MUNICIPALITY OF TUPI, REPRESENTED BY ITS MUNICIPAL MAYOR REYNALDO S. TAMAYO, JR., PETITIONER, V. HERMINIO B. FAUSTINO, RESPONDENT.

Municipality of Tupi versus Faustino

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Municipality of Tupi, through its Municipal Mayor, against Herminio B. Faustino. The Municipality asks the Supreme Court to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's declaration that Municipal Ordinance Number 688, Series of 2014, the so-called Speed Limit Ordinance, is void. The case matters because it is the Court's clean statement of two rules every local legislator and every bar candidate must know: an ordinance with penal sanctions does not become effective without the publication the Local Government Code demands, and a local speed limit that departs from the classifications and procedures of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code is invalid, however worthy its purpose. The Court itself frames the tension in its opening lines: does the end justify the means?

Procedural History

Faustino filed a petition for declaratory relief, annulment of the ordinance, and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Polomolok, South Cotabato. The trial court, by decision dated January 20, 2016, declared the ordinance invalid and void from the beginning, permanently enjoined its enforcement, and directed the Municipality to immediately refund all fines collected under it. The trial court held that the ordinance contravened the Land Transportation and Traffic Code because there was no prior classification of, and no markings or signages on, the public highway, and no certificate submitted to the Land Transportation Office, and because the ordinance imposed uniform speed limits for all vehicle types although the national law prescribes different limits for passenger cars and motorcycles on the one hand and motor trucks and buses on the other. The trial court declined, however, to declare the ordinance unconstitutional for lack of supporting evidence or argument. Both parties moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied both motions in an omnibus order dated May 15, 2017, and granted Faustino's motion for execution. The Municipality then went up to the Supreme Court, urging the exercise of judicial review on a pure question of law.

Facts

The Municipality of Tupi in South Cotabato observed a high rate of accidents along the national highway from Crossing Barangay Polonuling to Crossing Barangay Cebuano. To address this, its Sangguniang Bayan enacted Ordinance Number 688 on March 3, 2014, prescribing a maximum speed of eighty kilometers per hour from Crossing Polonuling to Crossing Acmonan and forty kilometers per hour from Crossing Acmonan to Crossing Cebuano, with fines of one thousand pesos for the first offense, one thousand five hundred pesos for the second, and a fine of two thousand pesos or thirty days imprisonment or both for the third.

On October 6, 2014, Faustino was flagged down for running at seventy kilometers per hour along the stretch limited to forty. He paid the one thousand peso fine under protest. Two days later, he filed his petition in court, alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was never published in a newspaper of general circulation, and praying for a refund of the fines and for moral damages.

The Municipality defended the ordinance as consistent with the national speed limits and as a successful measure of general welfare, noting that accidents in the covered areas were drastically reduced during its implementation. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, observed that the ordinance imposed stiffer penalties than the national law and authorized confiscation of driver's licenses and issuance of temporary operator's permits, acts only deputized Land Transportation Office personnel may lawfully perform.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy at the first instance to assail the validity of Municipal Ordinance Number 688.
• Whether or not Municipal Ordinance Number 688 complied with the publication requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991.
• Whether or not Municipal Ordinance Number 688 violates the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
• Whether or not the trial court's directive to refund all fines collected under the ordinance is proper.

Applicable Provisions

Section 59 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. - (a) x x x x (b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof. The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting. (c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.

This is the provision the ordinance failed to satisfy, and its breach is the first ground for nullity.

Section 511 of the same Code provides:

Section 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. (a) Ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.

This fixes the effectivity rule the ordinance ignored by providing for posting alone.

Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides:

Section 35. Restriction as to Speed. - (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. (b) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the rate of speed of any motor vehicle shall not exceed the following: MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SPEEDS Passengers Cars and Motorcycle Motor trucks and buses 1. On open country roads, with no "blinds corners" not closely bordered by habitations. 80 km. per hour 50 km. per hour 2. On "through streets" or boulevards, clear of traffic, with no "blind corners," when so designated. 40 km. per hour 30 km. per hour 3. On city and municipal streets, with light traffic, when not designated "through streets." 30 km. per hour 30 km. per hour 4. Through crowded streets, approaching intersections at "blind corners," passing school zones, passing other vehicles which are stationery, or for similar dangerous circumstances. 20 km. per hour 20 km. per hour

This is the classification scheme the ordinance had to follow, including its distinction between vehicle types.

Section 36 of the same Code provides:

Section 36. Speed Limits Uniform Throughout the Philippines. - No provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act.

This is the uniformity rule that limits local speed legislation.

Section 38 of the same Code provides:

Section 38. Classification of Highways. - Public highways shall be properly classified for traffic purposes by the provincial board, municipal board or city council having jurisdiction over them, and said provincial board, municipal board or city council shall provide appropriate signs therefor, subject to the approval of the Commissioner. It shall be the duty of every provincial, city and municipal secretary to certify to the Commissioner the names, locations, and limits of all "through streets" designated as such by the provincial board, municipal board or council.

This supplies the four prerequisites the Court distilled and found unfulfilled.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that declaratory relief was not the proper remedy, because the ordinance had already been enforced and its penalty imposed on Faustino. An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instrument involved. The proper remedy was certiorari and prohibition, which lie even against the legislative acts of a local government unit when grave abuse of discretion is alleged. Nevertheless, since all the essential allegations had been pleaded, the Court treated the petition below as one for certiorari and prohibition rather than dismiss it on a rigid application of the rules.

On the second issue, the Court held that the ordinance did not comply with the publication requirement. The ordinance itself provided only for posting in three conspicuous places, and there was no evidence that a newspaper of general circulation was unavailable in the entire province. The Court stressed that the essence of publication is to inform the people affected of the measure and enable them to voice their views or objections. Since the ordinance was never published, it did not become effective, much less enforceable.

On the third issue, the Court held that the ordinance contravened Sections 35, 36, and 38 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. It laid down four prerequisites: the local government unit must first classify its public highways according to the categories in Section 35; the highways must then be marked with signs visible to the public; the local secretary must certify to the Land Transportation Office the names, locations, and limits of all through streets; and both the classification and the posting of signs must be approved by the Land Transportation Office. None of these was complied with. The Court found the case strikingly similar to Primicias versus the Municipality of Urdaneta, where a similar ordinance was struck down for failure to comply with the same prerequisites, and it quoted with approval the rule that these provisions are mandatory.

On the fourth issue, the consequence followed: because the ordinance never took effect and is invalid, the fines collected under it must be refunded.

Doctrine

First, an ordinance with penal sanctions must be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province, and in the absence of such a newspaper, posted in all municipalities and cities of the province. Without publication, it does not become effective and cannot be enforced. Second, a local government unit may not prescribe speed limits other than those in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and any ordinance doing so must first comply with the four prerequisites of classification, marking, certification to the Land Transportation Office, and approval by that Office. Third, declaratory relief is available only before breach; once the ordinance has been enforced against a party, the remedy is certiorari and prohibition. Fourth, good intentions and even proven success in reducing accidents cannot cure legal infirmities in a local enactment.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals, sustaining the nullity of Ordinance Number 688 and the order to refund the fines collected under it.

Remember This

Memorize the line: no publication, no effectivity, and no compliance with the four prerequisites of Section 38, no valid local speed ordinance. Examiners use this case to test the publication requirement for ordinances with penal sanctions and the limits of local legislative power over traffic under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.