G. R. No. 23964. June 01, 1966
GREGORIO V. GAERLAN, JR., PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. LUIS C. CATUBIG, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.
SANCHEZ, J.:
eight-seat City Council of Dagupan City – in the 1963 elections – were
petitioner Gregorio V. Gaerlan, Jr. and respondent Luis C. Catubig.
Having obtained the third highest number of votes, the City Board of
Canvassers, on December 2, 1963, proclaimed respondent Catubig one of
the elected 8 councilors. Petitioner Gaerlan, on the other hand, lost
his bid.
Seasonably, [1] petitioner went to Court on quo warranto to challenge respondent’s eligibility [2]
for the office, on the averment of non-age. The judgment below gave the
nod to petitioner and held respondent ineligible to hold the office of
councilor of Dagupan City, excluded him therefrom, and declared vacant
the seat he occupies in the City Board. Respondent appealed.
There
is no quarrel as to the facts. Respondent Gatubig was born in Dagupan
City on May 19, 1939f At the time he presented his certificate of
candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days;
on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24
days; and at the time he took his oath of office as councilor on
January 1, 1964,[3] he was 24
years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether respondent1s age be reckoned as of
the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or the date of
election,[4] or the date set
by law for the assumption of office – the result is the same. Whichever
date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age.
With
the foregoing backdrop, respondent calls upon us to resolve two
questions; Firstt has petitioner a cause of action against respondent?
Second. in the affirmative, is respondent eligible to the office of
councilor of Dagupan City?
- The thrust of respondent’s argument is simply this: Petitioner
Gaerlan, Jr. placed 16th out of the 16 candidates. Gaerlan thus has no
right to the office, either by election or otherwise; and said
petitioner cannot validly question respondent’s right to sit.
This case calls into question the applicability of Section 173 of the Revised Election Code[5] which, in part, reads:
“Procedure against an ineligible person. – When a
person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal
office, his right to the office may be contested by any registered
candidate for the same office before the Court of First Instance of the
province, within one week after the proclamation of his election, by
filing a petition for quo warrant.***”
The language of this statute is very plain. The right of a non-eligible person elected to a municipal office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office.
Petitioner perfectly fits into this legal precept. He was a registered
candidate for the same office. It matters not that he has no claim or
right to the office of councilor in the event respondent be ousted.
Because the clear-cut language – “any registered candidate for the same
office” – does not require that said candidate could, if his quo warranto
case prospers, himself occupy that office. Right here, we find a
forbidding obstacle to any other view of the statute. To say otherwise
would empty this legal provision of its obvious contents. Sanchez vs.
del Rosario, supraf is to be read as controlling in the presents There,
as here, the office involved was that of Councilor, the statute under
consideration the same Section 173, Revised Election Code. And again,
there as here, petitioner would not sit if the action be successful.
This Court there expressly ruled:
“That petitioner would not be entitled to the elective
office even if respondent is ordered to vacate the same is likewise an
invalid objection against the institution of this suit, for otherwise,
Section 173 of the Revised Election Code would clearly be rendered
nugatory. Under said law, the contestant’s right to the office involved
is not contemplated, and thus this Court has repeatedly ruled that
respondent’s declaration of ineligibility does not entitle the
petitioner to said office (Luison vs. Garcia, G. R. No. L-10981, April
25, 1958; Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 2, 727; Calano
vs, Cruz, G. R. No. L-6404, January 12, 1954). Yet, in said rulings,
the petitioners have never been considered to be without any legal
personality to file the necessary quo warranto proceedings. We need not
conjecture into the philosophy of the law; suffice it to say that the
legislature expressed its intentions very plainly.”
But respondent would want us to apply Section 6 of Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court, as follows:
“SEC. 6. When an individual may commence such an action.
– A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action
therefor in his own name.”
Section 6 just quoted is out of focus. Petitioner here is not “claiming
to be entitled” to the office of councilor. Besides, we are unprepared
to scuttle the jurisprudence heretofore cited – which is so well
buttressed upon law and reason. Moreover, distinction should be drawn
between quo warranto referring to an office filled by election and quo warranto involving an office held by appointment, thus –
“*** In quo warranto proceedings referring to
offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility
of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to
offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of
the appointment. In the first case when the person elected is
ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate
occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible,
since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his
certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who
has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office.”[6]
The foregoing, once again, emphasizes the rule that in quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by election, the only issue is
the eligibility of the candidate elected. In such a posture, it is
beyond debate that the applicable statute here is Section 173 of the
Revised Election Code, the specific law on the subject.
And, petitioner’s standing in court is confirmed.
- Respondent presses the claim that the question of age-eligibility should be governed by the provisions of Republic Act 170[7] and not by Republic Act 2259.[8]
For ready reference, we present in parallel columns the two conflicting
legal provisions – on the left side, Section 12, Republic Act No. 170,
as amended, and on the right, Section 6, Republic Act 2259.
12. *** The elective members of the Municipal Board shall be qualified
electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and not
less than twenty-three years of age. ***”
6. No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he
is at least twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for at least
one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter.”
Pertinent here it is to state that Republic Act No, 484 amending, inter alia.
Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950;
whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 – nine years
later.
The problem, cast in legal setting, is whether or not Section 12 should
give way to Section 6, On this point ths following reproduced in haec verba from Libarnes vs. Executive Secretary, et al., L-21505, October 24, 1963, is an authoritative expositor of the law, viz:
“Again, the question whether or not a special law has been
repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws is dependent
mainly upon the intent of Congress in enacting the latter. The
discussions on the floor of Congress in enacting the that its memners
intended to amend or repeal all orovisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except
those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. In fact,
the explanatory note to Senate Bill No. 2, which, upon approval, became
Republic Act No. 2259, specifically mentions Zambcanga City, among
others that had been considered by the authors of the bill in drafting
the same. Similarly, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2259 makes reference
to ‘all chartered cities in the Philippines’, whereas Section 8
excludes from the operation of the Act fthe cities of Manila, Cavite,
Treee Martires and Tagaytay’, and Section 4 contains a proviso
exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said Act – including, therefore, the City of Zamboanga – are subject thereto.”[9]
The only reference to Dagupan City in Republic Act 2259 is found in
Section 2 thereof whereunder voters in said city, and in the City of
Iloilo, are expressly precluded to vote for provincial officials.
Therefore, by the terms of the Libarnes decision, the age-limit
provision in the last-named statute (Republic Act 2259) is controlling.
Indeed, we find no warrant in logic to go along with respondent. Adverting to Libarnea, supra,
Act 2259 (Section 8) excludes from the operation thereof a number of
cities. Dagupan City is not one of them. We are not to enter into the
impermissible field of injecting into a statute a provision plainly
omitted therefrom. And until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to
tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what
the legislative body has expressly ordained. And, this position we take
here is accentuated by the fact that by Section 9 of Act 2259,
“All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and
regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby
repealed.”
Given the fact that Dagupan City beyond peradventure Is removed from
the exceptions, it stands to reason itself that its charter provision
on the age limit is thereby repealed. And this, because “the last
statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words
so as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and
therefore to displace the prior statute”.[10]
Specifically with reference to the uniform age limit of 25 years set
forth in Section 6 of Republic Act 2259, we take stock of the
phraseology employed. This section starts with “No person shall be *** Councilor unless he is at least twenty-five years of age”. This specific language gives us added
reason to believe that in reality – and for the sake of uniformity –
the 23-year age limit in the Dagupan City Charter must have tc yield.
Because in the legislative scheme, councilors are conferred the right
to succeed the City Kayor in the event the Vice-Mayor is unavailable.[11] The City Mayor must at least be 25 years of age.[12]
So it is, that in the event a councilor 23 years of age is elected and
before 25 years catapulted to the position of mayor, then we have the
anomalous situation where the person succeeding as mayor will be less
than 25 years. Such a situation, it seems to us, is not centerr.plated
by the law.
With the foregoing guideposts, we are unable to subscribe to the
view that respondent’s age qualification should be governed by the
provisions of the Dagupan City Charter. We, accordingly, hold that
respondent is disqualified on the ground of non-age: Because at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the
election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was below the
age of 25 years.
Upon the law and the facts, we vote to affirm the appealed judgment. No costs allowed.
SO ORDERED
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
[1]
Section 173, Revised Election Code, provides that eligibility may be
contested within one week after the proclamation of election.
[2] Eligibility includes “the attainment of the age required by law”. Feliciano vs. Aquino, L-10201, September 23, 1957.
[3] Sec. 2, par. 2,
Republic Act 2259, provides that “the newly elected city officials
shall assume office on the first day of January following their
elections, ***”
[4] In Feliciano vs. Aquino, supra,
this Court interpreting Section 12 of Act 1582 which, in part, reads:
“An elective municipal officer must have been, at the time of the
election, a qualified voter and resident in the municipality for at
least one year, owing allegiance to the United States; he must be not
less than twenty-three years of age, ***”, held that “a candidate for
an elective municipal office must teive, in order to be eligible, at
least twenty three years of age at the time the election is held, ***”
The same result was reached in Sanchez vs. del Rosario, L-1687S, April
26, 1961, where this Court was called upon to interpret a similar
provision (Section 2174 of the Administrative Code), which reads: “An
elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be a
qualified voter in his municipality and must’have been resident therein
for at least one year, and must not be less than twenty-three years of
age, ***”
[5] Section 2 of the Revised Election Code provides that elections to public office are governed by said Code.
[6] Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration in Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 6/t5, 654; emphasis supplied.
[7] The Charter of the City of Dagupan, as amended by Republic Act 484.
[8] Entitled “An Act
making elective the offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Councilors in
Chartered Cities, regulating the election in such Cities and fixing the
salaries and tenure of such offices.”
[9] Italic supplied.
[10] Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol, et al., 44 Phil. 138 147, citing Frost vs. Wenie, 157 U.S., 46; 39 L. ed., 614, 619.
[11] Section 7 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, and Section 3 (2nd par.) of Republic Act 2259.
[12] Section 6, Republic Act 2259.