THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CORNELIO TISBE AND FRANCISCO PANDIÑO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

The
defendants in this case were tried jointly with Julio Montecer, Esteban
Austria and Victoria Perez for the crime of abduction, committed,
according to the information, as follows:

“That
on or about the night of November 19, 1923, in the barrio of Bana,
municipality of Tiaong, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, the
above named accused, conspiring together and assisting one another and
with lewd designs, did willfully, unlawfully and criminally and without
justifiable motive, ascend and enter the dwelling of one Rafael
Alcazar, and through force, violence or intimidation upon persons,
robbed his daughter named Alberta Alcazar, a girl 17 years old, taking
her from her home and carrying her to a forest, with grave alarm of her
parents and other relatives, and once in the said forest, the herein
accused, conspiring together and helping one another and with abuse of
superior strength and through force, violence and intimidation,
compelled the said Alberta Alcazar to have carnal knowledge with one of
the defendants, Cornelio Tisbe, as said Cornelio Tisbe did in fact and
with the help of his four accused willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
throw to the ground and succeed to lie several times with the said
youth Alberta Alcazar against her will and without her consent.

“Contrary to law.”

After proper trial, the lower court rendered a separate judgment,
acquitting the defendants Julio Montecer, Esteban Austria and Victoria
Perez on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution did not show
beyond doubt the guilt of the defendants Julio Montecer and Victoria
Perez, and as to Esteban Austria there was no proof that the latter has
taken part in the crime.

Subsequently, to wit, on August 25,
1924, the same court rendered another judgment against the appellants,
finding them guilty of the crime of abduction and sentencing them to
fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal
and to the accessories prescribed by the law, and further sentencing
Cornelio Tisbe to acknowledge the offspring, should there be any, and
to endow the offended party in the sum of P500, and each to pay
one-fifth of the costs.

His Honor, the trial judge who tried this case, says in the judgment appealed from the following:

“After
a careful analysis of all the evidence introduced by both parties, the
court finds that Alberta Alcazar was abducted against her will by the
defendant Cornelio Tisbe, the latter being accompanied by Francisco
Pandiño. It cannot be explained if Alberta Alcazar had voluntarily
escaped with the defendant in order to get married before the justice
of the peace of the municipality of Rizal, Laguna, why she should have
denied before said officer that she knew how to sign.

“It
may be argued, however, that the testimony of the mother is not
entitled to any credit, as the court in the former decision said that
the latter’s testimony must be taken with much caution. It is true that
in its judgment of acquittal regarding the other defendants, the court,
in discussing the testimony given by the mother of the offended party
in that judgment, said that the latter’s testimony must be taken with
caution, because it had noted that said testimony was quite exaggerated.

“Even
eliminating the testimony of the mother, the prosecution has other
evidence, namely, the testimony of the offended party, which shows that
she was abducted against her will; it is not usual that a woman, who
has voluntarily eloped with her abductor and married afterwards, should
deny the fact and complain that she was abducted against her will.”

We have read the evidence introduced in this case, and agree with the
finding of the lower court that the testimony of the mother of the
offended party must be taken with caution because there is much
exaggeration in it. But if the testimony of the mother is stricken out,
we doubt very much that the sole testimony of the offended party in the
instant case is sufficient to justify the judgment against the
appellants. The testimony of the defendant Tisbe that he and the
supposed offended girl had decided to elope on the night in question in
view of the objection of the mother to his proposal of marriage was not
contradicted by the offended party, notwithstanding that she was
presented as witness in rebuttal. It is an admitted fact that she was
living then in the house of Don Luis Umali in the populated center of
Tiaong, and yet on the night in question she went to the house of her
mother in the barrio of Bana of said municipality. And what a
coincidence! It was on that night when she was abducted against her
will, according to the prosecution. The testimony of the defendant
Tisbe as to how they took a carromata to go to the municipality of
Rizal, Province of Laguna, was not contradicted either by the offended
party.

Tisbe has testified having had carnal relations with
the offended party before the night in question, as a result of his
amorous relations with her, but the offended party did not contradict
this testimony in the rebuttal.

The appellant Tisbe
testified having taken the offended girl to the presence of the justice
of the peace of Rizal to marry her; and the offended girl limits
herself to saying that she did’ not know that marriage, that she was
not aware being before a justice of the peace, and that she impressed
her finger mark on the blank certificate of marriage, because she was
compelled to do so by that old man (referring to the justice of the
peace); but the justice of the peace testified that he asked the
contracting parties if they voluntarily wanted to get married, and the
offended girl gave her consent voluntarily. If the offended party had
not previously agreed with the defendant Tisbe to celebrate that
marriage; or if it were true that she was taken against her will, why
did she not present a complaint against that act to the justice of the
peace? For aught that appears in the record, we see no reason for
rejecting the testimony of the justice of the peace of Rizal. It is
said that under the threats of her abductor, the offended girl was not
free to give her consent to the celebration of the marriage; but the
fact that she did not make any protest whatever when she had every
opportunity to do so before the justice of the peace of Rizal, supports
the contention of the appellant Tisbe.

The defense set up by
the defendant Tisbe consists chiefly in that the celebration of the
marriage between the offended party and the defendant Tisbe having been
proven after the commission of the abduction in question, all criminal
responsibility must be held extinguished in accordance with Act No.
1773. In our opinion if there was any abduction in the instant case the
appellant Tisbe must be given the benefit of the provision of section 2
of Act No. 1773.

As to the appellant Francisco Pandiño, suffice it to cite the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of United States vs.
Poquis (14 Phil., 261). In that case the defendants were prosecuted for
the crime of abduction for having seized and taken away by force a
young girl by the name of E against her will and with unchaste designs.
All were found guilty with the exception of R who was acquitted for
having subsequently contracted marriage with the victim of the
abduction, that is, E. It was held that said marriage, according to
section 2 of Act No. 1773, was a bar to the prosecution of the other
defendants for the crime charged in the information.

The
marriage shown by Exhibit 1 of the defense not having been declared
void and illegal by the trial court, application must be made here of
section 2 of Act No. 1773, and for that reason the appellants Cornelio
Tisbe and Francisco Pandiño must be, as are hereby, acquitted with the
costs de officio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur