G.R. No. 23514. November 12, 1925
ALEJANDRA DE LOS REYES, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. BRAULIO DE VILLA, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
OSTRAND, J.:
1923, Alexandra de los Reyes filed an application for the registration
of two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Sariaya,
Province of Tayabas. Under the date of March 31, 1928, the Court of
First Instance rendered a decision the final or disposing clause of
which reads as follows:
“Therefore, after general order of default, the inscription and registration
of the two parcels of land which are the subject of the petition as
well as the house of strong materials built on parcel No. 1 in the name
of Alejandra de los Reyes, a widow of 62 years of age, is ordered. As
soon as this decision becomes final, let the decrees and corresponding
certificates of title be issued.”
On June
5, 1923, the court issued the following order: “The decision rendered
by this court on March 31, 1923, having become final and
non-appealable, it is hereby ordered that the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office comply with section 21 of Act No. 2347.” The
section mentioned provides for the preparation of the final decree by
the1 Chief of the General Land Registration Office.
On November 22, 1923, the following final decree of registration was issued:
“DECREE NO. 145230
“UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
“PHILIPPINE ISLANDS“COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, PROVINCE OF TAYABAS
“Case No. 1232, G. L. R. O. Record No. 22862, having been duly and
regularly heard, in accordance with the provision of law, it is hereby
decreed that Alejandra de los Reyes, a widow, of Sariaya, Tayabas,
Province of Tayabas, P. I., is the owner in fee simple of certain land
situated in said Province of Tayabas more particularly bounded and
described as follows: (Here follows technical description of the land
by courses and distances.)“Therefore, it is ordered by the court that said land be registered in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name
of said Alejandra de los Reyes, subject, however, to such of the
incumbrances mentioned in article 39 of said law as may be subsisting,
and to:“Witness: the Honorable Servillano Platon,
Auxiliary Judge of said Court, the 31st day of March, A. D. nineteen
hundred and twenty-three;“Issued at Manila, P. I., the 22d day of November, A. D. 1923, at 9 a. m.
“Attest:
“ENRIQUE ALTAVAS “Chief of the General Land “[SEAL OF THE COURT]”
On July 25, 1924, the appellant herein, Braulio de Villa, presented a
petition for the review of the decree under section 38 of the Land
Registration Act, the petitioner alleging that the registration of the
land in question had been obtained by fraud. This petition was opposed
by Alexandra de los Reyes on the ground that it had been presented
after the expiration of the time allowed by said section 38 for the
presentation of such petitions, and in an order dated October 22, 1924,
the court below sustained this contention and dismissed the petition.
From this order the petitioner for review appeals.
The only
question presented for our consideration is as to the date from which
the year within which a petition for review under said section 38 may
be presented, should be computed. The appellant contends that in the
present case the year began on November 22, 1923, when the final decree
was issued, and that therefore the petition for review filed July 25.
1924, was presented well within the one year period provided for in
section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The appellee, on the other
hand, maintains that the decision of March 31, 1923, in which the
registration was ordered was a decree within the meaning of section 38
and that the one year period began to run as soon as that decision was
rendered and that consequently the petition was presented out of time.
In our opinion section 38 itself when read together with section 40 of
the same Act furnishes a complete answer to the question. The two
sections read as follows:
“Sec. 38. If the
court after hearing finds that the applicant has title as stated in his
application, and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and
registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration
shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the
exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice,
or citation, or included in the general description ‘To all whom it may
concern.’ Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry
of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration
shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever,
subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided. But any
person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud
in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase ‘innocent purchaser for
value’ or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed
to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.”“Sec. 40. Every decree of registration
shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and
shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the owner is
married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife.
If the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of the
disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a
description of the land as finally determined by the court, and shall
set forth the estate of the owner, and also, in such manner as to show
their relative priority, all particular estates, mortgages, easements,
liens, attachments, and other incumbrances, including rights of husband
or wife, if any, to which the land or owner’s estate is subject, and
may contain any other matter properly to be determined in pursuance of
this Act. The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for
transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.”
(Italics are ours.)
The Land Registration
Act expressly recognizes two classes of decrees in land registration
proceedings, namely, decrees dismissing the application and referred to
in section 37, and decrees of confirmation and registration dealt with
in the next succeeding four sections of the Act. It will be noted that
section 38 speaks of the latter class, the decrees of registration.
It says: ” * * * Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and
quiet title thereto * * *. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud
to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within
one year after entry of the decree * * *.”
Section 40 defines or describes the decree of registration,
prescribes the form and contents of every such decree, and provides for
its entry. As no one will deny that the legislative power may define
any particular decree and prescribe its form and as both of the
sections quoted expressly refer to the same kind of decree, i. e., the
decree of registration, there would seem to be little or no room for
doubt that the appellant’s contention is correct and that the time for
presenting his petition for review began to run from the date of the
entry of the final decree of November 22, 1923. We might therefore let
the matter rest here without further discussion, but the somewhat loose
use of the word “decree” in various sections of the original Land
Registration Act and the failure to give due consideration to
subsequent legislation, has led to considerable confusion and our
reports contain conflicting expressions by way of obiter dicta
on the subject. We shall therefore briefly discuss the arguments
against our views, especially so since the point in question is now for
the first time squarely before the court.
Counsel for the
appellee contends (1) that inasmuch as section 38 speaks of a decree
subject to appeal it must refer to the decision of the court and not to
the decree described in section 40, which is non-appealable and (2)
that since the enactment of Act No. 2347, which transferred the duty of
preparing and entering the latter decree to the Land Registration
Office, such decree has become a mere administrative decree inferior to
the decision of the court and is not entered as a judicial decree.
I
The appellee’s first contention falls to the ground when it is
considered that the original Land Registration Act did not provide that
the decision of the court should become final and non-appealable before
the entry of the decree of registration; that provision was the result
of subsequent legislation. In passing the original Act the legislator
no doubt had in mind a situation where the clerk would be able to enter
the decree immediately upon the filing of the decision of the court;
the provision in section 38 that the indefeasibility of the decree
shall be subject to “the right of appeal hereinbefore provided” so
indicates. At that time the impression prevailed that in this country
an ordinary non-technical description by metes and bounds of the land
to be registered would be sufficient for the purposes of the decree and
of the certificate of title and that it therefore was practicable for
the clerk, without technical assistance, to enter the decree
immediately after the rendition of the decision and before the
expiration of the time for appeal. When the change in procedure was
made, the legislator very properly did not disturb the reference to the
right of appeal in section 38; there may still be eases where a final
decree of registration is inadvertently entered before the time for
appeal has expired. This will rarely occur, but the possibility exists
and it would be unjust to cause a party to lose his right of appeal
without any fault on his part, through a mistake of the clerk.
In the earlier cases brought before the now defunct Court of Land
Registration, the original idea prevailed and decrees of registration
were sometimes entered immediately after the rendition of the decisions
and with land descriptions based on mere non-technical sketches instead
of on accurate surveys. This soon led to hopeless confusion. Provisions
were therefore made for land descriptions prepared by technical men
upon careful surveys and in section 4 of Act No. 1108, it was further
provided that no certificates of title should be issued until after the
period for taking an appeal had expired. This, in practice, was
regarded as equivalent to requiring the postponement of the entry of
the decree until the decision had become final and non-appealable, so
that after the passage of that Act no final decree of registration was
supposed to be prepared and entered until the decision upon which it
was based had become final.
This procedure was adhered to
after the abolition of the Court of Land Registration and is still
followed. Section 21 of the Act of reorganization of February 28, 1914
(Act No. 2347) reads as follows:
“Sec. 21. Of the decree.—Immediately
after final decision by the court directing the registration of any
property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of such decision to the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the
decree in accordance with section forty of Act Numbered Four hundred
and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree to
the register of deeds of the province or city in which the property is
situate. The register shall then comply with the duties assigned to him
in section forty-one of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six.”
The term “final decision” in this section has always been construed to
mean a decision which has become final and non-appealable.
The reasons for the change to the present system of procedure in
preparing and entering the decrees of registration are very obvious.
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be
stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of
title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land.
This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs
that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are
ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases
amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become
necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be
done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief
surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such duties
(Administrative Code, section 177). When in addition to this it is
considered that in practice the decree of registration is not entered
until after the expiration of the period of thirty days from the time
of the notification of the decision ordering the registration (Act No.
1108, section 4, in relation with Act No. 1484), it can hardly be
seriously contended that the decree of registration must be presumed to
be entered at the time of the filing of the decision of the court.
The decision upon which the decree of registration is based is, under
the present practice, nothing but a statement of the facts of the case
and the law applicable thereto, together with an order for the eventual
preparation, issuance and entry of the decree. In other words, in
relation to the land registration cases in which the registration is
granted, our trial courts now follow the old equity practice in England
and the United States, with the exception that the decree is prepared
by the chief clerk of land registration instead of by counsel, and that
it is signed by said chief clerk in the name of the judge instead of by
the judge himself. After its preparation and signing, the decree is
immediately entered by copy in volumes eventually bound and kept in the
General Land Registration Office. Then, and not until then, does the
final and complete decree of registration becomes a matter of record.
The present case well exemplifies the procedure above outlined. The
decision is dated March 31, 1923, but bears no note of its filing with
the clerk. It states the facts of the case and contains a final or
“dispositive clause” which declares a “general default,” orders the
registration of the two parcels of land which formed the subject of the
application, and provides that decrees and certificates of title shall
be issued when “this decision becomes final.” In a certain sense and in
the wider signification of the term, the decision may be regarded as a
decree, and is sometimes referred to as such, but that it is not the
decree of registration described in section 40 of the Land Registration
Act is very obvious: It does not bear the date and the year, hour and
minute of its entry and is not signed by the clerk. It is not stated in
a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of title and
does not describe the land; the land description must be gathered from
other parts of the record. A person having before him only the decision
itself would be unable to determine the area and location of the land.
Over two months after the rendition of the decision, the court issued
an order declaring it final and non-appealable and directing the Chief
of the General Land Registration Office to prepare the decree of
registration, but such decree was not issued and entered until November
22, 1923. The decree thus entered is hereinbefore quoted and is in the
form prescribed by section 40 of the Land Registration Act; it is
signed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in the name
of the judge who rendered the decision, and bears the seal of the
court; and it states the date and hour of its issuance which may be
presumed to be simultaneous with its entry. It is both in form and in
substance the decree of registration described in section 40 and
referred to in sections 38, 39 and 41 of the Land Registration Act and
it is the decree in this case.
The decree of
registration has its origin in the decision ordering its issuance and
entry, and inasmuch as it relates back to the rendition of that
decision, it may readily be conceded that had section 38 provided that
the petition for review might be presented within a year from the rendition of the decree, the situation would perhaps have been different. But here we are only concerned with the date of the entry
and under the old equity practice, which is followed in land
registration cases, there is a wide difference between the rendition of
a decision or order directing the issuance of a decree and the entry of
such decree. The fact that most of the Courts of First Instance have
deviated from the old practice in ordinary civil cases, and that in
such cases the filing of the decision of the court is generally
considered equivalent to the entry of the judgment, has nothing to do
with cases such as the present; here both practical considerations and
the law compel a different procedure.
II
The appellee’s second contention is that while previously to the
enactment of Act No. 2347, the decree of registration provided for in
section 40, supra, was a judicial decree, that Act by
transferring the duty of issuing the decree to an administrative
officer, i. e., the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, made
it an administrative decree of inferior rank.
This
contention can certainly not be sustained. The decree is issued in the
name of the court, and under its seal, by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office in his capacity as chief clerk of the Court of
First Instance in land registration matters, and not as an
administrative official merely. His duty is ministerial and he is
acting under the orders of the court. The decree must be in conformity
with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record,
and he has no discretion in the matter. He cannot exercise independent
judicial functions and if he is in doubt upon any point in relation to
the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is his duty to refer the
matter to the court. He acts as an official of the court and not as an
administrative official, and his act is the act of the court. The
decree is therefore a judicial decree and so far from being inferior to
any other judicial order, it is the last word of the court in regard to
the registration and is the basis for the issuance of the certificate
of title; if we were to hold otherwise, our Land Registration Act would
be unconstitutional. The determination of private land titles is a
judicial matter and cannot be effected by administrative orders or
decrees; under our constitutional limitations it must be a judicial
process throughout (People ex rel. Kern vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575).
Summarizing our conclusions hereinbefore stated, we hold that in a land
registration case where the application for registration is granted,
there can be only one decree of registration; that the petition for a
review of such decree must be presented within one year from its entry;
that the final form and contents of the decree of registration is
prescribed by section 40 of the Land Registration Act and that it
cannot be formally entered until it has been prepared as therein
provided; that such a decree has its inception in the decision of the
court ordering its issuance and entry and is a judicial and not an
administrative decree; that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the date noted on such decree as the date of its issuance and entry
must be taken to be the true date of such entry; and that the time for
presenting a petition of review begins to run from that date.
Some of the members of the court are not in complete accord with all of
the conclusions herein set forth, but recognizing the importance of
definitely settling the principal question, will sign our decision
without dissent.
For the reasons stated, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the case be
remanded to the court below for trial upon the merits. No costs will be
allowed in this instance. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.