JUAN E. SEVILLA, PETITIONER, VS. LEONCIO PARINA, ADAN ROSETE, HONORABLE ABELARDO SUBIDO (ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE), HONORABLE JOSE B. LINGAD (ACTING COMMISSIONER OF …

The Government seeks a review of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of
which reads:

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner and against the respond­ents, declaring that respondent Leoncio Parina is not entitled to
the position of Customs Examiner I-R-23 in the Appraiser’s Division of the
Bureau of Customs and that petitioner Juan E. Sevilla
is the person legally entitled to hold and exercise the same, and ordering the
Personnel Officer of the Bureau of Customs, Acting Commissioner of Civil
Service, Acting Commissioner of Customs and Acting Secretary of Finance to
restore said petitioner immediately to that position with a salary corresponding to the position next lower in
rank.  Without special
pronouncement as to costs.”

Petitioner Juan E. Sevilla was, on February 15, 1954, appointed clerk in the Bureau of
Customs.  On January 1, 1956, he received a permanent appointment as
Customs Liquidator.  Promoted, on November
1, 1956, to the
position of Customs Examiner I,
Item No. 123-16, page 246, of Republic Act No. 1600, he was subsequently extended promotional appointments in
salary, the last of which was for P2,808.00 per
annum.  Sometime in 1960, an
administrative charge, Case No. R-21540, was filed against him, for alleged
grave misconduct, upon the ground
that a carton and a pack of untaxed Chesterfield cigarettes, three (3) packs of untaxed Camel
cigarettes and two (2) cakes of
face soap were found in his possession, as he sought to take them with him from
the Manila Air Station, after examining the baggages of passengers who had
arrived from Guam on board the transport “SS DAVID SHUNK.” After
appropriate proceedings, the Civil Service Commission rendered a decision, dated
November
9, 1960, finding him
guilty as charged and suspending him for six (6) months, without pay, and
reprimanding him, as well as giving him a warning.  This decision was, on appeal to the Civil
Service Board of Appeals,
affirmed by the latter, except as
to the penalty, with respect to which the Board had decreed:  “his salary is hereby reduced to that corresponding to the position next lower in
rank, in lieu of the six (6) months suspension imposed by the
Commissioner of Civil Service,”
apart from the afore mentioned
reprimand and warning.  A reconsideration
sought by Sevilla was denied by said Board, on
September
26, 1962.

Subsequently, or on
December 2, 1963, the then Secre­tary of Finance, upon the recommendation of
the Acting Com­missioner of Customs, and with the approval of the then Acting Deputy Commissioner of Civil
Service, appointed Sevilla as Clerk II, R-25, at
P2,196.00 per annum — which, admittedly, is the salary corresponding to the
position next lower in rank to
that held by him – effective upon assumption of duty, and promoted Leoncio Parina — who had,
theretofore, held said position of Clerk II at P2,196.00 per annum — to Sevilla’s position as Customs Examiner I, R-32, with a
salary of P2,808.00 per annum. 
Thereupon, Sevilla instituted, in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, the present quo warranto
proceedings against Parina, The Acting Secretary
of Finance, the Acting Commissioner of Customs, the Personnel Officer of the
Bureau of Customs and the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service; to oust Parina from said office of Sevilla
and secure the latter’s reinstatement thereto. 
In due course, said court rendered the aforementioned decision, from
which the Government has appealed directly to the Supreme Court, on questions
purely of law.

The issue in this appeal, as in the lower court, boils down to
whether or not the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals, sentencing Sevilla to a reduction of his salary ‘to that corresponding
to the position next lower in rank,” meant to divest him of his position
as Customs Examiner I — with an item and an annual compensation of P2,808.00 —
and to require that he be given another position, with the reduced salary
aforementioned, or merely reduced his salary to that corresponding to the
position next lower in rank, without a change of item and/or position.

The Government maintains that the first alternative was intended
by the Civil Service Board of Appeals, although the latter did not say so
specifically, because “it would be absurd to consider that a single
position can be lower in rank to itself,” and because Sevilla’s
salary can not be reduced “without the accompanying appointment to the
position to which the reduced salary corresponds.”

We are unable to share this view. 
To begin with, the decision of the Board did not direct that Sevilla be given a “position”
other than that he was holding. 
It merely ordain­ed that his “salary” – not position —
be “reduced to that” — meaning
salary — “corresponding to the position next lower in
rank.” Indeed, a person may hold an office or position at a salary lower
than the amount of the budgetary item therefor, which
is but the maximum he can be given, under said item.  Secondly, despite Sevilla’s
appointment — immediately preceding the contested one — for an item and
position carrying a compensation of P2,808.00 per annum, it is not contested
that the Board could have rendered a
valid decision either suspending his right to discharge the duties of
said position and to collect the emoluments attached thereto, or divesting
him completely of said position and of the aforesaid emoluments, by
decreeing his removal from office or dismissal from the service, without any
further action on the part of the appointing authority.  Obviously, the Board has the lesser
power to reduce said emoluments, without such action on the part of the appointment authority, or without
requiring another appointment.

Otherwise, the effectivity of the decision of the Board, even if valid and
final, as well as executory, would be depend­ent upon
the willingness of the appointing authority to imple­ment it.  Upon the other hand, the power of appointment
necessarily entails the exercise of judgment and discretion.  Hence, the officer clothed with such power
cannot be compelled to exercise it in favor of a given person.^[1] As a consequence, the theory of the
Government in this case tends, either to im­pair the efficacy of decisions of
the Civil Service Board of Appeals, or to undermine the basic assumptions of
the power of appointment.  We do not believe that either alternative is consistent with the letter and
spirit of our laws.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

SO
ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
“Congress can not, either appoint the Commissioner of the National Employment Service, or impose upon the President
at the duty to appoint any particular person to said office.  The a pointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by
Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of
the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative
power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office.” (Manalang vs. Quitoriano,
L-6898, April 30, 1954.)

“Appointment of a public
officer involves the exercise of discretion which, unless abused, the courts
will not attempt to control.  Without
that power, in no just sense can it be said that the right exists.  While the appointing officer or body may
listen to the recommendation or advice of others, yet the selection must
finally be his or its act.  And so this
power of selection of an appointee is and should be vested alone in the
officers of boards authorized to appoint, although it is limited to persons
possessing the qualifications required by the civil service statues and
rules.” (42 Am. Jur. 951)