CATALINO VALDERRAMA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

As appears from the record, on November 17, 1916, several hacienda
owners of Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a contract with
Miguel J. Osorio, known as milling contract, wherein Osorio agreed to
install in Manapla a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons,
for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda
owners, who in turn bound themselves to furnish the central with all
the cane they might produce in their estates for thirty years from the
execution of the contract, all in accordance with the conditions
specified therein.

Later on, the defendant North Negros
Sugar Co., Inc., acquired the rights and interest of Miguel J. Osorio
in the milling contract aforesaid.

Two years thereafter,
that is to say, on January 29, 1919, Catalino Valderrama (case No.
23810) and on February 1st of the same year, Emilio Rodriguez (case No.
23811) and Santos Urra, Ignacio Benito Huarte, Adolfo Huarte and Pedro
Auzmendi (case No. 23812) made with the appellant other milling
contracts identical with the first one of November 17, 1916, with some
new conditions which are specified in detail in the aforesaid documents
Exhibits A and 1. Santos Urra thereafter transferred to Pedro Auzmendi,
and the latter to Lorenzo Echarri, their interest in the milling
contract executed by them.

In view of the fact that the hacienda
owners, who were up to that time customers of the central, could not
furnish sufficient cane for milling, as required by the capacity of
said central, the defendant made other milling contracts with various hacienda
owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, in order to obtain sufficient cane
to sustain the central; and this gave rise to the plaintiffs filing
their complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which each of them
has established in his respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each hacienda
of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while the defendant maintains
that it had the right to transport to its central upon the railroad
passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.

The plaintiffs, in separate complaints, prayed the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros to pronounce judgment, holding that the
defendant had no right, under the easement or otherwise, to cause its
locomotives and wagons to run across the estates of the plaintiffs for
the purpose of transporting sugar cane of any agriculturist of Cadiz,
Occidental Negros.

The defendant answered the amended
complaints, admitting some allegations thereof and denying others. And
as special defense, it alleged that the plaintiffs respectively granted
the defendant, for the period of fifty years from the date of the
aforesaid contracts, an easement of way 7 meters wide upon the lands of
the plaintiffs for the construction and operation of a railroad for the
transportation of sugar cane; that said easement of way was established
without any restriction whatsoever, as regards the ownership of the
cane to be transported over the said railroad; that said contract was
then in full force and effect and had never been annulled or modified.

After hearing the three cases, the trial court entered one single
judgment for all of them, holding that the defendant had no right to
pass through the lands of the plaintiffs described in their amended
complaints for the transportation of sugar cane not grown from any of
the haciendas of the plaintiffs. From this judgment, the defendant appealed.

In view of the similarity of the facts and questions raised in the
three complaints, they will herein be considered jointly, as was done
by the trial court.

The parties agree that the only question
herein involved is as to the extent of the easement of way which the
plaintiffs have established in their respective haciendas in favor of the defendant, and therefore it is important to know the terms in which such easement of way was established.

In the contract executed by the plaintiff Valderrama with the defendant
on January 29, 1919, there appears: “6th. That in order to have the
obligations herein entered into by Mr. Valderrama duly registered, in
regard to the rural estates belonging to him and which are described
hereinafter, an easement of way 7 meters wide and for the period
of 50 years from the date hereof is hereby created in favor of the
‘North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,’ upon his property hereinafter
described, at such place as said corporation may see fit for the
construction of a railroad.”

And in the contract of the
plaintiff Rodriguez of February 1, 1919, there also appears: “6th. That
in order to have the obligations herein entered into by Mr. Emilio
Rodriguez duly registered, in regard to the rural estates belonging to
him which are hereinafter described, an easement of way 7 meters
wide and for the period of 50 years from the date hereof is hereby
established by said Mr. Emilio Rodriguez in favor of the ‘North Negros
Sugar Co., Inc.,’ upon his estate aforementioned, at such place as said
corporation may see fit for the construction of a railroad.”

And lastly in the contract of Santos Urra and others of February 1,
1919, there likewise appears: “7th. That in order to have the
obligations herein entered into by Santos Urra, Ignacio Benito Huarte,
Adolfo Huarte and Pedro Auzmendi duly registered, in regard to their
estate hereinafter described, an easement of way 7 meters wide and
for the period Of 50 years from the date hereof is hereby established
in favor of the ‘North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,’ upon their estate
hereinafter described, at such place as said corporation may see fit
for the construction of a railroad.”

As may be seen,
the question raised depends upon the interpretation to be given to the
clause of the contracts of the plaintiffs above quoted. The plaintiffs
allege that the aforesaid clause is ambiguous, and under the first
exception of section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they have the
right to introduce extraneous evidence to explain the true intent of
the parties. And it is ambiguous, according to them, because it may be
applied to the transportation of the cane of the plaintiffs or of other
producers, which is contrary to the intent of the contracting parties.
If the above quoted clause is ambiguous, the plaintiffs have the right
to introduce circumstantial evidence to explain the true intent of the
parties, but in our opinion said clause is clear enough in its terms to
express what the parties have intended to agree upon. Had the clause
mentioned only an “easement of way,” there might be a doubt as to
whether or not the easement of way is for pedestrians, horsemen or
carriages. But when the clause says: “easement of way 7 meters wide for
the period of 50 years for the construction of a railroad,” there can
be no doubt about what the contracting parties have agreed upon, to
wit, that the plaintiffs have created upon their respective haciendas
at a suitable place an easement of way 7 meters wide and for a period
of fifty years, in order to enable the defendant to build and maintain
a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane to the central. It is
clear that the cane of the plaintiffs was to be transported upon the
railroad to the central; but to limit the use of the road exclusively
to the cane of the plaintiffs and within their respective haciendas would make the contract in question ineffective, except as to the hacienda which is contiguous or nearest to the central.

The object of such a milling contract, from which arises the easement
in question, is undoubtedly to obtain mutual benefit to the producers
of sugar cane and the corporation putting up the central. It is only by
taking this principal idea into account that it may be conceived why
the parties had come to an agreement to assume such obligations as are
set forth in the milling contract. But the contract could not produce
any benefit to the parties, if the explanation given by the plaintiffs
would be admitted, as to their intention in creating the aforesaid
easement of way upon their respective haciendas, that it was only in favor of their respective haciendas. Such an explanation is inadmissible because it is contrary to the object of the milling contract.

It is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was
established in favor of the servient estates, because it is a well
settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and
not by reason of easement.

This is a case of an easement for
the benefit of a corporation, voluntarily created by the plaintiffs
upon their respective estates for the construction of a railroad
connecting said estates with the central of the defendant. Once the
road is constructed, the easement is apparent because it is
continuously exposed to view by the rails which reveal the use and
enjoyment of said easement. It is evident, as above stated, that the
cane of the plaintiffs is to be transported to the central by means of
wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the easement was created for
the benefit of the corporation, owner of the central, it may cause its
wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit,
according to the needs of the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce
sufficient cane to cover the capacity of the central, it would be
unjust to impose upon the defendant corporation the burden of
maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain from another source
sufficient cane with which to, maintain its business; this is specially
true here, because in the milling contract with the plaintiffs, there
is nothing to prohibit the defendant from making milling contracts with
other planters, and obtain in that way all the cane necessary to cover
the capacity of the central.

Another reason advanced by the
appellees in support of their theory is that by transporting upon the
road, through the servient estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz,
it would alter the easement, making it more burdensome. It is true that
the owner of the dominant estate, in making on the servient estate the
necessary works for the use and preservation of the easement, cannot
alter it, nor make it more burdensome (art. 543 of the Civil Code); but
this does not mean that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons
passing upon the railroad other cane than that of the plaintiffs. What
is prohibited by the legal provision above cited is that the defendant,
in extending the road or in repairing it, should occupy a greater area
of land of the servient estates, or deposit excavations or building
materials outside of the area of 7 meters, because in the first case,
the easement will be altered, and in the second it would become more
burdensome. But nothing of the kind happens when the defendant
transports on the railroad, crossing the servient estates, the cane of
the planters of Cadiz; the railroad continues to occupy the same area
on the servient estates, and the incumbrance resulting from the
easement continues to be the same, whether the tractors traverse the
line 10, 20 or 30 times a day transporting cane for the central.

Furthermore, the record shows a circumstance indicating that at the
time of the execution of the milling contracts above referred to, there
was no intention on the part of the contracting parties to limit the
use of the railroad to the transportation of cane grown by the
plaintiffs in their respective haciendas, and that is
because, while the duration of the milling contracts is fixed at thirty
years, that of the easement is at fifty. So that if at the end of
thirty years the plaintiffs or their successors should no longer desire
to furnish canes for milling in the central of the defendant, the
latter shall still have the right to the easement for the remaining
period, but without transporting on the railroad any cane for the
central. An interpretation of the clause in question leading to such a
result is untenable.

For the foregoing, we are of the
opinion that the trial court erred in finding that the appellant could
not transport on its railroad passing through the haciendas of the appellees, where it has an easement of way established in its favor, the cane grown in the haciendas
of the producers of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, to be milled in the
central of the appellant. And, therefore, the judgment appealed from
must be reversed and the appellant absolved, as it is hereby absolved,
from the complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.