THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GABINO ABELLERA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This
appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the subprovince of Benguet, Mountain Province, finding the
appellant, Gabino Abellera, guilty of the offence of homicide, and
sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months
and one day, reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, one Day-ag, in the amount of P500, and to pay the costs.

Prior to the homicide which gave rise to this prosecution the
appellant, Gabino Abellera, was caretaker and foreman at the mansion
house in Baguio. Among the persons employed under his supervision were
two Igorot gardeners named Day-ag and Caoili. In the afternoon of
October 7, 1924, these two laborers had been working in the garden near
the house, but it rained and they took refuge in the part of the house
where Day-ag had quarters. When the shower had passed Caoili returned
at once to work, but Day-ag remained behind, saying that he wanted to
fix his calapiao, a covering of woven leaves for protection
from rain. Caoili worked for a few minutes and heard the 4.30 whistle.
At about this time he saw the appellant Abellera emerge from a room of
the mansion house and start in the direction where Caoili was working;
but upon seeing Caoili he turned back and went towards the stables
where the appellant had his own quarters.

Meantime Day-ag
had not come out, and at about 5 Caoili ceased work and took his tools
to leave them in the place where Day-ag slept. Upon coming to this
place Caoili noticed that Day-ag was not there and he passed on calling
aloud to him. Presently Caoili heard groans, and fearing that something
had gone wrong, he went out and called to Abellera to come, as Day-ag
was groaning. Abellera asked what was the matter, and upon being
informed, told Caoili to call two fellow-laborers Paoil and Martin and
go with them to Day-ag as he himself (Abellera) wished to finish
eating. Caoili went to find Paoil and Martin and as the three were
preparing to enter the appellant called to them to wait, saying that
all would go together. The three then waited for the appellant, and
when he came the four approached Day-ag’s room together, the appellant
being in front. The appellant pushed open the door and asked what was
the matter. But no answer was returned and Day-ag only groaned. The
appellant then went out, telling the other three to stay outside where
they then were until he (Abellera) could go into the house and
telephone for the police. While Abellera was absent upon this errand
Paoil, contrary to his instructions, entered the room and asked Day-ag
who stabbed him. Upon this Day-ag opened his eyes and said: “Gabino,”
referring to the appellant, Gabino Abellera. This was heard by the
other two companions standing at the door.

After telephoning
for the police the appellant was seen to be unsettled and uneasy,
running from place to place in the premises, as if in search of the
person who might have committed the deed.

The sergeant of
police, accompanied by two others, presently arrived, and they were
joined later by the chief of police. Upon examining the injured person
he was found to have a number of cuts in the abdomen and three in the
neck. His weakness was very marked, and owing to the fact that the
windpipe had been perforated it was almost impossible for him to talk.
Upon being again asked by the sergeant who stabbed him, he pointed to
Gabino Abellera who was then present as the guilty person.

The chief of police then caused the appellant to be sent out of the
room, and Caoili and Martin were brought in. These were presented in
turn to Day-ag and he was asked if either of them had stabbed him. He
moved his head negatively to these questions and the appellant was
again brought in. Meanwhile attention having been drawn to the
condition of Day-ag’s throat a cloth was tied around his neck to
prevent the escape of air, as he attempted to talk. With this
assistance he was enabled to articulate words, and in reply to further
questioning as to who had stabbed him he pointed to Gabino Abellera and
pronounced his name “Gabino.” The chief of police then ordered Abellera
to go up to Day-ag and ask him who stabbed him and upon this being done
Day-ag said: “You.” A bolo was then seen at Day-ag’s side. It was
picked up by one of the police officers and Day-ag was asked whose bolo
that was. Day-ag replied that it was the bolo with which the appellant
had stabbed him in the abdomen and throat, and he said that after
stabbing him the appellant had put the bolo at his side and run away.

Day-ag was then taken to the hospital where he was treated, but he died
in a day or two as a result of the wounds which had been inflicted upon
him. In the course of the first evening the justice of the peace of
Baguio visited Day-ag and told him that he might die and that it was
desirable to have the truth. In response to the questions then directed
to him Day-ag again said that the appellant, Gabino Abellera, was the
person who stabbed him and indicated that the cause of enmity was the
belief on the part of the appellant that Day-ag had informed the city
engineer that the appellant was improperly being visited by a woman at
the mansion house.

Again, in the operating room of the
hospital Day-ag repeatedly said in the presence of various persons,
including the provincial fiscal, that it was Gabino who had assaulted
him, and the motive was again asserted to be that the appellant blamed
Day-ag as the one who reported to the district engineer that a woman
had visited the appellant at the mansion house.

Caoili and
Paoil both testified that a few days before the crime was committed the
appellant came where the two were engaged and began to sharpen his
knife on a grindstone. At the same time he admonished them that if he
should find out which one of them it was who was giving information to
the district engineer he would kill him; and on the same occasion the
accused said that he had dismissed one Dimalig, who had been the
predecessor of Day-ag as gardener, because Dimalig had talked out.

The conviction of the appellant in the court below rests mainly upon
the weight attributed by the trial court to the repeated statements of
Day-ag that the appellant was the guilty person; and we may observe
that apart from those declarations the proof would be insufficient to
sustain the conviction.

Upon a careful review of the
evidence we are unable to entertain a doubt that Day-ag spoke
truthfully in denouncing this appellant as his slayer. The appellant
undoubtedly had an opportunity to commit the deed, and Day-ag pointed
him out as the slayer from the beginning. In this story he never
wavered. The district engineer testified that he had never obtained
information from Day-ag or any other person prior to the date of this
crime that the appellant had improperly received a woman at the mansion
house; and if the commission of the crime was due to malice engendered
by this belief, the appellant had probably been in error.

We
may observe that the testimony of the Igorot Caoili is in our opinion
entitled to weight. He says that he had no malice against the
appellant, and that in fact the appellant was married to a kinswoman of
Caoili. It is difficult to believe that either this witness or Paoil
has testified falsely, and it is still more difficult to believe that
Day-ag would have falsely imputed the crime to the appellant if the
latter were innocent.

An attempt was made on the part of the
appellant’s lawyer to destroy the weight of Day-ag’s declaration by
reason of the fact that Day-ag was an Igorot, and therefore a pagan. It
is generally accepted that Igorrotes have no belief in a
possible future life or in a doctrine of future rewards and punishment.
It is urged that this circumstance destroys the weight of Day-ag’s
statements. Admitting, however, that this circumstance may be entitled
to some weight as reflecting on the value of Day-ag’s statements, it
does not have the effect of rendering such statements inadmissible, and
his declarations were properly admitted in evidence as competent proof
against the accused. From the facts connected with Day-ag’s condition
at the time he made these repeated statements, we have no doubt that he
appreciated the fact that his death was near at hand and the statements
referred to are entitled to the weight usually attributed to dying
declarations.

Evidence of the good character of the
appellant was introduced in the lower court, and it appears that he was
esteemed by those who knew him as a competent and reliable man. This
consideration, however, is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
upon the point of the commission of the homicide, and no error was in
our opinion committed by the trial court. The penalty, we note, is in
accordance with law.

The judgment will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur.