CIRIACO INGCO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. BENEDICTO M. SANCHEZ, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BATANGAS, AND CESAR MAÑEBO, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Ingco versus Sanchez

The Case

This is the case of Ingco versus Sanchez, decided by the Supreme Court in December 1967. Ciriaco Ingco, the reelected mayor of Bauan, Batangas, sought a writ of prohibition to stop the Provincial Fiscal of Batangas from conducting a preliminary investigation into a criminal charge of estafa through falsification of public documents against him. His defense was that his reelection had condoned the alleged wrongdoing of his previous term. The case matters because it draws the line between administrative liability, which reelection may wipe out, and criminal liability, which it does not.

Procedural History

Cesar Mañebo accused Mayor Ingco of estafa through falsification of public documents before the Acting Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, and the charge was endorsed to the Provincial Fiscal of Batangas for preliminary investigation. When the fiscal began the investigation after the November 1963 elections, Mayor Ingco moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that his reelection had condoned the alleged malfeasance. The investigating fiscal denied the motion, and denied reconsideration as well. Mayor Ingco then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Batangas to restrain the fiscal. After hearing, that court denied the petition, holding that reelection does not wash away or condone an elective official's liability for an act violative of the penal laws committed during a past term. Mayor Ingco elevated the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.

Facts

Ciriaco Ingco was elected mayor of Bauan, Batangas, in November 1955. He was reelected in November 1959, and again reelected in November 1963.

In September 1963, Cesar Mañebo accused the mayor of estafa through falsification of public documents, committed in the discharge of his official functions during the period from February through August 1963. The charge was filed with the Acting Prosecutor of the Department of Justice and endorsed to the Provincial Fiscal of Batangas for preliminary investigation. The fiscal, however, commenced the preliminary investigation only after the November 1963 elections.

On January 8, 1964, Mayor Ingco moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the fiscal had neither jurisdiction nor authority to proceed, because his reelection had operated to condone the alleged malfeasance of his previous term. When the fiscal denied the motion and the reconsideration, the mayor went to court to stop the investigation.

Issues

• Whether or not a criminal charge against an elective municipal official for acts done in the discharge of his official functions during a previous term may still be prosecuted after he has been reelected and while he is serving a subsequent term.
• Whether or not the ruling in the Pascual case, that a public officer should never be removed for acts done prior to his present term, extends to a criminal prosecution so as to bar the preliminary investigation.

Applicable Provisions

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which the Court invokes to show that reelection is not a ground for extinguishing criminal liability, provides in part:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. 2. By service of the sentence. 3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. 4. By absolute pardon. 5. By prescription of the crime. 6. By prescription of the penalty. 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

The Court notes that this enumeration of grounds for the extinction of criminal liability does not include reelection to office, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned.

The Constitution, which the Court cites to show that only the President may pardon a criminal offense, provides:

Section 10. The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction for all offenses except impeachment.

This bears on the case because the mayor's claim of condonation amounts to a pardon, a power the electorate does not possess.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the criminal charge may still be prosecuted. The appeal is devoid of merit. The mayor's fallacy lay in treating his situation as parallel to the Pascual case, where it was pronounced that a public officer should never be removed for acts done prior to his present term. There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The investigation sought to be restrained rests on a criminal accusation, the object of which is to cause the indictment and punishment of the mayor as a private citizen. In the Pascual case, the subject was an administrative charge, and its object was merely to cause suspension or removal from public office. A criminal case involves the character of the mayor as a private citizen, with the People of the Philippines as a party, while an administrative case involves only his actuations as a public officer. The ruling that when the people elect a man to office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case. A crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code does not include reelection among the grounds for extinction of criminal liability. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.

On the second issue, the Court held that the circumstance that the offense was perpetrated in connection with the mayor's discharge of his official duties is no reason to stop the prosecution, for the alleged acts constitute a crime distinct in itself and detachable from its character as an administrative offense committed by a public officer. If his wrongful acts may properly be a cause for removal, he might invoke his reelection as a defense in an administrative proceeding to remove him, but certainly not in the criminal charge against him. The Court quotes with approval the authority that where certain conduct of a public officer subjects him to a criminal prosecution under the common law, the fact that a statute makes such conduct a ground for his removal from office does not relieve him of his criminal liability.

Doctrine

Reelection to public office does not extinguish criminal liability for acts committed during a previous term. The condonation doctrine, under which the electorate is deemed to have forgiven an official's faults, applies only to administrative liability, meaning removal or suspension from office, and never to a criminal prosecution. A crime is a public wrong against the State as a whole, distinct in itself and detachable from its character as an administrative offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code lists the grounds for the total extinction of criminal liability, and reelection is not among them. Only the President may grant pardon of a criminal offense.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, denying the writ of prohibition and allowing the fiscal to proceed with the preliminary investigation, with no costs on equitable grounds.

Remember This

Reelection condones the administrative offense but never the crime, because Article 89 does not list reelection among the grounds that extinguish criminal liability. Examiners use this case to test the boundary between the condonation doctrine and criminal prosecution, and to distinguish it from the Pascual ruling on removal from office.