IN RE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DOMINGO FLORENTINO. JOSE VILLANUEVA, EXECUTOR, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. ROBERTA DE LEON, OPPONENT AND APPELLEE.

Domingo Florentino died at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, on January 16, 1924,
leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter, the will of the late
Florentino was admitted to probate and Jose Villanueva named executor.
Villanueva qualified as executor by filing the necessary bond in the
amount of P20,000. He was granted the usual letters of administration.

In the meantime, one Roberta de Leon had presented a motion in which
she prayed in effect that the court allow her to intervene in the
proceedings. She alleged that she and the deceased Florentino had been
living together as husband and wife since 1888; that in that year they
formed & partnership to which each contributed P1,000 for the
purpose of engaging in business; and that the partnership was dissolved
by the death of Florentino without there having been any liquidation.
This motion was denied by Judge Quintero as improper, inasmuch as the
movant could present her claims to the commissioners or institute an
independent action to confirm her rights in the estate. In accordance
with the suggestion of the court, Roberta de Leon did in fact bring
suit against Jose Villanueva, executor, in which she asked that she be
declared the owner of one-half of the property left by Domingo
Florentino.

Later, Roberta de Leon filed another motion duly
sworn to in which she alleged that the executor had made it appear that
the property of the deceased was worth only P50,000, whereas the same
was valued at over P300,000. Specific mention was made by her of
jewelry and tobacco leaf. Accordingly, movant prayed the court to order
the executor to correct the inventory to the end that the true amount
should appear in the same.

On October 31, 1924, Judge
Mariano issued an order commanding the executor within three days to
give reasons under oath why the jewels referred to in one of Roberta de
Leon’s motions, should not be included in the inventory, and to explain
what had been done with the tobacco leaf. In the same order, the court
ruled that Roberta de Leon had the right to intervene in the settlement
of the accounts. The contents of this order were objected to by counsel
for the executor and steps taken to perfect an appeal. In turn, counsel
for Roberta de Leon entered opposition on the ground that the executor
had no right of appeal. The court admitted the appeal in so far as it
related to the right of Roberta de Leon to intervene, but denied the
appeal in so far as it related to the order to the executor to state
under oath why the jewels in question should not be included in the
inventory and also to explain what had been done with the consignments
of tobacco leaf.

In this court, three errors are assigned by
the executor as appellant. The second and third errors need not be
discussed since they relate to matters as to which the lower court
denied appeal. Had appellant desired to contest the correctness of the
action taken by the trial judge in not certifying the bill of
exceptions as to one question, he had his remedy pursuant to section
499 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Not having taken advantage of this
provision of the law, the appellate court is powerless to interfere on
questions which are not properly before it. (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 499; Somes vs. Crossfield and Molina [1907], 8 Phil., 283; Lituaña and Calica vs.
Oliveros [1918], 38 Phil., 628.) The single question is whether or not
an alleged partner of a deceased person has such interest in the estate
of the deceased as to allow her to take part in the approval of the
accounts.

It is the duty of the probate court to scrutinize
carefully the accounts of executors and administrators and to correct
all errors founded in law or fact. It is the right of all the creditors
and distributees of the estate to be present and, if so disposed, to
contest the account of the executor or administrator. Only a prima facie
right at the time of filing the petition is sufficient to entitle the
applicant to intervene in the accounts of the executor or
administrator. It is for the trial court to determine whether the
person seeking to participate in the proceedings is a person interested
within the meaning of the law, or is merely an intruder who should be
excluded from any further participation. The determination of this
question must necessarily be largely discretionary in the trial court.
Any doubt as to the interest of the petitioner ought, however, to be
resolved in favor of the petitioner, and any doubt arising in the
appellate court ought to be resolved in favor of the action taken by
the trial judge. Administrators and executors instead of opposing the
intervention of interested parties should welcome the participation of
the same for their own protection. (See Garwood vs. Garwood [1866], 29 Cal., 514, cited by appellant; Estate of Willey [1903], 140 Cal., 238.)

On the supposition that that part of the order of the trial court which
relates to the right of Roberta de Leon, the alleged partner of the
deceased, to intervene in the testate proceedings is appealable, we
entertain the view that the action taken by the trial judge was
correct. Accordingly, it results that the order is affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.