G.R. No. 23925. May 24, 1967
THE ACTING COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE PORT OF MANILA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IV, SITTING AT QUEZON CIT…
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
An American military personnel assigned in the Philippines, Robert A. Gibson, purchased for $2,700.00 at
the United States sometime in March 1956,
a Chevrolet two-door station wagon.
Shipped to the Philippines,
the car was landed in Manila on September 11, 1956.
On September 12, 1956, it was registered by Gibson, in his name, with the Motor
Vehicle’s Office in Quezon City. A certificate of registration was issued with
the statement of its exemption from payment of registration fees, for the
reason that the Chief of the MVO had received an official communication from United
States military authorities to the effect
that said car was owned by Gibson and used in connection with his duties. A special plate number was issued for the
car. Said registration was renewed the
following year by Gibson, in the same office.
On September 11, 1957,
Gibson informed the MVO Chief in writing that the same car was no longer used
officially and requested to be allowed to pay its registration fees and that
private number plates be issued to him.
Stamped on said letter was the following: “Subject to duties and taxes when sold
or transferred in the Philippines
to non- exempt persons”.[1]
Subsequently, the car became the subject of a series of
transfers. On September 12, 1957, a registration certificate
and the corresponding private plates were issued by the Cavite
City MVO agency to one Bonifacio Alinsod
with address at 471 España Ext., Q.C. On October
29, 1957, Alinsod sold the car for P6,500.00 to one Silverio Espiritu. On November 30, 1957, Espiritu sold it to Maximo Calalang. A month
later, this sale was registered at the MVO Pasig
agency and a certificate of registration and private plates were issued to Maximo Calalang. On December
6, 1957, the car was sold to one Felisa
San Jose, although the sale’s registration was made only on February 13, 1959. Felisa San Jose
remained in possession of the car up to March
19, 1963, when she sold the same to Concepcion
S. Calalang.
Parenthetically, this last purchaser is the spouse of former purchaser Maximo Calalang and has the same
address as that given by previous buyer Alinsod.
The sale last made was presented for registration to the MVO Pasig agency, but that office refused on the ground that
the car in question was among those included in the master list of “hot
cars”, i.e., motor vehicles brought into this country by
tax-exempt persons or entities, and subsequently transferred to non-tax-exempt
persons or entities, for which the import taxes have not been paid. As the registrant failed to submit proof of
payment of the advanced sales or the compensating taxes due on said car,
registration was
not allowed.
Pursuant however to a preliminary mandatory injunction writ
issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City, in a suit Concepcion S. Calalang institued,[2]
the registration certificate and plates were later issued by the MVO Pasig
agency, for1963. And in 1964, because of
an amended preliminary mandatory injunction writ, a new registration
certificate was issued in Concepcion S. Calalang’s favor.
On July 22, 1964,
the Chief of the Registration Division of the Land Transportation Commission[3]
certified to the Collector of Customs of Manila that the car in question was
originally imported tax-free by one Robert A. Gibson and is registered in the name
of Concepcion S. Calalang. Acting thereon and finding that the advanced
sales or compensating taxes due on the car have not been paid, the Acting
Collector of Customs issued a warrant of seizure and detention, Identification
Warrant No. 8235, dated July 30, 1964. Said warrant was forwarded for execution to
the Law Enforcement Command of the Bureau of Customs. No execution, however,
could be made by the latter as Concepcion S. Calalang refused to surrender the car. So the warrant was referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation. And on August
13, 1964, NBI
agents, armed with a copy of the said warrant of seizure and detention, seized
the car from Concepcion S. Calalang’s
house in Quezon City and brought the same to the NBI office in Manila.
The next day, August 14, Concepcion S. Calalang filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City branch, a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, with preliminary mandatory injunction, against inter alia the Acting Collector of Customs for Manila,
to review his actuations and to recover the car (Civil Case No. Q-8198). Said official filed an opposition to
the prayer for preliminary injunction and a motion to dismiss the petition for
lack of jurisdiction. After a
preliminary hearing, the court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the
preliminary mandatory injunction writ applied for.
Asserting said court’s lack of jurisdiction, the Acting Collector
of Customs instituted the present action before Us for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. As prayed for, We
issued preliminary injunction, restraining until further orders the enforcement
of the trial court’s preliminary mandatory injunction and further proceedings
in the case therein.
The petition, raising the fundamental issue of jurisdiction, is
meritorious. The suit filed with
respondent Judge was “to review and nullify whatever
has already been done by respondents [herein petitioner] without and/or in
excess of their jurisdiction,”[4]
namely, the issuance of the warrant
of seizure and detention, and the execution thereof by the NBI agents.
Statute[5]
as well as jurisprudence[6]
are very clear, however, that it is the Court of Tax Appeals, and not the Court
of First Instance, that has jurisdiction to review the actuations of the Customs authorities in regard to “seizure,
detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other
law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs.“ So We ruled in MIllarez v. Amparo, 97 Phil. 282, 284-285:
“Republic Act No. 1125, section 7, effective June 16,
1954 gave the Court of Tax Appeals exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review on appeal, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs,
involving ‘seizure, detention or release of property affected x x x or other matters arising under the Customs Law or
other law administered by the Bureau of Customs’. In our opinion this provision necessarily has
taken away the power of the Manila court of first instance to ‘review’
decisions of the Customs authorities, ‘in any case of seizure’ – as in this
case – under section 1383 et
seq. of the Revised Administrative Code.[7]
“Consequently the respondent judge had no authority to
entertain the complaints of Serree Investments, Lim Hu and Fructuoso Nepomuceno, which, although entitled Mandamus and
Certiorari were in reality petitions to review the actuations of the proper
customs authorities, now exclusively reviewable
by the Court of Tax Appeals (R.A. 1125).
Furthermore, conceding that the complaints were strictly mandamus or
certiorari civil actions, still they were groundless, the petitioners having an
adequate remedy by appeal, as stated, to the Court of Tax Appeals. Neither certiorari nor mandamus, it will be recalled, is available where
relief by appeal is provided. Therefore,
the complaints having no merit, issuance of the preliminary mandatory
injunctions was clearly erroneous, and the challenged writs should be
annulled.”
Needless to state, also, the provisions of the Revenue Code
levying the taxes sought to be collected here -advanced sales tax or
compensating tax – are being implemented by the Customs authorities[8]
and hence are part of Customs law.[9]
Respondent Calalang no doubt has the
right to question the legality of the seizure action commenced by the Customs authorities. For this however she must go to the proper court, namely, the Court of Tax Appeals, since its jurisdiction to review seizure cases necessarily includes all questions
affecting the legality or illegality of a seizure. Since the Court of First Instance was without
jurisdiction to entertain the petition of respondent Calalang
in the first place, it could not validly issue the ancillary writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction therein applied for.
Respondent however submits the argument, sanctioned by the trial court, that Sec. 7 of
Republic Act 1125 is not applicable, considering that there is no decision yet
of the Commissioner of Customs which can be subject of appeal to the Court of
Tax Appeals. The submission is not only
without merit but even argues against respondent’s cause. In Acting Collector v. De la Rama, L-20676, February
26, 1965, ruling on the same contention, We
held that such absence only shows that the party affected did not exhaust
administrative remedies. There being
administrative remedies available, i.e., appeal to the Commissioner of Customs
first,[10]
certiorari would not be proper.
Furthermore, some additional remedies were immediately available
to respondent: (1) to secure the release
of the seized car upon the filing of a sufficient
bond with the Customs Collector[11]
and/Or (2) to file a protest with the Customs Collector.[12]
All these available remedies heavily weigh against the propriety of certiorari
which can only issue in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition herein is granted and the Court of
First Instance of Rizal is declared without
jurisdiction in Civil Case No. Q-8198 therein, and its orders and preliminary
injunction writ therein issued are hereby annulled. The preliminary writ of injunction heretofore
issued by Us is made permanent. Costs against respondent Calalang.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.
[1]
Pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 183(b) and the last paragraph of Sec. 190(g) of the National Internal Revenue Code.
[2]
Civil Case No. Q-7165, for mandamus
with preliminary mandatory injunction
to compel the Registrar of the MVO Pasig agency to
issue registration certificate and license plates in her favor.
[3]
Formerly the Motor Vehicle’s Office.
[4]
Par. 19 of Petition
in Civil Case No. Q-8198; Rollo, P. 32.
[5]
Sec. 7, Republic
Act 1125 and Sec. 2402, Tariff and Customs
Code.
[6]
Millarez v. Amparo, 97 Phil. 282; Namarco v. Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 185;
Acting Collector v. De la Rama, L-20676, Feb. 26, 1965; and Commissioner v. Cloribel,
L-20266 Jan. 31, 1967.
[7]
Now Sec. 2402 of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
[8]
Sec. 6, National Internal Revenue Code.
[9]
Leuterio v. Commissioner, 101 Phil. 223.
[10]
Sec. 2313, Tariff and Customs Code.
[11]
Sec. 2301, Ibid.
[12]
Sec. 2308, Ibid.