ROBERTO R. MONROY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FELIPE DEL ROSARIO, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the
incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal,
when on September 15, 1961,
his certifi­cate of candidacy as representative
of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming
elections was filed with the
Commission on Elections.  Three days
later, or on Septem­ber 18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter
withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. 
The Commission on Elections, per resolution,^[1]
approved the withdrawal.  But on Septem­ber
21, 1961, respondent Felipe del
Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his
oath of office as munici­pal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited
the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candi­dacy in question.

Upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting in Pasig, held in
the suit for injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents that (a)
the former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of
candidacy was filed on September 15, 1961; (b) respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his
having assumed office as such on September 21, 1961; (c) petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the
salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up
to the time he can reassume said office; and (d) petitioner must pay respondent
P1,000.00 as moral damages.

This judgment was, on appeal by petitioner to the Court of
Appeals, affirmed in toto except for
the award of moral damages which was eliminated.  The same Court
reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner’s filing a motion to reconsider.  Hence, this petition for certiorari to review
the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner first argues that both the lower court and the Court
of Appeals had done what they had no juris­diction to do – review a resolution
of the Commission on Elections.  The
submission is without merit.

The Constitution empowers the Commission on Elec­tions to

“x x x decide, save those involving
the right to vote, all administrative
questions affect­ing
elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling
places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officials, x x x“^[2]
(Emphasis supplied)

And the decisions, orders and rulings of
the Commission on these administrative questions are reviewable
only by the Supreme Court.^[3]
Since the powers of the Commission are limited to matters connected with the
“conduct of elections”, necessarily its adjudicatory or quasi-judi­cial
powers are likewise limited to controversies connec­ted with the “conduct
of elections.”  This phrase covers
all the administrative process of preparing and operat­ing the election
machinery so that the people could exer­cise their right to vote at the given
time.^[4]
All ques­tions and controversies that may arise therefrom
are to be resolved exclusively
by the Commission, subject to re­view only by the Supreme Court.

However, in this case there appears to be no deci­sion, order or
ruling of the Commission on any adminis­trative
question or controversy.  There was no dispute before the
Commission.  Respondent never contested
the filing of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.  Neither has he disputed before that body the
withdrawal thereof.  And even if there
was a controversy before the Commission, the same did not and could not
possibly have anything to do with the conduct of elections.  What the parties are actually controverting is whether or not petitioner was still the
municipal mayor after September 15, 1961.  This
purely legal dispute has absolutely no bearing or effect on the conduct of the
elections for the seat of congress­man for the first district of Rizal.  The election
can go on irrespective of whether petitioner is considered re­signed from his
position of municipal mayor or not.  The
only interest and, for that matter, jurisdiction, of the Commission on
Elections in this regard is to know who are the running candidates for the
forthcoming elections, for that affects the conduct of election.  So when petitioner withdrew the certificate
announcing his candidacy for Congressman, as far as the Commission could be
concerned, petitioner was no longer interested in running for that seat.  The matter of his having forfeited his
present po­sition and the possible legal effect thereon by the withdrawal of
his certificate was completely out of the pic­ture.  Hence, that purely legal question properly fell
within the cognizance of the courts.

Now the withdrawal of his
certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former
position.  Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that ?

“Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running
for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certi­ficate
of candidacy,”

makes the forfeiture automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for ano­ther
office.  Only the moment and act
of filing are con­sidered.  Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is for­feited forever and nothing save a new
election or appointment can restore the ousted official.  Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Cas­tro v. Gatuslao,
98 Phil. 194, 196:

 “x x x The wording of the law plainly indi­cates that only the date of filing
of the cer­tificate of candidacy should be taken into ac­count.  The law does not make the
forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable,
since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.  x x x” (Em­phasis
supplied)

Petitioner’s contention
that the certificate of can­didacy was filed without his knowledge and consent
and, hence, the Commission’s approval of its withdrawal inva­lidated such
certificate for all legal
purposes, is un­tenable.  It nowhere
appears that the Commission’s reso­lution expressly invalidated the
certificate.  The with­drawal of a
certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate
void ab initio.  Once filed, the permanent legal effects
produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn.  Moreover, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals ex­pressly found as a fact that the
certificate in question was filed with petitioner’s knowledge and
consent.  And since the nature of the
remedy taken by petitioner before Us would allow a discussion of purely legal
questions on­ly, such fact is deemed conceded.^[5]

Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals
likewise erred in affirming a lower court judg­ment requiring petitioner to pay
respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the salaries he was allegedly
entitled to receive from September 21,
1961, to the date of petitioner’s vacation of his office as
mayor.  In support of this he relies
solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, holding that a senator who
had been proclaimed and had assumed office but was later on ousted in an
election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held
the office of senator, and can retain the emoluments received even as against
the successful protestant.  Petitioner’s
factual premise is the appellate court’s finding that he was a de facto
officer when he continued occupying the of­fice of mayor after September
15, 1961.

However, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Rodriguez case
is not applicable here for absence of fac­tual and legal similarities. 
The Rodriguez case involved a senator who had been proclaimed as
duly elected, assumed the office and was subsequently ousted as a result of an
election contest.  These peculiar facts
called for the ap­plication of an established precedent in this jurisdiction
that the candidate duly proclaimed must assume office not­withstanding a
protest filed against him and can retain the compensation paid during his
incumbency.  But the case at bar does not
involve a proclaimed elective official who will be ousted because
of an election contest.  The pre­sent case for injunction and quo
warranto involves the for­feiture of the
office of municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to
that office by the vice mayor because of the operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev.
Elec­tion Code.  The established
precedent invoked in the Rod­riguez case cannot therefore be applied in this
case.

It is the general rule then, i.e., “that the right­ful
incumbent of a public office may recover from an of­ficer de facto
the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even
though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title”^[6]
that applies in the present case.  The
resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto
officer who did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledge that the de facto
doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto
officer principally, but rather for the protection
of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of
persons discharging the duties of an office with­out being lawful officers.^[7]
The question of compensation involves different principles and concepts
however.  Here, it is possession of
title, not of the office, that is decisive. 
A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the
salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful
retention of the public office.^[8]

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from,
the same is, as it is hereby,
affirmed in toto.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., on official leave.

Sanchez, Castro, and
Fernando, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
The records of this case do not include a copy of this resolution.  Hence, it nowhere appears when this re­solution
was issued.

^[2]
Philippine Constitution, Art. X, sec. 2.

^[3] Ibid;
see also:  Sec. 5, Rev. Election Code.

^[4]
See:  Guevara vs. Commission on
Elections, L-12596, July 31, 1958.

^[5]
See:  Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola,
L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967.

^[6] Walker
v. Hughes, 36 A 2d 47, 151 ALR 946, 949-950.

^[7]
See:  2 Tañada
& Carreon, Political Law of the Phils., 1962, pp. 544-545.

^[8] Walker
vs. Hughes, supra.