ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARIANO CORRALES TAN. FLAVIANA SAMSON, ADMINISTRATRIX AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE CORRALES TAN ET AL., CLAIMANTS. VICENTE CORRALES TAN, APPELLANT.

This
is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
declaring that Flaviana Samson was legally married to the deceased
Mariano Corrales Tan, that she and her children Arsenia, Gregoria,
Santiago, Dativa, Aurelio and Amancio Corrales Tan y Samson, are his
legal heirs, and that the appellant Vicente Corrales Tan, while a
natural child of said Mariano Corrales Tan, has not been legally
acknowledged as such and is therefore not entitled to a share in the
inheritance beyond the amount bequeathed to him in the will of the
deceased.

The evidence in the case has not been brought
before this court and we are, therefore, not in position to review the
findings of fact of the court below. Upon these findings there can be
no doubt that Flaviana Samson was legally married to the deceased and
that the children of the marriage are legitimate heirs.

The
only other question to be determined is whether upon the facts found
Vicente Corrales Tan can be considered an acknowledged natural child of
the deceased. The court below found that before his marriage to
Flaviana Samson, Mariano Corrales Tan was living with a woman by the
name of Prudencia Santos and with her had a child, the herein
appellant, who was born on the 5th of April, 1894; that the child was
baptized on the 22d of the same month and that in his certificate of
baptism Exhibit A, it is stated that he was the natural child of
Mariano Corrales Tan and Prudencia de los Santos; that in Exhibit B,
another document of the same date on file in the archives of the parish
church where the child was baptized, Mariano Corrales Tan, in the
presence of two witnesses, recognized Vicente Corrales Tan Quintin as
his natural child had with Florentina de los Santos.

The following articles of the Civil Code prescribe the manner in which the acknowledgment of natural children may be effected:

“Art.
131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record
of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.”

“Art. 133. A person of full age may not be acknowledged as a natural child without his consent.

“The
approval of the court, to be granted after hearing the prosecuting
officer, shall be necessary to the acknowledgment of a minor, unless
such acknowledgment be made in a certificate of birth or in a will.

“The
minor may in any case contest the acknowledgment within the four years
next following the attainment of his or her majority.”

“Art.
137. Actions for the acknowledgment of natural children may be
commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents except in
the following cases:

“1. If the father or mother died
during the minority of the child, in which case the latter must
commence the action within the four years next following the attainment
of its majority.

“2. If, after the death of the father or
mother, some document, before unknown, should be discovered in which
the child is expressly acknowledged.

“In this case the action must be commenced within the six months next following the discovery of such document.”

Vicente Corrales became of age long before the death of his father.
Hence, paragraph 1 of article 137 above quoted is not applicable to his
case and, in order to establish his status as an acknowledged natural
child, he must show that he was so acknowledged during the life of the
deceased. According to article 131, such acknowledgment “must be made
in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.”
The appellant argues that the entries in the records of the parish
church together with document Exhibit B, must be considered as a
sufficient record of birth under that article.

This
contention cannot be sustained. The record of birth mentioned in
article 131 is that provided for in article 326 of the same Code and as
the application of that article to the Philippine Islands was suspended
by decree of the Governor-General dated December 29, 1889, and was
never put into effect, it follows that that form of acknowledgment did
not exist in this country in the year 1894. Whether entries in the
civil register provided for in section 2214 of the Administrative Code
will meet the requirements of article 131, we need not here decide.

But it is argued that article 327 of the Civil Code is applicable to the present case. That article reads:

“The
records of the registry shall be evidence of civil status and no other
evidence thereof shall be admitted, unless such records have never
existed or the books of the registry have disappeared, of the question
arises in the course of litigation.”

In our
opinion that article only lays down a rule of evidence and has no
bearing on the formalities for a valid acknowledgment of a natural
child; as we have seen, article 131 requires that unless the
acknowledgment is made in a will or other public document, it must be
made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register.

The appellant suggests that the fact that he in the will of the
deceased is named as one of the legatees is an implied acknowledgment.
There is, of course, no merit in this suggestion; legatees are as often
as not unrelated to the testator.

It is also suggested that
Exhibit B is a public document and, therefore, in itself a sufficient
acknowledgment. Assuming without conceding that it is a public
document, it would nevertheless not constitute an acknowledgment unless
duly approved by a court (art. 133, Civil Code; Legare vs. Cuerques, 34 Phil., 221).

In his fourth and last assignment of error the appellant contends that
the court below erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence. The new evidence is not before us, but as
far as can be gathered from the record, it consists of the record of a
proceeding before a customhouse immigration board, in which proceeding
the deceased appears to have acknowledged that appellant was his son,
and it is argued that the proceedings were of a quasi-judicial nature
and that the action of the board in the matter constituted a judicial
approval of the acknowledgment. We do not think so; the collector of
customs and his subordinate boards are not courts within the meaning of
article 133, supra.

The order appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.