G.R. No. 23586. September 30, 1925
MARTA QUEROL AND SEGUNDO FLORES, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FRANCISCO QUEROL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
VILLAMOR, J.:
complaint and damages in the sum of P74,900, plus P3,720, as damages
from the filing of the original complaint until the delivery of the
said properties to the plaintiff, Marta Querol, with the costs.
The defendant denies all the allegations of the complaint, and as
counterclaim alleges that the registration in the registry of property
of Albay, of the realties in litigation under the name of the plaintiff
Marta Querol is void and of no effect, for the reason that it is
illegal, and for the further reason that the same was done under the
name of a fictitious person. And as special defense, the defendant
alleges that the action brought by the plaintiffs has already
prescribed. Wherefore he prays that he be absolved from the complaint;
that the plaintiffs’ claim to the realties in litigation be denied;
that the registration of the property in question in the registry of
property of Albay be declared void and of no effect; and that judgment
be rendered against the plaintiffs for costs.
Each party
introduced evidence, and the Honorable Pedro Tuason, who tried the
case, entered a well reasoned decision, deciding the questions of fact
and law that were submitted by the parties. The decision appealed from
is as follows:
“This action is instituted
to recover four parcels of land and to compel the defendant to make an
accounting of their products. Six parcels are described in the
complaint, but two of them having been sold by the plaintiffs to a man
by the name of Ceferino Guanzon in 1915 or 1916 are mentioned in the
complaint only for the purpose of the accounting asked.“It
has been fairly if not conclusively established by the evidence, that
the plaintiffs are husband and wife. Marta Querol, the wife, is the
alleged real owner of the property for the recovering of which this
action has been brought, the inclusion in the complaint of her husband
as plaintiff being formal.“The plaintiff Marta Querol is
an illegitimate daughter of the defendant Francisco Querol by a woman
named Agapita Rolda who was washerwoman for the defendant’s father and
who died before Marta Querol was baptized. Marta Querol was born in the
house of Seminiano Querol, father of the defendant, and in which the
said defendant was living at the time. She was born on the 23d of
February, 1870, and baptized on the 2d of the following month, having
been given the name of Marta Rolda. (See Exhibit 1.) Marta later bore the surname of her father and is now known as, and called even by her father, Marta Querol. (See
Exhibits E, F and G.) At the time Marta Querol was born, Francisco
Querol, the defendant, was married to Laurearia Sanchez Imperial.
Francisco Querol, the defendant, is and was the only child and heir of
Seminiano Querol.“Marta Querol was reared and taken care
of in the house of Seminiano Querol. She was put by Seminiano Querol in
a college in Naga, Camarines Sur, where she studied as boarder from
1880 until 1890. On June 26, 1892, the two plaintiffs were married, and
have had children who have been taken care of by the defendant. One of
them studied in Manila where he finished the first or the second year
course in law in 1917 at the expense of the defendant.“On
March 14, 1892, Marta Querol applied to the justice of the peace of
Ligao, Albay, for a possessory title to all the six parcels of land in
question. On March 24, 1892, the justice of the peace approved that
application and ordered the delivery of the original of the record to
the applicant in order that she might apply, as she in fact applied,
for its registration. However, because certain necessary information
had not been received from the Anotaduria de Manila definite inscription was not then made, but in lieu thereof the registrar made an anotacion preventiva which on March 29, 1895, was converted into a definite inscription.“All
the six parcels covered by the possessory information had been
purchased by Seminiano Querol, father of the defendant, some as early
as 1854; the deeds of sale by which Seminiano Querol acquired these
parcels were executed in his name, and at the dates of the trial were
in the possession of the defendant. The names of some of the persons
from whom Marta Querol alleged in her application for the registration
of her alleged possession, to have acquired these parcels, and the
descriptions of some of these parcels coincide with those on some of
the deeds drawn in favor of Seminiano Querol.“In the
possessory information proceedings Seminiano Querol was not cited and
does not appear to have had any knowledge of the filing of the
application by Marta Querol, much less consented to the inscription of
the possession in her name. At the time the petition was filed by Marta
Querol and the same was approved by the justice of the peace, Marta
Querol was living in the house of Seminiano Querol, she then being
still single and her wedding, which took place about two months later,
having been celebrated in that house.“In or about 1900, on
account of political disturbances in Albay, the plaintiffs went to
Sorsogon where they stayed until 1906, when they returned to Albay. The
plaintiffs have not been in possession of any of the lands in question
at least since they left for Sorsogon. The defendant has been in
possession of these lands since at least 1903, except the two parcels
having an. aggregate area of between two and three hectares, which, as
above stated, were sold to Ceferino Guanzon in 1915 or 1916 by the
plaintiffs and of which Ceferino Guanzon have taken possession.“That
the six parcels of land in question were the property of Seminiano
Querol is a fact not only established by the private documents
presented by the defendant but also admitted by the plaintiff Marta
Querol. Marta Querol insinuates however that these lands were donated
to her by Seminiano Querol. She testifies that while she was still in
college, Seminiano Querol told her that the lands (propiedades)
which he had bought for her were ready, and that when she left school
she made the application for a possessory information title. She admits
that the first time she saw these lands was in 1891, although in her
petition she stated she had acquired them long before, some as early as
1854, (she was born in 1870). She also testifies that from 1891 she was
in actual possession of these lands until the revolution broke out when
she and her husband, as already stated, moved to Sorsogon; that in 1903
the other plaintiff, Segundo Flores, came to Albay and asked the
defendant to take charge of the lands; that after she and her husband
returned to Albay in 1906, they repeatedly requested the defendant to
give them the said lands but that Francisco Querol refused to do so,
stating that Segundo Flores was a spendthrift, and that said properties
could be later given to plaintiffs’ children by the defendant.“But
Francisco Querol, the defendant, denies that Marta has ever been in
possession of any of the properties involved in this suit. He also
denies that the plaintiffs ever requested him to take care of any of
said properties while they were in Sorsogon, or that they, or any of
them, required him to give or return said properties to them. He
asserts that he had been in possession of the lands as owner since his
father died. He introduced in evidence as Exhibit 18d a title deed (composicion con el Estado)
covering twelve parcels; but this title does not seem to include any of
the lands herein involved; there is a great variance in the
descriptions.“The alleged possession of the parcels in
question by the plaintiffs at the time and after Marta Querol filed an
application for a possessory title has not been established. On the
contrary, the preponderance of the evidence negatives the presumption
of right raised by the possessory information. Marta Querol stopped
studying, according to her own testimony, in 1892, although she changed
that testimony, saying that she left school in 1890, instead of 1892.
If these lands had been donated to her, as she insinuates, by Seminiano
Querol, the most natural thing would have been for the donor to give
her all the papers pertaining thereto, if not also to execute a deed of
donation.“There are other circumstances which bear out the
testimony of the defendant, that he has been in possession of these
lands as owner. In the first place, in 1908 the defendant had his lands
surveyed (see Exhibit 19) and the survey, seems to have
included at least some of the parcels in controversy, judging from the
names of the places where the lands surveyed are located. In the second
place, all the six parcels have always been assessed for the purpose of
taxation, by and in the name of the defendant, and he has always paid
the taxes and appropriated the products to the exclusion of the
plaintiff for nearly twenty years, at least. The apparent indifference
shown by the defendant regarding the sale of two of the smallest
parcels by the plaintiff has been explained by him, stating that he had
put the matter in the hands of his attorney. This attitude of the
defendant, at all events, is not strange if the relationship between
him and the plaintiffs and the relatively small area of the parcels
sold are taken into consideration.“The alleged donation is
not evidenced by any written instrument. Indeed, mention or rather
intimation of the lands having been donated to Marta Querol was made by
her only m answer to interrogatories by the court. Evidently, the
plaintiffs did not rely upon any donation made by Seminiano Querol to
establish title to the properties, but only and exclusively on the
value of the possessory information. The question then is, under the
circumstances what was the effect of the inscription of the possessory
information upon the true owner of the lands. In Merchant vs.
Lafuente (5 Phil., 638), the Supreme Court in effect lays down the rule
that a person not the owner of the land who procures an inscription of
it in his name as owner under the provision of article 20 of the
Mortgage Law does not acquire title thereto, as against the true owner,
unless an innocent purchaser, relying upon such inscription, has
acquired it. The possessory information proceedings instituted by Marta
Querol were approved and inscribed with the proviso ‘without prejudice
to third persons with a better right.’ Title secured by possessory
information proceedings does not constitute an unquestionable title of
ownership or of possession. (Modesto vs. Leyva, 6 Phil., 186.)“This case is very similar to Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs.
Municipality of Bantay (28 Phil., 347), only the party having a
possessory information in the case cited, had a stronger case than the
plaintiffs herein, in that the former’s the Roman Catholic Church’s
title recites that the possessor had been in possession of the lands
for thirty years before the application was filed, whereas Marta
Querol, according to her own showing, saw the parcels she claims for
the first time, in 1891, one year before she instituted the possessory
proceedings. In the case cited the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice
Carson, says:” ‘It is manifest that
plaintiff’s allegations of title and of right to possession, as set
forth in the record in this case, must stand or fall in accordance with
the effect which should be given to the registered “informacion
posesoria” (possessory information) prepared in the month of March,
1895, and registered on the 18th of April of that year. Indeed, counsel
for plaintiff rest their contentions in this court wholly and
exclusively on the probative value which they insist should be accorded
that instrument.” ‘ “Possessory informations” of the nature of the one under consideration herein were ex parte
proceedings had before a judge of first instance or a justice of the
peace, wherein one in possession of real estate, claiming the right to
possession, was permitted after notice to the adjoining landowners to
set forth the fact that he was in actual possession of such real estate
and the nature of the title under which he claimed the right of
possession, and to call such witnesses and to produce such evidence in
support of his claim as he thought necessary and proper. If the
evidence thus submitted appeared to be satisfactory, and the applicants
claims were not successfully rebutted by some interested person the
proceedings were approved by the judge before whom they were had, who
at the same time ordered that they be registered “Without prejudice to
third persons having a better right in the premises.” From a
consideration of the very nature of such ex parte proceedings
it is clear that in themselves they could in no event have the effect
of prejudicing a third person who has a better right to the ownership
than the claimant in the possessory proceedings. When executed in due
form, they furnish, at most, prima facie evidence of the fact
that at the time of their execution, the claimant was in possession,
claiming the right to possession as set forth in his application.
Accordingly we find in article 394 of the Mortgage Law the following:”
‘ “The period of possession which appears to have elapsed at the time
said entries are made shall be computed for the prescription which does
not require a just title unless a person prejudiced thereby denies it,
in which case said period of possession must be proven in accordance
with the common law.” ‘ “Entries of possession shall
prejudice or favor third persons from the date of their record, but
only with regard to the effects which the laws attribute to mere
possession.” ‘ “The entry of possession shall not
prejudice the person who has a better right to the ownership of the
realty, although his title has not been recorded, unless the
prescription has confirmed and secured the claim recorded. Between the
parties the possession shall be effectual from the date prescribed by
the common law.”” ‘It is true that provision is made
whereby the possession evidenced by a registered possessory information
may ripen and be converted into a record of ownership after twenty
years of uninterrupted possession have elapsed from the date of entry
(art. 393, Mortgage Law), but the title thus secured is no more than a
statutory title by prescription, and, as we have seen, until the full
period of twenty years has elapsed, a registered possessory information
cannot prejudice a third person with a better right in the premises. It
is true also that under the provisions of the Maura Law, persons
holding under a registered possessory information secured during the
very short period during which it was in force, were given a title—as
against the Government—to public lands claimed by them; but the
provisions of this law in no wise affected the rights of claimants
other than the Government itself. It is very clear, therefore, that the
possessory information submitted by plaintiff in the case at bar cannot
prevail against the authentic and undisputed proof of title to the
lands in question in the defendant municipality.’“But have the plaintiffs acquired title to the parcels in question by prescription?
“Article 393 of the Mortgage Law referred to in the decision quoted contains the following provision:
” ‘Entries of possession shall be converted into records of ownership when they have the following requisites:
” ‘1. That twenty years have elapsed since the date of entry.
”
‘2. That the conversion of the entry of possession be announced by
means of a proclamation in the proper Official Bulletin, so that
persons interested, who consider themselves prejudiced thereby, may
object by bringing the proper action within the period of thirty days;
and” ‘3. That after the periods mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs having elapsed, no entry or note exists in the
registry indicating that the prescription has been interrupted.’“Twenty
years had elapsed from the date of the inscription to the date of the
commencement of this action, but the plaintiffs had not been in
possession of any of the lands, for twenty years. At most they were in
possession from 1892 till 1900, less than ten years, the period of
prescription necessary when the possessor had just title and possessed
the property in good faith. Nor has it been shown that conditions Nos.
2 and 3 have been fulfilled.“For the foregoing reasons, the defendant is absolved with the costs against the plaintiffs.
“It is so ordered.”
We have quoted verbatim the decision of the lower court, for, in our
opinion, it contains a correct statement of the facts, as well as a
logical discussion of the laws applicable to the case.
We
have studied the record before us in connection with the errors
assigned by the appellants, and are of the opinion, and so hold, that
the findings of fact and law made by the trial judge are in accordance
with the merits of the case. And there appearing from the record
nothing justifying the alteration or reversal of the judgment appealed
from, the same must be, as is hereby, affirmed, with cost, against the
appellants. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
[1] Original decision in English.