MARCOS B. COMILANG, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HON. GENEROSO A. BUENDIA, JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF BAGUIO; ABDON DELENELA, GUILLERMO PEREZ AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BAGUIO A…

On appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 1440, denying the petition
of Marcos Comilang to annul the order of the
Municipal Court of Baguio City, in Civil Case No.
1433, dated August 11, 1964, directing the sheriff of Mountain Province to
place Abdon Delenela and
Guillermo Perez in possession of a parcel of land occupied
by the petitioner.

The antecedents of the controversy which culminated in this
appeal are as follows:

About the year 1908, Nicolas Comilang
staked a mining claim known as the “Bua Fraction
Mineral Claim” over a parcel of land in Tuding, Benguet, Mountain
Province, with an area of 76,809
square meters, more or less.  His
exploration works in the mining claim did not last for long, for he abandoned
it, and stopped the exploration, but he continued to live in the house he built
on a portion of the land with his wife, broth­ers and sisters.

In the year 1918, Macario Comilang also settled on a portion of the land with an area
of about one (1) hectare, for residential and agricultural purposes.  After his death, his daughter, Fabiana Comilang Perez remained
to live in the house built by her father on the land.  Still later, other relatives of the old
Nicolas Comilang settled and built their own houses
over other portions of the land, one of which houses was acquired by Abdon Delenela who now resides on
the land with the other Comilang heirs.

Surface rights over the area embraced in the ori­ginal Bua Fraction Mineral Claim of Nicolas Comilang
soon became the subject of litigation in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City (Civil Case No. 250 – Action to Quiet Title,
instituted by the heirs of Guillermo, Marcelina,
Julian, Timoteo, Melecio
and Macario, all surnamed Comilang,
against appellant herein Marcos Comilang who claimed
to have bought the rights and interest of Nicolas Comilang
in the old mining claim.  In a decision
rendered in said case No. 250, dated November
26, 1952, the court dismissed both claims of ownership of the
plaintiffs and the defendant and declared the area public land.  The court, however, recognized the possession
of the parties over certain specified portions of the area, among which was an
area of about one and one-half (1-1/2) hectares in possession of Marcos Comilang, which has been declared for taxation purposes in
his name.  This decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. No. 11157-R on October 29, 1955.

In the same year, the 1-1/2 hectares of land occupied by Marcos Comilang, then declared under Tax Declaration No. 4771 in
his name, was levied upon and sold at public auction by the sheriff of Mountain
Province to satisfy a judgment for a sum of money obtained by the spouses Jose
Coloma and Eugenia Rumbaoa against Marcos Comilang in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in Civil Case No. 1433.  The judgment creditors were the purchasers at
the auction sale, and a certificate of sale was executed in their favor by the
sheriff on June 1, 1957.

In the mealtime, an application for lode patent covering the Bua Fraction Mineral Claim was filed with the Bureau of
Mines. Abdon Delenela and
his co-heirs filed their opposition to the application.  Pending the controversy before the Bureau of
Mines, Delenela and his co-heirs instituted an action
for determination of their rights on the land in the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City, docketed as Civil Case No. 735.  The parties submitted an amicable settlement
recognizing co-ownership among themselves of the Bua Mineral Claim. 
In a decision rendered in said Case No. 735, dated March 3, 1958, the court awarded one-half in
undivided share in the mineral claim in favor of Marcos Comilang,
and the other half also in undivided share in favor of Ab­don
Delenela and co-heirs.

Later, in the exercise of their right as co-owners, Abdon Delenela and Guillermo
Perez, with the knowledge and conformity of Marcos Comilang,
redeemed and bought from the Colons spouses, the latter’s rights, title,
interest and claim to the 1-1/2 hectares of land acquired under the certificate
of sale thereof executed in the latter’s favor by the sheriff on June 1,
1957.  This redemption sale took place on
June 11, 1958.

On February 9, 1959, the Director of Mines recommended the
issuance of a lode patent over the Bua Mineral Claim
in favor of Marcos Comilang, Delenela,
and the other claimants in the proportion of one-half (1/2) in undivided share
in favor of Marcos Comilang, and the other one-half
(1/2) also in undivided share In favor of Delenela and
the other heirs in pursuant to the decision of March 3, 1958, aforementioned,
in Civil Case No. 735.

On August 12, 1959, upon motion of Abdon
Delenela and Perez, who have thus acquired and
succeeded to the rights of the Coloma spouses on the 1-1/2 hectares, the
Municipal Court of Baguio City issued a writ of
possession in their favor directing the sheriff of Mountain Province to evict
Marcos Comilang and his wife from the 1-1/2 hectares
of land sold in the execution sale.

In a petition for certiorari with preliminary in­junction filed
in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 897, Maxima Nieto de Comilang,
wife of Marcos Comilang questioned the power of the
Municipal Court to issue said writ of possession on two grounds, namely:  (1) that conjugal property had been levied
upon and sold in the execution sale, and her share therein is affected; and (2)
that there can be no severance of surface rights over a mineral claim located
under the Philippine Bill of 1902, and petitioner argued that the sheriff could
not have validly sold the surface rights in the execution sale of June 1,
1957.  On February 23, 1961, the court rendered a decision in said
case, holding that the writ of possession issued by the respondent Municipal Judge
was within his competence and jurisdiction. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, docketed as G. R. No.
L-18897, a decision was rendered on March
31, 1964, the dispositive portion of
which is as follows:

“For the foregoing considerations the judgment appealed from
is hereby affirmed insofar as it denies the petition of Maxima Nieto de Comilang to exclude from the sale, or annul the sale on
execution of the residential lot formerly owned by her husband, of 1-1/2
hectares covered in the final certificate of sale; but that part of the
appealed decision holding that the sale at public auction included the 1-1/2
undivided share of Marcos Comilang to the Bua Mineral Claim, is hereby set aside and said mineral
rights of Marcos Comilang are hereby declared free from
the execution or sale on execution.”

The decision having become final, Abdon Delenela and Guillermo
Perez reiterated their motion in the Municipal Court of Baguio
City in Civil Case No. 1433, praying that an alias writ of possession be issued
to evict Marcos Comilang and his wife from the 1-1/2
hectares of land in question.  On August 11, 1964, over the objection
of Marcos Comilang, the court issued the writ prayed
for.

For a second time, a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction was instituted by Marcos Comilang
in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City seeking
the annulment of the order granting the alias writ of possession in favor of Delenela and Perez, and again the Court of First Instance
of Baguio threw out the petition in its order dated
October 22, 1964.  The court expressed
its views in the following rationale:

“The one and one-half hectares of land referred to therein (S.
C. decision) is the same parcel of land and house above-described which was
already sold at public auction to the respondents, Guillermo Perez and Abdon Delenela.

“The said judgment is res adjudicata and the consequent execution, and the writ of
possession is but its necessary consequence.

“All the authorities cited by the petitioner were no longer of
any value because they were necessarily passed upon and disposed of in the
course of finally deciding the case.

“Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby
denied.”

Marcos Comilang is now before Us on appeal from this last decision.

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in denying his
petition on the ground of res adjudicata,
arguing that it was his wife Maxima Nieto de Comilang,
and not he, the, party in the former case appealed to the Supreme Court in G.
R. No. L-18897. 
Therefore, it is claimed, one of the requisites of res
adjudicate is lacking.  We find no merit
in the argument.  As husband and wife and
before the dissolution of their marital union, their interest in the said
property is one and the same.  The fact
that the wife was the party in the former case while it is now the husband who is the pe­titioner in the instant case, when
admittedly both actions were instituted for the protection of their common
interest therein, is no argument to the proposition that there is no identity
of parties in these cases.  Such identity
of interest is enough to hold that they are privy to one another, having a
common interest in the property.  Neither
is it to able to contend that the issue involved in the two
cases are not identical. It cannot be disputed that in both cases, the
main relief sought is the annulment of writs of possession issued by the Municipal
Court of Baguio City
directing the sheriff concerned to evict the spouses Comilang
from the land, and the questions involved in both cases pertain to the legality
or validity of those writs aforementioned. 
In the decision in L-18897, this Court sustained the validity of the
execution sale.  There can be no doubt,
therefore, that the judgment in the former case is binding in the instant
proceeding.

It is argued further by the appellant that the final certificate
of sale conveying the land described in Tax Declaration No. 4771 to the
purchasers in the execution sale is not a valid disposition of a portion of the
public domain, and specially in view of the subsequent issuance of a mineral
lode patent over the Bua Mineral Claim by the
Director of Mines (Patent issued on November 7, 1966) whereby full ownership
not only of the minerals therein but also of the surface ground have been
conveyed to the patentee thereof, and, there­fore, the Municipal Court of Baguio City may no longer eject them from the land.

We do not agree with the contention of the appellant.

The Court has not overlooked the doctrines heavily relied upon by
the appellant that the moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit
on the land located, and perfected his location in accordance with the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the power of the Government to
deprive him of the exclusive right to possession of the located claim was gone,
the land had become mineral land and they were excepted from the lands that
could be granted to any other person (McDaniel v. Apacible
and Cuisia, 42 Phil. 749, 756); and that when a Iocation of a mining claim is perfected under said law, it
has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present
possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground
as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim (Gold Creek Mining
Corporation vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259). 
We are also cognizant of the rule invoked by the appellant that when
circumstances have arisen subsequent to the remanding of the record from the
Supreme Court to the trial court, a stay of execution may be allowed on grounds
which are in their nature peculiarly equitable, as for instance, to give
defendant an opportunity to set off a claim against plaintiff (Chua A. H. Lee
v. Mapa, 51 Phil. 624); or when after judgment has
been rendered and it has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which
render its execution impossible and unjust, the interested party may ask the
court to alter or modify the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and
the facts (De la Costa v. Cleopas, 67 Phil. 686; Realiza v. Duarte, L-25027, 20528 & 20529, August 31,
1967); and this remains true, notwithstanding affir­mance
of the judgment by the Supreme Court, which imparts no higher quality than to a
final judgment un appealed from, except that it cannot he questioned or reviewed
(Chua A. H. Lee v. Mapa, supra).  However, these authorities, by no means,
render the argument of herein appellant unassailable.  There are factual differences in the settings
of the case cited and the one at bar, the equities of which require the application
of a different rule.

To begin with, the 1-1/2 hectares portions of the Bua Fraction Mineral Claim described in Tax Declaration No.
4771 in the name of herein appellant was levied upon and sold at public auction
to satisfy the money judgment against him in Civil Case No. 1433 of the Mu­nicipal
Court of Baguio City, and the corresponding certificate
of sale was issued in favor of the judgment creditors.  Interest acquired under like certificates of
sale alone has been described as more than a lien on the property, more than an
equitable estate, an inchoate legal title to the
property.  (21 Am. Jur., section 264, p.
133).  The validity of that sale was
questioned when the Municipal Court ordered the eviction of appellant from the
land sold on execution, and the Supreme Court declared in L-18897 that the sale
was valid.  The sale operated to divest
appellant of his rights to the land which vested in the purchasers at the
auction sale.  The parties herein
subsequently litigated their rights to the mineral claim in Civil Case No. 735
of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, and on
the basis of their amicable agreement (appellant was a party in the case), the
court declared the Bua Mineral Claim co-ownership
property of the parties thereto “except the improvements existing
thereon” (p. 9, appellant’s petition). 
There is no room for doubt, therefore, that the right to possess or own
the surface ground is separate and distinct from the mineral rights over the
same land.  And when the application for
lode patent to the mineral claim was prosecuted in Bureau of Mines, the said
application could not have legally included the surface ground sold to another
in the execution sales:  Consequently, We
have to declare that the pa­tent procured thereunder,
at least with respect to the 1-1/2 hectares sold in execution, pertains only to
the mineral right and does not include the surface ground of the land in
question.

Viewed from another perspective, We have
arrived at the same conclusion.  In his letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, dated February 9, 1959, recommending the approval of Mineral Lode
Patent No. V-24, the Director of Mines said that applicants Marcos Comilang, et al. had acquired vested rights on the Bua Fraction Mineral Claim before the Constitution of the
Philippines was approved on November 15, 1935.  Under the doctrines laid down in McDaniel v. Apacible, and in Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, supra,
said vested rights include the ownership of both the minerals and the surface
ground; that such was the locator’s right before as well as after the issuance
of the patent; and that such was vested property although fee remains in the
Government until patent issues.  Such
vested right of herein appellant passed to the appellees
under the sale on execution aforementioned of the 1-1/2 hectares portion of the
mineral claim.  The subsequent issuance
of the Lode Patent to the entire area of the Bua
Mineral Claim did not militate against that acquired rights, for Sec.  45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 expressly
provides that nothing in said Act shall be deemed to impair any lien which may
have attached in any way whatever prior to the issuance of the patent.  Moreover, it is significant to note that the
very Lode Patent No. V-24 aforementioned expressly declares on its face that
“the mining premises hereby conveyed shall be held subject to all vested
rights and accrued rights, the legal import of which is that the patentee
Marcos Comilang, shall hold the 1-1/2 hectares
portion of the area em­braced in the patent as described in the Tax Declaration
No. 4771, in trust for the appellees.

Apart and independent of the statute, there is a rule in American
Law known as the “Doctrine of Relation”, to the effect “that all
parts and ceremonies necessary to complete a conveyance shall be taken together
as one act, and operate from the substantial part by relation.” This
“substantial part” is recognized as the “original act”
which is to be preferred, and to this all subsequent acts are to have relation.  This doctrine of relation appears to
have been often applied to the adjudication of real actions by American courts.

The case of Landes v.
Brant, 10 How. 348, U. S. 13 Law ed., 449, broadly asserts this doctrine
of relation.  In that case, a Spanish
claim of land was acquired by Clamorgan under Dodier, the original claimant, by virtue of ten consecutive
years possession prior to December 20, 1903.  Such claim was authorized by the Act of
Congress.  Clamorgan
was entitled to a patent by virtue of a certificate of confirmation made by
commissioners.  His petition for such
confirmation was filed in December, 1805. 
In 1808 judgment was recovered against Clamorgan,
the claim was sold, and the sheriff’s deed executed to McNair.  It was held that the execution sale passed to
the purchaser all the title that could have passed from Clamorgan
to McNair by a quitclaim deed; that applying the doctrine of relation
and taking all the parts and ceremonies necessary to complete the title
together as one act, then the confirmation of 1811 and the patent of 1845 must
be taken to relate to the first act; that of filing the claim in 1805.  On this assumption, intermediate conveyances
made by the confirmee or by the sheriff on his
behalf, of a date after the first substantial act, are covered by the legal
title and pass that title to the alignee.  And on this ground, the deed made by the
sheriff to McNair is valid.  This
doctrine has been applied in a great number of decisions.

Applying the same rule to the case before Us,
it is seen that the original act that ripened into Mineral Lode Patent No. V-24
was the location of the mineral claim and the recording thereof in the Mining
Recorder of Mt. Province sometime in 1922. 
Vested right to the property accrued to the locator before 1935,
although patent was issued only recently November 7, 1966).  This Patent cannot nullify the intermediate
conveyance of that right in the execution sale of 1958 to herein appellees.

Finally, the argument that the proceedings for the issuance of a
writ of possession, as has been resorted to by the appellees,
is not the proper court procedure, the appellant intimating that it should be
by a proper action.  The contention does
not deserve serious consideration.  The
corresponding rights of the parties to the property in question had been
ventilated in the various cases affecting it, and the decisions in those cases
have sustained the validity of the sale. It is now a matter of right on the
part of the appellees to be placed in pos­session of
the land by clear mandate of Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
requires that upon execution and delivery of the final deed of sale in
execution the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or
last redemptioner unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.  As this Court said in Tan Soo
Huat v. Ongwico, 63 Phil.
747:

“There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at
a sheriff’s sale of real property is obliged to bring a separate and
independent suit for possession after the one-year period for redemption has
expired and after he has obtained the sheriff’s final certificate of sale.  There is neither legal ground nor reason of
public policy precluding the court from ordering the sheriff in this case to
yield possession of the property purchased at public auction where it appears
that the judgment debtor is the one in possession thereof and no rights of
third persons are involved.”

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed.  Costs against appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.