cases (including that of the Gatchalians)
on July 6, 1962; and it was of course impracticable to prepare and sign fully
reasoned decisions in all these cases on the same day.

Furthermore, it would have been senseless for the Board of
Immigration Commissioners to have taken a vote and decided the Gatchalian cases on July 20 (and there is no evidence that
they ever did so), because the Commissioners were familiar with the law and
knew that such a decision would be useless, as the period of review had already
lapsed since July 6.

It is argued for the appellee that the
minutes in Exh. 5-A refer only to the cases of
Gloria, Francisco and Benjamin Gatchalian.  But the designation of the case is
“Gloria Gatchalian et al.” No reason is
shown why the case of these three should be considered and voted upon
separately, considering that the claims to citizenship and entry of all were
based on the same circumstances, applicants being the descendants of one
Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino, and that all their
applications for entry were in fact jointly resolved by the Board of Inquiry in
one single decision (Annex I, petition, G. R. No. L-24844).

We, therefore, conclude that the Court below erred in finding and
declaring that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry in the case of
petitioner-appellee had become final and unreviewable, and that its review and revocation by the
Commissioners of Immigra­tion was null and void.

Appellee also argues that the decision
of the Inquiry Board had become non-reviewable since
1961 because of its confirmation by the majority of the proceeding Board of
Commissioners.  It is pointed out that
two members of the latter board (Talabis and De la
Rosa) in reference to said decision had marked “Noted” over their own
signatures, while only the third Commissioner made of record his adverse
opinion.  Such argument is untenable.

First, even disregarding the ambiguity of the term
“Noted” the former Immigration Commissioners appeared to have acted
individually in this particular instance and not as a Board.  It is shown by the different dates affixed to
their signatures that they did not actually meet to discuss and vote on the
case.  This was officially made of record
by the Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order No. 9, of January 24, 1962,
wherein he stated

“that for the
past several years , the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not
met  collectively to discuss and
deliberate in the cases coming before it.” (Exh. 3, Rec. p. 37, C. F. Inst. Case No. 61824, G. R. No.
L?24844)” (Emphasis supplied)

Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory
the purpose of its constitution as a Board. 
The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in order
that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and ideas
should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs.
Humphries, LRA 1915F 1047).  This process
as of the essence of a board’s action, save where otherwise provided by law,
and the salutary effects of the rule would be lost were the members to act
individually, without benefit of discussion.

“The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be
exercised by the individual members separately. 
Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in
session, upon a concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum
present.” (42 Am. Jur. 389,
sec.74).

“Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a
board but of the official body, the members must be together and act in their
official capacity, and the action should appear on the records of the
board.” (Penn. R. Co. vs. Montgomery Co. Pass. R.
Co., 167 P 2d. 62, 27 LRA 766).

“Where a duty is entrusted to a board,
composed of different individuals, that board can act officially only as such,
in convened session, with the members, or a quorum thereof, present.”
(State vs. Kelly, 21 ALR 156).

Secondly, in consonance with the foregoing principles, the
aforementioned Memorandum Order of the Secretary of Justice, issued in the
exercise of his powers of control and supervision as Department Head, (Adm.
Code, sec. 79[c]), expressly declares that –

“the public
interest so requiring, it is hereby ordered that all decisions purporting to
have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry, are set aside.”

and this
nullification included the alleged 1961 decision which the appellee
now invokes and upon which he relies.

Finally, it is well to note that appellee
did not traverse the allegation of appellant Commissioners in their return to
the writ of Habeas Corpus that appellee
Pedro Gatchalian gained entry on the strength of a
forged cablegram, purportedly signed by the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Felixberto Serrano, and apparently authorizing appellee’s documentation as a Filipino (par. 3[a] of
Return, C.F.I. Rec., pp. 15-16).  Such
failure to deny imports admission of its truth by the appellee,
and establishes that his entry was irregular. 
Neither has he appealed the decision of the Commissioners of Immigration
to the Department Head.

Proceeding on another tack, appellee Gatchalian stresses that he was not heard by the Board of
Commissioners, and invokes Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez, L-22 696,
May 29, 1964, as ruling that an applicant is entitled to be heard in-review by
the Board of Commissioners.  Whatever was
said in that sense in the Fernandez case is pure obiter dictum,
since the issue therein was the power and right of the Court of Appeals, to
grant bail to a detainee whose case was pending therein on appeal.  At any rate, the right to hearing declared in
the Fernandez case was recognized in connection with the attempt of a
Board of Commissioners to review a ruling of the preceding Board that had
previously affirmed the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry, where the validity
of the first ruling was not questioned; while in the present case, as has
been shown, there is no valid confirmatory decision of the preceding Board of
Immigration Commissioners.  In reality,
the right to representation by counsel before the Immigration Commissioners is
only granted by the Immigration Law (sec. 27(c) of C. A. 613) in cases of
appeal by the alien from an adverse decision of the Board of Inquiry.  The law is as follows:

“(c) An alien excluded by a board of special inquiry or
a dissenting member thereof may appeal to the Board of Commissioners,
whose decision in the case shall be final. 
The decision on appeal shall be put in writing and promulgated not less
than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision.  In appeal cases, the alien shall have
the right to be represented by an attorney or counsel who shall have
access to the record of the board of special inquiry in the particular case on
appeal.” (Come Act 613, as amended by Rep. Act 503).  (Emphasis supplied).

Plainly, the quoted provision does not by its terms apply to a
review motu propio
by the Board of Immigrations Commissioners of decision admitting an alien, as
in the case at bar; for in such eases, the reviewing Board only passes on the
sufficiency of evidence already produced before the Board of Special
Inquiry.  The alien, having been already
heard by the latter, is not entitled to further hearing unless the law so
provides.  This is particularly true in
administrative proceedings (Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41
Phil. 193, quoted and followed in Bishop vs. Galang,
L-18365, May 31, 19 63).

The foregoing facts and considerations,
clearly prove, in our opinion, that the decision appealed from was erroneous on
the facts and the law; and considering the powers vested by statute in the
Immigration authorities, the order of release issued by the Court below was
unwarranted and improper, and should be set aside.

It is likewise unavoidable to conclude, that the enforcement of
the order to release appellee Pedro Gatchalian, notwithstanding the appeal interposed by the
Immigration Commissioner from the decision under review, was in plain violation
of section 15, Revised Rule 102 , and in patent excess
of jurisdiction.

“SEC. 15. When
prisoner discharged if no appeal. 
— When the court of judge has examined into the cause of caption and
restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained he shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement, but such
discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on
the officer or person detaining the prisoner. 
If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does
not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be
forthwith released.” (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision and order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, here complained of, are reversed, nullified and set
aside.  Costs against appellees, Macario Arocha, and Pedro Gatchalian.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.