DANIEL A. VILLAREAL, JR. (ON BEHALF OF ORLANDO A. VILLAREAL), PETITIONER, VS. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, RESPONDENT.

Villareal versus Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Daniel Villareal, Junior, on behalf of his father Orlando Villareal, against the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to reverse the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, which had dismissed his special civil action and affirmed a writ of execution and a sheriff's notice to vacate issued against his father. The case matters because it fixes a hard rule on the enforcement of final judgments: the five-year period for execution by motion binds not only the winning party who files the motion but also the court that must issue the writ, and a writ issued after that period is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Procedural History

The case began as an action for unlawful detainer filed by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System against Orlando Villareal and others before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 39. That court dismissed the complaint for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, reversed the dismissal and ordered Orlando and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation. That decision became final and executory, as shown by an entry of judgment issued in December 2002.

Within two years, the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the Metropolitan Trial Court. Orlando filed a comment and opposition, asking that the motion be held in abeyance pending compliance with the Urban Development and Housing Act. More than ten years after the motion was filed, the Metropolitan Trial Court granted it, then issued the writ of execution, and later a sheriff's notice to vacate and pay followed.

Daniel Villareal, Junior, on behalf of Orlando, then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, challenging the writ and the notice. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition and affirmed both issuances, and it denied his motion for reconsideration. He then went to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Facts

In a decision dated October 30, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 39, dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System against Orlando Villareal and other persons claiming rights under him, for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, reversed the dismissal in a decision dated September 27, 2002, ordering Orlando and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the premises at V. Heizer Street, Balara Filters, Quezon City, to surrender possession to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, and to pay 2,500 pesos as reasonable compensation from November 1997 until possession is restored.

On December 15, 2002, the clerk of court issued an entry of judgment stating that the decision had become final and executory. Within two years, on May 17, 2004, the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the Metropolitan Trial Court. Orlando filed a comment and opposition, praying that the motion be held in abeyance pending compliance with Section 23 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.

More than ten years after the motion was filed, on July 28, 2014, the Metropolitan Trial Court granted the motion, holding that the Urban Development and Housing Act did not apply because Orlando failed to prove that he belonged to the class of underprivileged and homeless citizens. The writ of execution itself was issued only on October 26, 2015, and in April 2016 the sheriff served a notice to vacate and pay. The petitioner then challenged these issuances before the Regional Trial Court, which dismissed his petition and affirmed them, prompting this appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition based on an erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and in disregarding applicable jurisprudence.
• Whether or not a writ of execution issued by the court after the lapse of five years from the entry of judgment, although the motion for execution was filed within that period, is valid.
• Whether or not the judgment debtor's filing of a comment and opposition to the motion for execution may be counted as delay that extends the five-year period.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

This provision supplies the two modes of execution and the five-year period that the Court applies to both the filing of the motion and the issuance of the writ.

Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

This provision justifies the petitioner's direct resort to the Supreme Court, because he raises only a question of law.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner correctly filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 rather than a special civil action under Rule 65. He did not question the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court; he assailed the wisdom of its judgment and its application of Section 6 of Rule 39. That is a question of law, so direct resort to the Supreme Court was proper and the principle of hierarchy of courts did not apply.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the writ of execution issued in October 2015 was null and void. The decision became final and executory, and was entered, on December 15, 2002, so the five-year period ran from that date. The motion for execution was filed in May 2004, which was within the period, but the writ itself was issued only in October 2015, more than twelve years after entry. The Court held that the five-year period must be observed both by the winning party who files the motion and by the court that issues the writ, and that after the lapse of the period the court is stripped of jurisdiction, so any writ it issues is void. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

In Arambulo v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, we explained the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of execution by motion is only effective within the five-year period from the entry of judgment. Outside this five-year period, any writ of execution issued pursuant to a motion filed by the judgment creditor, is null and void.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that Orlando's comment caused the delay. The exceptions allowing execution by motion after five years share one common denominator: the delay is caused by the judgment debtor or is incurred for his benefit. Here, Orlando merely filed a comment, which no law or rule forbids, and the delay came from the time the court took to act on the motion. The Court closed with a reminder that the prescriptive period exists precisely to prevent the winning party from sleeping on his rights.

Doctrine

For execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor must accomplish two acts within the five-year period from the entry of judgment: the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution, and the court's actual issuance of the writ. The period binds both the winning party and the court. A writ issued after the lapse of the five-year period is null and void, because the court has lost jurisdiction over its issuance, and the judgment creditor's only recourse is an independent action to revive the judgment within the period set by law. The exceptions permitting execution by motion beyond five years require that the delay be caused by the judgment debtor or incurred for his benefit; the mere filing of a comment or opposition by the debtor does not extend the period.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the decision and order of the Regional Trial Court, thereby invalidating the writ of execution and the sheriff's notice to vacate and pay issued against Orlando Villareal.

Remember This

Memorize the twin requirement: the motion must be filed and the writ must be issued within five years from entry of judgment, or the writ is void. Examiners use this case to test the modes of execution under Section 6 of Rule 39 and the rule that the five-year period cannot be extended by the debtor's mere filing of a comment.