G.R. No. 242257. June 15, 2021
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO OF VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ. VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PSUPT. MARC ANTHONY D. DARROCA, CHIEF OF POLICE, SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL POLICE …
LEONEN, J.:
zeal with which our law enforcement officers clamp down on persons of
interest or their loved ones must be bound by the fundamental rights of
persons.”[1]
On October 15, 2019, this Court granted the Petition for a writ of
amparo after finding that petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez proved with
substantial evidence that she and her children became persons of
interest and were put under surveillance because of her dead husband’s
suspected affiliation with the New People’s Army, thereby “creating a
real threat to their life, liberty, or security.”[2]
Further, this Court pointed out that spousal and filial privileges,
which continue to exist after the death of a spouse, protected
petitioner and her children from inquiries regarding her husband’s
activities.[3]
This Court likewise castigated the police officers’ brusque
treatment of petitioner and their surreptitious surveillance. We
stressed that if they wanted to interview petitioner, they should have
formally done so by holding the interview in an intimidation-free
environment and ensuring that petitioner was ably assisted by legal
counsel.[4]
Finally, this Court called on the lower courts to be more perceptive
in ferreting out the different dynamics at play between police officers
and civilians, and to not make their privileged status be the benchmark
when rendering judgment.[5]
The dispositive portion of our Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER
is issued prohibiting members of the Philippine National Police from
monitoring or surveilling petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez and her children,
Scarlet Sanchez Labinghisa and Star Sanchez Labinghisa. The respondent
police officers are reminded to uphold the rights of citizens as
contained in the Constitution as well as conduct investigations in
accordance with their promulgated manuals including the . Ethical
Doctrine Manual.SO ORDERED.[6] (Emphasis in the original)
In their Motion for Reconsideration,[7] respondents contend that “the right to privacy, as well as gender and power analysis, [is] not applicable in the present case.”[8]
They also point out that the rules on marital privilege and
disqualification only apply to judicial proceedings, not to
investigations.[9]
Respondents assert that a writ of amparo is confined to serious human
rights violations—particularly, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances—and that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove that she was entitled to the writ. They maintain that since
petitioner was a proper subject of an interview, the police officers’
act of interviewing her and taking her photos fell under the regular
investigation process and was not intended to harass her or violate her
rights.[10]
Respondents stress that even the purported threat to charge her with
obstruction of justice was brought about by petitioner’s stubborn
refusal to answer valid questions from the police officers. This, they
add, was not connected with extrajudicial killing.[11]
Respondents reiterate that they did not conduct or order the
surveillance of petitioner and her daughters. They point out that
petitioner’s accusations were mostly grounded on mere speculation.[12] They stress that for the writ of amparo to be issued, the alleged threats must be actual or likely to happen.[13]
Nonetheless, respondents maintain that even if petitioner were under
monitoring and surveillance, that still did not violate or threaten her
right to life, liberty, and security. As a proper subject of
investigation—being the wife of a known member of the National People’s
Army—her surveillance would have been justified.[14]
The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
I
The right to privacy is a fundamental right, with the Constitution
providing explicit limitations on unwarranted State intrusion into
personal affairs. To deter potential abuse of the State’s awesome powers
by State agents, the Constitution guarantees every person’s right to
due process,[15] to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,[16] and to the privacy of their communication and correspondence.[17]
One’s right to privacy is not set aside because of their relationship
with a person of interest or because they have become a person of
interest.
The continued drive against communists—with President Rodrigo Duterte
even proclaiming that the New People’s Army posed a bigger threat than
extremist groups[18]—puts
petitioner and her children in a precarious position, because while
respondents deny surveilling petitioner and her children, they
nonetheless admit that as the family members of a communist, they were
proper subjects of investigation.[19]
While respondents have the mandate to investigate, their duty must be
balanced with petitioner’s fundamental rights. Respondents must also
take into account that petitioner and her children are not ordinary
witnesses, as seen by the privileges of testimony[20] and communication[21]
that they enjoy. Hence, petitioner’s relationship with her husband
insulates her from any inquiries on his supposed communist activities.
Whatever information respondents may have wished to obtain from
petitioner or her children, as witting or unwitting witnesses, is
protected by spousal and filial privilege.
Additionally, if respondents wanted to investigate petitioner and her
children, they should have conducted a formal investigation instead of a
surreptitious surveillance, which not only infringed on petitioner’s
right to privacy and her spousal privilege, but was also an abuse of
respondents’ authority as State agents. As we said in our Decision:
Even the surreptitious surveillance of petitioner and her
family is an abuse of the Philippine National Police’s authority. If
respondents wanted to interview petitioner and her children, they should
have done so formally: informing them of their rights, holding the
interview in an environment free of intimidation, and making sure that
they had access to and were assisted by legal counsel or legal
assistance groups. Further, when a minor is being interviewed, the
interviewer should be specially trained to handle children.[22]
II
Restating the points he had raised in his earlier dissent, Justice
Ramon Paul L. Hernando says petitioner failed to substantiate her
entitlement to a writ of amparo with the required substantial evidence.
He also repeats that petitioner failed to show that respondent State
agents committed any unlawful act or omission to merit the issuance of a
permanent protection order and writ of amparo in her favor.[23]
This Court disagrees.
Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires both parties to
the petition to establish their respective claims with substantial
evidence. Apart from this, Section 17 also imposed a secondary
requirement on State agents: They must show extraordinary diligence in
the performance of their duties, and are forbidden from seeking refuge
in the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official
duties:
SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. — The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that
ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the perfonnance of duty.The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty.The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade
responsibility or liability.
This Court, through Razon v. Tagitis,[24] stated that courts must consider the “totality of the obtaining situation”[25] in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to a writ of amparo.
The totality of petitioner’s evidence convincingly shows that she
and her family became subject of unwarranted police surveillance due to
their relationship with a suspected member of the New People’s Army,
resulting in an actual threat to their life, liberty, and security due
to the government’s unparalleled zeal in eradicating communism:
The totality of obtaining circumstances likewise shows
that petitioner and her children were the subject of surveillance
because of their relationship with .a suspected member of the New
People’s Army, creating a real threat to their life, liberty, or
security.Being Labinghisa’s widow, despite being separated in fact from him
for more than a decade, puts her at a precarious position in light of
the current administration’s aggressive efforts to stamp out the
communist struggle in the country, which is seen as the “scourge of
society[.]” Her apprehension at being targeted as a suspected member of
the New People’s Army was, thus, palpable and understandable, causing
her to “act suspiciously” as claimed by respondents, who subjected her
to threats and accusations.Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca claims that petitioner was
only placed under general investigation because they wanted to know the
identity of the last unclaimed cadaver. However, the drive-bys and
tailings intensified after petitioner had identified her husband,
belying his assertions that their investigation was innocuous.[26] (Citations omitted)
III
Respondents are gravely mistaken in their assertion that “the right
to privacy, gender and power analysis, are not applicable in the present
case.”[27]
Human social interactions are never done in a vacuum and are always
marked by power dynamics. Even the most innocuous of exchanges are still
influenced by badges of power such as wealth, gender, and position.
Trial courts must thus be perceptive of and recognize the oftentimes
gross imbalance in power dynamics between private citizens and State
agents.
Here, two tiers of power were at play: (1) law enforcer-civilian;
and (2) male-female. In this case, male police officers investigated and
monitored petitioner and her children due to their relationship with an
alleged member of the New People’s Army.
Petitioner was targeted because she initially refused to divulge her
relationship with her dead husband when she went to the funeral parlor.
Respondents claim that she was only placed under general investigation
because they wanted to know the identity of the unclaimed cadaver, but
even after she had admitted to being the suspected member’s estranged
wife, police surveillance continued and even intensified, causing her
fear and anxiety for her and her children’s safety.
Respondents maintain that there was no violation of petitioner’s
right to privacy as her behavior in the funeral parlor naturally raised
the suspicion of the stationed police officers. The Regional Trial Court
then adopted respondents’ assertion that the taking of petitioner’s
photo and the threats to charge her with obstruction of justice were
just par for the course in the conduct of an investigation. It turned a
blind eye to the gross power imbalance between the parties, ruling as if
petitioner were on an equal footing with State agents, thus deeming it
but proper that her reticence and nervousness be taken against her. We
reiterate our instruction to the lower courts:
In inferring conclusions involving power deficits in relationships,
judges must be careful not to be gender-blind. In denying the Petition
for the writ of amparo, the Regional Trial Court echoed respondents’
statement that the taking of petitioner’s photo and the threats of
obstruction of justice thrown at her were part of “the conduct of a
logical investigation.” It could not see, or it refused to see that
these actions, together with the surveillance done, were actual or
imminent threats against petitioner and her children.In rendering judgment, judges must not impose a standpoint viewed
from their implicit status in society. They must look beyond their
status as well-cmmected people who can assert themselves against men in
uniform and who have no filial relation to one tagged as a communist.By advertently or inadvertently ignoring petitioner’s not so unique
predicament as the spouse of a labeled communist, the Regional Trial
Court created standards that would deny protection to those who need it
most.[28] (Citation omitted)
Thus, in determining the existence of substantial evidence to support
a petition for a writ of amparo, judges should also be cognizant of the
different power dynamics at play when assessing if there is an actual
or future threat to a petitioner’s life, security, or liberty. Refusing
to acknowledge this might lead to an outright denial of protection to
those who need it the most.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The issued PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER
prohibiting members of the Philippine National Police from monitoring
or surveilling petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez and her children, Scarlet
Sanchez Labinghisa and Star Sanchez Labinghisa, over their suspected
association with the New People’s Army is REITERATED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J. I join the dissent of Justice Hernando.
Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario and Lopez, JJ., concur.
Hernando, J., I maintain my dissent.
Carandang, J., I join the dissen of J. Hernando
[1] Sanchez v. Darroca,
G.R. No. 242257, October 15, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65970 >
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Rollo, pp. 300-315.
[8] Id. at 301.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 302-304.
[11] Id. at 305.
[12] Id. at 306-308.
[13] Id. at 311.
[14] Id. at 309.
[15] CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
[16] CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or wanant of anest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
[17] CONST., art. III, sec. 3(1) provides:
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[18] Gabriel Pabico Lalu, Terrorism is top PH threat, NPA is worse than Abu Sayyaf-Duterte.
INQUIRER.NET, June 23, 2020, <
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1295870/terrorism-is-number-oneproblem-npa-worse-than-abu-sayyaf
> (last accessed on June 23, 2020).
[19] Rollo, p. 309.
[20] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 23 provides:
SECTION 23. Disqualification by reason of marriage.- During
their marriage, the husband or the wife cannot testify against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 25 provides:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person shall be
compelled to testify against his or her parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants, except when such
testimony is indispensable in a crime against that person or by one
parent againstte other.
[21] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 24(a) provides:
SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication[s]. -The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the maniage, cannot be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except
in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants[.]
[22] Sanchez v. Darroca,
G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/65970 >
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[23] J. Hernando, Dissenting Opinion, pp. 2-3.
[24] 626 Phil. 581 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[25] Id. at 592.
[26] Sanchez v. Darroca,
G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65970 >
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[27] Rollo, p. 301.
[28] Sanchez v. Darroca,
G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019, <
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65970 >
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
DISSENTING OPINION
HERNANDO, J.:
I maintain my objections to the writ of amparo given to petitioner and vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents.
Section 1 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo states the purpose and coverage of such a writ:
Sec. 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Ladaga v. Mapagu[1] further expounds:
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to
its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of
cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays
the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well
as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the
perpetrators. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo
is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or
threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a
remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous
or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.
For the court to render judgment granting the privilege of the writ,
the petitioner must be able to discharge the burden of proving the
allegations in the petition by the standard of proof required, that is,
substantial evidence[2] Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[3]
In a petition for writ of amparo, the court is allowed a
certain degree of leniency or flexibility in the application of the
evidentiary rules by adopting the totality of evidence standard. The
Court explained in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[4]
that evidentiary difficulties had compelled it to adopt standards
appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing
the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.[5]
It determined that the fair and proper rule was to consider all the
pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under usual rules to be admissible if it
is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.[6] In other words, the rules are reduced to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.[7]
Thus, even hearsay testimony or circumstantial evidence can be admitted
and appreciated if it satisfies this basic minimum test.[8] Yet the Court also issued a caveat in Bautista v. Dannug-Salucon[9]
that such use of the standard does not unquestioningly authorize the
automatic admissibility of hearsay or circumstantial evidence in all amparo
proceedings. The matter of the admissibility of evidence should still
depend on the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Judging by the foregoing quantum of proof applicable particularly to a petition for a writ of amparo,
Sanchez was utterly remiss in presenting substantial evidence to prove
her entitlement to such a writ I find no established violation or threat
to the life, liberty, or security of Sanchez or her children by any of
the respondents. Neither did Sanchez show proof that the respondents
committed any unlawful act or omission as to justify her plea for a writ of amparo.
To reiterate, the writ of amparo specifically covers cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Extralegal killings are described as killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.[10]
At the outset, Sanchez filed the Petition for Writ of Amparo
before the RTC with herself as the aggrieved party and not her deceased
husband, Labinghisa. Hence, it is not for the Court herein to look into
the circumstances of Labinghisa’s death during the alleged PNP-NPA
encounter. There is also, notably, no allegation here at all that
Labinghisa’s death was an extralegal killing.
As for Sanchez herself, I fail to perceive any actual, imminent, or
continuing threat on her life and/or that of her children. By her own
narrative, the only express threat made against her was that she would
be prosecuted for obstruction of justice if she would refuse to answer
the questions of the police officers at St. Peter’s during her second
visit on August 17, 2018. This hardly puts her in danger of
extrajudicial killing.
Even assuming that the alleged surveillance and monitoring conducted
on Sanchez and her children were true, the same is too thin an
allegation for the Court to deduce therefrom that they are under threat
of extralegal killing. Moreover, Sanchez clearly failed to establish
that the surveillance and monitoring allegedly conducted on her and her
children amounted to unlawful acts as to fall under the protective
mantle of the writ of amparo.
Neither was Sanchez able to satisfactorily prove that she had been
the victim of enforced disappearance or is under threat thereof, as it
is defined under Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851[11]:
“Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons” means
the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
In Navia v. Pardico,[12] the Court identified the elements constituting enforced disappearance, to wit:
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:
it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of
amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof
are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by
substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with
the authorization; support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.[13]
Pursuant to the first element of enforced disappearance, Sanchez did
not allege, much less prove, that she had been arrested, detained, or
abducted by any of the respondents or people acting under their
authority. There is likewise absolute lack of allegations and proof of
government participation in such arrest, detention, or abduction. While
Sanchez might have been interrogated by police officers during her
second visit to St. Peter’s on August 17, 2018, she was still able to
eventually leave and go home that same day. There appears to be no other
instance when Sanchez or her daughters had been actually deprived of
their liberty. Even until the hearing of her Petition, Sanchez
apparently could still freely travel from one place to another.
Sanchez’s basic allegation was only that she and her daughters were
afraid to leave their house and engage in their daily activities because
of the purported surveillance and monitoring. Their mere apprehensions,
without any other substantiating evidence, do not quality as a threat
that will justifY issuance of the writ.
Sanchez mainly inferred the existence of a threat against her life,
liberty, and security from information allegedly relayed to her by two
persons, namely, (a) PO2 DelaCruz, her contact in the police who
disclosed to her that her photos were being circulated in the PNP and
being posted at police stations;[14]
and (b) her brother, who told her that the Mayor ofHamtic wanted her to
go to the police station to clarity her name and involvement.[15]
However, Sanchez’s brother neither executed any affidavit nor
testified in court. Consequently, there was no way for the courts to
verity whether he had in fact relayed such information to Sanchez and
whether such information was reliable and true. More significantly, PO2
Dela Cruz expressly denied telling Sanchez that her picture was being
circulated within the PNP and posted at police stations.
PO2 Dela Cruz, whom Sanchez introduced in her pleadings to be not
merely her contact and informant in the local police but also her close
personal friend and godmother to her daughter Star, described the
context and details of her exchange of text messages with Sanchez from
August 15 to August 22, 2018:
witness, there was an exchange of text messages from August 15, 2018
until August 22, 2018 between you and the petitioner?
picture of Vivian was taken when she went to the funeral parlor of St.
Peter but her picture was not posted at the Municipal police station,
sir.
do not have any idea because based on her she was being monitored but I
was not sure if that was the members of the Philippine National Police.
in your text messages, it appears that you are the one x x x informing
her that she [was] being monitored, in your text message?
there is a possibility that the police force of Antique would monitor
her because she would not reveal the name of her husband, correct?
That PO2 Dela Cruz testified in respondents’ favor weighs heavily and
adversely against Sanchez. While PO2 Dela Cruz affirmed in open court
that she had informed Sanchez that the latter’s picture was taken at St.
Peter’s and that the latter might be monitored, she likewise clarified
that it was done in connection with the investigation of the police as
regards the remaining unidentified body among the seven fatalities from
the PNP-NPA encounter on August 15, 2018.
In contrast, Sanchez’s actuations raised the police’s suspicions.
Despite being able to confirm as early as the evening of August 15, 2018
that the unidentified body was Labinghisa’s, Sanchez still went to St.
Peter’s presumably to be able to personally identify Labinghisa’s
remains. She went to St. Peter’s on two consecutive days, on August 16
and 17, 2018, on the pretext of identifying whether one of the remains
was that of her husband, but she refused to disclose to the police
officers then present her deceased husband’s name. She offered no
evident reason for her evasiveness, more so that she and Labinghisa, as
she had asserted, were already separated-in-fact for more than 13 years.
Such circumstances would reasonably make her the subject of a lawful
legitimate police investigation. Per PSupt. Darroca’s testimony, Sanchez
and other persons claiming any of the bodies at St. Peter’s were all
placed under general investigation[17] and interviewed to obtain information that might be vital in the ongoing anti-insurgency operations.
As for respondent police officers, I find for the sufficiency of
their conduct, defenses, and compliance with Section 17 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, which states:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.
The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that
ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the performance of duty.The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove
that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty.The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade
responsibility or liability.(Emphasis supplied.)
Extraordinary diligence as required and contemplated in this
provision is more than the diligence expected of a good father of a
family. Section 9 (d) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is thus relevant:
SEC. 9. Return; Contents. Within seventy-two (72)
hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified
written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among
other things, contain the following:(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate
or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat, act or omission;(c) All relevant information in the possession . of the respondent
pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party;
and(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return
shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken:i. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in
the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
iv. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought
about the death or disappearance;v. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents exercised this extraordinary diligence in the perfonnance
of their duty and proved the same. The averments in their Verified
Return and attached Affidavits,[18]
bolstered by PSupt. Darroca’s testimony in open court, that they had
expended and would continue to expend extraordinary diligence in acting
on Sanchez’s allegations, are adequate defenses. They had respectively
issued the orders to their subordinates to validate if there was any
threat against Sanchez and not to deliberately and intentionally come
within one kilometer radius of Sanchez and her children pursuant to the
TPO issued by the RTC. PSSupt. Agpangan further ordered the Police Chief
of the Hamtic MPS to validate the alleged visit of its police
intelligence personnel and the passing-by of its police patrol car at
Sanchez’s house, as well as the Officer-in-Charge of the San Jose MPS to
verify with the Land Transportation Office the ownership of the tinted
car with plate number ALL 5385 which purportedly followed Sanchez and
her children around. To this effect, a Vehicle Verification Request to
the Land Transportation Office was likewise submitted by the defense
before the RTC to prove that respondents attempted to trace the said
tinted vehicle alleged to have tailed Sanchez and her children outside
their home.[19] It bears
repeating that PO2 DelaCruz’s corroborative statements in open court
confirmed that Sanchez was in fact not under any surveillance and that
there was no clear evidence that the police was plotting against her
life, liberty, or security.
Even if she was indeed being monitored, the only reason apparent from
the records was that Sanchez or any other concerned persons claiming
the bodies at St. Peter’s were all under general investigation[20] and may possess information vital to the ongoing anti-insurgency operations.[21]
To gain such information is within police duty, and to withhold the
same may constitute probable cause for obstruction of justice.
In fine, to sanction this case with a grant of a writ of amparo
may set a dangerous precedent and will have a crippling effect upon
legitimate police operations such as monitoring, surveillance, and
interviewing. Again, Section 1 of the Rule of the Writ of Amparo states that the writ of amparo is a remedy against an unlawful act or omission of a public official, or of a private individual or employee. To grant the petition for writ of amparo to petitioner is to declare that the police operations such as monitoring, surveillance, and interviewing are unlawful acts.
We step into the shoes of the investigating police officers. What
would be their natural course of action upon sighting Sanchez in the
funeral parlor, asking to look at the bodies of the slain suspected NPA
members and declining to explain her purpose when asked?
Besides, it is settled that mere threat of legal action against
Sanchez, i.e., charging her with the offense of obstruction of justice,
was proper under the circumstances and is not an actionable wrong. It
was not a threat to unjustly deprive her of her liberty.
Also note that Presidential Decree No. 1829 (PD 1829)[22]
penalizes any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates, or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation
and prosecution of criminal cases. Stubborn and unjustified refusal (as
against initial hesitation) to reveal identities of suspected NPA
members may give rise to a punishable act under PD 1829.
Withal, respondents’ defenses were not a mere blanket denial. All
these enabled the RTC to judiciously determine that respondents’ efforts
to verify the existence of the alleged threat were sincere and
sufficient.[23]
It is also necessary to state that the evidentiary rules on
privileged communication will not insulate Sanchez or her children from
any inquiries regarding Labinghisa’s purported membership in the NPA.
The pertinent provisions under Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court state:
Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.
– During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants.Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. – The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the
marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants;x x x x
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. -No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
However, there was no indication in the records that Sanchez or any
of her children were being made to testify against Labinghisa. It is a
long stretch to claim that respondents’ alleged surveillance of Sanchez
and her children is tantamount to making them act as witnesses against
Labinghisa, which is a State incursion into their privileged
wife-husband and children father relationships and thus correctible by a
writ of amparo.
Also, the marital privilege rule is inapplicable in the case at
hand. As already mentioned, there was never an instance that Sanchez or
any of her children were being forced to testify against Labinghisa or
against each other. In any case, and in view of Labinghisa’s demise, the
preservation or disturbance of domestic tranquility or marital peace is
no longer feasible.
At any rate, mere personal identification as one’s spouse cannot be
considered as equivalent to adverse testimony. There is also nothing
inimical under the law if Sanchez admits before the investigating police
officers her relationship with a suspected NPA member. There is simply
an unjust inconsistency between alleging fear of being tagged as a
spouse of a communist and, at the same time, banking upon the same legal
status to support her petition for a writ of amparo.
It also bears emphasizing that all these rules on evidence enjoy
relevance only in matters covered by judicial proceedings. Section 1,
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Evidence defined. – Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these ru1es, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (Emphasis supplied.)
Plainly, the alleged acts committed by public respondents against
Sanchez and her children transgressing upon their purported privileges
were committed out of court. Hence, the rules on evidence should not
apply here.
The RTC had meticulously considered and carefully weighed all the
evidence presented by the parties. There is, in my mind, no reason for
this Court, even after its own review of the evidence on record, to
disturb the findings of fact of the court a quo, especially considering
that the latter had an opportunity to observe the behavior of the
witnesses in the course of their testimony and was in a better position
to gauge their veracity.
Even applying the minimum of the totality of evidence standard, which
would have allowed the admission and appreciation of hearsay and
circumstantial evidence, Sanchez still failed to discharge the burden of
proof necessary for the grant of a writ of amparo in her favor.
There is just a dearth of evidence adduced by Sanchez, hence, falling
short of substantial evidence necessary to establish any actual
violation or threat to her right to life, liberty, or security. Her
apprehensions did not rise to the level that must be necessarily
protected by a writ of amparo. Otherwise stated, mere acts of
surveillance or monitoring, as part of legitimate police operations,
could not and should not be characterized as acts indicative of or
preparatory to extrajudicial killings or enforced disappearances falling
under the protective mantle of a writ of amparo. At most, these
are indications of instinctive fear, trauma even, naturally brought out
by her connections with a person slain by the police authorities. On its
lonesome, this fear does not impel the issuance of the writ of amparo. The writ cannot be issued on mere inferences or deductions.
This Court on several occasions granted the writ on the basis of
indirect and circumstantial proof, but only after a painstaking probe
into the totality, strength, and credibility of the entire evidence on
record:
In Bautista v. Dannug-Salucon,[24] the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals granting Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon’s petition for a writ of amparo
that had been backed up by circumstantial evidence and uncorroborated
testimonies. Dannug-Salucon, a founding member of the National Union of
People’s Lawyers in Isabela and a human rights lawyer representing
political prisoners and suspected members of the NPA, alleged that, per
information of her clients and employees, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had tagged her as a
Red Lawyer and were conducting surveillance on her activities and
routine. Numerous incidents transpired leading to the filing of the amparo
case: her paralegal, also an activist and human rights defender, was
fatally gunned down; one of her clients who was a civilian asset for the
PNP Intelligence Section told her that the AFP was tracking her and had
included her name on the military’s Watch List of so-called terrorist
supporters; her confidential informant was cornered by three military
operatives who interrogated him regarding the purpose of his visit to
Dannug-Salucon’s office; different individualappearing to be soldiers
had even approached and questioned the vendors in front of her office as
to their observations on Dannug-Salucon’s schedule; members of the
Criminal Investigation Detection Group and soldiers visited her office
with no clearly declared purpose; her driver had been tailed by an
unidentified motorcycle rider; and a known civilian asset of the
Military Intelligence Group (MIG) in Isabela informed her that she was
being watched by the MIG. She also tried reporting the incidents to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Isabela but received no
positive report identifying the individuals behind the alleged
surveillance. In granting the writ, the Court held that the combination
of all the foregoing incidents had adequately established that “the
threats to her right to life, liberty and security were neither
imaginary nor contrived, but real and probable.
“Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[25] a case cited and heavily relied upon by Sanchez, involved a petition for a writ of amparo
by Mary Jean Tagitis, thewife of a consultant for the Islamic
Development Bank who suddenly disappeared and reportedly fell under
custody of police intelligence operatives and was being held against his
will in an attempt of the police to implicate him with the terrorist
group Jemaah Islamiyah. Colleagues of her husband reported his
disappearance to the local police authorities but to no avail. Tagitis
thereafter filed complaints with the PNP in Cotabato and Jolo seeking
help to find her husband. Her efforts, however, yielded no positive
results and she was even chided by the police that her husband was not
missing but was on a rendezvous with another woman. It was ruled
therein that cases of enforced disappearances pose “evidentiary
difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and
responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process
requirements that underlie every proceeding,”[26]
and that even hearsay testimony may be considered by the amparo court
provided such testimony can lead to conclusions consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced.[27]
Finding that Tagitis properly pleaded the ultimate facts of her
husband’s enforced disappearance and the totality of the circumstances
met the requirements of substantial evidence, the Court deemed
sufficient the hearsay evidence presented by Tagitis.
No factual circumstances run in common between the present case and
the aforecited ones, and all these jurisprudential precepts granting
exception to indirect proof do not apply here.
There is no automatic admissibility of hearsay evidence in all amparo proceedings.[28]
In this case, there is no reason to deviate from this rule, as
Sanchez’s proof consisted only of hearsay that are all too frail,
inadequate, and unfounded to stand on its own.
It must be kept in mind that the extraordinary remedy of writ of
amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal
sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.[29]
I therefore vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents.
[1] 698 Phil 525, 540 (2012).
[2] Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Sec. 18. Judgment.The
court shall render within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ
and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied.
[3] Republic v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 183.
[4] 621 Phil. 536 (2009).
[5] Id. at 613.
[6] Id. at 616.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] G.R. No. 221862, January 2018.
[10] Mamba v. Bueno, 805 Phil 359, 377 (2017).
[11] Philippine Act on Crimes Against international Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against humanity.
[12] 688 Phil. 266 (2012).
[13] Id. at 279-280.
[14] Rollo, p. 125.
[15] Id.. at 127.
[16] Id. at 150-156.
[17] TSN, September 4, 2018, pp. 33-35, id at 144-146.
[18] Their statements in their Verified Return (rollo, pp. 63-73) and correlative Affidavits, all averred in compliance with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and affirmed in open court, should suffice:
PSCUPT JOHN C BULALACAO
Attached to this Return as ANNEX “2” is the Affidavit of PSCUPT BULALACAO, attesting that:
x x x x
6. In compliance with Section 9 of the Rule and Order of the Court, the following are my actions to be undertaken, to wit:
As regards the alleged threat and acts committed by PNP members to
the person of the petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children,
Scarlet S. Labinghisa and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the
Writ of Amparo issued by Hon. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive
Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, I have to undertake the following:
- To direct PSSUPT LEO ERWIN D AGPANGAN,
Provincial Director of Antique Police Provincial Office to validate if
there is any record with any office of any alleged threat against the
petitioner; - To direct all personnel of Police Regional Office 6 not
to deliberately and intentionally come within one kilometer radius from
the petitioner xxx and to her children xxx until further advise [sic]
pursuant to the order of the court issuing the Temporary Protection
Order; but such order must not be understood to mean that the police
personnel are prevented from performing their regular functions and
duties maintaining peace and order in their respective areas of
responsibilities and such order must not be prejudicial to the safety
and wellbeing of the rest of the citizens in the community;
xxxx
PSSUPT LEO IRWIN D. AGPANGAN
Attached to this Return as ANNEX “3” is the Affidavit of PSSUPT AGPANGAN, attesting that:
x x x x
5. In compliance with Section 9 of the Rule, as regards the alleged
threat and acts committed by PNP members to the person of the
petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children, Scarlet S. Labinghisa
and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the Writ of Amparo issued
by Hon. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, l
have undertaken and will undertake the following:
- Directed PSUPT MARK ANTHONY D DARROCA,
Officer-in Charge of the San Jose MPS to validate the alleged threat if
there is any against the petitioner. - To direct the Chief of Police of the Hamtic MPS to
validate the alleged: 1) meeting between Vivian A Sanchez and an alleged
intel personnel in the house of the former; 2) the alleged passing-by
house of the petitioner of the patrol car of the Hamtic MPS; - To direct the OIC San Jose Municipal Police Station to
verify with the Land Transportation Office (LTO) the alleged tinted car
with plate number ALL 5385.
6. To direct all personnel of the Antique PPO not to deliberately and
intentionally come within one kilometer radius from the petitioner xxx
and to her children xxx until further advise [sic] pursuant to the order
of the cowi issuing the Temporary Protection Order; but such order must
not be understood to mean that the police personnel are prevented from
perfonning their regular functions and duties maintaining peace and
order in their respective areas of responsibilities and such order must
not be prejudicial to the safety and well-being of the rest of the
citizens in the community;”
PSUPT.MARK ANTHONY D. DARROCA
Attached to this Return as ANNEX “3” is the Affidavit of PSSUPT AGPANGAN, attesting that:
xxxx
13. As regards the alleged threat and acts committed by PNP members
to the person of the petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children,
Scarlet S. Labinghisa and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the
Writ of Amparo issued by Hon. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive
Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, I have ordered my men not to not to [sic] come within one kilometer radius from the petitioner xxx and to her children xxx until further advise [sic]
pursuant to the order of the court issuing the Temporary Protection
Order; but such order must not be understood to mean that the police
personnel are prevented from performing their regular functions and
duties maintaining peace and order in their respective areas of
responsibilities and such order must not be prejudicial to the safety
and well-being of the rest of the citizens in the community.”
[19] Per testimony of PSupt. Darroca, id at 149.
[20] Id at 144-146.
[21] Sanchez made the following allegations per her Petition for Writ of Amparo, par. 8, p. 2 thereof, id. at 36, as reiterated in her present Petition for Review on Certiorari, par. 8, p. 4 thereof, id. at 13:
“The next day, Petitioner went back to St. Peter’s
Funeral Home to confirm again her husband’s body, however three (3)
police officers began interrogating her and even threatened to arrest
and charge her with obstruction of justice when she refused to answer. x
x x”
[22] Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders (1981 ).
[23] Per Republic v. Cayanan, supra note 3.
[24] G.R. No. 221862, January 23, 2018.
[25] Supra note 4.
[26] Id. at 613.
[27] Id. at 616.
[28] Supra note 4.
[29] Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 627 Phil. 37, 73-74 (2010).