DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES AND LUISA REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, RESPONDENT. MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES, AND PACIENCIA REYES, PETITIONERS, VS.…

The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta
de los Reyes have petitioned for a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 31221-R) affirming that of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding No.831 of said Court, admitting to probate the alleged last will and
testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to the probate.

It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First
Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed
on October 22, 1930, and
annexed to the petition.  The will
instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.  The petition was set for hearing, and in due
time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio
Reyes and Luisa Reyes, and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor
and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be
heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked.  Grounds advanced for the opposition were
forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel
by laches of the proponent, and revocation of the
will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the
testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances
were finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a deci­sion promulgated on
August 3, 1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).

After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First
Instance, by decision of June 20, 1958, found that the will was genuine and
properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation “until such time when we shall
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the ques­tion
of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented.”

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes
petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revoca­tion be considered and resolved;
whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was
in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but
“reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied
revocation at the opportune time.”

On January 11, 1960,
the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole
purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.

On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the
issue whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger
portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944,
subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under
Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the
trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held
the will of the late Benedicta de los
Reyes “unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of
sale.” Whereupon, the oppositors
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958,
admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal;
that the same was appealable independently of the
issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants,
there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds
of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.

Oppositors then appealed to this Court.

In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants
pose three main issues:  (a) whether or
not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had
become final for lack of appeal; (b) whether or not the order of the Court of
origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel
invoked by oppositors appellants had likewise become
final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta
de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her
execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943
and April 3, 1944.

As to the first point, oppositors-appellants
contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered
interlocutory, because it failed to resolve the issues of estoppel
and revocation propounded in their opposition. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant’s stand is
untenable.  It is elementary that a
probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last
will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise.  (Montaño vs. Suesa,
14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710).  As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions
of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that “any
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment x
x x where such order or
judgment:  (a) allows or disallows a
will.”

Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial
Court’s resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an
appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher
Courts.  This contention is without
weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instances
when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court
below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive.  Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke
said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest.  Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the
decree was correctly dismissed.

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of
conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed.  For one, if the will is not entitled to
probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become
superfluous:  in law, there is no such will
and hence there would be nothing to revoke. 
Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants
is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix
allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
devise the properties concerned.  As
such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the
particular devise or legacy.  Only the total
and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).

As to the issue of estoppel, we have
already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the
presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being
primarily designed to pro­tect the testator’s expressed wishes, which are
entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent’s ownership and right of
disposition within legal limits. 
Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to
deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its
violation (Revised Rule 75).  It would be
a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext
of estoppel. 
Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or
not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly
so ruled.

The last issue, that of revocation, is
predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of
the Code of 1889), which recites:

“ART. 957.  The legacy
or devise shall be without effect:

(1) x x x

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the
thing bequeathed or any part thereof it being understood that in the latter
case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part
thus alienated.  If after the alienation
the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of
nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid,
unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of
the right or repurchase;

xxx.”

It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes,
the basis of the quoted provision is a presumed change of intention on the part
of the testator.  As pointed out by Manresa in his Commentaries on Article 869 of the Civil
Code (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 743) —

“Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador.  Si este,
despues de legar, se desprende de la cosa por titulo lucrativo
u oneroso, hace desaparecer su derecho sobra ella,
dando lugar a la presuncion de que ha cambiado de voluntad, y no quiere que el legado
se cumpla.  Mas para que
pueda presumirse esa voluntad, es
necesario que medien actos del testador
que la indiquen.  Si la perdida del
derecho sobre la cosa ha sido independiente
de la voluntad del
testador, el legado podra quedar sin efecto, mas no en virtud del numero 2:  del
articulo 869, que exige siempre actos
voluntarios de enajenacion por parte del
mismo testador.”

As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such
change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.  In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in
its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this
Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba,
L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), “no consideration
whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba” on
account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in
conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply
in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an
alteration or departure therefrom.^[1]
Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the
circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of
the conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies,
if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the
annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that

“it was the
moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was
the only cause for the execution of Exhs. A and B” (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances).  (Decision, L-5618 and
L-5620).

If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted
passage implies, then the transferor was not expressing her own free will and
intent in making the conveyances.  Hence,
it can not be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision
on her part to abandon the original legacy.

True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the
recovery of the alienated property “even if it be by reason of the nullity
of the contract” does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV,
4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the “nullity of the contract” can not be taken
in an absolute sense.^[2]
Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example, that if a testator’s
subsequent alienation were avoided because the testator was mentally deranged
at the time, the revocatory effect ordained by the
article should still ensue.  And the same
thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided on
account of physical or mental duress. 
Yet, an alien­ation through undue influence in no way differs from one
made through violence or intimidation. 
In either case, the transferor is not expressing his real intent,^[3]
and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce
a revocation of the anterior bequest.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. 
Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez.

SO ORDERED.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1] Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV,
4th ed. p. 378) aptly remarks:

“Cuando
el testador, a sabiendas de
la disposicion contenida en
su ulltima voluntad, enajena al legatario la cosa legada, si bien
esta sale del poder de aquel, va a parar
al del legatario, acto que no puede interpretarse
como mudanza de la voluntad, puesto que transmite la cosa a la persona a la que deseaba favorecer con ella.  Por esta circunstancia,
y por la de no revocar el legado, mas bien
parece que persiste en su intencion de beneficiar al legatario, ye que no con la propia cosa, con el derecho que le concede el art.
878.  Si al donar el testador al futuro legatario la cosa que le dejaba en el testamento, indica solo una realizacion anticipada de la ultima voluntad, el venderla sin derogar la disposicion del legado parece indicar
tambien que no ha habido idea modificadora de la intencion, sino que prosigue en la de favorecer al instituido, y ye que no es posible
conseguirlo con la cosa misma, se impone el verificarlo en la manera determinada por el articulo, o sea mediante la entrega del precio.”

^[2]
“Deciamos anteriormente
que necesitaba alguna explicacion la frase del
num. 2: del art. 869; aunque sea por la nulidad del
contrato, pare no apartarla
de sus verdaderos y prudentes Iimites.  Literalmente entendida, autorizaria el que fuese revocado
un legado por enajenacion que hubiese realizado
el testador con vicio en el
consentimiento. 
Dice con razon el jurisconsulto
frances
Demante, ‘que se llegaria a
consecuencias contrarias a los principios mas elementales del Derecho y de la razon si, exagerando dicha doctrina, se diese efecto revocatorio
a una enajenacion nula por vicio
de consentimiento.’ Como
una voluntad impotente pare transferir la propiedad podria tener la fuerza de revocar un legado?
Si la enajenacion lleva el vicio de violencia o de error, sera posible
atribuir algun efecto a acto
semejante? Es Iogico
deducir entoncos que el testador se arrepintio, como dicen las Partidas, del otorgamiento de Ia manda?” (Scaevola, op.
cit.)

^[3] Cf. Torres vs. Lopez, 48 Phil. 772; Coso
vs. Deza, 42 Phil. 596.