IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR MICHAEL LABRADOR ABELLANA (PETITIONER, DETAINED AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA CITY), VS. HON. MEINRADO P. PAREDES, IN HIS CAPACITY …

Abellana versus Paredes

The Case

This is a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus filed by Michael Labrador Abellana against the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City that convicted him of drug offenses. Abellana does not deny that a court of competent jurisdiction rendered judgment against him. He instead invokes the writ as a post-conviction remedy, claiming that he was deprived of his constitutional rights to due process and to competent counsel during the proceedings below. The case matters because it draws the precise boundary of the high prerogative writ: habeas corpus lies to relieve a person from unlawful restraint, but it cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or to reopen a final judgment on a mere allegation that a constitutional right was violated.

Procedural History

Abellana was charged before Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City with violation of Sections 11 and 12 of Article II of Republic Act Number 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. He pleaded not guilty to both charges. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment of conviction. Abellana then filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration, which the trial court denied. He next filed a petition for relief from judgment, which the trial court likewise denied for lack of factual and legal basis and because it was filed out of time. Aggrieved, he went up to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, agreeing with the trial court that he had due notice of the hearings and that the proper remedy was an appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial. That dismissal became final and executory, and an entry of judgment was made. Abellana then filed with the Supreme Court this original petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Facts

Acting on a search warrant for violation of Section 11 of Article II of Republic Act Number 9165, a police team searched Abellana's house in Barangay Suba, Cebu City, in the presence of the accused and barangay tanods. The search yielded a large transparent plastic pack of white crystalline substance believed to be shabu, together with drug paraphernalia consisting of a scissor, two disposable lighters, an improvised clip, a rolled aluminum tinfoil, an improvised burner, six assorted sizes of empty plastic packs, and an improvised funnel. Two Informations were filed against him, one for possession of dangerous drugs and one for possession of equipment fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.

Abellana was represented at trial by his first counsel, who filed a motion for re-examination and re-weighing of the seized drugs and a petition for bail, both of which were granted. The re-weighing showed the drugs weighed 4.4562 grams rather than 6.89 grams, and Abellana was released on bail. After the prosecution rested, his demurrer to evidence was denied. A second counsel then entered his appearance. When the case was called for the initial presentation of the defense evidence, neither Abellana nor his counsel appeared, and the trial court submitted the case for decision. The trial court later set the promulgation of judgment. The second counsel received the notice and filed an urgent motion to defer the promulgation, but he deliberately did not appear at the promulgation as a sign of protest, and Abellana himself failed to appear despite notice through his bonding company.

The trial court convicted Abellana and sentenced him to imprisonment and fines for both charges. His motion for new trial or reconsideration was denied on the ground that, having failed to appear at promulgation without justifiable cause, he had lost the remedies available against the judgment. He was arrested months later, and his subsequent petition for relief from judgment was likewise denied. It was only after the Court of Appeals dismissal had become final that he came to the Supreme Court seeking the writ of habeas corpus.

Issues

• Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus may be granted as a post-conviction remedy on the ground that the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.
• Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to competent counsel by the negligence of his second counsel.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, on the promulgation of judgment, provides:

SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

This provision bears directly on the case because the trial court held, and the Supreme Court agreed, that Abellana's unjustified absence at promulgation caused him to lose the remedies against the judgment, including a motion for new trial or reconsideration.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the petition. It began with the nature of the writ: the high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and the most basic criterion for its issuance is that the individual be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement. If a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ is unavailing, and it cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court that duly acquired jurisdiction. The Court acknowledged that jurisprudence allows the writ as a post-conviction remedy in exceptional circumstances, including a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person. But it stressed that the threshold remains high: a mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not enough, and the violation must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.

On due process, the Court held that what is safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. Abellana had several opportunities to be heard and squandered them by his own fault or choice. The hearing at which the case was submitted for decision was not the first setting for the defense evidence, since the trial court had earlier ordered him to present his witnesses and he failed to do so. As for the promulgation, his counsel had received the notice and had even filed an urgent motion to defer the promulgation, and the trial court had also notified Abellana through his bonding company. Applying Section 6 of Rule 120, the Court held that he lost the remedies available to him when he failed to appear despite notice, and that he could not shift the blame to his counsel. While the second counsel was out of line in deliberately absenting himself as a sign of protest, it was still incumbent on Abellana to attend the promulgation.

On the second issue, the Court likewise found no deprivation of the right to competent counsel. Abellana was represented when the prosecution witnesses testified and he had the opportunity to cross-examine them, and his first counsel was not remiss, having obtained for him the re-weighing of the drugs and the grant of bail. Any negligence of his second counsel did not suffice to void the proceedings, and the judgment against him stood.

Doctrine

The writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, but it is unavailing when the restraint is by legal process, and it cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court that duly acquired jurisdiction. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy only in exceptional circumstances, one of which is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, and even then the threshold is high: a mere allegation of a constitutional violation is not enough, for the violation must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings. Procedural due process means a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and what is prohibited is the absolute absence of that opportunity; a party who was given several opportunities but squandered them by his own fault or choice cannot claim a denial of due process. Finally, under Section 6 of Rule 120, an accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction without justifiable cause loses the remedies available against the judgment, and he cannot shift the blame to his counsel for his own failure to attend.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the writ of habeas corpus was not issued; Abellana remained subject to the judgment of conviction.

Remember This

Memorize this line: habeas corpus is unavailing when the restraint is by legal process, and a mere allegation of a constitutional violation will not void a final judgment. Examiners use this case to test the narrow post-conviction scope of the writ and the rule that an accused who absents himself from promulgation without justifiable cause loses his remedies under Section 6 of Rule 120.