G.R. No. 241144. June 26, 2019
JUANITA E. CAHAPISAN-SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, V. JAMES PAUL A. SANTIAGO, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
dated January 11, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 12-9628, which declared the marriage
of petitioner Juanita E. Cahapisan-Santiago (petitioner) and respondent
James Paul A. Santiago (respondent) null and void on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity.
The Facts
Sometime in 1999, respondent met petitioner at a car service
center along Marcos Highway, Antipolo City. At that time, petitioner was
forty (40) years old and respondent was twenty-two (22) years old.[5]
Petitioner became respondent’s girlfriend, and three (3) months into
the relationship, she became pregnant. Eventually, or on March 31, 2000,
petitioner and respondent got married before the Mayor of Pangil,
Laguna. During their marriage, however, instead of experiencing marital
bliss, their relationship was fraught with quarrels.[6]
Respondent averred that petitioner was domineering,
considering that she was the one earning and he was a high school
drop-out. Sometime in 2005, petitioner and respondent separated because
they could no longer stand each other. After eleven (11) years of living
apart, respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage[7] before the RTC.[8] In support of his petition, respondent presented the report[9]
of an expert clinical psychologist, Ms. Shiela Marie O. Montefalcon
(Ms. Montefalcon), who assessed him to be suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder (DPD),[10] and petitioner from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD).[11]
According to the report, respondent’s DPD is a long term chronic
condition that manifested itself through his overdependence on
petitioner and his own mother to meet his emotional and physical needs.
The clinical features of respondent’s DPD were likewise exhibited
through his: (a) difficulty in making everyday decisions
without an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from petitioner
and his own mother; (b) problem in expressing disagreement with others because of fear or loss of support or approval; (c) struggle in initiating projects on his own because of lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive dependence on petitioner and his own mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e) inclination to substance use and abuse.[12]
On the other hand, petitioner’s NPD was found to be grave, severe, and
already ingrained deeply within her adaptive system, as evidenced by her
pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of
empathy.[13] As both parties
were found to be psychologically incapacitated to perform their
essential marital obligations, Ms. Montefalcon, therefore, recommended
that their marriage be declared null and void.[14]
For her part, petitioner contended that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated, but was merely immature and lacked a
sense of responsibility.[15]
She also pointed out that respondent’s past addictive behavior is not
permanent, considering that the latter was able to cope with his drug
dependency and was able to change for the better.[16]
She added that respondent’s alleged DPD is even contrary to his
personality, since the report stated that respondent “can present a
proposal or lead a group discussion with ease and tact. He is assertive
but sometimes impatient. He is best in situations that need sound common
sense and practical ability with things. He relies on his ability to
improvise instead of preparing in advance.”[17]
Furthermore, respondent’s “common capacities and strengths” are “being
friendly, energetic, resourceful, and having negotiating skills.”[18] Finally, she claimed that it was respondent’s womanizing, and not his purported dependency, that caused their frequent fights.[19]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[20]
dated January 11, 2017, the RTC granted the petition and declared the
marriage of the parties null and void on the ground of respondent’s
psychological incapacity.[21]
The RTC ruled that the totality of evidence sufficiently established
respondent’s incapacity to fulfill his marital obligations, as he was
shown to have disregarded and abandoned his family after repeated
quarrels with petitioner.[22] Moreover, having been diagnosed with DPD, respondent manifested his inability to be cognizant of his familial obligations.[23] However,
as to petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity, the RTC held that
there was insufficient evidence to prove its root cause or juridical
antecedence.[24]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal[25] before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated June 6, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.[27]
The CA ruled that respondent was able to discharge his burden of
proving that his marriage with petitioner was void due to his
psychological incapacity.[28] In this regard, it found that the root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity, i.e.,
DPD, was medically identified, and that the same was present at the
inception of his marriage with petitioner, considering that prior to the
marriage, he was already irresponsible, drug dependent, and
overdependent on his mother.[29] It also found that respondent’s DPD was permanent, incurable, and grave, as a result of his upbringing and family background.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[30] which was denied in a Resolution[31] dated August 1, 2018; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the
parties’ marriage should be nullified on the ground of respondent’s
psychological incapacity, i.e., DPD.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious. At the outset, it bears stressing
that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, already ruled that there was
insufficient evidence to prove the root cause or juridical antecedence
of petitioner’s alleged NPD. Finding no cogent reason to disturb the
same, the resolution of this case shall, thus, revolve on whether or
not, on the other hand, respondent’s psychological incapacity, i.e., DPD, was proven.
Jurisprudence states that the validity of marriage and the
unity of the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory
laws; hence, any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor
of the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of
proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable
and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.[32]
Under Article 36[33] of the Family Code, as amended,[34]
psychological incapacity is a valid ground to nullify a marriage.
However, in deference to the State’s policy on marriage, psychological
incapacity does not merely pertain to any psychological condition;
otherwise, it would be fairly easy to circumvent our laws on marriage so
much so that we would be practically condoning a legal subterfuge for
divorce.[35]
According to case law, psychological incapacity should be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders that clearly manifest utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[36] It should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 68[37] of the Family Code, among others,[38] include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support.[39]
In this accord, psychological incapacity must therefore be characterized by three (3) traits: (a) gravity, i.e.,
it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e.,
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[40]
Applying the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that – contrary to the rulings of the courts a quo – the totality of evidence presented failed to sufficiently establish respondent’s psychological incapacity based on his DPD.
In this case, respondent relied heavily on the testimony of and
psychological examination by the clinical psychologist, Ms. Montefalcon,
to establish his psychological incapacity. In her report, she
enumerated several clinical features indicative of respondent’s DPD, to
wit: (a) difficulty in making everyday decisions without an
excessive amount of advice and reassurance from petitioner and his own
mother; (b) problem in expressing disagreement with others because of fear or loss of support or approval; (c) struggle in initiating projects on his own because of lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive dependence on petitioner and his own mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e) inclination to substance use and abuse.[41]
However, the report leaves much to be desired as it did not even
identify specific actions or incidents that could amply demonstrate his
alleged psychological incapacity. As the petitioner aptly points out,
“[i]n the [p]sychological [r]eport, there is nothing in [respondent’s]
acts that is indicative of his ‘chronic condition in which he depends
too much on others to meet his emotional and physical needs.’ In fact,
the report failed to show ‘who’ are those other that [respondent]
depended [on] too much x x x.”[42]
Also, as petitioner emphasizes, respondent’s alleged DPD appears to be
even contrary to his personality since the report actually states, among
others, that respondent’s “common capacities and strengths” are “being
friendly, energetic, resourceful, and having negotiating skills.”[43]
Moreover, the report states that respondent “is best in situations that
need sound common sense and practical ability with things [as] he
relies on his ability to improvise instead of preparing in advance.”[44]
More importantly, the link between respondent’s acts to his
alleged psychological incapacity was not established. Even if it is
assumed that respondent truly had difficulties in making everyday
decisions without excessive advice or reassurance coming from other
people, such as petitioner and his own mother, the report fails to prove
that the said difficulties were tantamount to serious psychological
disorder that would render him incapable of performing the essential
marital obligations. As case law holds, “[i]n determining the existence of psychological incapacity, a
clear and understandable causation between the party’s condition and
the party’s inability to perform the essential marital covenants must be
shown. A psychological report that is essentially comprised of mere
platitudes, however speckled with technical jargon, would not cut the
marriage tie.”[45]
Similarly, Ms. Montefalcon’s report merely provided general
characterizations of the parties’ illnesses as deeply-rooted, grave, and
incurable. In her report, she stated that the root cause of the
parties’ flawed personality patterns was attributable to genetic factors
and/or dysfunctional factors involved in their childhood milieu. She
also declared that their illnesses were grave, since the parties were
not able to carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and
family, and incurable, as they have no psychological insight that they
have character problems.[46]
However, no evidence was presented to substantiate these conclusions. In
fact, as petitioner demonstrates, the report seems to contradict the
foregoing characterizations since it was observed that respondent “was
awaken and decided x x x to fix his life” and that “[h]e admitted that
he is weak but he was able to resist drugs and [is now] helping his
mother run their business.”[47] As such, it cannot be concluded that respondent’s DPD is imbued with the required quality of permanence or incurability.
If anything, Ms. Montefalcon’s evaluation only supports the allegations
regarding respondent’s infidelity, immaturity, and dependence on his
mother and wife, which traits do not, however, rise to the level of the
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the
parties’ marriage. Indeed, while respondent’s purported womanizing
caused the couple’s frequent fights, such was not established to be
caused by a psychological illness. In fact, records reveal that when
petitioner discovered respondent’s affair for the first time, the latter
immediately severed it. They would also eventually reconcile and live
together after their fights. Thus, respondent’s infidelity does not
appear to be a symptom of a grave and permanent psychological disorder
that renders him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. In a
long line of cases, the Court has held that sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.[48]
In fine,
for failing to sufficiently prove the existence of respondent’s
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code, the petition is granted. The contrary rulings of the courts
a quo are hence, reversed and set aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated June 6, 2018 and the Resolution dated August 1, 2018 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 109683 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-28.
[2] Id. at 30-45. Penned
by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justices
Rodil V. Zalameda and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring.
[3] Id. at 46-47.
[4] Id. at 48-59. Penned by Judge Ruth C. Santos
[5] See id. at 31 , 49, and 84.
[6] Id. at 31 and 84-85.
[7] Dated March 27, 2012. Records, pp. 1-6.
[8] See rollo, p. 32.
[9] See Psychological Evaluation Report dated February 15, 2012; id. at 99-110.
[10] See id. at 106-107.
[11] See id. at 107-108.
[12] See id. at 106-107. See also id. at 50-51.
[13] See id. at 107. See also id. at 51.
[14] See id. at 109.
[15] See id. at 16 and 23.
[16] See id. at 15-16.
[17] See id. at 18 and 106.
[18] See id.
[19] See id. at 14 and 25. See also id. at 31.
[20] Id. at 48-59.
[21] Id. at 55 and 58-59.
[22] See id. at 56.
[23] See id.
[24] See id. at 57.
[25] See Brief for the Respondent-Appellant dated December 15, 2017; id. at 64-80.
[26] Id. at 30-45.
[27] Id. at 44.
[28] See id. at 38.
[29] See id. at 39-40.
[30] Not attached to the rollo.
[31] Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[32] See Republic v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018.
[33] Article 36. A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[34] Executive Order
No. 227, entitled “AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE ‘FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,”‘ approved on July 17, 1987.
[35] See Republic v. Tecag, supra note 32.
[36] See Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018.
[37] Article 68. The
husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[38] The parties’
mutual obligations include those provided under Articles 68 to 71, as
regards the husband and wife, and Articles 220, 221, and 225, with
regard to parents and their children, all of the Family Code. (See
Guideline 6 in Republic v. CA, 335 Phil. 664, 678 [1997].)
[39] See Republic v. Tecag, supra note 32.
[40] See Republic v. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014, 716 SCRA 8, 16, citing Santos v. CA, 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995).
[41] See rollo, pp. 106-107. See also id. at 50-51.
[42] Id. at 18 and 106.
[43] Id.
[44] Id.
[45] See Republic v. Tecag, supra note 32.
[46] See rollo, pp. 108-109.
[47] Id. at 19.
[48] Marable v. Marable, 654 Phil. 529, 539-540 (2011).