SPOUSES AURORA TOJONG SU AND AMADOR SU, PETITIONERS, VS. EDA BONTILAO, PABLITA BONTILAO, AND MARICEL DAYANDAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

Su versus Bontilao

The Case

This is the story of spouses Aurora Tojong Su and Amador Su, registered owners of a parcel of land in Lapu-Lapu City, who sued several occupants for unlawful detainer on the theory that the occupants had been staying on the land by their mere tolerance. The occupants answered that they were the true owners, heirs of the person they claimed was the original owner, and that they had possessed the land since their youth. The case matters for two reasons: it is a clean lesson on the procedural rules of summary procedure in ejectment cases, and more importantly, it is a strict reminder that a Torrens title alone does not win an unlawful detainer suit. The plaintiff must still prove tolerance, and tolerance must be shown by positive acts, not by mere silence.

Procedural History

The spouses Su filed their complaint for unlawful detainer, damages, and attorney's fees before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lapu-Lapu City. The case was set for preliminary conference, but neither the spouses nor their counsel appeared, and the trial court dismissed the case as to the respondents. Counsel then filed a motion for reconsideration, explaining that his wife and young son had fallen ill that morning. The trial court found the explanation well-taken, granted reconsideration, and reset the preliminary conference. New counsel later entered his appearance, the preliminary conference was terminated, and the case was submitted for decision.

The respondents then filed an omnibus motion asking that the original dismissal be reinstated, arguing that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Rules on Summary Procedure and that the spouses had failed to file a pre-trial brief. The trial court denied the motion, holding that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited only when it seeks reconsideration of a judgment on the merits, and that the case could be decided on the pleadings, evidence, and position papers. On the merits, the trial court ruled for the spouses, ordering the respondents to vacate and to pay attorney's fees.

The respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City, which affirmed the trial court in full. After reconsideration was denied and a writ of execution was ordered without prejudice to appeal, the respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint outright on procedural grounds, faulting the trial court for recalling its dismissal and noting that counsel's excuse was personal to him and did not explain the spouses' own absence. Reconsideration was denied, so the spouses came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

The subject property is a lot in Barrio Looc, Lapu-Lapu City, with an area of about 2,830 square meters, covered by a transfer certificate of title registered in the name of Aurora Tojong Su, married to Amador Su. The respondents, Eda Bontilao, Pablita Bontilao, and Maricel Dayandayan, had built their houses on the lot and were occupying it.

On the first of March 2012, the spouses filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, alleging that the respondents had occupied the property by their mere tolerance, with the understanding that they would peacefully vacate upon proper demand. When the spouses needed the property and asked the respondents to leave, the respondents refused. A formal demand went unheeded, and the barangay settlement efforts failed, so the complaint was filed.

The respondents denied any tolerance. They claimed the spouses had no cause of action because they were not the real owners, having obtained their title through fraud when they bought the property from one Gerardo Dungog despite knowing that the respondents' predecessor, Mariano Ybañez, owned it under a tax declaration. As his heirs, the respondents claimed to be the true owners in continuous possession since their youth, and therefore not occupants by anyone's tolerance.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial courts and in dismissing the complaint on purely procedural grounds, namely the non-appearance at the preliminary conference and the failure to file a pre-trial brief.
• Whether or not the spouses proved that the respondents' occupation of the property was by their tolerance, as required in an action for unlawful detainer.
• Whether or not the spouses' Torrens title alone entitled them to recover possession through a summary action for ejectment.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides:

Section 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.

This is the provision under which the trial court originally dismissed the complaint, and its recall is the procedural heart of the case.

Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily, provides:

Section 4. Appearance of parties. – It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

This is the provision that saves the spouses, because their counsel held a special power of attorney authorizing him to appear for them.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred. The spouses had executed a special power of attorney in favor of their former counsel, expressly granting him full authority to represent them at the preliminary conference and to enter into a compromise or submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. That power had been offered before the trial court and attached to the records, which negated any suggestion of a belated execution. Under Section 4 of Rule 18, that written authorization excused the non-appearance of the spouses. Counsel's own absence was explained in his motion for reconsideration, and the trial court found the explanation well-taken; what excuses a party from pre-trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge, absent a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.

The Court also held that the motion for reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading. The prohibition covers a motion seeking reconsideration of a judgment rendered on the merits, not an order of dismissal for non-appearance at the preliminary conference, which is not an adjudication on the merits. On the pre-trial brief, the Court noted that the notice of preliminary conference required only the appearance of the parties, and that cases under the Rules on Summary Procedure may be resolved on the pleadings, affidavits, and position papers. The spouses' prompt steps, hiring new counsel and promptly seeking reconsideration, showed no intent to delay.

On the second issue, however, the Court found that the spouses failed to prove tolerance. Tolerance signifies permission, not mere silence or inaction, which is negligence and not tolerance. The records were devoid of evidence on how and when the respondents entered the lot, and how and when permission to occupy was given. Bare allegations were insufficient.

On the third issue, the Court held that it was error to rule for the spouses merely on the basis of their Torrens title. The holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner and entitled to possession, but that fact alone does not give unbridled authority to wrest possession from a current possessor in a summary action without proving the essential requisites of unlawful detainer. The owner must first prove that the occupation was based on permission or tolerance; absent that, the owner should pursue other, more appropriate legal remedies.

Doctrine

First, in an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance must be proved; bare allegations are insufficient. Tolerance signifies permission, not mere silence or inaction. The plaintiff must show how and when the defendant entered the property and how and when the permission was given. Without proof of tolerance, the defendant's possession is deemed illegal from the very beginning, and the action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed.

Second, a Torrens title establishes ownership and the right to possess, but it does not by itself entitle the owner to eject a possessor through a summary action. The owner must still prove the essential requisites of unlawful detainer, above all the fact of tolerance.

Third, on procedure, the non-appearance of a party at the preliminary conference may be excused where a representative appears fully authorized in writing under Section 4 of Rule 18, and a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal for non-appearance is not a prohibited pleading, because it does not seek reconsideration of a judgment on the merits.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed, the Court having found no proof of tolerance despite the spouses' Torrens title.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a Torrens title gives ownership, but not automatic possession through ejectment; tolerance must be proved by positive acts, not by silence. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of unlawful detainer by tolerance, and to test the procedural rules on non-appearance at the preliminary conference and prohibited motions under the Rules on Summary Procedure.