G.R. No. 24224. November 03, 1925
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. RAMON MAZA AND FRANCISCO MECENAS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
MALCOLM, J.:
Philippine National Bank is suing Ramon Maza and Francisco Mecenas on
five promissory notes of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) each.
Maza and Mecenas executed two of the promissory notes on January 20,
1921, due three months after date. The three other notes due four
months after date were executed by the same parties on January 21,
1921. One of the above-mentioned notes, typical of the rest, reads as
follows:
“P10,000.00 “A los tres meses de la fecha, pagaremos mancomunada y solidariamente a la orden del Philippine National Bank, Iloilo, Iloilo, I. F., la cantidad de diez mil (P10,000) pesos en el Philippine National Bank.
“Iloilo, I. F.
“Valor Recibido.
“No. 340 Pagadero el 4/20/21
“RAMON MAZA “FRANCISCO MECENAS”
The
notes were not taken up by Maza and Mecenas at maturity. The
obligations with accumulated interest totaled P65,207.73 on September
22, 1924.
To recover the amounts stated on the face of the
notes with back interest, action was begun by the Philippine National
Bank in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Ramon Maza and
Francisco Mecenas. The special defense interposed by the defendants was
that the promissory notes were sent in blank to them toy Enrique Echaus
with the request that they sign them so that he, Echaus, might
negotiate them with the Philippine National Bank in case of need; that
the defendants have not negotiated the promissory notes with the bank,
nor have they received the value thereof, or delivered them to the bank
in payment of any preexisting debt; and that it was Enrique Echaus who
negotiated the notes with the bank and who is accordingly the real
party in interest and the party liable for the payment of the notes.
Defendants also moved that Echaus be ordered included as one of the
defendants. The trial judge denied the motion. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants jointly and severally
for a total of P65,207.73, with interest at 9 per cent on twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000) from September 23, 1924, or at the rate of
five pesos (P5) a day, and with interest at 9 per cent on thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000) from September 23, 1924, or at the rate of
P7.50 a day, and with costs.
Four errors are assigned by the
defendants on appeal. The first error relates to the order of the trial
judge refusing to require Enrique Echaus to become a party to the
action. As the defendants failed to duly except to the order, they are
not now entitled to ask this court to review the ruling. Moreover, it
is not evident that Echaus was an indispensable party. The other three
errors go to the merits and rest on the same foundation as the special
defense.
From the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, it
is deduced that the defendants admit the genuineness and due execution
of the instruments sued on (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 103, 285;
Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co. and Fernandez [1918], 38 Phil.,
634). Neither do the appellants point out any mistake in regard to the
amount and interest that the lower court sentenced them to pay to the
plaintiff bank. Predicated on these premises, from whatever point of
view we look at the case, we arrive at the same conclusion—that the
defendants are liable.
On the first assumption that Maza and
Mecenas were the principals and Echaus the agent, as argued by counsel
for the appellee, the principals must fulfill their obligations (Civil
Code, art. 1727). On another assumption, which is a fact, that the
defendants are exactly what they appear to be, the makers of the
negotiable instruments, then they must keep their engagement and must
pay as promised. Their liability on the instruments is primary and
unconditional. (Negotiable Instruments Law, Act No. 2031, sec. 60.)
The most plausible and reasonable stand for the defendants is that they
are accommodation parties. But as accommodation parties, the defendants
having signed the instruments without receiving value therefor and for
the purpose of lending their names to some other person, are still
liable on the instruments. The law now is that the accommodation party
can claim no benefit as such, but he is liable according to the face of
his undertaking, the same as if he were himself financially interested
in the transaction. (Negotiable Instruments Law, Act No. 2031, sec. 29;
First Nat. Bank of Elgin vs. Bach [1920], 98 Ore., 332.)
The defense is made to the action that the defendants never received
the value of the promissory notes. It is, of course, fundamental that
an instrument given without consideration does not create any
obligation at law or in equity in favor of the payee. However, to
fasten liability upon an accommodation maker, it is not necessary that
any consideration should move to him. The consideration which supports
the promise of the accommodation maker is that parted with by the
person taking the note and received by the person accommodated. (5
Uniform Laws, Annotated, pp. 140 et seq.; Clark vs. Sellner [1921], 42 Phil., 384; First National Bank of Hancock vs. Johnson [1903], 133 Mich., 700; 103 Am. St. Rep., 468; Marling vs. Jones [1909], 138 Wis., 82; 131 Am. St. Rep., 996; Schoenwetter vs. Schoenwetter [1916], 164 Wis., 131.)
While perhaps unnecessary to this decision, it may properly be remarked
that when the accommodation parties make payment to the holder of the
notes, they have the right to sue the accommodated party for
reimbursement, since the relation between them is in effect that of
principal and sureties, the accommodation parties being the sureties.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.